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Abstract 
 
This volume brings together research aimed at shedding light on a 
general problem, by focusing specifically on the services sector.  In the 
WTO system, the services sector is regulated by the General Agreement on 
Trade in Services (GATS); in the European system, it is regulated by a 
broad and complex body of rules, combining judge-made principles with 
those embodied in the secondary legislation, which codifies and applies 
these principles to different regulated sectors. 
The general problem at the core of this study stems from the difficulty in 
striking a balance between two important needs. One the one hand, there is 
the need to recognise national authorities’ right to autonomously regulate 
and govern in their own territory. On the other hand, there is the need to 
limit this power of autonomous regulation, mainly to protect the right of 
foreign economic operators to access the national market and function in 
conditions of equality with respect to all other operators. 
This problem is addressed from the particular perspective of 
administrative law. The premise underlying the various contributions is that 
supranational (global and European) law constrains domestic regulation 
(and domestic administrations) largely through techniques and procedures 
drawn from administrative law.  Sovereignty-limiting procedures developed 
by national legal systems in order to protect citizens have been readapted 
by supranational public powers to protect the rights of foreign economic 
operators and to realise the goal of market integration. 
This administrative law perspective also gives shape to the structure of 
this volume, which is divided into three thematic areas. Each area 
corresponds to a category of constraints imposed by supranational 
administrative law upon States’ right to regulate. 
The first area is the law of administrative procedure: here, the 
supranational law regulates the national decision-making process, often 
through techniques and procedures that are inspired by, and then 
superimposed upon, national administrative procedure. 
The second area is substantive administrative law, specifically the limits 
imposed by supranational administrative law upon the content of member 
States’ regulatory decisions. 
The third area regards the rules governing national public powers’ 
transfer of their right to regulate, rather than the supranational check upon 
the exercise of this right. To further economic integration, supranational 
public powers may pressure States to transfer their power to regulate in 
their own territory in both a vertical and horizontal direction: vertically, to 
supranational institutions, through techniques of harmonisation; 
horizontally, to other States, through techniques of mutual recognition. 
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SUMMARY: 1. Supranational limitations upon States’ right to regulate: is there an administrative 
law of economic integration? - 2. Supranational procedural limitations: the principle of transparency - 
3. Supranational substantive limitations: necessity, reasonableness and proportionality - 4. The 
transfer of the right to regulate: equivalence and harmonisation. 
 
 
1. Supranational limitations upon States’ right to regulate: is there an 
administrative law of economic integration?  
 
The WTO and the European Union are public authorities empowered to 
integrate the national markets of their member States. Such integration 
inevitably creates a need to regulate the relationships between the different 
legal and administrative systems framing these national markets. The 
differences between national legal and administrative systems, and the 
protectionist behaviours that these differences sometimes conceal, can 
hinder integration. This motivates the search for international and 
supranational constraints upon national administrations and regulations.  
This volume brings together research aimed at shedding light on a 
general problem, by focusing specifically on the services sector.  In the 
WTO system, the services sector is regulated by the General Agreement on 
Trade in Services (GATS); in the European system, it is regulated by a 
broad and complex body of rules, combining judge-made principles with 
those embodied in the secondary legislation, which codifies and applies 
these principles to different regulated sectors. 
The general problem at the core of this study stems from the difficulty in 
striking a balance between two important needs. One the one hand, there is 
the need to recognise national authorities’ right to autonomously regulate 
and govern in their own territory. On the other hand, there is the need to 
limit this power of autonomous regulation, mainly to protect the right of 
foreign economic operators to access the national market and function in 
conditions of equality with respect to all other operators. 
This problem is addressed from the particular perspective of 
administrative law. The premise underlying the various contributions is that 
supranational (global and European) law constrains domestic regulation 
(and domestic administrations) largely through techniques and procedures 
drawn from administrative law.  Sovereignty-limiting procedures developed 
by national legal systems in order to protect citizens have been readapted by 
supranational public powers to protect the rights of foreign economic 
operators and to realise the goal of market integration. 
This administrative law perspective also gives shape to the structure of 
this volume, which is divided into three thematic areas. Each area 
corresponds to a category of constraints imposed by supranational 
administrative law upon States’ right to regulate. 
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 The first area is the law of administrative procedure: here, the 
supranational law regulates the national decision-making process, often 
through techniques and procedures that are inspired by, and then 
superimposed upon, national administrative procedure. 
The second area is substantive administrative law, specifically the limits 
imposed by supranational administrative law upon the content of member 
States’ regulatory decisions. 
The third area regards the rules governing national public powers’ 
transfer of their right to regulate, rather than the supranational check upon 
the exercise of this right. To further economic integration, supranational 
public powers may pressure States to transfer their power to regulate in their 
own territory in both a vertical and horizontal direction: vertically, to 
supranational institutions, through techniques of harmonisation; 
horizontally, to other States, through techniques of mutual recognition. 
Two contributions are dedicated to each of these three areas, which focus 
on the global and the European dimensions respectively. This study is 
structured to encourage a comparison between EU and WTO law, and to 
address the many interesting questions that this comparison raises. Most 
importantly, are there common principles and procedures?  If so, might they 
be further extended and generalised to anchor a body of supranational law 
which constrains States in order to protect foreign economic operators and 
further the larger goal of market integration: in other words, is there an 
administrative law of economic integration?  How does the supranational 
application of administrative law to States interact with and transform the 
more traditional national approach, whereby administrative law exclusively 
seeks to protect citizens? And more generally, how is the public, 
administrative law approach to the governing of international relations an 
important complement to traditional international law, insofar as it is based 
on private law concepts? 
 
2. Supranational procedural limitations: the principle of transparency 
 
A basic category of limitations upon States’ right to regulate gravitates 
around the principle of transparency. This principle ought to be understood 
in its broadest sense, as ultimately coinciding with administrative procedural 
law taken as a whole. It includes, for example, due process principles of 
participation, duties to state reasons, and requirements of administrative 
simplification.  
The principle of transparency was introduced into international trade law 
by Article X of the GATT, which strongly reflects the influence of 
American administrative law.  Picking up on the American Administrative 
Procedure Act’s distinction between rule-making and adjudication, Article 
X requires member States to publicise the measures of general application 
that affect international trade and administer them in a uniform, impartial 
and reasonable manner.  These principles have been further extended by 
later agreements, like the GATS, as Benedetto Cimino explains in his 
contribution.  With regard to rule-making, the duty to publicise measures of 
general application is extended in two ways. First, it comes to include duties 
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 to notify the other member States, as well as duties to establish specific 
offices for providing information on the national law in force, both to other 
member States (enquiry points) as well as to private actors (contact points). 
Secondly, the duties of publication and communication come to overlap 
with participation, according to the logic of notice and comment, which is 
also drawn from American administrative law and recommended to the 
States, albeit with norms that do not have a fully binding character.  
Moreover, at the level of adjudication, the national administration is 
subjected not only to principles of reasonableness, objectivity and 
impartiality, but also to numerous, highly detailed rules, predominantly 
aimed at simplifying the authorisation procedures that condition the exercise 
of the free provision of services: these include a reduction in unnecessary 
administrative burdens and the certainty and the reasonableness of the time-
limits for concluding the procedures. 
To sum up, in addition to being subject to national procedural rules, 
national decisions affecting the free provision of services must also fulfil the 
requirements of a global law of administrative procedure. It is not easy to 
specify all of the implications of this phenomenon. Benedetto Cimino 
focuses on two in particular. The first is the virtuous cycle created by the 
interaction between national and global administrative law. The global law 
establishes a lowest common denominator of administrative protection to 
which national administrative laws must adapt; the internalisation of the 
global norms established to protect foreign operators incidentally benefits 
national operators as well. Thus, global administrative law can have the 
effect of raising the level of administrative protections recognised by States 
in relation to their own citizens. The second implication points in an 
opposite direction. By recognising foreign operators’ (or the States that 
represent them) right to participate in national decision-making processes, 
national authorities (especially in less developed countries), expose 
themselves to the well-known risks of regulatory capture by foreign firms. 
This, argues Cimino, explains States’ particular concern to avoid binding 
global norms requiring participation in rule-making procedures, as global 
administrative law could then pre-empt, or at least reduce, citizens’ control 
over national institutions.  
The body of Community principles addressed to national administrative 
proceedings in the area of services is very rich and articulated. Giuliano 
Fonderico argues that this can be roughly broken down into two structurally 
and functionally distinct bodies of law. The first one embodies the 
principles of “good administration” (such as transparency, the duty to state 
reasons, the right of defence and the predetermination of decision-making 
criteria), valid for all national proceedings for the regulation of services that 
may have prejudicial effects upon the full and effective enjoyment of 
Community freedoms, and especially upon the implementation of the 
principle of non-discrimination. These principles originate in the 
jurisprudence of the Court of Justice (which derives them from such basic 
Treaty principles as proportionality and non-discrimination), and are then 
further elaborated in the secondary legislation. In this way, Community law 
complements national administrative law in the area of services, but without 
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 setting up a general model of administrative procedure to substitute the 
individual national systems. Rather, it is a body of procedural protections 
applied in the measure strictly necessary for the protection of the free 
movement of Community enterprises and citizens. 
Fonderico then analyses a second series of cases, in which the national 
proceedings for the regulation of services do conform to Community norms.  
These are cases in which the Community law is more penetrating because it 
addresses the national rules that “can create undesirable effects upon the 
markets of other Community Member States”; the Community law targets 
highly integrated sectors (like communications, energy or technical rules), 
and its application is entrusted to common systems of sectoral 
administration. In these areas, Community law contributes an increased 
protection of the participatory rights of citizens and enterprises, as well as 
organisational and procedural circuits between national administrations and 
the Commission, and between the national administrations themselves. The 
regulation of national proceedings thus serves not only to protect the access 
of individual enterprises or individual Community citizens to the markets of 
other member States, but also to balance the different national interests, with 
each other and with the interests of the Community. And the procedural 
openings thus achieved “provide a space for sharing knowledge, preventing 
and addressing controversies in the exercise of national powers, and for the 
direct involvement of interested private actors.” 
 
3. Supranational substantive limitations: necessity, reasonableness and 
proportionality 
 
Other kinds of constraints upon States’ right to regulate have a 
substantive rather than procedural nature. These include the review of the 
correspondence of the national rules with the public end they ostensibly 
pursue, and which ought to justify any limitations upon operators’ freedom 
to provide services. 
In the WTO system, this review takes the form of the “necessity test”: a 
national measure having a trade-restrictive effect is permitted only insofar 
as it is necessary to realise a legitimate objective. The GATS agreement, as 
illuminated by Mariangela Benedetti and Sabrina Quintili, provides for a 
two-part necessity test. First, there is a “more aggressive” necessity test, 
which addresses national measures that are discriminatory. Discriminatory 
measures are presumptively illegitimate, but this presumption may be 
overcome where the State can demonstrate that they are indispensable to 
realising a narrow array of public purposes specifically indicated in the 
agreement, such as public morals, public order, the protection of public 
health and the environment and privacy (Art. XIV, General Exceptions). 
There is also a second, more deferential test, which applies to measures that 
are not discriminatory, but still hinder or limit the free provision of services. 
These measures are presumptively legitimate, but other member States may 
challenge them for not being necessary to pursue a legitimate objective. 
Examples of such objectives can been seen in the non-exhaustive list 
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 contained in the disciplines adopted by the Working party on domestic 
regulation in implementation of GATS Article VI. 
Benedetti and Quintili examine these two versions of the necessity test, 
highlighting their structural differences through an analysis of their 
application by the WTO Dispute Settlement Bodies. The authors also 
highlight some features that are common to both necessity tests: not only do 
they both derive from a common origin, but their interaction also creates a 
tendency towards convergence. 
It is from this perspective that Benedetti and Quintili consider the 
following, very interesting possibility. The subject-matter of WTO judicial 
review is progressively expanding to include even non-discriminatory 
national measures. Inevitably, it has become more deferential and respectful 
of national authorities’ regulatory discretion. But this more deferential 
review is also being applied to discriminatory measures, which were 
previously subjected to a stricter scrutiny. The overall consequence is that 
national measures are now subject to a more uniform and more complex 
necessity test, independently of their discriminatory character. To evaluate 
the legitimacy of the measure, the judicial body is not limited to considering 
whether it is absolutely indispensable for the achievement of the public 
goal, but weighs and balances a broader range of factors: how important is 
the public interest to be pursued by the contested measure? How does the 
measure contribute to the realisation of the public goal? To what extent is 
the interest in the free provision of services compromised? Is there a 
reasonably available alternative measure capable of realising the same 
public goal in the same way? As we can see, the evolution of the WTO 
necessity test seems to signal a progressive approach towards the principle 
of proportionality, which is applied in Community law, thus supporting the 
argument that a common administrative law of economic integration is 
being formed.  
Mariangela Benedetti and Sabrina Quintili’s contribution gives us 
another interesting starting point for further reflection. The WTO judicial 
body assesses the importance of the public end pursued by the national 
regulator. It thus evaluates not only the congruence of the measure with 
respect to the purpose, but also the “worthiness” of the purpose itself. From 
this perspective, judicial review risks becoming more invasive, rather than 
more deferential, specifically with regard to non-discriminatory measures. If 
it is true that such measures can be justified by the pursuit of a legitimate 
objective (the list set forth in implementing the agreement is just 
illustrative), it is also true that the judicial body could develop a review of 
the legitimacy of the objectives themselves. On this point, however, we will 
have to await further jurisprudential developments.  
The European law governing services also limits the discretion of 
national public authorities. The limitations regard both the administrative 
law and the administrative function of the member States; their sources are 
the jurisprudence and legislation (primary and secondary) of the European 
Union; they consist of general precepts whose application is subject to both 
the specification of ex ante standards and the ex post review of the action of 
public authorities and a case-by-case judgement on the worthiness (from the 
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 Community perspective) of the balance between the various interests 
affected by the individual measure.  
There are many ways in which the different components of this system 
hold together in a consistent way. 
First of all, as Simona Morettini points out, since the 1990’s, “in many 
sectors, directives have given normative form to principles articulated by the 
Court of Justice in relation to non-harmonised services”. 
Second and most importantly (because regarding both laws and the 
administrative power), the European law on the discretion of national public 
administrations presents some common characteristics: it targets national 
measures restricting the free circulation of services; national measures may 
derogate from European norms only if they respond to imperative needs of a 
general interest (specified in part by the Treaty, in part by the European 
courts) and respect the principle of proportionality; it is the courts’ 
responsibility to check the observance of these conditions. 
Thirdly, the European rules are addressed not only to member States’ 
regulatory and administrative authorities, but also to their national courts. 
This is especially true when the exercise of an administrative power is under 
scrutiny. In accordance with the rules on preliminary reference, the Court of 
Justice tells national courts which principles to apply in resolving the cases 
before it and the criteria to follow in determining the proportionality of a 
legally-contested administrative measure. 
Finally, Morettini analyses the interesting example of the Court of 
Justice’s review of national authorisation regimes to illustrate its impact on 
the extension of national administrative discretion.  In some cases, the Court 
sets forth the interests that, from the Community point of view, may 
legitimise a preventive authorisation regime. In these cases, the 
administration must give a primary importance to these interests in applying 
the legislation. In other cases, the Court provides an interpretation of the 
requirements to which authorisation is subject; to the explicit end of 
preventing the arbitrary exercise of administrative powers, the Court 
establishes the duty to set forth criteria which are objective, non-
discriminatory, known in advance and the duty to conclude the proceeding 
within a reasonable time-limit; it requires the non-discriminatory application 
of the norms. 
 
4. The transfer of the right to regulate: equivalence and harmonisation. 
 
A third line of inquiry focuses on a different kind of limit, though it 
constrains domestic regulation for the same reasons as the others. It emerges 
out of cases in which national authorities are required to cede their right to 
regulate, letting in substantive rules created from the outside. This cessation 
may take place in a horizontal sense, in favour of other States, or in a 
vertical sense, in favour of supranational public powers. 
The principle of harmonisation has a vertical character, in so far as it 
requires domestic regulation to converge towards the common standards set 
forth by international or supranational organisations. In the global arena, the 
WTO does not have regulatory powers. Thus it does not produce standards 
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 directly. However, harmonisation is achieved through the technique of 
borrowing regimes: WTO rules refer to the standards set forth by other 
global standards setters and require the member States to respect them. But 
which global bodies may be subject to such reference? And what techniques 
does the WTO use to encourage States to comply with these global 
standards? These central questions in the area of harmonisation are the focus 
of the careful analysis of Maurizia De Bellis and Elisabetta Morlino, who 
examine not only the GATS discipline in force, but also the state of current 
negotiations. The authors shed special light on how member States tend to 
protect their right to regulate much more jealously in the service sector than 
in the goods sector. The principle of harmonisation thus appears to be weak 
in the services sector. In particular, while domestic measures consistent with 
international standards are presumptively legitimate for products (see the 
TBT and SPS agreements), the WTO does not accord the same presumption 
in the area of services.  Here the discipline currently in force just says that 
the correspondence of national measures with international standards ought 
to be taken into account when applying the necessity test. De Bellis and 
Morlino explain the reasons behind this increased caution. In the services 
sector, global standards setters are numerous and diverse. They often have a 
limited membership, like the Basel Committee. They often do not provide 
for the effective participation of all the WTO members, especially the 
developing countries. This produces a resistance on the part of many States, 
which seem to be little inclined to shed their right to regulate and entrust it 
to bodies whose decision-making process they can barely affect. This also 
influences the content of some of the current proposals, which seem to 
associate more inclusive global standards setters (only those which formally 
and substantively guarantee an effective participation of all the members of 
the WTO) with more efficient harmonisation mechanisms (the presumption 
of the legitimacy of measures conforming to the standards). 
The principle of equivalence, by contrast, functions in a horizontal 
direction, in requiring member States to transfer their right to regulate to 
other States, recognising that their rules are different from, but equivalent 
to, their own.  Here too, De Bellis and Morlino’s analysis reveals that the 
member States, while accepting WTO judicial review of the exercise of 
their right to regulate, are much less disposed to give up this right to foreign 
regulators. The weakness of the WTO equivalency principle is clear in 
comparison with the European one. There are three reasons for this. First, 
the recognition of foreign rules is optional, and States may basically take it 
or leave it. The States have in fact exercised this option with moderation, as 
illustrated by the authors’ data on the mutual recognition agreements 
notified to the WTO. Secondly, recognition functions most of the time on a 
bilateral basis, rather than a multilateral one, even in departure from the 
most favored nation principle. Finally, most agreements do not provide for 
automatic and comprehensive recognition, but rather a blander kind of 
equivalence, which grants a “right to scrutinise” to the State called upon to 
introduce foreign rules into its own system. 
The authors observe, however, the emergence of a new generation of 
mutual recognition agreements, which do reinforce the principle of 
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 equivalence. These agreements introduce forms of automatic recognition, 
which exclude the States’ right to scrutinise (thus reducing the 
administrative costs of this scrutiny): The authors argue that the 
presumption of non-conformity is no longer “implied by equivalence 
checks, but rather a presumption of equivalence with a possible check of 
non-conformity, which can be invoked only on the basis of evidence of 
substantial differences”. These new kinds of mutual recognition agreements 
signal two further innovative tendencies. First, there is the tendency towards 
the privatisation of equivalence: States are increasingly entering into 
agreements with foreign professional organisations, recognising the validity 
of their norms. Second, there is a more cautious tendency towards the 
connection of harmonisation and equivalence: the presence of common 
standards becomes the premise and the basis for the mutual recognition of 
the norms that conform to them. 
Something similar can also be seen in the European system. But here the 
conformation of the two principles of harmonisation and equivalence has 
different characteristics from those observed in the WTO.  
Alessandro Tonetti examines two important and recent directives in the 
area of services, n. 2005/36 in the area of professional services and n. 
2006/123 on services in the internal market. 
The picture that emerges is the following. The harmonisation of the 
substantive disciplines covers a very limited area: only ten of the nearly 
eight hundred professions governed by the member States are subjected to 
this type of harmonisation norm, but even here the European law leaves 
significant margins of discretion to the States. Even less extensive is the 
area of substantive harmonisation in the rules governing services, being 
essentially limited to a series of consumer protection measures. 
Instead, we see a peculiar relationship between harmonisation and 
equivalence. Tonetti’s essay clearly illustrates the three constitutive 
elements. First of all, the harmonisation norms function as an accessory to 
the equivalence norms, to guarantee their correct operation. 
Equivalence norms, in turn, essentially regulate the relationships between 
national administrations and the citizens (or enterprises) of other member 
States operating in their jurisdiction.  In both of the directives taken into 
consideration, the administration, in the course of a special proceeding, must 
certify the equivalence between the norms of the origin and the host States 
and, in case of substantive discrepancies, can adopt compensatory measures, 
in respect of the principle of proportionality. 
It is this specific characteristic of the principle of equivalence, finally, 
that explains the main characteristic of the harmonisation measures: they 
target national administrative proceedings and organisations. The procedural 
measures require States to introduce protections for the benefit of the 
interested party and to simplify administrative proceedings; the 
organisational measures require the States to identify the competent 
authorities and to institute contact points to provide information to 
interested actors; they also establish the forms of cooperation between the 
administrations of the different member States. 
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 This has varied consequences, some common to those observed in the 
WTO discipline, others peculiar to European law. Above all, both the 
European and WTO systems manifest a limitation of States’ right to 
regulate, effected by the “vertical” (in the case of equivalence) or the 
“horizontal” (in the case of harmonisation) substitution of national rules. 
Secondly, the limitations upon the national discretion regard not only 
legislation, but also administration, as demonstrated by the prohibition upon 
national administrations in the host State from imposing the same 
administrative burdens already required by the origin State. 
Finally, limitations on member States’ right to regulate, which follow 
from both harmonisation and equivalence measures, make use of typically 
administrative law techniques and procedures: for example, they require the 
law-makers and administrators of member States to give reasons for their 
actions and to subject their decisions to the judgement of a foreign body, the 
Commission. 
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 REASONABLENESS, IMPARTIALITY, OBJECTIVENESS AND 
PARTICIPATION: THE GATS STANDARDS 
 
 
BENEDETTO CIMINO 
 
 
SUMMARY: 1. Introduction - 2. Substantive and procedural protections- 2.1. Reasonableness - 2.2. 
Objectivity - 2.3. Impartiality - 3. Procedural protections: participation - 3.1. Participation in 
individual proceedings - 3.2. Participation in rule-making proceedings - 3.3. Reasons for the current 
lack of global norms for rule-making proceedings - 4. Conclusion 
 
 
1. Introduction 
 
Until the 1970’s, the main barriers to global trade were national 
protective measures, such as tariffs, import quotas, export subsidies and 
State enterprises with a monopoly on transboundary trade. To overcome 
these restrictions, international trade law employed the classical tools of 
market liberalisation: the abolition of tariffs and other entry barriers (cross-
border measures). The effectiveness of these tools can be measured 
quantitatively, on the basis of the tariff levels reached or the amount of 
quotas on importation reduced or eliminated: the Kennedy Round signals 
the apex of this approach, while also revealing its limits. New barriers are 
emerging. They consist of measures that are formally non-discriminatory 
and generally applicable to national and foreign products alike. They are 
barriers that function “geographically” within States and not at their borders, 
but are equally able to create trade distortions1. 
These measures do not have protectionist ends. On the contrary, they 
pursue objectives considered legitimate by supranational law itself. 
However, the exercise of the domestic regulatory power can be directed to 
illicit ends, giving rise to measures that are discriminatory in fact. 
Moreover, some internal measures can be objectively unnecessary, 
inadequate or disproportionate. 
It is therefore necessary to perform a complex balancing of contrasting 
interests. On the one hand, there is market liberalisation: this interest is 
institutionally protected by supranational law, for the benefit of exporters 
and the national consumers that can enjoy greater competition (and thus 
lower prices, greater selection, etc.). Market liberalisation is realised mainly 
through a limitation of national governments’ power and the recognition of 
greater private autonomy. On the other hand, there are all the non-economic 
interests that can be wrongly harmed by market liberalisation and 
deregulation (workers’ rights, the struggle against fraud; health protection; 
prevention of unfair competition, etc.): global law recognises individual 
                                                 
1 There are measures relating to the characteristics and qualities that a good or a service 
must have in order to be legally introduced into trade, such as the titles, requirements and 
education that service providers must have; these are measures of domestic regulation (so-
called “behind-the-border or internal measures”). 
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 Member States’ right to protect these interests, mainly for the benefit of 
their own citizens. They do this mainly through government regulation and 
oversight. 
At the normative level, supranational law defines the goals of 
liberalisation, determines the policies that States can properly pursue and 
imposes external limits on the exercise of the national regulatory power. 
Within these limits, States get to establish the level of protection of their 
citizens’ non-economic interests.2 All administrative functions are exercised 
at the domestic level, on the model of indirect implementation. 
National public powers thus become a part of the global regulatory 
system. This creates structural tensions. National powers are responsive to 
domestic constituencies, but they are required to pursue supranational or 
foreign interests as well. The extra-territorial efficacy of national decisions 
and the power to regulate foreign subjects raises new problems of 
legitimation3. 
To confront this tension, supranational law looks to national 
administrative law4. It is not difficult to understand why. 
                                                 
2 For a more searching analysis of the WTO rules on domestic regulation, see, ex 
plurimis: G. MORCEAU and J. TRACHTMAN, TBT, SPS, and GATS: A Map of the WTO Law 
of Domestic Regulation, in Journal of World Trade, 2001, p. 811 et seq.; P. SAUVÉ and A. 
MATTOO  Domestic regulation and the GATS: untangling the issues, in , P. SAUVÉ (ed.), 
Trade rules behind borders: essays on services, investment and the new trade agenda, 
London, Cameron May, 2003, p. 113 et. Seq.; A. MATTOO and P. SAUVÉ (ed.), Domestic 
Regulation and Service Trade Liberalization, Washington, 2003; M. KRAJWESKI, National 
Regulation and Trade Liberalization in Services: The Legal Impact of the General 
Agreement on Trade in Services (GATS) on National Regulatory Autonomy, The Hague, 
2003; J.P.TRACHTMAN, Negotiations on domestic regulation and trade in services (GATS 
Article VI): a legal analysis of selected current issues, in E.-U. PETERSMANN (ed.), 
Reforming the world trading system: legitimacy, efficiency and democratic governance, 
Oxford, 2005, p. 205 et. seq.
3 See B. KINGSBURY, R.B. STEWART and N. KRISCH, The Emergence of Global 
Administrative Law, in 68 Law and Contemporary Problems 36 (2005): “the emerging 
global administrative law establishes checks for coordinated domestic administration, or, in 
the terminology introduced here, for the distributed element in global administration. In 
order to ensure that domestic regulators act as participants in the global regime rather than 
merely as national actors, intergovernmental agencies have promoted global norms to 
govern not only the substance of domestic regulation, but also the decisional procedures 
followed by domestic regulatory agencies when applying a global norm or when subject to 
its strictures. In effect, these procedural requirements place domestic regulatory bodies and 
officials in an additional role as agents of the relevant global regime and seek to make them 
in some way responsible for compliance with it  These requirements are designed to protect 
the interests of other states, individuals, and firms subject to regulation, as well as broader 
social and economic interests affected by the regime by providing them with procedural 
means to ensure the fidelity of domestic regulators to global administrative norms designed 
to protect their rights or concerns”. 
4 This analytical framework is developed in studies on global administrative law. In 
general, see B. KINGSBURY, R.B. STEWART and N. KRISCH, The Emergence of Global 
Administrative Law, cit.; S. CASSESE, Il diritto amministrativo globale: una introduzione, in 
Riv. trim. dir. pubbl., 2005, p. 331 et. seq.; Id., Global Standards for National 
Administrative Procedure, in 68 Law and Contemporary Problems 109 (2005); L. CASINI, 
Diritto amministrativo globale, in Dizionario di diritto pubblico, Milano, 2006, ad vocem; 
J.-B. AUBY, La globalisation, le droit, l’Etat, Paris, 2003; S. BATTINI, Amministrazioni 
senza Stato. Profili di diritto amministrativo internazionale, Milano, 2003; ID., L’impatto 
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 Administrative law exists to check an essentially non-representative 
power and to bind it to the pursuit of specific ends. It thus requires public 
authorities to give reasons for their decisions, it subjects their decisions to 
judicial review and grants participatory rights to private actors. 
International trade law, having parallel purposes, makes use of similar 
legal tools. But the transplantation of national norms and principles to the 
supranational sphere is not completely linear. The global adoption of 
traditionally national legal tools implies their partial metamorphosis, for at 
least five different reasons. 
First of all, national and international law seek to protect different 
interests. National administrative law procedures aim to defend individuals 
– whatever their interest, as long as it is legitimate – in their relations with 
the government. International trade law uses the same tools to defend a 
more specific category of private interests and actors: foreign importers of 
goods and services. 
Second, different institutions come into play in the national and 
international contexts. In a purely national setting, individuals have two 
tools for checking government power, one direct and procedural, the other 
indirect and political, operating through parliamentary representation and 
democracy. In the global setting, individuals have only the procedural tool 
at their disposal. 
Third, the structure of regulation is different at the national and 
supranational levels. Supranational law does not aim to create a general 
procedural model to replace corresponding national models, but rather just a 
body of protections that can be applied as necessary to economic 
integration. 
Fourth, the relationships are more complicated at the international level. 
National administrative laws do of course deal with complex multi-polar 
relationships that go beyond the simple bilateral contraposition between the 
government and private actors. But this complexity multiplies in the global 
context. 
Finally, the transplantation of national administrative law does not take 
place in a homogenous way. It is more rooted in some sectors than in others. 
Particular tools and institutions are preferred over others. 
A useful area in which to analyse this perspective is the multilateral 
regime for the liberalisation of trade in services. As the European 
Commission recently stressed: “Services are much more prone to Internal 
Market barriers than goods and are harder hit. Because of the complex and 
intangible nature of services and the importance of the know-how and the 
qualifications of the service provider, the provision of services is often 
subject to much more complex rules covering the entire service activity than 
                                                                                                                                               
della globalizzazione sulla pubblica amministrazione e sul diritto amministrativo: quattro 
percorsi, in Giorn. dir. amm., 2006, p. 339; see also “The Emergence of Global 
Administrative Law”, 68 Law and Contemporary Problems (2005); the European Journal 
of International Law, 2006, vol. 16, n. 1; and 37 New York University Journal of 
International Law and Politics 4 (2005); finally, see the papers published by the Institute 
for International Law and Justice, New York University, at www.iilj.org. 
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 5is the case for goods”.  This regulation affects not only a commercial good 
as such, but also a whole process for the provision of a service, the different 
ways in which it can be marketed and the service provider’s characteristics. 
As a result, the global rules in this area are particularly penetrating and 
affect many aspects of national regulation. 
This study will examine the rules applicable to administrative procedure, 
rather than the substantive content of national regulatory measures. I will 
thus focus on the supranational requirements regarding the phases that 
precede the adoption of a measure of general application (the rule-making 
process); and the requirements affecting the application of national 
measures (duties to provide reasons for decisions and to guarantee 
participation in adjudication proceedings). 
The focus of this analysis will be the domestic regulation norms 
expressly set forth in Article VI of the General Agreement on Trade in 
Services; the secondary norms contained in the Disciplines on Domestic 
Regulation in Accountancy Sector6 and in the Reference Paper on 
Telecommunications7; the proposals for new disciplines introduced before 
the Working Party on Domestic Regulation, a subsidiary body of the WTO 
established by the Council for Trade in Services in order to negotiate new 
obligations to be submitted to the approval of the Member States8. I will 
make particular reference to the Consolidated Working Paper, issued in 
                                                 
5 European Commission, The State of the Internal Market for Services, Report to the 
Council and the European Parliament, COM(2002) 441 def., Brussels, 30 July 2002, 6 ff. 
6 See WTO, WPPS, Report to the council for trade in services on the development of 
disciplines on domestic regulation in the Accountancy sector, S/WPPS/4, 10 December 
1998, and WTO, CTS, Decision on Disciplines Relating to the Accountancy Sector, S/L/63, 
15 December 1998. 
7 The Reference Paper was drafted by the Negotiating Group on Basic 
Telecommunication, a body established by the Decision on Basic Telecommunications to 
promote the liberalisation of the telecommunications sector, given the weakness of 
disciplines provided by the GATS. The document does not have autonomously binding 
effects, but the States may include it in their own additional commitments, i.e. 
commitments that the Members, based on Art. XVIII of the GATS, may take on to promote 
the liberalisation of their markets. The Reference Paper has been adopted by more than 60 
member States so far.   
8 Article VI:4 of the GATS mandates the Council for Trade in Services to enact the 
disciplines “with a view to ensuring that measures relating to qualification requirements 
and procedures, technical standards and licensing requirements do not constitute 
unnecessary barriers to trade in services”. To this end, in 1995, the CTS established a 
Working Party on Professional Services, “to examine and report, with recommendations, on 
the disciplines necessary to ensure that measures … in the field of professional services do 
not constitute unnecessary barriers to trade” (WTO, CTS, Decision on Professional 
Services, Adopted by the Council for Trade in Services on 1 March 1995, S/L/3, 4 April 
1995). In 1998, CTS gave binding force to the Disciplines on Domestic regulation in 
Accountancy sector, which had been drafted by the Working Party. The WPPS was 
replaced by the new Working Party on Domestic Regulation, and given the task of 
developing all the relevant disciplines ex art. VI:4 GATS (WTO, CTS, Decision on 
Domestic Regulation, S/L/70, 2 April 1999). For a thorough analysis of these issues, see 
L.S. TERRY, GATS Applicability to Transnational Lawyering and its Potential Impact on 
U.S. State Regulation of Lawyers, Vanderbildt Journal of Transnational Law, 2001, 989. 
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 2006 by the WPDR Chairman, which brings together the various proposals 
put forward by the national delegations9. 
The normative material will be examined in light of the following 
principles: reasonableness, objectivity, impartiality and participation in 
adjudication and rule making procedures; for each principle, I will 
demonstrate how the global transplantation of national rules has affected 
their scope and purpose. 
 
2. Substantive and procedural protections 
 
2.1. Reasonableness 
 
The principle of reasonableness, in both common law and in droit 
administratif legal systems, emerges as an instrument for checking the 
discretionary power of administrative authorities.10 It is meant, above all, as 
a prohibition upon arbitrary, irrational or patently unfair decisions, “so 
absurd that no sensible person could ever dream that it lay within the powers 
of the autority”,11 12 as in the so-called “Wednesbury unreasonableness”  of 
British law, or the French doctrine of erreur manifeste d’appréciation13.  
The principle of reasonableness also comprehends the various forms of 
the illegitimacy of an act of state due to the abuse of power. From this 
standpoint, it becomes the summa of the “categories of reasonableness” 
under English law, or of the “excess of power” under Italian law14. 
Reasonableness, finally, has the more specific meaning of the 
determination of discretion in its proprium, as a balancing of conflicting 
interests. The principle of reasonableness thus opens the courthouse doors to 
the review of administrative action as an activity functionally directed 
towards the pursuit of the primary public interest through the least possible 
sacrifice of the relevant secondary interests. The German experience, which 
has inspired the jurisprudence of the European Union and its Member 
States15, translates this approach as Verhältnismäßigkeitprinzip, the duty to 
                                                 
9 WTO, WORKING PARTY ON DOMESTIC REGULATION, Disciplines on Domestic 
Regulation pursuant to GATS Article VI:4. Consolidated Working Paper, Note by the 
Chairman, JOB(06)/225, July 2006.  
10 A. SANDULLI, Il procedimento,  in S. Cassese (ed.) Trattato di diritto amministrativo, 
Milano, 2003, p. 1064 et. seq. 
11 LORD GREEN MG, in the Tameside Case [1977] AC at 1026. 
12 See Associated Provincial Picture Houses Ltd. v. Wednesbury Corporation [1948] 1 
KB 223 at 229. 
13 Conseil d’Ètat, 15 février 1961, Arrêt Lagrange. 
14 G. PERICU, Attività amministrativa, in L. MAZZAROLLI et. al. (ed.), Diritto 
amministrativo, III ed., Bologna, 2001, p. 1251; H.W.R. WADE and C.F. FORSYTH, 
Administrative Law, VIII ed., 2000, Oxford, at p. 385 et. seq. 
15 On the proportionality principle in European jurisprudence, see Judgment of the 
European Court of Justice, 29 November 1956, in Case 8/55, Fédération charbonnière de 
Belgium; 14 December 1962, joined cases 5-11, 13-15/62, Società acciaierie San Michele; 
on this topic, see also E. ELLIS (ed), The Principle of Proportionality in the Laws of 
Europe, Oxford, 1999, p. 66; F. ORTINO, Basic Legal Instruments for the Liberalisation of 
Trade, cit., p. 402 ff.; G. BEMANN, Proportionality and Subsidiarity, in C. BARNARD and J. 
SCOTT (ed.), The Law of the Single Market: Unpacking the Premises, Oxford, 2002, p. 75 
et. seq. On the proportionality principle in European countries, see, in particular, the “bilan 
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 adopt measures which are proportionate, to be evaluated by means of a two-
fold analysis of the measure’s suitability in pursuing the predetermined 
objective and the lack of less harmful alternatives (necessity). 
In the GATS context, the principle of reasonableness is formally 
embodied in Article VI:1 (each Member shall ensure that all measures of 
general application affecting trade in services are administered in a 
reasonable … manner) and is widely invoked by the jurisprudence and 
implemented in secondary norms. First of all, reasonableness has directly 
implied a procedural protection, consisting in the duty to give reasons. This 
approach can be seen in certain provisions of the Accountancy Disciplines16 
and in the Reference Paper on Telecommunications17. Secondly, it is 
understood as the duty of thoroughness in processing the application, 
particularly in reference to the full understanding of the relevant facts. 
Moreover, reasonableness is invoked to require the government to provide a 
case-by-case analysis, explicating the decision’s coherence with the facts 
established by the investigation as well as to allow a margin of flexibility in 
evaluating the most opportune solution in light of the concrete 
circumstances18. 
At first glance, the transplantation of reasonableness to the global level 
seems to proceed in a linear way. Looking more closely, however, this 
linear pictures dissolves. The GATS review of reasonableness addresses 
                                                                                                                                               
coût-avantage” in French jurisprudence, starting with the decision of the Conseil d’Ètat, 28 
mai 1971, Arrêt Ville Nouvelle Est.   
16 See art. IX:4, Disciplines on domestic regulation in the accountancy sector: “On 
request, an unsuccessful applicant shall be informed of the reasons for rejection of the 
application”. 
17 See Reference paper on Telecommunications, art. 4, paragraph 2: “[t]he reasons for 
the denial of a licence will be made known to the applicant upon request”.   
18 WTO, PANEL REPORT, Mexico – Measures Affecting Telecommunications Services 
(Mexico – Telecommunications), WT/DS204/R, 2 April 2004, paragraph 7.328: “The 
dictionary meaning of the word ‘reasonable’ means ‘being in accordance with reason’, ‘not 
extreme or excessive’. The word ‘reasonable’ implies a degree of flexibility that involves 
consideration of the circumstances of a particular case.  What is ‘reasonable’ in one set of 
circumstances may prove to be less than "reasonable" in different circumstances.  The 
elements of ‘balance’ and ‘flexibility’, as well as the need for a ‘case-by-case analysis’, are 
inherent in the notion of reasonable”. In this case, the panel applies the jurisprudence of 
APPELLATE BODY REPORT, United States – Anti-Dumping Measures on Certain Hot-Rolled 
Steel Products from Japan (hereafter US – Hot-Rolled Steel), WT/DS184/AB/R 24 July 
2001, paragraph 84-85, “in sum, a "reasonable period" must be interpreted consistently with 
the notions of flexibility and balance that are inherent in the concept of "reasonableness", 
and in a manner that allows for account to be taken of the particular circumstances of each 
case". Although the Appellate Body was interpreting a "reasonable" period of time in the 
context of a different WTO Agreement, we consider that the same basic elements of the 
word "reasonable" also apply in the present context. Our interpretation of these provisions 
raises a further interpretive question, namely the meaning of a "reasonable period" under 
Article 6.8 of the Anti-Dumping Agreement and a "reasonable time" under paragraph 1 of 
Annex II. The word "reasonable" implies a degree of flexibility that involves consideration 
of all of the circumstances of a particular case. What is "reasonable" in one set of 
circumstances may prove to be less than "reasonable" in different circumstances.  This 
suggests that what constitutes a reasonable period or a reasonable time, under Article 6.8 
and Annex II of the Anti-Dumping Agreement, should be defined on a case-by-case basis, 
in the light of the specific circumstances of each investigation”. 
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 national experiences only in their modus operandi, their technique for 
balancing the interests. But more importantly, it changes the hierarchy of 
relevant interests. To comprehend the real content of the principle of 
reasonableness in the global context we can take three examples. 
Article XVI prohibits “planning licensing.” In contrast to authorisation 
requirements for the purposes of oversight19, which provide for a qualitative 
examination of the service provider’s abilities, planning licensing subjects 
the provision of a given service to quantitative limits and constitutes a de 
facto numerical limitation.  Market access is thus subjected to an evaluation 
of the congruity of the supply of a service existing at a particular moment 
and the demand for it. 
In WTO terminology, this has to do with an economic needs test (ENT), 
“measures based on criteria the fulfillment of which is beyond the control of 
the affected service supplier”20. The GATS regards ENTs as “market access 
restrictions”, which are illicit as such in all of the sectors for which the 
States have undertaken market-access commitments without opposing ad 
hoc reservations21. 
This qualification radically affects national administrations’ discretion. In 
balancing the interests involved in an authorisation procedure, they cannot 
completely sacrifice the interest of the professionally or commercially 
capable service supplier. The service provider may be subjected to stringent 
evaluations of competence, ethics, financial stability, etc., but cannot be 
subjected to a comparative evaluation against other aspirants. The outcome 
of the reasonableness evaluation is in part predetermined by the 
                                                 
19 For this distinction, see M.S. GIANNINI, Diritto amministrativo, Milano, 1993, II, p. 
615, and A. SANDULLI, Il procedimento, cit., p. 1273. 
20 WTO, CTS, Economic Needs Tests. Note by the Secretariat, S/CSS/W/118, 30 
novembre 2001. See also the definition provided by the Oecd: “an ENT can generally be 
characterized as a provision in national regulations, legislation or administrative guidelines 
imposing a test which has the effect of restricting the entry of service suppliers, based on an 
assessment of "needs" in the domestic market. Such measures may operate to restrict access 
for both foreign and domestic suppliers to a market” (OECD, WORKING PARTY ON TRADE 
COMMITTEE, Assessing Barriers to Trade in Service. The Scheduling of Economic Needs 
Test in the Gats: an Overview, TD/TCWP(2000)11/F); and by WTO, CTS, Economic Needs 
Test. Communication from Mercosur, S/CSS/W/139, 20 marzo 2002: “ENTs in the GATS: 
these measures can generally be considered as a quantitative restriction to foreign services 
and services suppliers on the basis of the extent of existing local suppliers in the domestic 
market”. 
21 Based on art. XIX et. seq. of the GATS, Member States should define, through 
negotiations, their intended commitments to the progressive removal of market access 
restrictions (ex art. XVI) and they must grant foreign services and service suppliers a 
treatment no less favourable than that accorded to their own like services and service 
suppliers (ex art. XVII). This regulatory flexibility is further increased by the possibility of 
including some limitations to the commitments undertaken by means of an ad hoc 
procedure: the States may include the restrictive measures that they reserve the right to 
apply in their Schedules of Specific Commitments. For a full understanding of this 
mechanism see, in particular, WTO, GROUP OF NEGOTIATIONS ON SERVICES, Scheduling of 
initial commitments in Trade in Services. Explanatory note, MTN.GNS/W/164, 3 
September 1993; ID., Scheduling of initial commitments in Trade in Services, Explanatory 
Note, Addendum, MTN.GNS/W/164/Add.1, 30 November 1993. See also, M. KRAJESKI, 
National Regulation and Trade Liberalization, cit., at 75 et. seq., and L. ALTINGER and A. 
ENDERS, The Scope and Depth of GATS Commitments, 19 World Economy 312 (1996). 
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 supranational law, which defines the admissible level of the compression of 
the private interest beyond that provided by national laws.  
A second example can be drawn from the extension of the duty to give 
reasons, meant as a procedural rule requiring that the reasons underlying a 
decision be made explicit. The duty to give reasons is familiar in both 
national and global procedural law, but the scope of its application and its 
purposes differ significantly from one context to the other. 
In adjudication proceedings, national laws (with important differences 
between one legal system and another) impose relatively broad duties to 
give reasons. In Italy, this affects every individual proceeding, including 
agencies’ non-discretionary decisions. In Spain, this duty is triggered by 
negative decisions, decisions which depart from precedent or from the 
opinions set forth in the course of the procedure and acts implying a wide 
discretion. In Germany, even favourable decisions need to be motivated, 
when they adversely affect the rights of third parties, but non-discretionary 
decisions do not. The principle thus aims to protect the interests of both the 
individuals directly addressed by the provision and third parties, especially 
in the face of widely discretionary choices. Moreover, it enables the 
decentralised review of the legitimacy of administrative action. In rule-
making proceedings, by contrast, at least in civil law systems, the opposing 
principle holds: there is no duty to give reasons, unless individual laws 
provide otherwise22. 
In the global context, the duty to give reason is, in a sense, more limited. 
In individual proceedings, it applies only to negative decisions. Moreover, 
only the applicant has the right to ask for the reasons for which his 
application has been rejected (art. VI:3 GATS); at the same time, this duty is 
more extensive in rule-making administrative proceedings whose outcomes 
may have restrictive effects upon trade: “Members shall inform another 
Member, upon request, of the rationale behind domestic regulatory 
measures … in relation to legitimate objectives” (Accountancy disciplines, 
III:5). 
There is a reason for the different approach. The WTO duty to give 
reasons aims solely at the protection of the Member States and foreign 
service providers. As a result, other interested parties (national competitors, 
citizens, etc.) are not considered to be directly relevant and their protection 
is left to the States. Moreover, States cannot avoid this obligation by opting 
for rule-making procedures. 
A third example comes from the use of the term reason and its variants in 
the secondary law. It is used eight times in the Accountancy disciplines, and 
twenty times in the Consolidated Working Paper.    
In more than half the cases, it refers to the procedural duties falling upon 
the applicant or to the time limits of the procedure and thus becomes a tool 
in the review of long, complicated and burdensome procedures.  
                                                 
22 For the Spanish law, see Ley 30/1992, de 26 de noviembre de Régimen Jurídico de 
las Administraciones Públicas y del Procedimiento Administrativo Común, art. 54; for the 
Italian law, see l. 7 August 1990, n. 241, art. 3; in Germany, Verwaltungsverfahrensgesetz, 
§ 39. For a comparative analysis, see, in particular, S. BATTINI, L’obbligo di motivazione, in 
G. NAPOLITANO (ed.), Diritto amministrativo comparato, Milano, 2007. 
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 The test of reasonableness (or proportionality) is used as a simplification 
technique23. Substantively, this implies a further prioritisation of the 
relevant interests in national proceedings. The interest in a swift conclusion 
to the authorisation procedure is given priority over the adequate 
representation of third-party interests. 
 
2.2. Objectivity 
 
The WTO principle of objectivity has two meanings. The first and more 
general one implies the duty to evaluate on the basis of criteria that are 
concrete, non-subjective and open to unanimous agreement24. 
The second and more narrow meaning of objectivity is the requirement 
that decisions be based upon predetermined criteria, thus rendering 
government action more predictable. A clear link between objectivity, 
predetermination and transparency can be seen in the Accountancy 
Disciplines: “[l]icensing procedures (…) shall be pre-established, publicly 
available and objective”25. The norms are fully adjudicable. There are 
precedents in the WTO jurisprudence of the censure of overly “casual” 
national procedures for their unpredictable outcomes26. 
The problem of limiting administrative discretion is addressed by many 
national laws,27 28 but rarely assumes such a central importance.  English law 
                                                 
23 This approach emerges in some decisions of the European Court of Justice. The Court 
of Justice, indeed, applies the proportionality principle to administrative burdens and 
procedures as well as to substantive barriers to free circulation. Consequently, the Court 
examines whether administrative burdens and procedures are structured so as to minimise 
their trade restrictiveness and are not more burdensome than necessary to pursue imperative 
goals. In particular, the Court has affirmed that the proportionality principle requires that 
economic operators should be able to obtain the permits required by domestic law, “under a 
procedure easily accessible” and within a reasonable time. 
24 Objectiveness is used as tool to guide the rule of reason test: art. VI:4 GATS, in 
particular, clarifies that the requirements provided by domestic regulation must be “based 
on objective …criteria, such as competence and the ability to supply the service”. Other 
WTO agreements go further: in the SPS, the objectiveness principle requires domestic 
agencies to respect the scientific evidence (see, SPS agreement, art. 5, Assessment of Risk 
and Determination of the Appropriate Level of Sanitary or Phytosanitary Protection). 
25 This duty has a horizontal dimension in the Consolidated Working Paper, § G.1.  
26 WTO, APPELLATE BODY REPORT, United States – Import of certain Shrimp and 
Shrimp Product, WT/DS58/AB/R, 12 October 1998, paragraph 180. 
27 In Italian law, see A. POLICE, La predeterminazione delle decisioni amministrative. 
Gradualità e trasparenza nell’esercizio del potere discrezionale, Napoli, 1997; P. VIRGA, 
Eccesso di potere per mancata prefissione dei parametri di riferimento, in Scritti in onore 
di Massimo Severo Giannini, I, Milano, 1988, p. 587 et. seq.  
28 An exception is US law. In this context, the issue is strictly tied to the constitutional 
principle of the separation of powers, according to the non-delegation doctrine. Initially 
conceived as formal prohibition upon the Congress from delegating a wide discretion to 
administrative agencies, the doctrine has been subsequently reinterpreted as a substantial 
safeguard “to protect private parties against injustice on account of unnecessary and 
uncontrolled discretionary power” (K. DAVIS, Administrative Law Treatise, II ed, 1978, 
208 et. seq.). The courts have begun to impose a prior limitation upon administrative 
agencies of their own discretionary powers, by way of an adequate rule making procedure, 
to reduce the risk of partiality and arbitrariness in adjudication procedures: see the two 
fundamental decisions, 326 F.2d 605 (5th Cir. 1964), Hornsby v. Allen, e 398 F.2d 262 (2d 
Cir. 1968), and Holmes v. New York City Housing Authority. On this issue, see also 
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 denies that a wide discretionary power is per se incompatible with the rule 
of law, as long as it is not unfettered discretion29. This approach is 
paralleled in Continental legal systems as well. In Italy, for example, the 
duty to predetermine the criteria for administrative decisions emerges only 
in the 1990’s, and is limited to particular areas of administrative activity, 
like giving economic advantages (contributions, subsidies, financial aids) or 
awarding public contracts or, in general, in cases of comparative 
evaluation30. 
From the national perspective, the exercise of a wide discretionary 
power, being subject to ministerial directive and parliamentary oversight, 
can be legitimised by the proper functioning of the so-called democratic 
circuit. Only where the need of impartiality is great, because scarce 
resources must be allocated between multiple applicants, are predetermined 
internal limitations required. 
The transnational perspective, however, stands the national one on its 
head. While the procedural control upon administrative action is 
accompanied and reinforced by democratic controls for citizens, it stands 
alone in protecting foreign economic operators. In other words, the extra-
territorial effect of national administrative decisions regarding actors who 
do not make up a constituency in national representative bodies creates an 
intense need (unknown in national constitutional and administrative law) for 
their external legitimation. 
Secondly, foreign firms are vulnerable to unfavourable treatment by 
national authorities, sensitive to the protectionist pressures from national 
groups. This increases the risk that decisions affecting foreign firms will not 
be totally impartial. This risk extends to every sector and area of 
administrative activity. 
Owing to these two factors, the supranational law is particularly 
suspicious of administrative discretion and thus seeks techniques for 
reviewing and monitoring its exercise. It is no coincidence that the 
predictability of administrative action is a very important issue in European 
law, which links it back to the principles of proportionality and equality. 
See, in particular, the recent Directive on services, art. 10 (Conditions for 
the granting of authorisation): “Authorisation schemes shall be based on 
                                                                                                                                               
SHAPIRO, The choice of Rulemaking or Adjudication in the Development of Administrative 
Policy, 78 Harv. Law Rev. 921 (1965) and R. B. STEWART, The Reformation of American 
Administrative Law, 88 Harv. L. Rev. 1667 (1974-5). 
29 In the past, some scholars contested the legitimacy of wide discretionary powers (e.g., 
see A.V. DICEY, Law and constitution, 1885, IX ed. London, 1950, 202). Modern scholars, 
however, uphold a different point of view (H.W.R. WADE and C.F. FORSYTH, 
Administrative Law, cit., 345 et. seq.). 
30 See, in particular, art. 12, l. n. 241/1990. Some scholars maintain that in presence of 
“a disproportionate relationship between available means and objectives and when it is 
impossible to satisfy the requests of all applicants … the predetermination of criteria is 
mandatory, on pain of the  illegitimacy of the decision because of an excess of power” (P. 
VIRGA, Eccesso di potere per mancata prefissione dei parametri di riferimento, in Scritti in 
onore di Massimo Severo Giannini, I, Milano, 1988, p. 587 et. seq.). However, realistically, 
this duty is not a general principle, but is enforceable only when provided by law (A. 
Sandulli, Il procedimento, cit., p. 970 et. seq.). For a list of relevant norms, A. POLICE, La 
predeterminazione, cit., p. 173 et. seq.). 
 19
 criteria which preclude the competent authorities from exercising their 
power of assessment in an arbitrary manner”31. 
All of the WTO agreements demonstrate a clear preference for binding or 
semi-binding adjudication procedures. This topic assumes great importance 
in those areas in which public authorities (for objective or for policy 
reasons) were granted wide margins of appreciation32. 
Given the wide discretion in the national authorisation of specific 
commercial activities, the development of the new disciplines in the services 
sector, which would guarantee objectivity and predetermined licensing 
criteria, is a central mandate of the Council for Trade in Services. The 
Consolidated Working Paper, in particular, sets forth detailed rules for the 
various procedures, linking them to duties of prior publication33.  
This issue could assume its greatest importance in the face of competitive 
licensing procedures, as in the allocation of scares resources or when States 
reserve the right to limit the provision of a service for general interest 
purposes, as in the presence of an Economic Needs Test.  
 
 
                                                 
31 Directive 2006/123/CE of the European Parliament and the Council, on Services in 
the Internal Market, 12 December 2006.  
32 WTO, WORKING GROUP ON THE INTERACTION BETWEEN TRADE AND COMPETITION 
POLICY, The Fundamental WTO Principles of National Treatment, Most-Favoured Nation 
and Transparency,  Background Note by the Secretariat WT/WGTCP/W/114, 14 April 
1999:  “[w]hile, as stated above, publication and administration provisions serve to foster a 
rules-based approach to trade policy, the function of transparency obligations is perhaps 
relatively most important in areas where the role of WTO rules of general application is 
limited.  One such case concerns areas where the scope for discretionary government 
measures is large, either because of their actual or potential direct control over specific 
economic transactions affecting trade, such as in the areas of government procurement and 
state trading, or because national laws of general application allow for considerable 
executive discretion in establishing trade measures. An example of this is the area of import 
licensing, in particular that of a discretionary nature, which is the focus of the WTO 
Agreement on Importing Licensing Procedures. This has, as one of its principal aims, to 
ensure that import licensing, particularly non-automatic import licensing, is implemented in 
a transparent and predictable manner”. 
33 Consolidated Working paper, E.3; see also Reference Paper on Telecommunication, 
art. 6, Allocation and use of scarce resources: “Any procedures for the allocation and use of 
scarce resources, including frequencies, numbers and rights of way, will be carried out in an 
objective, timely, transparent and non-discriminatory manner”; Accountancy Disciplines, 
art. III, Licensing Requirement: “Licensing requirements shall be pre-established, publicly 
available and objective” (and identically, art. IV Licensing procedures); EU - Disciplines on 
Licensing Procedures, art. 1 .1. and 1.2. Proposals and guidelines to favor the compliance 
with this provision are developed in the documents of other international organizations: see 
OECD, Trade Facilitation Principles in GATT Article V, VIII and X: Reflections on 
Implementation Approach, TD/TC/WP(2003)12/FINAL, 2 June 2003, passim, and  notably, 
§ B, Predictability mechanisms; likewise, some scholars have tried to define in depth the 
substantive content of the duties assumed by the Member States: see ALLEN, ROBERT 
STUMBERG, Memorandum for the Intergovernmental Policy Advisory Committee -  
Harrison Institute for Public Law, Georgetown University Law Centre, GATS proposal that 
domestic regulations must be “objective”, 1 March 2007 – Draft “6” for circulation, who 
suggest five likely meanings of the term “objective (a) not arbitrary; b) not biased; c) 
relevant to the ability to perform or supply the service; d) not subjective; e) the least-trade-
restrictive alternative”) and analyze their impact on the Member States’ right to regulate. 
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 2.3. Impartiality 
 
Intuitively, the impartiality of administrative action assumes a particular 
importance in the global context. The invocation of this principle, in GATS 
art. VI:1, signals a leap with respect to the classical legal categories of 
international trade law; these classical categories are rooted in the more 
general prohibition of discrimination, based on the two traditional formulas 
of “most favoured nation treatment”34 35 and “national treatment” . 
Impartiality is a quid pluris, focused on the treatment given by the 
authorities to individuals as such36, and evoking the consolidated national 
doctrines prohibiting favores and odia as well as the principle nemo iudex in 
                                                 
34 This principle is formulated in GATS article II, which obliges Member States 
unconditionally to: accord to services and service suppliers of any other Member treatment 
no less favorable than that it accords to like services and service suppliers of any other 
country; eliminate all discrimination between foreign services; and to extend to all the most 
favorable discipline. On the  prohibition of “external” discrimination, see, ex plurimis, L. 
ALTINGER and A. ENDERS, The Scope and Depth, cit.,, 308 et. seq.; R.B. SELF, General 
Agreement on Trade in Services, in TERENCE P.S. (ed.), The World Trade Organization, the 
Multilateral Trade Framework for the 21st Century and U.S. Implementing Legislation, 
Washington, 1996, 527 et. seq.; C.G. RASCAZZO, La Comunità europea e l’accordo 
generale sugli scambi di servizi: affinità e differenze di metodi e di obbiettivi, in G. 
SACERDOTI and G. VENTURINI, La liberalizzazione multilaterale dei servizi e i suoi riflessi 
per l’Italia, Milano, 1997, p. 188 et. seq.; G. VENTURINI, Recenti sviluppi in tema di 
liberalizzazione degli scambi di servizi, in SIDI, Diritto e organizzazione mondiale del 
commercio internazionale dopo la creazione della Organizzazione mondiale del 
commercio, Napoli, 1997, p. 137 et. seq.; C. ARUP, The New World Trade Organization 
Agreements. Globalizing Law trough Services and Intellectual Property, Cambridge, 2000, 
113 et. seq; S. CHARNOVITZ, Triangulating the World Trade Organization, in 96 American 
Journal of International Law 28 (2002). 
35 This principle is formulated in GATS article II, which requires Member States to 
accord to services and service suppliers of any other Member treatment no less favorable 
than that which they accord to their own like services and service suppliers (but only in 
sectors covered by specific commitments). It prohibits not only all measures that prescribe 
a formally discriminatory treatment (de jure discrimination) based on nationality, but also 
those not safeguarding the “equivalence of competitive opportunities” to national and 
foreign operators (de facto discrimination). On this issue, see note 34 as well as the 
European Commission, GATS: General Agreement on Trade in Services. Guide to the 
undertakings, Brussels, 1995, 31: “[f]ormally identical or formally different treatment shall 
be considered to be less favourable if it modifies the conditions of competition in favour of 
services or service suppliers of the Member compared to like services or service suppliers 
of any other Member”. 
36 The WTO jurisprudence leaves no doubts. See these findings, concerning the 
homologous provisions of GATT article X: WTO, PANEL REPORT, Argentina - Bovine 
Hides, WT/DS155/R, paragraph 11.76 (the principle of impartiality “generally will not be 
whether there has been discriminatory treatment in favor of exports to one Member relative to 
another. Indeed, the focus is on the treatment accorded by government authorities to the 
traders in question”); WTO, Panel Report, EC – Bananas, paragraph 32; see also WTO, 
COUNCIL FOR TRADE IN GOODS, Article X of the GATT 1994 –  Scope and Application, 
Note by the Secretariat, G/C/W/374, 14 May 2002:  “Referring paragraphs 1 and 3 (b) of the 
same Article, and highlighting their focus on private traders as main beneficiaries of the 
obligations established in those provisions, the panel found that Article X could not be 
reduced to apply only to incidents of discrimination between Members”.
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 re sua. Formally, it translates into the duty of the equal treatment of service 
suppliers “under like circumstances,” in order to preserve competition37. 
An examination of just the national legal categories is not however 
sufficient to understand the actual and potential scope of the impartiality 
principle in the global context.  
National solutions, both organisational (tenure, the merit system, division 
of competences between political and administrative bodies), and functional 
(the duty to fairly weigh all the relevant private interests), are not always 
adequate to global problems.  
The above-mentioned conflict, between the structural location (national) 
and the (partly) global functions that administrations must fulfil can be 
clearly seen here.  
Global law thus seeks out alternative solutions. The tendency is away 
from impartial administration and towards independent and neutral 
administration. Organisationally, this model is characterised by the 
attribution of regulatory competences to authorities which are separate from 
the regulated class and free from their influence. Functionally, it is 
characterised by the prohibition upon public powers from pursuing policies 
beyond the proper competitive structure of the market38.  
So far, this model has only been imposed in the telecommunications 
sector, but there are proposals for extending it to other public services, like 
the postal service39. Article 5 of the Reference Paper requires the 
establishment of independent regulatory authorities which are “not 
accountable” to the executive40. Article 3, relating to the burdens upon 
                                                 
37 WTO, PANEL REPORT, Mexico – Telecommunication, paragraphs 7.329-30: “This 
footnote [footnote 2 of the Annex on Telecommunication] clarifies that no discrimination is 
permitted with respect to other foreign suppliers, to domestic suppliers, or to other users of 
like public telecommunications transport networks and services under like circumstances.  
The word "non-discriminatory" therefore addresses the conditions of competition of service 
suppliers in relation to other suppliers who are users of public telecommunications transport 
networks and services”. 
38 See Annex on Telecommunication, art. 5; Reference Paper on Telecommunication, 
art. 6, Allocation and use of scarce resources, art. 3, Universal service and, notably, art. 5, 
Independent regulators: “The regulatory body is separate from, and not accountable to, any 
supplier of basic telecommunications services. The decisions of and the procedures used by 
regulators shall be impartial with respect to all market participants”. See also P. COWEY, 
M.M. KLIMENKO, The WTO Agreement and Telecommunication Policy Reform, Policy 
Research Working Paper, in www.worldbank.org.
39 WTO, CTS, Postal/Courier: Proposal for a Reference Paper, Communication from 
the European Communities and their Member States, paras II:3, Individual license and II:4, 
Independence of the regulatory body. 
40 On the WTO debates on regulatory independence, see WTO, COUNCIL FOR TRADE IN 
SERVICES, Principles of Competitive Entry: Independent Telecommunications Regulation 
and Interconnection Principles. Communication from the United States, S/C/W/110/Add.1, 
15 June 1999, in particular  I.A: “a truly effective regulator also must be protected from 
direct political influence from industry or other government entities”. See also, OECD, 
WORKING PARTY ON TELECOMMUNICATION AND INFORMATION SERVICES POLICIES, 
Telecommunications Regulations: Institutional Structures and Responsibilities, 
DSTI/ICCP/TISP(99)15/FINAL, 26 May 2000; P. COWEY, M.M. KLIMENKO, The WTO 
Agreement and Telecommunication, cit., 12; WTO, CTS, General Trends in 
Telecommunication Reform. Communication from the ITU, S/C/W/110/Add.4, 17 June 
1999; ITU, TELECOMMUNICATION DEVELOPMENT BUREAU, Telecommunication policies and 
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 universal services, imposes obligations of transparency, non-discrimination 
and “competitive neutrality”41. The procedures for allocating scarce 
resources are animated by a particular attention to the neutrality of public 
action through the elimination of pre-established positions of privilege and 
the requirement of non-discrimination in public concessions procedures42. 
The Reference Paper is an example of the universal application of 
principles and models familiar to some national experiences. But global law 
presents truly original features, in its aim of extending the principle of 
separation between regulators and the regulated beyond the context of 
national public services, to make it a general requirement throughout the 
administrative system. See the clear formulation contained in the 
Consolidated Draft Text, G2: “The decision of and the procedures used by 
the competent authority preparing, adopting or applying licensing 
procedures shall be impartial with respect to all market participants. In 
particular, it shall be separate from any supplier of services for which a 
licence is required”. 
This proposal, if made binding, would strongly impact national 
regulation, in two sectors in particular. The first is in the area of local public 
services, in which local administrations are often in charge of the companies 
providing transportation, water supply, electricity and the like. The second 
is in the area of professional services, where the norm is not easy to 
reconcile with the regulatory and decision-making powers exercised by 
professional associations. This latter issue clearly emerged during the XXIII 
meeting of the WPDR, in the debate following the European Union’s 
proposal for regulating licensing procedures. Many delegations raised 
objections. The duty of separation however did make it intact into the 
Chairman’s consolidated version43. 
                                                                                                                                               
their repercussions at the level of institutional, regulatory and operational aspects of 
services, Document 1/193(Rev.1)-E, 23 September 1997, annex 3, Guidelines on the 
regulatory body. 
41 According to the International Telecommunication Union, the principle of 
transparency concerns either the public availability of all applicable national norms and 
information relating to all relevant facts. Notably, the States shall make available all 
information about subsidies granted to and the burdens effectively borne by the incumbent 
operator, preferably by means of separate accounts for different parts of its operations. The 
principle of non-discrimination entails the duty to accord an equal treatment to all 
operators, nationals and foreign. Notably, the burdens of universal service, when not 
charged to taxpayers, shall be allocated in a fair manner between service suppliers. Finally, 
according to the principle of competitive neutrality, no potential operator shall prevented 
from accessing the market and no service suppliers shall enjoy an unfair benefit, under 
pretext of pursuing social goals relating the institution of the universal service (ITU, 
Methodological Note on Universal Service Obligations, Note by the Secretariat, 9 October 
1998, 5, in www.itu.org). 
42 See art. 6, Allocation and use of scarce resources: “Any procedures for the allocation 
and use of scarce resources, including frequencies, numbers and rights of way, will be 
carried out in an objective, timely, transparent and non-discriminatory manner”. 
43 In connection to the doubts expressed by the delegation of New Zealand, the Swiss 
delegate joined the debate: “[o]n sub-paragraph 3, she asked if professional bodies, acting 
impartially with respect to licensing procedures, could fulfil the requirement” (WTO, 
WPDR, Report on the meeting held on 30 September 2003, Note by the Secretariat, 
S/WPDR/M/23, 27 November 2003, 16); subsequently “[t]he representative of Canada, in 
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3. Procedural protections: participation 
 
3.1. Participation in individual proceedings 
 
The participation of private actors in administrative proceedings has an 
important place in the national administrative procedure laws. In 
adjudication proceedings in particular, the right to be heard or, at least, the 
right to present written arguments and observations is often granted by 
general provisions. 
GATS law, by contrast, does not contain any provision directly addressed 
to participation in individual proceedings. There are two immediate 
explanations for this. 
The first and more simple one attributes this lacuna to global bodies’ 
deference to the Member States’ right to regulate, in the name of the 
principle of national procedural autonomy, according to an approach often 
defended in the European Community context as well. But this is only a part 
of the truth. It is sufficient to note how, in other contexts, WTO norms do 
set forth individual procedural obligations in great detail44. 
The second explanation regards the types of national proceedings 
regulated by the Agreement. While the general principles of reasonableness, 
impartiality and objectivity can be applied to administrative activity as a 
whole, the norms that regulate individual procedures are not contained in 
the GATS text, but rather in the secondary norms issued by the Council for 
Trade in Services, a body whose mandate is limited to approving the rules 
governing authorisation and certification procedures45. These procedures, 
                                                                                                                                               
giving preliminary comments, associated himself  with Switzerland's and New Zealand's 
comments on sub-paragraph 3 regarding the separation of service suppliers and the 
competent authority, and the challenge it posed to self-regulating professional bodies. He 
welcomed further discussion on the idea of neutrality as contained in sub-paragraphs 2 and 
3” (ibid, § 19). This is the reply of EU delegation: “[o]n sub-paragraph 3, the formulation 
was intended to address different services sectors, recognizing that some authorities might 
not be independent of the market operators. Decision-making as a regulator should be 
separated from commercial interests, and she welcomed suggestions for alternative 
formulations” (ibid, 25). 
44 See, for example, art. 5 of the Antidumping agreement, or art. 3, Investigation of the 
Agreement on safeguards: “[a] Member may apply a safeguard measure only following an 
investigation by the competent authorities of that Member pursuant to procedures 
previously established and made public in consonance with Article X of GATT 1994. This 
investigation shall include reasonable public notice to all interested parties and public 
hearings or other appropriate means in which importers, exporters and other interested 
parties could present evidence and their views, including the opportunity to respond to the 
presentations of other parties and to submit their views, inter alia, as to whether or not the 
application of a safeguard measure would be in the public interest. The competent 
authorities shall publish a report setting forth their findings and reasoned conclusions 
reached on all pertinent issues of fact and law”. 
45 Indeed, GATS article V:4 delegates to the Council the power to enact disciplines only 
“with a view to ensuring that measures relating to qualification requirements and 
procedures, technical standards and licensing requirements do not constitute unnecessary 
barriers to trade in services …”. For a useful distinction between these procedures, see, first 
of all, WTO, WPPS, The Relevance of the Disciplines of the Agreements on Technical 
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 aimed at widening the legal rights of private actors, do not trigger the same 
needs for protection that disciplinary proceedings, for example, would. 
This is the more convincing interpretation, but it raises further questions. 
As is clear, the widening effect only regards the immediate and direct 
subject of the proceeding, and not possible third parties with contrasting 
interests, like competitors or citizens in general who may be harmed by the 
granting of a license. Intuitively, from the standpoint of the global regulator, 
the target of the provision is the foreign service supplier, while those with 
contrasting interests are other national operators or the citizens of the host 
country. The decision to not regulate participation thus presupposes a 
specific value judgment. 
This interpretation is supported by further considerations, provided by 
the jurisprudence and other normative measures, that can influence, 
however indirectly, the exercise of the right of participation. Based on the 
perspective of this analysis, it is necessary to distinguish between the 
position of the applicant and that of third parties. 
Section E.3 (Transparency) of the Consolidated Draft Text addresses 
national participatory right: “[e]ach Member shall ensure that the following 
information are made publicly available: …(j) where there is public 
involvement in the licensing process, information on how that involvement 
is provided for”. 
The purpose of this rule is to enable economic operators to be informed 
of the procedural steps that can negatively influence or delay the granting of 
a license, The norm protects just the interests of the applicants and does not 
create the right for a third party to participate in the procedure. Still, where 
the applicant has not been adequately informed of the public involvement in 
his proceeding, he can raise a procedural irregularity. In general, 
administrations cannot hear parties representing contrasting interests 
without having previously made public the procedures that will be followed 
and bearing the risk of being contested before global dispute resolution 
bodies.  
Norms prescribing the reasonable duration and maximum simplicity of 
the procedure affect even more strongly the national power to grant 
participatory rights to parties other than the applicant (GATS, art. VI:3; 
Accountancy disciplines, V.16; Consolidated working paper, §§ G.4 and 
G.10). States, on the basis of these rules, cannot recognise an absolute right 
to intervene in the relevant proceedings. Rather, the legitimacy and scope of 
such rights are made subject to a reasonableness review, according to a 
balancing test that gives greater weight to the service supplier’s interest in 
the most timely conclusion of the procedure. 
                                                                                                                                               
Barriers to Trade and on Licensing Procedures to Article VI:4 of the General Agreement 
on Trade in Services. Note by the Secretariat, S/WPPS/W/9, 11 September 1996; for the 
recent negotiations, see also the Consolidated Working Paper, § D, Definitions; and WTO, 
WPDR, Definitions of Qualification Requirements, Qualification Procedures, Licensing 
Requirements, Licensing Procedures and Technical Standards. Communication from the 
Separate Customs Territory of Taiwan, Penghu, Kinmen and Matsu S/WPDR/W/37, 6 
October 2005. 
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 These substantive and procedural limits do not of course refer to the 
applicant’s right to participate in a defensive role. This right is in fact fully 
guaranteed. 
An applicant for authorisation can make use of the rights accorded by 
GATS art. VI:3 GATS: to have information concerning the status of the 
application, to correct any errors in the application, to be advised by the 
administration on the administrative burdens to be borne. These are 
technically simplification and loyal cooperation requirements, but they do 
offer procedural opportunities for establishing a dialogue with the 
administration, however much from a defensive position. And this is 
without neglecting the right to a review of adverse decisions, which GATS 
expressly grants only to the applicant (art. VI:2). 
The full right to be heard pending an adverse decision can be deduced 
from an interpretation of the general principles. The jurisprudence has 
effectively followed this path in the area of import licenses for goods and 
there is no reason to preclude its application to the domestic regulation of 
services as well. This jurisprudence applies the principles of reasonableness 
and impartiality not only to the final decision, but also to the administrative 
proceeding in its entirety, thus defining minimum standards of due process 
binding upon national authorities . 46
The Appellate Body overruled a national proceeding in which “there is 
no formal opportunity for an applicant country to be heard, or to respond to 
any arguments that may be made against it, in the course of the certification 
process before a decision to grant or to deny certification is made”. The 
judgment, moreover, held decisions adopted through an “informal”, 
“casual” or “not transparent” procedure to be illegal. It thus clearly 
recognised the affected parties’ right to be heard, the agencies’ duty of 
individual notification of adopted measures, and a prohibition of fact-
finding based only on an “ex parte enquiry”47. 
Though the service supplier’s right to defence is affirmed in principle, it 
is much more difficult to evaluate which instrumental rights, and how many 
                                                 
46 In an important recent finding, the Panel, discussing the notion of “administration of a 
measure,” noted: “Does the term "administer" relate to the application of laws, regulations, 
decisions and rulings in particular cases? If so, does it concern the manner in which 
administrative processes are conducted? … In the Panel's view, the application of a law in a 
particular case encompasses the administrative process entailed in that application, because 
the administrative process represents the series of steps, actions or events that are taken or 
occur in pursuance of what is required by the law in question. In addition, we consider that 
the application of a law in a particular case encompasses the results of administrative 
processes.  We hold this view because the results of administrative processes are the final 
manifestation of the application of a law in a particular case.  Furthermore, the results of 
administrative processes are, by definition, the product of administrative processes which, 
as we have already said, would seem to fall within the scope of the ordinary meaning of the 
term « administer »” (WTO, APPELLATE BODY REPORT, European communities – Selected 
Customs Matters, WT/DS315/AB/R, 13 November 2006, § 7.103 e § 7.105). 
47 WTO, APELLATE BODY REPORT, US – Shrimp, cit., para 180 e ss.; on this decision, 
see S. CASSESE, Global standards for national administrative procedures, 68 Law & 
Contemp. Probs. 109 (2005), and G. DELLA CANANEA, Beyond the State: the 
Europeanization and Globalization of Procedural Administrative Law, 9 European Public 
Law, 574 (2003). 
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 of them, ought to be recognised. The analogy with other WTO agreements 
does not lead very far, because the relative discipline involves measures that 
are applicable trans-nationally, directly affecting the relationships between 
States, not relations between States and the private actors that come into 
contact with them.  
48Invocations of due process and procedural fairness , however, seem to 
legitimate the reference to the principles common to national legal 
systems49.  
Notwithstanding the different models and great asymmetries in their 
respective procedural standards, procedural protections increase in relation 
to the threat to the rights of private parties50. In the area under examination 
here, therefore, the duties of due process ought to assume a greater 
importance in disciplinary proceedings, or in proceedings for revoking or 
not renewing a license. This interpretation can be linked, however 
indirectly, to § E.3(h) of the Consolidated Draft Text. This norm imposes 
the prompt publication of “any monitoring, compliance or enforcement 
procedures including notification procedures for non-compliance”. Formally 
it is a duty to publish something, but, substantially, entails a minimum 
standard of fairness, at least in sanctioning procedures. 
 
3.2. Participation in rule-making proceedings 
 
                                                 
48 For the principle of natural justice in common law, see H.H. MARSHALL, Natural 
Justice, London 1959; P. JACKSON, Natural Justice, London, 1979; FLICK, Natural Justice: 
principles and practical applications, Sidney, 1979; H.W.R. WADE and C.F. FORSYTH, 
Administrative Law, cit., 435; on determining what process is due in several contexts under 
US law, see FRIENDLY, Some Kind of Hearing, 123 in U.PA. L. Rev. 1267 (1975); see also 
BREYER, STEWART, SUNSTEN, SPITZER, Administrative Law and Regulatory Policy, 
Problems, Text and Cases, IV ed., New York, 1999, 691 et. seq. 
49 See A. SANDULLI, Il procedimento, cit., 1064; G. PERICU, Attività amministrativa, cit., 
1313. On German law, see, ex plurimis, EHLERS, Anhorung im Verwaltungsverfahren, in 
JURA, 1996, 617 et. seq.; in the United States, the courts have displayed a special solicitude 
in extending procedural safeguards to protect licensed professionals. As early as 1873, the 
Supreme Court held that a lawyer might not be disbarred without notice and opportunity for 
hearing [ex parte Robinson, 86 U.S. 505 (1873)]; hearings have also been required in initial 
licensing [Willner v. Committee on Character and Fitness, 373 U.S. 96 (1963)]. 
50 In Germany, VwVfg, § 28, holds that only the individuals affected by a decision that 
transforms their “status quo” into a “status quo minus” have the right to be heard 
(STELKENS, BONK, SACHS, Verwaltungsverfarhensgesetz – Kommentar, § 28, c.p.v. 26). In 
Italy, the so-called “giusto procedimento” (which differs from ordinary participation rights 
having a democratic or collaborative functions, because its aims to afford an individual the 
opportunity of defence) concerns decisions, such as expropriations or sanctions, that affect 
pre-existing rights or legitimate interests. On this point, see the decision of the Italian 
Constitutional Court, 20 March 1978, n. 23, and 25 October 1985, n. 234; see also, G. 
SCIULLO, Il principio del giusto procedimento tra giustizia costituzionale e amministrativa, 
in Jus, 1980, p. 291 et. seq.; in United States, for the application of APA to licensing 
procedures, see C.R. HOWART, Federal Licensing and the APA: When Must Formal 
Adjudicative Procedures Be Used?, 37 Admin. L. Rev. 317 (1985); HETHERINGTON, State 
Economic Regulation and Substantive Due Process of Law, 53, Law & Contemp. Probs. 
267 (1970) and NOTE, Due Process Limitations on Occupational Licensing, 59 Va. L. Rev. 
1097 (1973). 
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 Rights to participate in regulatory proceedings, of various intensity and 
scope, are provided in many national legal systems, but they are only 
recognised generally in Anglo-American law. The development of these 
rights coincides with the expansion of delegating legislation and with the 
decline of the myth of administration as a mere transmission belt for 
parliamentary choices. 
In the early 20th century, in England, statutory inquiries replaced 
Parliamentary Private Bills, which had been used until then in expropriation 
proceedings. Following this, such inquiries were extended to the whole 
administrative system for the regulation and planning of private activities.51 
In the United States, notice and comment and formal rule making 
procedures52 were tied to the increased government regulation and 
administrative discretion in implementing the public policies of the New 
Deal.53
The participation of private actors functions as a surrogate to the political 
process in ensuring the full representation of the interests affected by the 
administrative choices. Procedural intervention replaces democratic 
representation as a technique for legitimising and controlling the 
discretionary choices of unelected public authorities. 
The function of participatory rights in the rule-making phase, and the 
causes leading to their creation, go far to explain the attention given to them 
by global law. But in this context, the topic assumes a greater, though 
somewhat different importance. 
Participatory rights assume a greater importance in global law, because 
every act adopted by a public authority (whether elected or not) in a foreign 
                                                 
51 On participatory rights in the United Kingdom, see J. F. GARNER, Consultation in 
Subordinate Legislation, in Public Law, 1964, p. 105 et. seq.; A. D. JERGESEN, The Legal 
Requirements of Consultation, in Public Law, 1978, p. 290 et. seq.; T. PROSSER, 
Democratisation, Accountability and Institutional Design: Reflections on public Law, in P. 
MCAUSLAN – J. F. MCELDOWNEY (eds.), Law, Legitimacy and the Constitution, London, 
1985, p. 170 et. seq.; A. POLICE, La tutela del privato nel diritto urbanistico inglese: le 
garanzie del procedimento, in Rivista giuridica di urbanistica, 1991, n. 4, III, p. 661 et. 
seq.; G. RICHARDSON, The Legal Regulation of Process, in G. RICHARDSON – H. GENN, 
Administrative Law and Government Action, Oxford, 1994, 105; F. FRACCHIA, Analisi 
comparata della partecipazione procedimentale nell’ordinamento inglese ed in quello 
italiano, in Diritto e società, 1997, n. 2, p. 189; G. HART, The Value of the Inquiries 
System, in Journal of Planning & Environment Law, 1997, p. 8 et. seq.; in the case law, see 
R. v. Liverpool Corporation, 14 Feb. 1972, [1972]2 QB 299; Bushell and another v. 
Secretary of State for the Environment, 4 Feb. 1980, [1981] AC 75; R v. Birmingham City 
Council, 22 Jan. 1993, 91 LGR 532. 
52 See U.S. Code, Title 5, Part 1, Chapter 5, 553, Rule making: “General notice of 
proposed rule making shall be published in the Federal Register, unless persons subject 
thereto are named and either personally served or otherwise have actual notice thereof in 
accordance with law. The notice shall include: 1) a statement of the time, place, and nature 
of public rule making proceedings; 2) reference to the legal authority under which the rule 
is proposed; and 3) either the terms or substance of the proposed rule or a description of the 
subjects and issues involved …  After notice required by this section, the agency shall give 
interested persons an opportunity to participate in the rule making through submission of 
written data, views, or arguments with or without opportunity for oral presentation. After 
consideration of the relevant matter presented, the agency shall incorporate in the rules 
adopted a concise general statement of their basis and purpose”.
53 For participation rights in the United States, see infra, 3.3. 
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 legal system has a subjectively “administrative” nature for the citizens of 
other States. It does not matter to a foreign firm whether a rule has been 
enacted by a parliament or an executive agency; the problems of 
accountability are the same54.  
Participatory rights have a somewhat different importance at the global 
level, because their purpose here is not to recreate the representation of the 
opposing interests embodied in a national collectivity at the administrative 
level, but more specifically to open the door to some specific external 
interests, which would otherwise be neglected.  
In the WTO context, the TBT and SPS agreements contain the most 
detailed provisions for participation in rule-making proceedings. They adopt 
the American model of notice and comment. The rules provide for a duty of 
publication and notification to the WTO Secretariat of every relevant new 
law, standard and regulation, including an indication of the objective 
pursued and its underlying rationale. This notification must be given within 
a useful time (at an appropriately early stage, when amendments can still be 
introduced and comments taken into account). States must give the other 
Member States a reasonable time in which to present and discuss their 
observations, and they are obliged to take these observations and 
discussions into consideration when making their decision55. Annex 3 of the 
TBT, the Code of Good Practice, provides furthermore that a parallel 
procedure be opened to “interested parties” (the standardisation authorities) 
of the other Member States56.  
This procedure, however, has its limits. It takes place entirely at the inter-
State level (or, in any case, between public authorities). Governments 
intervene to represent the interest of their own economic operators, 
according to a model of diplomatic protection. The participation of domestic 
interest groups is left to the will of the individual States that intend to adopt 
the new measure.  
In the services sector, the rules governing participation in rule-making 
proceedings have even less bite. The primary law contained in the GATS 
                                                 
54 For this aspect, see S. BATTINI, La globalizzazione del diritto pubblico, in Riv. trim. 
dir. pub., 2006, p. 336. 
55 See, TBT Agreement, art. 2, Preparation, Adoption and Application of Technical 
Regulations by Central Government Bodies, paragraph 9 et. seq., and (the almost identical) 
SPS Measures Agreement, Annex B, Transparency of Sanitary and Phytosanitary 
Regulations, Notification Procedures, art. 5.  
56 TBT Agreement, Annex 3, Code of Good Practice for the Preparation, Adoption and 
Application of Standards, paras. L – N: “Before adopting a standard, the standardizing body 
shall allow a period of at least 60 days for the submission of comments on the draft 
standard by interested parties within the territory of a Member of the WTO … Such 
notification shall include, as far as practicable, whether the draft standard deviates from 
relevant international standards. On the request of any interested party within the territory 
of a Member of the WTO, the standardizing body shall promptly provide, or arrange to 
provide, a copy of a draft standard which it has submitted for comments … The 
standardizing body shall take into account, in the further processing of the standard, the 
comments received during the period for commenting. Comments received through 
standardizing bodies that have accepted this Code of Good Practice shall, if so requested, 
be replied to as promptly as possible. The reply shall include an explanation why a 
deviation from relevant international standards is necessary”. 
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 does not address regulatory procedures at all, concentrating instead on the 
substantive conformity of national measures with treaty obligations, through 
the so-called necessity test.  
The only existing law in this area is contained in the Accountancy 
Disciplines: “When introducing measures which significantly affect trade in 
accountancy services, Members shall endeavour to provide opportunity for 
comment, and give consideration to such comments, before adoption”. And 
it is lacking from many point of view. First of all, it does not clarify the 
scope of the recognised rights to intervene; apparently, participation seems 
open to private actors as well, though the context of the provision would 
seem to preclude this57. Secondly, at the procedural level, the provisions are 
vague, the procedural requirements are set forth only in a very general way 
and the interested administration’s duties to give reasons are not clarified. 
But most serious is the lack of a “mandatory provision.” The phrase “shall 
endeavour to” is in fact used in the practice of treaty drafting to refer to a 
non-binding undertaking.  
This problem is in fact one of the most important ones emerging from the 
Working Party debates, as well as from the position papers of various 
international organisations. Participants in the debates argued both in favour 
of the introduction of a binding horizontal duty of prior notification58, and 
against such a general duty, for its violation of States’ right to regulate59.  
                                                 
57 The same article, indeed, imposes the duty to give reasons for measures adopted, but 
only upon the request of another member State. Consequently, if only the States have the 
right to know the rationale behind a norm, a fortiori, is difficult to extend the right to 
participate in the rule making procedures to private individuals and to give consideration to 
their comments. 
58 WTO, WPDR, Transparency in Domestic Regulation. Communication from the United 
States, S/CSS/W/102, 13 July 2001, paragraph 5: “Meaningful notice and comment periods 
provide a reasonable assurance that interested parties will see the notice and have adequate 
time to respond.  The ability of individuals and firms to comment on regulatory measures 
before implementation offers a number of benefits, including increased efficiency and 
credibility of the proposed measure. Prior comment also reduces uncertainty and 
discriminatory treatment in a given market as all parties are better informed through the 
ability to participate in the development of regulations.  Prior comment allows the 
opportunity to solicit views on proposed new or amended regulations from all interested 
parties, including domestic and foreign service suppliers operating or seeking to operate in 
the national market as well as the general public so that the provision is developed under an 
informed debate. Established mechanisms to solicit and respond to public inquiries and 
comments help make the process easier to administer. Dismissing the need to consider and 
respond to comments on the proposed measures on the grounds of burdensome costs can 
deprive countries of the benefits such procedures provide. Beyond the initial start-up costs, 
maintenance costs for such a system can be low. As previously mentioned, new 
technologies such as the Internet have further reduced the financial burden associated with 
a prior consultation system. n order to complement the prior comment mechanism, pending 
regulations, comments received by the regulators, and responses to the comments all should 
be made available to the public”. 
59 WTO, WPDR, Domestic Regulation: Necessity and Transparency. Communication 
from the European Communities and their Member States, S/WPDR/W/14, 1 May 2001, 
paragraph 28: “The European Communities and their Member States recognise that prior 
consultations on the introduction of regulatory measures can prove useful. However, we are 
of the opinion that the different regulatory and legislative systems of Members need to be 
respected, and we therefore do not see any scope for introducing obligations for 
establishing prior consultation mechanisms as a result of disciplines under Article VI:4. 
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 The text under discussion, proposed by the United States and 
incorporated into the Consolidated Working Paper (the outcome of three, 
progressively less stringent  draft proposals) is based on § 553 of the U.S. 
Code, and is very detailed. In particular, rule-making bodies are required to 
provide States and private actors with an opportunity to comment and “[to] 
address in writing substantive issues raised in comments received”60. 
In more recent informal documents however, the most important features 
of the American proposal seem to have been abandoned in favour of the 
minimalist approach of the Accountancy Disciplines61. 
 
3.3. Segue: reasons for the current lack of global norms for rule-making 
proceedings 
 
There are three main reasons for the situation described above. 
The first reason is technical, and does not depend on the supranational 
context and the character of the ends at stake. Many countries, especially in 
the Third World, have highlighted inability of their bureaucracies to run 
participatory proceedings. Such proceedings do have disadvantages: 
increased delay arriving at a decision, thus compromising an 
administration’s ability to respond quickly to changing needs; increased 
costs of running the proceedings and conducting the necessary studies to 
analyse or refute the parties’ arguments; increased contentiousness and a 
more searching and intensive judicial review, leading to further delays62.  
                                                                                                                                               
The provisions of the accountancy disciplines, which recognize this difficulty, and call 
upon Members to endeavour to provide opportunity for comment when introducing new 
measures, could provide valuable guidance for the current work on regulatory disciplines”. 
60 See the Consolidated Working Paper, E:4: “[ Proposal i] Each Member shall 
endeavour to: a) publish in advance any measures of the type referred to in paragraph E.1 
that it proposes to adopt; and b) provide interested persons and other Members a reasonable 
opportunity to comment on such proposed measures. Each Member shall endeavour to: c) 
at the time it adopts such final measures, address in writing substantive issues raised in 
comments received from interested persons with respect to the proposed measures; and d) 
allow a reasonable period of time between publication of such final measures and their 
effective date. [Proposal ii] Each Member shall endeavour to ensure that any measures of 
general application it proposes to adopt in relation to matters subject to these disciplines are 
published in advance, and a reasonable opportunity is available for interested persons, 
including those of other Members, to comment on such proposed measures”. 
61 The United States, which always argues for strengthening procedural transparency, 
has also had to accept this solution. See WTO, WPDR, Outline of US Position on draft 
Consolidated text in the WPDR. Communication from the United States, 11 July 2006, 
JOB(06)/223: “We are looking for disciplines that adopt realistic and flexible standards of 
compliance, covering … provision, on a best endeavour basis, for prior publication of new 
regulations and reasonable opportunity for interested persons to comment, as well as the 
expectation that substantive comments received will be taken into consideration by the 
regulator”. 
62The national experiences clarify these problems. In the United States, compliance with 
the APA procedural safeguards has created an average length of many years for each 
proceeding (relating to this problem, some scholars speak about “rule-making 
ossification”); moreover, this fact has compelled the agencies to seek alternative solutions 
to avoid procedural bottleneck, such as case-by-case decisions, negotiated rule making, 
broad interpretation of cases dispensing with the prior notification rule. For general 
remarks, see BREYER, STEWART, SUNSTEN, SPITZER, Administrative Law and Regulatory 
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 These arguments, however, are not fully persuasive. The issues raised 
could in fact be resolved by means of various expedients: ad hoc 
derogations; transitory periods; application of notice and comment only in 
the most sensitive sectors (such as telecommunications); limiting 
intervention to the individual States, at least at the initial phase, to reduce 
the documentary burden. In fact, such difficulties have not undermined prior 
notification procedures in the sectors covered by the TBT and SPS 
Agreements.   
The second and third reasons are tied to the transplantation of this 
particular procedure from the national to the supranational context, and to 
the functional mutation that follows from this: as discussed in the previous 
section, participatory rights have a greater though different significance at 
the supranational level. 
First of all, to limit the GATS notice and comment rules to just 
administrative proceedings would be an incongruous choice. In the national 
context, this could be justified by the different assumptions of legitimacy of 
the legislative and executive powers. But at the global level, this distinction 
carries less weight. Moreover, accepting this approach offers the Member 
States a comfortable escamotage for avoiding the obligations, by simply 
shifting the sedes decidendi. 
Still, extending participatory rights to rule-making procedures as well 
would require some Member States to significantly change their legislative 
systems. Though some countries already have generalised notice and 
comment procedures for secondary legislation, almost no one does for 
primary legislation. At most, there might be a practice of holding 
parliamentary hearings with private parties, but this has no binding effect on 
the decisions to be adopted.  
This consideration is even more important in the GATS context than in 
the context of the TBT or SPS, which regulate through technical norms or 
standards and therefore, because of the constitutional traditions of the 
Member States, only rarely require legislative acts having the form of law.   
                                                                                                                                               
Policy, cit., 633 et. seq.; MCGARITY, Some Thoughts on “Deossifyng” the Rule Making 
Process, 1992, Duke Law Journal, 1385; PIERCE, Seven Ways to Deossify Agency Rule 
Making, 47 Administrative Law Review, 59 (1995). Yet again, in the WPDR debates, these 
difficulties have been pointed out and many countries have urged giving broad flexibility to 
notice and comment provisions; after all, even the OECD has acknowledged that, for many 
developing countries, it is only realistic to  introduce transparency in rule making in 
specific sectors. See WTO, WPDR, Report on the meeting held on 7 and 18 February 2005, 
cit, § 140: “[t]he delegation of India, regarding such aspects of the paper as interested 
persons, publishing in advance, and responses in writing, while recognizing that some 
flexibility had been provided, raised the issue of the capacity of developing countries.  They 
agreed with Mexico that it was not necessary to address comments in writing”; § 141: 
“[t]he delegation of Chile … also raised other issues such as the costs implied by the 
proposal, capacity needs,  and the relationship with other proposals”;  § 151: “[t]he 
delegation of South Africa … noted that references to "reasonable" and "to the extent 
practicable" would offer a certain flexibility, but asked what aspects of the document would 
refer directly to the abilities of LDCs and developing countries in general to adopt the 
disciplines”. 
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 In the area of services, the situation is quite delicate. Just consider the 
regulation of professional services, an area which bears strong political 
implications, and has long been at the centre of parliamentary debates63.  
The American proposal for transparency in rule-making proceedings was 
hotly debated before the WPDR64. In the face of the objections put forward 
by many countries65, the American proponents had to concede the limits of 
rule-making procedures. 
The third factor hindering the development of global norms for rule-
making proceedings is connected to the different balance between national 
and foreign interests that they would create. 
The intervention of private parties would not be neutral with respect to 
the substantive content of the rules adopted, and it can affect the exercise of 
discretion. The authorities, in making final decisions, shall also take into 
consideration the arguments raised in the rule-making debates. Likewise, the 
quality of the reasons given, and their coherence in responding to the 
regulatory alternatives presented at the rule-making phase, would naturally 
become fertile ground for global judicial review. This would alter the 
current mechanisms for reviewing the Member States’ right to regulate, 
until now based exclusively on the necessity test. The current “static” 
determination of the regulation’s output would be supplemented by a 
“dynamic” review of the entire decision-making process, along the false line 
of the “hard look doctrine”. 
To better understand how this could affect the hierarchy and mutual 
relevance of the interests involved in a particular regulatory regime, it is 
useful to examine the American experience. 
                                                 
63 Prior notification, however, can be anticipated during the administrative procedures 
required to introduce an Executive’s proposed law. In particular, notice and comment 
should be required pending regulatory impact analysis (RIA), a procedure widely known in 
many OECD countries (there was such a proposal: WTO, WPDR, Regulatory Impact 
Analysis in Australia, S/WPDR/W/15. Communication from Australia, 3 May 2001, 
paragraph 8). This does not however solve the problem: comments, indeed, are not directed 
to the authority which adopts the final decision; and the result of participation cannot bind 
national parliaments. 
64 WTO, WPDR, Horizontal Transparency Disciplines in Domestic Regulation. Proposal 
by the United States, cited by the WTO, WPDR, Report on the meeting held on 7 and 18 
February 2005. Note by the Secretariat, S/WPDR/M/29, 11 July 2005, § 130 et. seq. 
“Another very important discipline it presented was the requirement for advance notice and 
comment. That was a mandatory requirement, designed to apply to specific commitments, 
but the delegation recognized there might be differences in how countries wished to 
implement the requirement, and therefore proposed the standard of to the extent 
practicable”. 
65 WTO, WPDR, Report on the meeting held on 7 and 18 February 2005, cit., § 144: 
“[o]n paragraphs B.2 and B.3 [about notice and comment], the delegation [of European 
Community] asked whether they would also apply to parliamentary bodies”; § 154: “the 
delegation of Malaysia, on paragraph B.2(b), said there could be a problem with Malaysia's 
domestic legislative procedures. Like other delegations, they also had concerns on 
paragraph B.3, and sought further explanation”. Such difficulties were also underscored by 
the Mexican delegation. The WPDP Secretariat noted that: “[r]egarding prior notice and 
comment, the delegation said it clearly concerned regulations of general application, and 
did not deal with legislation or laws, which would present a problem in many countries” 
(WTO, WPDR, Report on the meeting held on 7 and 18 February 2005, cit, 57). 
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 After WWII, American law saw a progressive delegitimation of the 
system of agencies granted wide discretionary powers by Congress. The 
economic analysis of law progressively highlighted the relationship between 
regulators and the regulated, characterising it as a form of corruption or, in 
more refined terms, as an imbalance in representation produced by 
regulatory capture.66 Undeniably, from the global perspective, this 
framework is well-adapted to the relationships between national regulatory 
authorities, and national and foreign firms, given States’ natural tendency to 
favour domestic pressure groups. 
American courts developed two methods for dealing with this legitimacy 
crisis. First, they extended the right to participation in rule-making 
procedures and standing to parties not directly and individually affected by 
the regulation (bodies representing diffused interests, collectivities, non-
governmental organisations, etc.). Second, they heightened their level of 
scrutiny, giving a hard look at the different parties’ arguments and 
regulatory alternatives, which created a heavy burden of motivation and 
procedural thoroughness. The problem of regulatory capture has thus been 
addressed through the granting of rights of information, participation and 
legal recourse to one or more non-governmental organizations – economic 
analysis speaks of republican tripartism67 - to balance the regulated firm’s 
influence and break the bipolar relationship between the regulatory authority 
and the regulatory target. 
Transplanted to the global level, this technique would break the link 
between national regulators and national firms by granting foreign firms and 
other Member States the right to intervene as third parties in administrative 
proceedings. 
In truth, the American proposal accords participation rights to national 
actors as well, thus implying an even wider procedural legitimation than that 
provided by the TBT and SPS agreements. It goal, however, is not so much 
to give voice to domestic firms as to bring out the possible differences 
between domestic groups. There is a basic awareness that national firms, 
which usually have protectionist interests, are in any case able to lobby the 
administrative authorities, especially in the face of opaque procedures. A 
greater transparency allows the adequate representation of other interests, 
like those of consumer organisations and national communities interested in 
                                                 
66 For a useful analysis of this issue, see R. B. STEWART, The Reformation of American 
Administrative Law, 88 Harv. L. Rev., 1667 (1974-5), and  ID., Administrative Law in 
Twenty-first Century, in 78 N.Y.U. L. Rev. 437 (2003); G. SHUBERT, The public interest, 
119 (1960); STIGLER, The Theory of Economic Regulation, 2 Bell J. Econ. & Mgmt. Sci. 3 
(1971); A. KAHN, The Economics of Regulation, 11-14 (1971); J. Landis, Report on 
Regulatory Agencies to the President-Elect, 71 (1960); J.J. LAFFONT AND J. TIROLE, The 
politics of government decision making. A theory of regulatory capture, in Quarterly 
Journal of Economics, 1089 (1991); M.E. LEVINE and J.L. FORRENCE, Regulatory capture, 
public interest, and the public agenda. Toward a synthesis, in 6 Journal of Law Economics 
& Organization, 167 (1990). 
67 I. AYRES, J. BRAITHWAITE, Tripartism: Regulatory Capture and Empowerment, 16 
Law & Soc. Inquiry, 435 (1991). 
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 increasing market competition, and whose participation could benefit the 
global interest in open markets68. 
Global law aims to utilise instruments conceived by administrative law to 
guarantee the balance between domestic groups, thus overcoming the 
particular “imbalance in representation” characterising the relationships 
between national authorities and foreign firms.  
This re-balancing does however lead to a new imbalance, on many 
different fronts. 
First of all, the problem of an imbalance in representation can re-emerge 
in the relationships between foreign firms and participating Member States, 
becoming a question of external discrimination. Not all foreign firms have 
the same resources for asserting their position. The disparity already 
existing between the different actors in the global area could thus be further 
accentuated by global rules on participating in rule-making procedures. 
Some Member States have expressly highlighted this concern69. 
The biggest risk of all is a possible over-representation of the interests of 
foreign firms, to the disadvantage of national firms and other groups, 
producing a kind of domestic reverse discrimination. Foreign firms could 
wield greater economic resources than national ones, which could be a 
decisive advantage in decisions requiring complicated procedures, accurate 
scientific studies and costly market analysis. But above all, foreign firms 
enjoy the significant coercive power provided by the threat of legal action 
before a WTO dispute resolution panel, brought by their Member State. This 
is a threat which national firms cannot make in the current WTO dispute 
resolution system. This possibility displaces the traditional analyses based 
on purely national models, introducing a unique element in the purely global 
dimension.  
                                                 
68 Using the public choice theory framework yet again, the negotiation of free trade 
treaties is tied to contrasts in domestic decision-making, more than to mediation between 
the distinct national interests of participating States (see P. MOSER, The Political Economy 
of the GATT, Grusch, Switzerland, 1990: “The main purpose of international trade 
negotiations is not to trade off divergent interests between countries, but to modify the rules 
of interactions in the domestic political process”). The costs of protectionism are spread 
among communities of consumers, whereas well-organized groups of producers enjoy the 
advantages: consequently, producers’ interests are over-represented compared to 
consumers’ interests before national decision makers. But, whenever decisions are made 
through bargaining with other commercial partners, new groups, interested in accessing the 
markets, counterbalance the protectionist efforts (see J. M. FINGER, The GATT as 
international discipline over trade restrictions: a public choice approach, World Bank 
Working Paper, March 1990; H. HAUSSER, Domestic Policy Foundation and Domestic 
Policy Function of International Trade Rules, in 41 Aussenwirtschaft, (1986), no. 2/3, at 
171-184). This analysis is related to traditional barriers to trade and to classical diplomatic 
boards where such decisions are made. However, where barriers are not protectionist, but 
regulatory, the locus decidendi change and it comes back to the national level: to ensure the 
correct functioning of countervailing mechanisms, indeed, a new forum emerges, where 
various interests can be represented. One can locate this forum in participation procedures. 
69See, for example, WPDR, Report on the meeting held on 7 and 18 February 2005, cit, 
§ 135, that summarizes the position of Korean delegation: “the implementation of prior 
comment … might therefore involve an imbalance of opportunity depending on each 
Member's capacity or resources”. 
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 Much depends, naturally, on the type of review to be performed by the 
Panel and the Appellate Body. The Accountancy Disciplines, using the 
same formula of the American Federal Administrative Procedure Act, 
provide for a “duty to give consideration” to the comments presented. On 
the basis of this formula, American courts have been able to impose very 
strict controls on national administrative authorities. From the technical 
standpoint, this is a procedural control. Consequently, its penetration 
depends, in large measure, on the level of formalisation attained in the 
process and on the confrontation between the authorities that are parties to 
the proceeding. It is no coincidence that many States have expressly 
requested that the required replies to the comments presented not be formal 
writings, but communicated in an informal way, thus breaking the 
functional link between the decision and the results of a participatory 
process, and shifting the burden of due consideration from the legal plane to 
the diplomatic one70. 
 
4. Conclusion 
 
In the introduction, I set forth five factors that influence the global 
transplantation of principles of national administrative law, thus affecting 
the function and structure of regulation. In light of this analysis, it is now 
possible to examine the precise implications of each of these factors. 
 
a) The beneficiaries of the protections change. Global administrative law 
seeks to legitimise and control the public powers employed in the regulation 
of transnational relationships and phenomena. As many studies have shown, 
global governance is only rarely marred by an absolute lack of 
accountability. More often, its faults lie in the incorrect selection of the 
constituencies to whom global authorities must respond71. 
The free trade agreements proceed from the classical approach to the 
problem of international legality. The implementation of these agreements 
follows two entirely domestic routes: national parliaments and 
administrations maintain control of their decisions, notwithstanding their 
extra-territorial efficacy72. This framework has the defect of selective 
accountability in relations with foreign firms and individuals. To protect 
them, global law employs the national administrative law techniques for 
                                                 
70 See WTO, WPDR, Report on the meeting held on 7 and 18 February 2005, § 138. As 
a consequence of these pressures, the United States blunted the duties of due consideration 
provided in its proposal, see WTO, WPDR, Report on the meeting held on 22 June 2005. 
Note by the Secretariat, S/WPDR/M/30, 6 September 2005, 42: “[c]hanges were made to 
B(3)(c) which dealt with responding in writing to comments on proposed regulations by 
changing the language so as to clarify that this provision required a summarized written 
response to substantive comments and not specific individual responses to all comments”. 
71 See R.W GRANT, R. O. KEOHANE, Accountability and Abuses of Power in World 
Politics, in 99 American Political Science Review, No. 1, 26 et. seq. (2005); R. O. 
KEOHANE, Global Governance and Democratic Accountability, in D. HELD M. KOENIG-
ARCHIBUGI (eds.), Taming Globalization: Frontiers of Governance, 2003, 130 et. seq. 
72 See B. KINGSBURY, Sovereignty and Inequality, in 9 European Journal of 
International Law, 623-5 (1998); N. KRISH, The Pluralism of Global Administrative Law, 
ibid, vol. 17, 253 (2006). 
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 protecting private autonomy and freedoms, while changing a key element, 
the beneficiaries of these protections. 
A clear distinction can be made between the roles and competences of 
the WTO and the States in the law of administrative procedure. The GATS 
grants some instrumental rights to foreign service suppliers: to participate in 
the proceeding, to obtain a decision within a reasonable time, to be given 
reasons for a refusal, to appeal to an outside tribunal.  It also imposes 
external limits upon the discretion of national administrations, thus 
influencing the balancing of the relevant interests in adjudication 
proceedings: it recalibrates the level of the acceptable sacrifice of the 
interest of foreign operators in their favour. 
Within these limits, it is the States function to grant participatory rights to 
their own citizens and national economic operators, as well as to take 
account of their interests in making decisions. National administrative 
provisions are, however, subject to a test of their procedural congruity and 
reasonableness. Specifically, the protections granted to domestic actors 
cannot unreasonably prejudice the speed of the decision; they cannot shift 
the axis of discretionary judgements, which must rotate around the interest 
of free competition.  
This analysis enables us to better appreciate the implications of the global 
regulation of domestic regulation. It does not imply the mere extension of 
the protections already offered by national legal systems but rather, in 
changing the beneficiaries of these protections, it also changes the 
regulation’s very purpose. This new situation is not neutral with respect to 
the pre-existing hierarchy of relevant public and private interests. It creates 
a new balance both in the relationships between private interests, as well as 
in the relationship between the private interest of the applicant and the 
public interest pursued by the regulatory authority. 
 
b) The institutional framework changes. From the national perspective, 
the democratic investiture of governing authorities and bureaucratic 
selection mechanisms is the proper institutional context for legitimising 
discretionary power and ensuring an impartial implementation of national 
policies.  But looking at this same institutional context from the 
supranational perspective, one suspects an intrinsic national prejudice in 
relation to foreign economic operators, compromising national 
administrations’ ability to pursue global ends. 
Global law thus influences both of these sources of bias, first by 
“quantitatively” limiting the scope of discretionary power, through the duty 
to employ predefined and transparent selection criteria.  Moreover, by 
introducing further organizational safeguards, it also breaks the link and the 
possible collusion between national regulators and the national targets of 
their rules. 
 
c) The structure of the regulation changes. International free trade 
organisations pursue specific rather than general objectives. This not only 
affects their function, but also the model of regulation that they employ. 
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 The global law governing domestic regulation cannot be understood as a 
global version of the American APA or the German VwVfg, each of which 
make up a complete and self-sufficient corpus of norms. Global regulation, 
by contrast, is more spotty and, for many of the issues central to national 
administrative law, it is subtle, mere principle or altogether absent.  
The negotiators’ approach is extremely pragmatic. The texts of the 
Accountancy Disciplines and the Consolidated Working Paper are full of 
detailed provisions in relation to specific procedural steps and 
administrative practices that can significantly impact commercial operators. 
Setting forth the basic protections of due process, procedural fairness and 
reasonableness, the disciplines are almost entirely focused on simplifying 
bureaucratic formalities, facilitating the public administration’s relationships 
with its “users”, prohibiting excessive formalities and imposing a 
cooperative logic, in order to decrease the length and cost of administrative 
proceedings.  
In other words, the disciplines are not a “codification”; they are not a law 
“of” procedure, but a law “on” procedure. This approach is undoubtedly 
influenced by technical difficulties (States’ resistance to giving up 
regulatory power, different legal traditions which hinder harmonisation), but 
is mainly justified by the ultimate goals of the law, which is the creation of a 
regulatory environment supportive of the transboundary provision of 
services. 
 
d) It makes relationships more complex. The levels of government and 
interest groups multiply: at the global level we have national and global 
authorities, national firms and foreign competitors, domestic associations 
and international non-governmental organisations. Furthermore, the same 
actors may perform different roles: in rule-making, in particular, the States 
can function both as authorities obliged to guarantee participatory rights to 
third parties, and also as third parties with their own right to intervene in 
other Member States’ regulatory proceedings. However, the relationship 
between the different actors is unstable: national citizens can support the 
interest in free competition, alongside the foreign firms or they may play a 
protectionist role. The heightened complexity is thus not a purely 
quantitative fact, but also a relational one, generating unexpected conflicts 
that can be exploited by global law. 
Some principles are particularly affected by this: the participation of 
citizens, if guaranteed directly by international commercial law, loses its 
function of protecting individuals and gets exploited to bring out conflictual 
interests at the national level. This becomes instrumental to the pursuit of 
external interests. 
This heightened complexity, and the risk of cross-purposes can however 
cause strong internal resistances and counter-pressures, which make it more 
difficult to impose functioning national mechanisms at the global level.  
 
e) The transplantation does not happen in a homogeneous way. The 
heterogeneity emerges on many fronts. First of all, some areas and 
relationships are more regulated than others: sometimes it is a negotiated 
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 choice, tied to the economic priorities of the moment (for example, the 
decision to regulate accountancy and telecommunications services comes 
from the strong internationalisation of the businesses operating in these two 
sectors); sometimes it has structural causes, like the influence on States’ 
right to regulate (regulating public services implies not only limiting the 
police power, to preserve competition, but also affirmative actions to enable 
the creation of a competitive environment).  
Secondly, some procedural protections are preferred over others. In 
general, substantive mechanisms are preferred over participatory ones. The 
traditional “continental” approach of reviewing the reasons given seems to 
prevail over the “Anglo-American” approach of procedural review. At first 
glance, reviewing the debates between the United States and the European 
Union in the WPDR, this could be tied to the cultural influence exercised by 
the two models. On greater reflection however, an explanation must take 
account of the specific dynamics of the global context, in which this 
ideological conflict vanishes.  The problem of the different costs of the 
procedural protections arises, which assumes a particular importance if 
correlated to States’ reluctance to bear the specific costs of the interests of 
foreign economic operators as opposed to their own citizens. Finally, as I 
have tried to demonstrate, it is clear that participatory guarantees have 
different implications in the global sphere than they do in the national 
context.
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1. Introduction 
 
Of the numerous changes that Community law demands of national laws, 
this paper shall examine three specific areas. This study seeks primarily to 
analyse the standards for transparency, participation and the rule of law that 
Community law imposes upon national administrative procedures for the 
regulation of services. This body of rules will also be referred to as the rules 
of “good administration,” even though we will see (infra, section 5.1) that 
this expression, for our purposes, has a stricter connotation than what is 
generally attributed to it . Following upon this analysis, I will test whether 
these rules (and their underlying principles) give rise to a general model for 
the limitation and integration of national laws affecting the single market. 
Finally, I will examine how Community principles of good administration 
interact with domestic law in national administrative procedures and how 
they influence the protection of the parties affected by regulation. 
This paper does not address the more general theme of the 
“Europeanization” of national law, nor the question of which law – 
Community or national – should enjoy “procedural primacy.” The more 
circumscribed scope of this examination focuses on the relationship between 
the substantive rights and duties envisaged by the Treaty, on the one hand, 
and national administrative procedures for the regulation of the market in 
services,1 on the other. We will see how the European Court of Justice has 
derived from this relationship a set of limitations upon national procedures, 
mainly in the service of greater transparency, greater participation, and the 
rule of law.  
                                                 
1 This is examined in J.S. DELICOSTOPOULOS, Towards European procedural primacy 
in national legal systems, in European Law Journal, 2003, pp. 609-610. 
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 The conformation  of national procedures to Community rules takes 
place through the direct effect of Treaty principles, as well as through 
policies developed by Community institutions on the basis of the Treaty.  
We will see that in both of these cases this conformation occurs in the 
negative sense as well, where Community law does not dictate specific rules 
for administrative procedures as such, but instead addresses conflicts and 
gaps between the national administrative procedural rules and one or more  
substantive Treaty norms. 
 
2. The conformation of administrative procedures affecting the market in 
services with Treaty principles 
  
2.1. The prohibition of discrimination on the basis of nationality and the 
principle of transparency: implications for the access to markets  
 
According to the Court’s ruling precedent, “the general principle of 
equality, of which the prohibition of discrimination on grounds of 
nationality is merely a specific enunciation, is one of the fundamental 
principles of community law.”2 The Court has drawn a number of dynamic 
conclusions from this principle as to the different phases of administrative 
proceedings, and the relationship between parties in them. 
Addressing the particular issue of procurement contracts, the Court 
linked the equal treatment of tenderers with the duty of transparency 
imposed by the directives in identifying the economically most 
advantageous offer: the award criteria must be known to all tenderers before 
the preparation of their tender.3 The Court’s underlying reasoning was not 
unlike that of Italian judicial decisions in the area of par condicio in public 
competitions.4 The award criteria must be defined in advance and remain 
stable in the course of the competition, in order not to prejudice some 
candidates’ chance of being selected.  
The Court thus interpreted the specific legal duties so as to link the 
principle of non-discrimination with the principle of transparency.  There 
are two types of relationship between these principles: first, transparency 
furthers equal treatment – in the above-mentioned sense of access to reliable 
award criteria; second, it enables the oversight of institutions’ concrete 
respect for equal treatment.5  In other words, not only must concrete 
                                                 
2 ECJ, 8 October 1980, Überschär, Case C-810/79. A penetrating examination of the 
principle of equality is that of G. DAVIES, Nationality discrimination in the European 
internal market, The Hague, 2003. Even cases of commercial restrictions, decided by the 
ECJ on the basis of other principles, are analyzed in light of non-discrimination.    
3 ECJ, 25 April 1996, Commission v. Belgium, Case C-87/94, paragraph 88 and the 
following, relying on Council Directive 90/531. 
4 See, ex multis, the decision of the Italian Council of State (Supreme Administrative 
Court), section V, 6 October 1999, n. 1331, in Cons. Stato, 1999, I, 1599; Cons. Stato, sez. 
IV, 10 luglio 1999, n. 1212, in Appalti urbanistica edilizia, 2000, 203, with commentary by 
LUDRIANO. 
5 In general terms, following a liberal reading of the principle of non-discrimination, 
ECJ, 18 November 1999, Unitron Scandinavia A/S, in Case C-275/98, paragraph 31.  
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 discrimination be avoided, but even the mere appearance of it must be 
avoided as well. 
The principle of equality (and its implications for the rules of “good 
administration”) was initially addressed only to the area of government 
contracts. However, the Court’s insistence on the relationship between its 
specific decisions and the basic principles of the Treaty paved the way for a 
broader application. In addition to government contracts – to which the 
criteria of equal treatment apply by virtue of secondary Community law6 — 
the Commission has considered the application of the principles of equality 
and transparency to other areas, such as the provision of services, not 
specifically covered by the directives on government contracts. This refers 
to the procedures by which public institutions select a particular enterprise 
to provide a service – as in the case of government contracts – but with the 
particular feature that “the consideration for the provision of services 
consists either solely in the right to exploit the service or in this right 
together with payment.”7 Through the concession, national authorities 
regulate enterprises’ access to particular markets, created by the authorities 
themselves, by means of a fixed legal regime and possibly the grant of 
public contributions.   
8In its communication in this area,  the Commission held that, 
notwithstanding a lack of specific precedents, the awarding of service 
concessions must respect the minimum criteria of non-discrimination and 
transparency, and thus that the criteria governing tender competitions must 
be known to all potential concessionaires in advance and apply to everybody 
in the same way.  The Commission reached this conclusion in the specific 
area of concessions, but with the premise that the same principles would be 
applicable to “any act of State laying down the terms governing economic 
activities.”9
The Court too has repeatedly expressed a similar disposition. Already in 
the Telaustria decision,10 which followed closely upon the Commission 
communication, the Court held the principle of transparency to apply to 
service concessions, thus requiring that there be a degree of advertising 
“sufficient to enable the services market to be opened up to competition and 
the impartiality of procurement procedures to be reviewed.”11 In the later 
                                                 
6  Directives 92/50/EEC and 93/38/EEC, now replaced by Directives 2004/18/EC and 
2004/17/EC, respectively. 
7 Directive 2004/18/EC, Article 1, paragraph 4. Along the same lines, the Commission, 
in its Interpretative Communication on Concessions under Community Law, 2000/C 
121/02, paragraph 2.2. On the concession of services in Community law, see B. MAMELI, 
Concessioni e pubblici servizi, in Riv. it. dir. pubbl. comunitario, 2001, p. 63. 
8 Commission, Interpretative Communication on Concessions under Community Law, 
op. cit.. 
9 Commission, Interpretative Communication on Concessions under Community Law, 
id., paragraph 3.  
10 ECJ, 7 December 2000, Telaustria Verlags GmbH, Case C-324/98.  
11 See paragraphs 61-62. Though this statement was an obiter dictum (as the main 
question before the Court was the application of Directive 93/38/EEC), the Court put it 
forward nonetheless with the intent of “helping” the national court in deciding the questions 
posed by the preliminary ruling (paragraph 59).  
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 12Consorzio Aziende Metano decision,  the Court (here directly vested with 
the question of transparency) reaffirmed that the lack of transparency in the 
awarding of a concession disadvantages foreign undertakings in expressing 
their interest in obtaining that concession, and thus constitutes an indirect 
discrimination on the basis of nationality.13 It is not that this discrimination 
favours national undertakings as such, but rather the individual undertaking 
that gets the concession award, which need not be a national one. Still, the 
Court’s reasoning implied that domestic undertakings are more likely to be 
aware of the intentions of their own national administrations and, in 
principle, more likely to benefit from such opaque procedures. 
Community secondary legislation has also developed analogous solutions 
to parallel issues arising in the area of public service concessions. In the air 
travel sector, for example, the grant of an operating license to an individual 
undertaking must be made on the basis of a public procedure, with a notice 
specifying the contents and conditions of the service and the guarantee of 
minimum time limits for tendering offers.14 More recently, specific duties of 
transparency in public service concessions and in the provision of general 
services can be found in the rules governing electronic communications, 
electrical energy and gas.15
Applications of the principle of transparency in the secondary legislation 
go beyond the area of concessions to include every act of national 
governments conditioning the provision of services. The practical criteria 
are similar to those set forth in the area of public contracts, though they tend 
to be more general and less formalistic. 
First of all, there are  cases in which Community law, faced with the need 
to fix a quota in granting of certain rights, has required the adoption of 
publicity procedures. This approach was  anticipated by some sectoral 
directives in the grant of rights of use for radio frequencies16 and in the 
selection of airport groundhandling service providers17, and later 
generalized by the “Services” Directive18. Moreover, the sectoral directives 
view the duties of transparency and the prior determination of the criteria to 
arise from the administration’s decision to fix a quantitative limit upon the 
rights to be granted. In the law governing radio frequencies, such 
                                                 
12 ECJ, 21 July 2005, Consorzio Aziende Metano v. Comune di Cingia de’ Botti, Case 
C-231/03. 
13 Paragraphs 17-18. The Court found direct concessions to be admissible only under 
special circumstances, such as there being a very modest economic interest at stake, such 
that “the effects on the fundamental freedoms concerned should therefore be regarded as 
too uncertain and indirect” to be appreciated (paragraphs 19-20).  
14 See Regulation 2407/92/EEC, Article 4. The secondary legislation in the area of 
maritime transport is less detailed, limiting itself to asserting the principle of non-
discrimination: Regulation 3577/92/EEC, Article 4. 
15 See Directives 2002/22/EC, Article 8, and 2003/54/EC, Article 3, paragraphs 2 and 4, 
and 2003/55/EC, Article 3, paragraph 2, respectively. 
16 Directive 2002/20/EC, Article 7.  
17 Directive 96/67/EC, Article 11, paragraph 1, letter b). 
18 See Directive 2006/123/EC, Article 12, about the rule’s drafting stages and upon the 
reasons which have restricted its original aims; see, within the research which the present 
paper is part of, A. TONETTI, Harmonisation and equivalence in the european services 
regulation, paragraph 3. 
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 obligations contribute to the procedure for the re-examination of the 
limitation, to be carried out periodically, and eventually initiated by the 
interested parties themselves. Once the quantitative limitation has been 
determined, the duty of transparency shifts to the phase in which the rights 
are granted. The law governing airport groundhandling services is less 
analytic than the law governing radio frequencies, and seems to assume the 
long-term rigidity of certain airport infrastructures, which would impede the 
exercise of such rights by an indeterminate number of operators. For this 
reason, the directives prefer to address administrators’ choices at the level of 
substantive discretion rather than that of procedure.  
The criteria for authorisation and enabling decisions, such as concessions 
of rights to use public goods, are, by contrast, strictly defined by 
Community norms19 though, in some cases, they may be left up to national 
authorities, in whole or in part. In such cases, the approximation  measures 
will require, among other things, that the criteria be “objective and 
“transparent,”20 a formula suggesting not only the substantive requirement 
that decision-makers exercise their discretion within reason, but also the 
procedural requirement that the criteria be knowable ahead of time to the 
interested undertakings.21  In certain sectors, like energy and gas, it is 
expressly required “that the authorisation procedures and criteria shall be 
made public”22; such requirement has been embodied also by the 2006 
“Services” Directive23
This approach can be seen even more explicitly in looking at the 
community rules on the administrative proceeding as a whole (and thus at 
every aspect of the rules governing it). The “Services” Directive contains, at 
such regard24, a principled affirmation which adopts a solution  already 
provided by the sectoral legislation. For example, in the licensing of railway 
undertakings, “[t]he procedures for the granting of licences shall be made 
public by the Member State concerned, which shall inform the Commission 
thereof.”25 In the field of electronic communications and networks, Member 
States must publish any decision to limit the granting of rights of use in 
                                                 
19 See Directive 2002/20/EC, Article 6 and annex.; Directive 2003/54/EC, Article 6. 
20 See Directives 97/67/EC, Article 9, paragraph 3, on postal services licenses;  
2002/20/EC, Article 6, paragraph 1, on the authorisation of electronic communications 
networks and services; 2003/54/EC, Article 6, paragraph 1, on the construction of new 
electricity generating plants. One markedly more detailed scheme for authorisations and 
licensing, even in the part dealing with the definition and advance publicity of the criteria, 
can be seen in Directive 1997/13/EC, subsequently repealed by Directive 2002/20/EC, 
governing general authorisations and individual licenses in the field of telecommunications 
services. We can see that the greater stringency of Community law was balanced by a wider 
discretion in making some of the basic choices that the first generation of 
telecommunications directives left up to the Member States.  
21 On the use of the word “transparency” in Community law, see B. VESTERDORD, 
Transparency – Not Just a Vogue Word, in Fordham Int’l L.J., 1998-1999, vol. 22, p. 902, 
which attributes the following content to it in the area of adjudication procedures: the duty 
to give reasons, the right to be heard and the right of access to one’s files.  
22 Directive 2003/54/EC, Article 6, paragraph 4; Directive 2003/55/EC, Article 4, 
paragraph 2. 
23 See Directive 2006/123/EC, Article 10, paragraph 1, letter f) 
24 See Article 13, paragraph 1. 
25 See Directive 95/18/EC, Article 15, paragraph 1. 
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 26general, as well as individual decisions affirmatively granting them.   In 
the more visible area of airport services, “These criteria shall be made 
public and the supplier of groundhandling services or self-handling airport 
user shall be informed in advance of the procedure for obtaining 
approval.”27. 
 
2.2. The prohibition of discrimination and the regulator’s independence  
 
A further implication of the principle of equality, relevant to this study, is 
of an organizational nature and has to do with the distinction between the 
regulatory agency, on the one hand, and the regulated bodies, on the other. 
Though this problem was initially raised with specific respect to the 
circulation of goods, its solution has since found a wider application, 
extending to services as well (and to any other economic activity subject to 
government regulation).  
The original case arose out of the privatisation of telecommunications 
terminal equipment, in which various Member States delegated technical 
regulatory responsibilities to the very actors involved in the production and 
sale of such terminal equipment.28 The Court was asked to evaluate the 
relevant Commission directive and held that granting regulatory functions to 
an undertaking, itself in competition with other regulated parties, violates 
the principle of equal treatment and gives the regulating undertaking an 
undue competitive advantage. The Court did not need to establish the 
concrete existence of discriminatory behaviour, finding the skewing of 
“equal opportunity” to suffice.29
30This principle was reaffirmed in later decisions  regarding service 
activities, and has had numerous applications in the secondary legislation.31 
                                                 
26 Directive 2002/20/EC, Articles 5, paragraph 2, and 7, paragraph 3. In the previous 
regulatory framework, Directive 94/46/EC, in order to justify the process of liberalisation, 
stated that “any special right which directly or indirectly - for example by not providing for 
an open and non-discrimnatory authorisation procedure - limits the number of the 
undertakings authorized to import, market, connect, bring into service and maintain such 
equipment, is liable to have the same kind of effect as the grant of exclusive rights.” On this 
basis, the currently valid directive in this area, 2002/77/EC, Article 1, prohibits Member 
States from granting special rights without respecting objective, proportionate and non-
discriminatory criteria. 
27 Directive 96/67/EC, Article 14, paragraph 1. Similarly, see also Regulation 
2407/92/EEC, Article 13, in the area of air transport, as well as Directive 2003/55/EC, 
Article 4, paragraph 2 on the market in gas. 
28 ECJ, 19 March 1991, France v. Commission (telecommunications terminals 
equipment), Case C-202/88. The case arose out of Directive 88/301/EEC, which the 
Commission had adopted on the basis of Article 86 (ex Article 90) of the Treaty.  
29 It must be said that whenever the enterprise which is simultaneously regulating and 
regulated enjoys a dominant market position, the national norms permitting this may 
constitute a violation of Art.icle 82 EC, since this may be an abuse of dominant position 
thus creating a “conflict of interest,” which is simply a particular way of looking at the 
violation of the principle of equality. See ECJ., 13 December 1991, GB-INNO BM, in Case 
C-18/88.  
30 ECJ 17 November 1992, Telecommunicaations Services, Joined Cases C-271, 281 
and 289/90; 9 November 1995, Tranchant, Case C-91/94. 
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 Still, its initial formulation contained the seeds of its further development, 
linked to a substantive interpretation of the separation between the regulator 
and the regulated. Moving beyond formal but ultimately subjective 
distinctions in order to consider conflicts of interests, the Commission held 
that when the Member States themselves own businesses active in the 
provision of the regulated services, there has to be an effective structural 
separation between regulatory functions and ownership and management.  
The Commission made this specification – also reaffirmed in various 
sectoral directives32 33 — in a decision regarding the postal sector,  where it 
held the attribution of ownership and management functions to distinct 
offices within the same ministry to be a conflict of interest and a violation of 
equal treatment. The Commission went further, also holding that the 
assignment of regulatory functions to a body only technically distinct from 
the regulated parties, when there are no other safeguards to ensure impartial 
judgment (for example, a restriction on regulatory employees going to work 
for the dominant operator in the regulated sector at the conclusion of their 
public employment), was insufficient to guarantee the requisite 
independence.34
The directives sometimes call for a “functional” independence, meaning 
that the regulatory body, in order to carry out its task, has to be not only 
legally distinct, but also to have its own resources vis a vis the regulated 
one.35 A sharp application of this point can be seen in the law governing 
telecommunications terminal equipment (though this is addressed to goods 
rather than to services), which specifies that, in the body charged with 
verifying technical conformity, “its director and the staff responsible for 
carrying out the tasks for which the notified body has been designated must 
not be a designer, manufacturer, supplier or installer of radio equipment or 
telecommunications terminal equipment, or a network operator or a service 
provider, nor the authorised representative of any of such parties. They must 
be independent and not become directly involved in the design, 
construction, marketing or maintenance of radio equipment or 
telecommunications terminal equipment, nor represent the parties engaged 
in these activities.”36
 
2.3. The freedom to provide services, the right of establishment and the 
principle of proportionality 
 
                                                                                                                                               
31 See Directives 90/388/EEC, in the field of telecommunications services; 2003/54/EC, 
Article 23, for energy; 2003/55/EC, Article 25, for gas; 96/67/EC, Article 14, paragraph 1, 
for airport groundhandling services; 95/18/EC, Article 3, as amended by Directive 
2001/13/EC, for railway services. 
32 Id. 
33 Commission Decision of 23 October 2001, La Poste, 2002/344/EC, paragraph 77 and 
the following section. 
34 This was obiter dictum, addressed to the specific issue raised by the interested 
Member State. 
35 Directive 97/67/EC, Article 22, paragraph 1. On this, see also infra, section 5.3. 
36 Directive 1999/5/EC, Annex VI. 
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 The core of the freedom to provide services and the right of 
establishment lies in the prohibition of discrimination on the basis of 
nationality. This prohibition influences both national procedural and 
national substantive law. National procedural rules must not discriminate on 
the basis of nationality, for example by providing for disadvantageous 
procedural time limits, less participatory protections or narrower rights of 
judicial review for the non-national party. Apart from this however, 
Community law does not import specific sets of duties for the protection of 
fundamental rights into national law. 
The Court has long been developing a further test to measure respect for 
the freedom of circulation: the “obstacle to market access” test, which 
applies in cases where there is no formal or substantive discrimination on 
the basis of nationality.37
From this perspective, any administrative measure regulating an activity 
– for example, an authorisations scheme, contribution requirements, etc. – 
can in principle constitute a restriction on the transboundary provision of 
services or the right of establishment. The Court however did not regard 
such measures as necessarily incompatible with the Treaty, insofar as it 
recognized that they might also pursue public interests worthy of protection. 
It admitted the possibility of an exception for such “mandatory 
requirements” as effective financial supervision, the protection of public 
health, the fairness of commercial transactions and consumer protection.38
This list is not exhaustive, and the Court also granted the Member States 
some leeway in defining their own interests, as long as they are not 
manifestly arbitrary and there is not a clear contradiction between the stated 
“mandatory requirement” and the State’s concrete behaviour.39 The Court 
tends to analyse the proportionality between the mandatory requirement and 
the state-imposed restriction.40 It is important to focus on those areas in 
which the Court analyses whether there are less restrictive measures capable 
of attaining the same goals, or whether the measure is excessively 
                                                 
37 Though this is a common formula in Community judicial decisions, some 
commentators regard it as essentially an expression of judicial rhetoric. See in particular, G. 
DAVIES, Nationality discrimination in the European internal market, op. cit.,  according to 
which the Court always really decides on the basis of effective or potential discrimination, 
even when it claims to be doing the opposite. On the different interpretations of the Court’s 
decisions, see E. SPAVENTA, From Gebhard to Carpenter: towards a (non-)economic 
European constitution, in CML Rev., 2004, 743. 
38 ECJ, 20 February 1979, Cassis de Dijon, Case C-120/78, on the circulation of goods, 
but also as an espression of a more general principle. With regard to services in particular, 
see ECJ, 12 July 2001, Smits y Peerbooms, Case C-157/99. Directive 2006/123/EC, Article 
4, nr. 8 recognises the reasons which, in ECJ case-law, can justify limitations on the 
circulation of services. 
39 See ECJ, 6 November 2003, Gambelli, Case C-243/01, in the area of gambling, where 
the Court held out the contradiction between a protection scheme aimed at limiting the 
spread of a service, on the one hand, and the State’s intensive advertising of that activity, 
on the other. 
40 See, among the most recent decisions, ECJ, 6 March 2007, Placanica et.al., Joined 
Cases C-338/04, C-359/04 and C- 360/04. 
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 41extensive.  In such analysis, the Court may give weight to the national 
norms governing regulatory proceedings in the area of services. 
The Court has repeatedly analysed whether the proceeding for the 
application of national measures – for example, the proceeding for granting 
authorization for the provision of a particular service – was structured in 
such a way as to minimize the restrictions on free circulation and the right to 
establishment. The Court’s reasoning in these cases likens the procedural 
burden to the obstacle to market access attributable to the substantive limits 
that the national law may put in the way42. Procedural burdens, like 
substantive ones, may not exceed what is necessary to protect “mandatory 
requirements.” 
This test was initially limited to a few specific areas, like the length of 
the proceeding or the access to a judicial remedy. In the Mueller case, 
regarding the circulation of goods, the Court affirmed that the principle of 
proportionality requires that authorisations be obtainable “under a procedure 
easily accessible to manufacturers and traders.”43 In the later decision, 
Commission v. Germany (purity requirement for beer), the Court added that 
national administrations have a duty to state the reasons for refusing 
authorisation, and that parties must be able to “challenge before the courts 
an unjustified failure to grant authorisation.”44
The procedural implications of the principle of proportionality have been 
the focus of increasingly sophisticated analysis.45 Evaluating a Spanish 
authorisation scheme for maritime cabotage transport, the Court in the 
Analir decision specified that the fundamental freedoms guaranteed by the 
Treaty cannot be subjected to the unlimited discretion of national 
administrations. The authorisation scheme must therefore be grounded in 
objective and non-discriminatory criteria that are known in advance to the 
undertakings concerned. The Court reaffirmed that those who are affected 
negatively by a decision ought to have the option of a judicial remedy.46
In the Smits y Peerbooms case, the Court added that “[s]uch a prior 
administrative authorisation scheme must likewise be based on a procedural 
system which is easily accessible and capable of ensuring that a request for 
authorisation will be dealt with objectively and impartially within a 
reasonable time and refusals to grant authorisation must also be capable of 
                                                 
41 These are two different formulas, though the Court does not always distinguish them 
carefully. The latter may be seen as comprehending the former. 
42 On this, see also “Services” Directive 2006/123/EC, at whereas (43). 
43 ECJ, 6 May 1986, Mueller, Case C-304/84. 
44 ECJ, 12 March 1987, Commission v. Germany (purity requirement for beer), Case C-
178/84, paragraphs 45-46. On the Court’s proprotionality analysis see, within the research 
which the present paper is part of, S. MORETTINI, Community principles affecting the 
exercise of discretionary power by national authorities in the service sector, in particular 
section 3.1. 
45 The Court, even when reviewing the decisions of Community institutions, 
demonstrates a growing sensitivity to the individual rights that can be inferred from formal 
procedural protections. On this see L. AZOULAY, The Court of justice and the 
administrative governance, in European law journal, 2001, pp. 429-430. 
46 ECJ, 20 February 2001, Analir, Case C-205/99, paragraphs 38-39. 
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 47being challenged in judicial or quasi-judicial proceedings.”  Then, the 
principle of simplification of procedures has been implemented by Directive 
2006/123/EC, which has drawn a number of conclusions regarding the 
simplification of documentation and the development of administration by 
electronic means48. 
 
2.4. The prohibition of state aids, proportionality and the principle of 
transparency in the financial relations between States and enterprises  
 
National government regulation of services is also limited by the 
prohibition of state aids, set forth in Articles 87 and 88 of the Treaty. This 
limitation extends to any form of aid that States or other government 
agencies may give to businesses. The States have traditionally used such 
aids to influence industrial policy and economic planning, through such 
tools as incentives and tariffs.   
Limits on state aids does not by definition affect the law governing 
national proceedings, at least not directly, because it merely sets forth the 
forms of state aids that are admissible. In particular circumstances, however, 
the prohibition of state aids can imply certain procedural adaptations, aimed 
at increasing the transparency of the financial relationships between States 
and both public and private enterprises.49 This is the case in granting either 
public or private corporations the right to exercise a service of general 
economic interest,50 a status which can imply the rights to both exploit 
different kinds of public goods and to claim monetary compensation for the 
provision of services. 
Member States have the discretion to define the missions of services of a 
general economic interest, just like they have the discretion to define the 
“mandatory needs” which justify limitations on the freedom to provide 
services. This discretion is subject to review only in the case of manifest 
error.51 At the same time, procedures for granting services concessions are 
subject to the principles of non-discrimination and proportionality, which 
                                                 
47 ECJ, Smits y Peerbooms, op. cit., paragraph 90. Likewise, see also the conclusions of 
the Advocate General Colomer, 16 May 2006, Placanica, Joined Cases C-338/04, C-
359/04 and C-360/04, paragraphs 121-122. The judicial review requirement, read together 
with the burden of proof requirement, set forth in the above-mentioned Commission v.  
Germany case, underscores the fact that a decision to refuse has to be motivated as to 
enable the party to challenge its reasoning before a Court. 
48 See Directive  2006/123/EC Article 5, paragraph  3 and Article  8,  respectively. 
49 The issue is thus even broader than the transparency of financial relations between 
States and public enterprises or holders of special and exclusive rights, which is governed 
by specific instruments of secondary legislation (see Directive 723/1980/EEC) which 
contains essentially accountancy requirements. 
50 On the definition of services of a general economic interest, see Communication from 
the Commission, Services of general interest in Europe, OJ 01, C 17. In the jurisprudence, 
see ECJ, 19 December 1991, Merci convenzionali, in Case C-179/90). 
51 Communication from the Commission, Services of general interest in Europe, op. 
cit., paragraph 14. 
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 means that they must not cause unnecessary distortions  in order to pursue  
the mission of general economic interest.52
This approach has given rise to the problem of defining the relationship 
between the benefits that an operator pursing a mission of general economic 
interest receives from the State (or from other governmental agencies), any 
fees that the operator must pay and collect, and the compensation derived 
from the fulfilment of the mission.  In one kind of imbalance among these 
factors, the state-provided benefits, added to the compensation for the 
performance of the service, exceed the total fees owed by the operator; this 
form of overcompensation could be seen as a state aid, and as such, be 
prohibited by ex-Article 87 of the Treaty. Community jurisprudence has 
approached this problem in various ways53 and has only recently attained 
coherence in the Altmark decision. Here, the Court set forth a four-part test 
for the determination of overcompensation, according to which: a) there 
must be an entrustment of a public service task, with clearly defined 
obligations; b) the parameters for calculating the compensation must be 
established in advance in an objective and transparent manner; c) the 
compensation cannot exceed what is necessary to cover all or part of the 
costs, taking into account a reasonable profit on the investment; d) when the 
undertaking charged with fulfilling public service obligations is not selected 
pursuant to a public procurement procedure, the level of compensation must 
be determined with reference to a typical undertaking.54
The Commission also maintains that there is a decreased risk of 
overcompensation, at least in principle, when the price is based on an “open 
and competitive” tender for the selection of the provider of a service of 
general economic interest.55 Should this not be the case, the providers’ 
internal accounts must be based on the consistent application of objectively 
justifiable cost accounting principles, to reveal the costs borne in relation to 
the amount of compensation.56 Following the Altmark decision, the 
Commission formalized this test in the “Community framework for State 
                                                 
52 Commission, Interpretative communication on concessions under Community law, 
2000/C 121/02, paragraph 3.1. 
53 V. C. BOVIS, Developing public procurement regulation: jurisprudence and its 
influence on law making, in CML Rev., 2006, pp. 461 and 481 and following sections. 
54 ECJ, 24 July 2003, Altmark Trans and Regierungspräsidium Magdeburg, in Case C-
280/00. These criteria were reiterated by the ECJ, 30 March 2006, Servizi ausiliari dottori 
commercialisti, in Case C-451/03, at paragraphs 62 and the following section. E. 
GROMNICKA, Services of General Economic Interest in the State Aids Regime: 
Proceduralisation of Political Choices?, in European public law, 2005, p. 429 and the 
following section, sets forth the Member States’ views on the Court’s procedural criteria. 
55 The Commission had developed this principle with respect to privatization measures, 
in which the compatibility of the sales price of public enterprises could be disputed. See 
Commission, Annual Report on Competition Policy¸ 1993, paragraphs 402-403. This 
principle is now applied to public financial investments, on which see Community 
guidelines on state aid to promote risk capital investments in small and medium-sized 
enterprises, 19 July 2006, paragraph 5.2.4., where calls for tender are seen as a mechanism 
for guaranteeing the proportionality of state aids. 
56 See the discussion paper, Services of general economic interest and state aid, 12 
November 2002; for an application of these principles to the particular case of airport and 
airline services see Commission, Community guidelines on financing of airports and start-
up aid to airlines departing from regional airports, 6 September 2005 (forthcoming). 
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 aid in the form of public service compensation”, 2005/C 297/04, and in 
Decision 2005/842/EC taken ex Article 86, paragraph 2, of the EC Treaty, 
underscoring the difference between illegitimate state aids and legitimate 
public compensation, in which the service of general economic interest is 
assigned pursuant to a public procurement procedure.57
Member States must thus set forth the concrete features of the service of 
general economic interest and the criteria for calculating compensation in 
advance, to ensure the transparency of the service provision and the 
verification of its compatibility. A public procurement procedure, with 
objective, transparent, predetermined selection criteria, continues to be 
framed as a burden, enabling interested Member States to request some 
relief from the verification procedure, in light of Article 88 of the Treaty.  
The assignment of services of a general economic interest must also 
respect the principles derived from the fundamental freedoms of the Treaty, 
in particular, the freedom of movement of services and the right of 
establishment. As we have seen,58 these principles already require 
administrative bodies to assign contracts and public service concessions 
through competitive procedures. The Article 87-derived obligation to hold 
public procurement procedures ought therefore to be seen as closing the gap 
in the cases where a similar obligation cannot be derived from other 
sources.59 It ought to address, in particular, the entrustment of services 
whose costs are not totally paid by a public authority (and which are 
therefore not governed by public works contracts) and which do not imply 
special and exclusive rights.60  
 
3. Procedural doctrines of good administration in the secondary 
legislation 
 
Procedural doctrines of good administration are provided by a number of 
secondary, sectoral and horizontal, legislation, which has been partly 
mentioned. 
The sectoral provisions mainly govern public (or used to be public) 
services as communications, energy, postal, airport services and banking 
and finance regulated services. The horizontal legislation sets forth the 
elaboration of technical rules, the mutual recognition of professional 
                                                 
57 See Decision 2005/842/EC, whereas (4). For a detailed application of the Altmark 
test, see Decision 2005/217/EC, TV2/Danmark. Prior to the Court’s decision, the 
Commission had carried out a analogous examination in Decision 2002/782/EC, Aiuti a 
Poste italiane S.p.A.. 
58 Paragraph 2.1. 
59 See Commission, Community guidelines on financing of airports and start-up aid to 
airlines departing from regional airports, op. cit., paragraph 58, which specifies that this 
reasoning holds “[w]ithout prejudice to the obligations deriving from the rules and 
principles applicable to public procurement and concessions.” 
60 This feature, at least in the Commission’s approach, is typical of service concessions, 
assuming that they regard activities that are normally the responsibility of the States, but 
whose operation is transferred to third parties. See, Commission, Interpretative 
communication on concession, op. cit., paragraph 2.2. 
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 qualifications and, more recently, the services themselves, as in the cited 
Directive 2006/123/EC.  
The Services Directive provides exceptions for its scope (article 2) and 
recedes with respect to sectoral legislation ( article 3); thus, the Services 
Directive is not a general provision nor strictly a gap closing provision. It 
governs a number of services resulting from those excluded from its  scope 
and those disciplined by sectoral legislation. 
As to procedures, the Services Directive consolidates the Community 
case-law trends or resumes the solutions already formulated by sectoral 
legislation. Under this point of view, the exclusions from the scope could 
cause the (wrong) assumption that the excluded services are not subject to 
the principles established by the Court, according to the Treaty. Actually, 
the exclusions and derogations laid down by the Directive partially depend 
on the difference between legal systems for the concerned services, as they 
depend, more often, on balancing solutions reached in the stages of the 
drafting of the Directive. 
 
3.1. The right of defence against unfavourable decisions 
 
When a national measure might have detrimental consequences for its 
target, the secondary law imposes a number of minimal procedural 
protections, foremost of which is the effective recognition of the right of 
defence. This right is a synthesis of a number of more specific doctrines, 
like the right to be notified of contestations, the right to be heard, the right to 
access one’s files and the right to use the relevant means of evidence.61 
Generally speaking, even the right of defence can be related back to Treaty 
principles: not only to the principle of proportionality applied to the freedom 
of circulation,62 but also the protection of fundamental rights and the 
principle of good Community administration.63 It thus applies to 
proceedings before national administrations, insofar as they governed by 
Community law, as well as to proceedings carried out by Community bodies 
directly. 
In the secondary norms on services, one finds various applications of the 
right of defence, according to the type of proceeding and the interested 
sector. With regard to proceedings for granting authorisation, for example, a 
                                                 
61 See the Opinion of Advocate General Ruiz-Jarabo, 11 February 2003, Aalborg 
Portland v. Commissione, in Case C-204/00, paragraph 28. 
62 See supra, section 2.3. 
63 The right of defense is also included in the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the 
European Union, specifically as a manifestation of the right to good administration (Article 
41, which specifies the right to be heard, to access one’s file and the obligation of the 
administration to give reasons for its decisions). For an examination of this right and its 
place in the European constitutional project, see D.U. GALETTA, Il diritto ad una buona 
amministrazione europea come fonte di essenziali garanzie procedimentali nei confronti 
della pubblica amministrazione, in Riv. it dir. pubbl. comunitario, 2005, pp. 819 and 829 
and following sections. On the co-existence of both an essentialist element – the protection 
of a fundamental right – and a functionalist one – good administration, in the European 
right of defense jurisprudence, see E. BARBIER DE LA SERRE, Procedural justice in the 
European Community case-law concerning the rights of the defence: essentialist and 
instrumental trends, in European public law, 2006, p. 225 and following section. 
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 right of defence against possible adverse decisions in the proceeding itself is 
generally replaced by a right of appeal from an administrative decision, in 
function of which the obligation to give reasons for final decisions is 
provided.  This solution64 65 can be seen in the concrete areas of banking,  
investment services,66 67 postal services,  the recognition of professional 
qualifications,68 69 70 airport groundhandling services,  railway services  and 
electronic communications networks71 and also in the “Services” Directive 
72, which provides a minimum right of defence in the procedure, requiring 
the administration to inform the applicant about any incomplete 
documentation73
Looking at proceedings appealing decisions in the granting of rights of 
use, the situation changes somewhat. The decision to revoke rights of use 
must be supported by reasons, and can be subjected to judicial review in the 
banking, investment74 75 and airport services sectors,  while in the electronic 
communications sector, an undertaking has the opportunity to present its 
views.76  This sector, moreover, admits a particular form of defence into the 
proceeding, which consists in the spontaneous remedy of the breach by the 
interested undertaking. No such possibility is provided in other areas, such 
as railway transportation77 78 and air transportation.
The degree of protection is not meaningfully increased in genuinely 
disciplinary proceedings (in proceedings for the revocation of rights of use, 
discussed above, there can be a disciplinary element, but this is always 
linked to the protection of the interests animating the authorisation regime in 
the first place), which themselves differ from sector to sector. The right of 
defence in this kind of proceeding, for example, is apparently neglected in 
                                                 
64 Which today seems rather backwards compared to solutions at the national level, 
given that recent amendments to Italian Law n. 241/1990 have introduced the 
communication of the reasons for rejection, which the interested party may challenge 
(Article 10-bis). 
65 Directive 2002/12/EC, Articles 10 and 33  
66 Directive 93/22/EEC, Article 3, paragraph 4. 
67 Directive 97/67/EC, Article 9, paragraph 3. 
68 Directive 2005/36/EC, Article 51, paragraph 2. 
69 Directive 96/67/EC, Article 14, paragraph 1. 
70 Directive 95/18/EC, Article 15. 
71 In virtue of a general appeals procedure, set forth in Article 4, Directive 2002/21/EC. 
72 Directive 2006/123/EC, Article 10, paragraph 6. 
73 See Article 13, paragraph 6. The right of defence is less expanded than what is 
provided by italian law. The information about the reasons for refusal- as provided by the 
recently amended Law nr. 241/1990 (article 10-bis)- allows the applicant to file comments, 
further than in the case of incomplete documentation. 
74 Article 14, Directive 2002/12/EC, and Article 3, Directive 1993/22/EEC, 
respectively. 
75 Directive 96/67/EC, Article 14, paragraph 2.  
76 Directive 2002/20/EC, Article 10, paragraph 2. Previously, Directive 97/13/EC, 
Article 9, paragraph 4. It must be specified that in this particular case, the revocation of 
rights of use is considered an extreme measure, to be adopted when remedial provisions are 
insufficient to bring the activity back within the scope of the authorisation. 
77 Directive 95/18/EC, Article 11. 
78 Regulation 2407/92/EEC, Article 13. 
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 the area of banking and financial services and, in electronic communications 
networks, is treated just as it is for revocation of rights of use.79   
The variety of approaches manifested in the secondary law can be 
interpreted in many different ways. At least in part, it can be explained as an 
expression of a Community confidence in a minimum level of protection 
that national systems always guarantee in making disciplinary decisions. 
Should such minimum level not be concretely respected, parties can pursue 
a legal remedy on the basis of general principles of European law.  Another 
interpretative key might be the temporal character of the rules governing 
different areas, suggesting progressively greater protection as the secondary 
legislation has become more refined. This explanation, however, would not 
hold for the positive law, which includes both older norms giving greater 
scope to the right of defence and more recent norms neglecting it (for 
example, in the area of banking law).     
But there is also a third possible interpretation. In the Court’s 
jurisprudence, as has been argued,80 an essentialist interpretation of the right 
of defence exists alongside a functionalist one: according to the essentialist 
interpretation, the right of defence ought to be guaranteed insofar as it is a 
personal right, independently of any concrete utility it may or may not bring 
to the proceeding and independently of the interests concerned; according to 
the functionalist interpretation, by contrast, the right of defence ought 
instead to serve “good administration” and ought to be increasingly 
protected the more that it serves this objective.81 The secondary legislation 
regulating services seems to privilege the functionalist approach, giving 
particular weight to balancing the interest of defence with the interest in 
adopting the provision. 
In authorisation procedures, in which Community law limits the 
discretion of national administrative authorities, the secondary legislation 
assumes that the undertaking’s contribution cannot be significantly 
increased after the presentation of the request. In appeals and disciplinary 
proceedings, the scope of defence increases, but it still runs into limits 
where important public interests are involved which could be easily and 
permanently harmed. This can explain the lack of specific protections in the 
rail and air transportation sectors, where passenger safety is at stake, and in 
the banking and finance sectors, believed to be vulnerable to quick-
spreading, systemic crises.  
The secondary law however provides an additional guarantee, as would 
be implied by the reasoning of the Court of Justice. This law frequently 
provides that negative decisions trigger special duties of publicity and 
information on behalf of the Commission or national authorities. This can 
be seen in the case of the refusal to authorize the construction and operation 
                                                 
79 Directive 2002/12/EC, Article 10. 
80 Supra, note 92. 
81 V. E. BARBIER DE LA SERRE, Procedural justice in the European Community case-
law concerning the rights of the defence: essentialist and instrumental trends, op. cit., 
passim. On the problems of defining the content of the right of defence, see also H.P. NEHL, 
Principles of administrative procedure in EC law, Oxford, 1999, p. 98. 
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 82 83of natural gas facilities  or the withdrawal of banking authorisations.  
Especially when they involve the Commission, these duties aim at 
supporting the exercise of the specific oversight powers, provided by Treaty 
Articles 226 and 86. But they also produce a specific effect in terms of the 
greater transparency of the state decisions that can affect the transboundary 
provision of services.  Even before triggering Commission review, perhaps 
this transparency might also discourage at least the most manifestly 
arbitrary behaviours.84
  
3.2. Participation in regulatory proceedings for the provision of services 
 
In addition to the right of defence from unfavourable decisions, the 
Community law applicable to services also makes various appeals to the 
principles of participation and transparency in regulatory proceedings, 
which generally conclude with enforcement measures or measures having 
general effects (like tariff provisions, rules governing access to 
infrastructure or the allocation of scarce resources). This is an area where 
the positive norms go ahead the case law of the European Court of Justice, 
which does not recognise the right of participation in general and law-
making proceedings of the European institutions unless provided by the 
Treaty or by secondary legislation.85
Still, such generalisations do not necessarily hold true in the practice of 
specific sectors. 
One example can be seen in the rules governing electronic 
communications, which expressly provide for a consultation of parties 
interested in regulatory projects having a “significant impact on the relevant 
                                                 
82 See, for example, Article 4, paragraph 3, of Directive 2003/55/EC, on the denial of 
authorisation.  
83 Directive 2002/12/EC, Article 14. 
84 But see Directive 2003/54/EC on the electricity market, whereas (30), according to 
which “the requirement to notify the Commission of any refusal to grant authorisation to 
construct new generation capacity has proven to be an unnecessary administrative burden.” 
Still, the same burden has been required in the nearly overlapping Directive 2003/55/EC, 
on the market in gas. 
85  The leading case in this subject is  ECJ 14 October 1999, Atlanta AG v. Commission, 
case C-104/97. See. P. CRAIG, EU Administrative Law, Oxford, 2006, pp. 316-318, also for 
further references. A decision of the Court of First Instance, 17 June 1998, UEAPME v. 
Commission, in Case T-135/96, recognised, with respect to substantially normative acts, a 
relationship between the lack of democratic representation and the need that such deficit be 
remedied by the consultation of social actors. Community case law, however, does not 
further develop this principle. We are beginning to see such affirmations in national 
jurisprudence. Cf. the decision of the Italian Council of State, section VI, 11 April 2006, n. 
2007, according to which “the exercise of regulatory powers by authorities not captured by 
the traditional tripartite division of powers and the circuit of responsibility set forth by 
Article 95 of the Constitution is nevertheless justified on the basis of the existence of a 
participatory proceeding, which reproduces the deliberation characteristic of representative 
bodies.” For commentary in this area, see M. CLARICH, I procedimenti e le garanzie del 
contraddittorio, in  Autorità indipendenti. Bilancio e prospettive di un modello, Bologna, 
2005, pp. 154-155. 
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 86market,”  whether or not such measures take the form of an individual 
decision or a normative act,87 or in the procedures for limiting the number 
of rights of use to be granted for radio frequencies, which administrations 
can only adopt after giving “all interested parties, including users and 
consumers, the opportunity to express their views.”88 It is a different case 
for technical regulations, for which the Member States are obliged to ensure 
that their standardisation bodies “publish the draft standards in such a way 
that comments may also be obtained from parties established in other 
Member States,”89 as well as for airport services regulation, where 
consultation is not open to the public, but is instead limited to a committee 
of airport users.90 Generally speaking, the Commission has invited the 
Member States to consult widely with interested parties when defining 
public service obligations.91
The model set forth by Community law, at least in its most recent 
formulations, is similar to the American-derived “notice and comment” 
requirement, which provides for the publication of draft rules and then the 
opportunity for interested parties to express their views in the context of 
formal hearings.92 An original feature of the participation provided by 
Community norms – which traces back to the particular nature of the Union 
– is the expressly trans-national scope that this can have (for example, in the 
case of technical regulations).  The publication of national measures is in 
fact aimed at soliciting comments from parties established in other Member 
States, on the assumption that such parties are potentially interested in the 
regulatory measure — as actual or aspiring service providers in that 
Member State — or that they can be indirectly affected by it.93
Another ground of distinction is the opening of national procedures, 
again in the service of greater transparency, to the Commission and the 
administrations of other Member States, which ought to be informed of 
regulatory measures that may affect intra-Community trade. Such notice 
must generally be given preventatively, so as to enable them to express their 
                                                 
86 On the fact that participation takes place in discussing the draft measures, see F. 
MERUSI, Il diritto amministrativo comune nelle comunicazioni elettroniche, in Riv. it. dit. 
pubbl. comunitario, 2004, pp. 1269 and 1271 and following sections, according to which 
the directives introduce an innovative form of “debate to contest.” 
87 Directive 2002/21/EC, Article 6. 
88 Directive 2002/20/EC, Article 7, comma 1, letter b). 
89 Directive 98/34/EC, Article 4, paragraph 1. 
90 Directive 96/67/EC, Article 13. 
91 See the above-cited decision, 2005/842/EC, at whereas (10). 
92 See the Federal Administrative Procedure Act, § 503 and following sections. On the 
“notice and comment” model, and its possible use in Community law, see G.J. EDLES, 
Developing a European admnistrative law tradition: the model of the US administrative 
procedure act, in European Public Law, 2000, pp. 543 and 556 and following sections. In 
the American legal commentary, see E. GELLHORN, Public Participation in Administrative 
Proceedings, in Yale L.J., 1972, vol. 81, p. 359; R.B. STEWART, The Reformation of 
American Administrative Law, in Harvard Law Review, 1975, vol. 88, p. 1969, and 
Administrative Law in the Twenty-first Century, in N.Y.U. Law Review, 2003, vol. 78, p. 
437. 
93 Transnational participation is widespread in environmental law, on which see R. 
MACRORY, S. TURNER, Participatory rights, transboundary enviromental governance and 
EC law, in CML Rev., 2002, p. 489.  
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 observations and thus influence the formation of the final decision or, in the 
case of information given after the decision’s adoption, to influence its 
reform or rejection.94 Such an approach can be seen, yet again, in the 
regulation of electronic communications,95 but there are also examples in 
the areas of recognition of professional qualifications,96 technical standards 
and regulations97 98 and land and air transportation.   
The various forms of participation envisaged by the secondary legislation 
can perform different functions, which is also true for participatory 
institutions as such.99 Participation in general proceedings, for example, 
enables private parties to collaborate and allows public institutions to 
prepare more accurate preliminary reports. One seemingly common goal 
among the Community provisions – which might also characterize them 
with respect to analogous national provisions – is the multiplication of 
bodies able to review the national application of Community law. 
Participatory institutions do not only serve the interest of the private 
parties that make use of them and the administrations that run the 
proceedings. They also promote the Community’s interest in the formation 
of a single market, with respect to which they guarantee a far-reaching 
oversight that Community institutions by themselves would not be able to 
offer. This view of participation is consistent with Community law’s 
traditional support for other forms for the decentralised review of the 
behaviour of Member States, such as litigation.100  
 
3.3. The duty to state reasons 
 
The duty to give reasons for decisions that can affect the Community 
freedoms of providing services and establishment is, as we have seen, a 
                                                 
94 Cf. M. CLARICH, Garanzia del contraddittorio nel procedimento, in Dir. amm., 2004, 
pp. 59 and 84-86, which speaks of “horizontal deliberation between regulators.”  The 
Services Directive provides – in general, but with a “balance- like” approach  – a “mutual 
evaluation”of the existing authorisation schemes concerning the Member States and the 
Commission, which is addressed to the promotion of bills at the Community level. See 
Article 39 Directive 2006/123/EC. 
95 Directive 2002/21/EC, Article 7. On procedures arising from the application of this 
norm, see L. SALTARI, I procedimenti comunitari composti: il caso delle telecomunicazioni, 
in Riv. trim. dir. pubblico, 2005, pp. 389 and 419, and following sections. 
96 See, for example, Articles 14 and 15 of Directive 2005/36/EC. 
97 Directive 98/34/EC, Article 2. 
98 See Regulation 1191/69/EEC, Article 8, and Regulation 2408/92/EEC, Article 9, 
respectively. 
99 One important reference is S. CASSESE, Il privato e il procedimento amministrativo. 
Un’analisi della legislazione e della giurisprudenza, in Riv. it. sc. giur., 1971, p. 25 and the 
following section., which distinguishes between the functions of participation, collaboration 
and defence.  
100 In fact, the desire to promote private lawsuits can be counted as one of the basic 
goals of the Community legal system, as seen by the Court of Justice. Cf. Commission, 
Fifteenth annual report on monitoring the application of Community law, COM(98) 317 
final; Sixteenth annual report on monitoring the application of Community law, COM(99) 
301 final. 
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 101principle affirmed in the Community case law.   The secondary law does 
not depart from this orientation, but rather reinforces it in countless 
decisions, mentioned in part above.102  There are essentially three categories 
of decisions which must be motivated: (1) authorisations and related, 
second-degree decisions (revocations, suspensions, etc.); (2) decisions to 
derogate from limits set by Community norms; (3) sanctions.103
With regard to authorisations for service activities, the secondary 
legislation generally requires motivation only for decisions refusing such 
authorisation, and combines this with the right to judicial appeal. This 
approach can be seen, other than in the “Services” Directive104, in the 
regulation of such areas as electrical energy, gas, airport services, banking, 
rail and air transportation services.105 In some of these cases, the 
Community norms include detailed requirements for the contents of such 
motivations. In the energy and gas sectors, for example, the Directives 
specify that the reasons for a refusal “shall be made public…The reasons 
must be objective, non discriminatory, well founded and duly substantiated. 
Appeal procedures shall be made available to the applicant.”106
By placing this limitation merely on refusal decisions, the legislation ties 
the duty to give reasons to the regulated party’s right to defend itself against 
the decision. The motivation required here is thus more restricted than that 
provided by the Treaty, in general terms, for the decisions of Community 
institutions (Article 253).  Here, the content of the decision is irrelevant, and 
the motivation is required not only in function of the right of defence, but 
also in service of the principle of transparency.107
In fact, looking at the national regulation of services, the duty to give 
reasons furthers a more limited and, as it were, more negative, objective: to 
more easily reveal discriminatory actions and national market closures 
possibly detrimental to Community undertakings. The assumption is that 
national regulation which limits access to service markets aims in fact to 
benefit domestic interests and, with respect strictly to the Treaty, is an 
obstacle to the freedom of circulation, and is permissible only insofar as it is 
proportional in its form and substance.108 From this standpoint, Community 
law has the sole interest of removing such unjustifiable obstacles, and leaves 
                                                 
101 ECJ, 12 March 1987, Commission v. Germany (purity requirment for beer), cit.. 
More generally, see supra, section 2.3. 
102 Supra, section 3.1. 
103 The duty to give reasons could then also be derived from the norms enabling the 
participation of interested parties in the proceeding. I will return to this subject infra, in 
section 5.3. 
104 Directive 2006/123/EC, Article 10, paragraph 6, where statement of reasons is 
required in any situation different from the grant of authorization (apart from rejections), 
which could delay the access of the provider to the market such as the extension of the 
procedure expiration date (see Article 13, paragraph 3). 
105 See Directives 2003/54/EC, Article 6, paragraph 4; 2003/55/EC, Article 4, paragraph 
3; 96/67/EC, Article 14, paragraph 2 ; 2002/12/EC, Articles 10 and 33 ; 95/18, Article 15, 
paragraph 2; as well as Regulation EC 2407/92, Article 13, paragraph 2. 
106 See Article 6, paragraph 4, of Directive 2003/54/EC and Article 4, paragraph 3, 
Directive 2003/55/EC, respectively. 
107 Cf. B. VESTERDORD, Transparency – Not just a vogue word, op. cit., pp. 903-906. 
108 See supra, section 2.3. 
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 it to Member States to protect the national interests potentially harmed by 
improperly granted authorisations.  
These objectives lose some of their force when the national proceeding 
arises out of a national implementing norm pursuing Community policies 
beyond the mere removal of trade barriers between the Member States. This 
can be seen in norms regulating the recognition of professional 
qualifications, where the Community acts affirmatively in establishing 
minimum standards for the exercise of specific activities.109 In such cases, 
the duty to give reasons can have a wider scope – covering any decision 
regarding recognition, including positive decisions to grant it. The same can 
be said for the right to appeal.110
In the case of derogation decisions, the duty to give reasons seems 
motivated by the concern for making decisions which potentially hinder 
Community trade subject to review. Such decisions emerge when the 
secondary legislation, after having fixed rules for the conduct of Member 
States and their administrations, permits these governments to derogate 
from such rules or to suspend their application in specific and exceptional 
circumstances. Such a regime is in place for the emergency enactment of 
technical rules for the protection of public health and safety,111 quotas for 
the authorisation for the provision of airport services,112 and emergency 
measures adopted by national authorities in the area of electronic 
communications.113  
In these areas, the duty to state reasons serves precisely to make explicit 
the reasons for the exemption and – this being always accompanied by the 
duty to notify the Commission and the authorities of other Member States – 
can make a difference in possible judicial or quasi-judicial appeals, as well 
as in monitoring and oversight measures by Community bodies.  This 
function is evident, for example, in the rules governing airport 
groundhandling services, which provide for limitations on the number of 
authorisations. The communication of the exemption by the national 
government triggers a procedure before the Commission which, via 
publication of the national decision in the Official Journal of the European 
Communities and consultation of interested parties, can lead to a decision to 
approve or to oppose it.114 A similar regime is in place in the area of air 
travel services for decisions limiting and refusing the exercise of traffic 
rights.115
                                                 
109 See the case of the medical profession, addressed by Article 21, paragraph 6, 
Directive 2005/36/EC.  
110 See Article 51, paragraphs 2 and 3, Directive 2005/36/EC. On the content of the 
motivation, see Code of conduct approved by the Group of Coordinators for the general 
system of recognition of Diplomas, which includes as a best practice the right to appeal and 
specifies the procedure to follow (see paragraph 12). Obviously, in this as in other cases, 
Community law does not preclude the Member States from adopting higher standards of 
transparency, as for example, a generalised duty to give reasons.  
111 Directive 98/34/EC, Article 9, paragraph 7. 
112 Directive 96/67/EC, Article 9. 
113 Directive 2002/21/EC, Article 7, paragraph 6. 
114 See Directive 96/67/EC, Article 9, paragraphs 3-6. 
115 See Regulation 2408/92/EEC, Article 9. 
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 In the motivation of disciplinary decisions, the affected party’s right of 
defence takes on a particular importance. We see this in the provisions of 
implementing regulations, basically in the areas of banking and finance. In 
both of these cases, government powers to discipline are accompanied by 
duties to give reasons and to provide for the judicial review of 
administrative decisions.116  
 
3.4. The duration of the proceeding 
 
The secondary legislation also addresses the duration of national 
proceedings, in light of the general principle established by the Court that 
national restrictions on the exercise of Community rights must be based on a 
procedural system which resolves disputes arising out of such restrictions in 
a “reasonable time.”117
The different regimes embodied in the norms have the following general 
characteristics. 
First, the temporal factor is relevant mainly in the procedures that lead to 
the lifting of a limitation on the activity of an interested party. This can be 
seen in the case of authorisations for the exercise of regulated professions, 
banking and finance, and currently in the “Services” Directive.118 There are 
also examples arising from negative authorisation mechanisms – roughly 
similar to Italian “declarations of the commencement of activity” – where 
the competent authority’s failure to meet certain time limits precludes it 
from blocking the provision of a regulated service.119
We do not encounter norms regulating the time limits in second-degree 
procedures for determining the exercise of rights, nor in penalty or 
otherwise disciplinary proceedings.120 We can conclude from this that, at 
least in the secondary legislation, the main goal is the swift access to 
markets, rather than fulfilment of a more general principle of determinate 
time limits for administrative decisions. 
While the secondary legislation can set forth determinate time limits – 
usually specifying a few months,121 122 or even less  — it does not always 
make use of this solution (and, in many cases, does not consider the 
                                                 
116 Directive 2002/12/EC, Article 22, paragraph 6; Directive 93/22/EC, Article 19, 
paragraph 7. 
117 ECJ, Smits y Peerbooms, op. cit, paragraph 90. See supra, paragraph 2.3. 
118 See Directives 2005/36/EC, Article 51, paragraph 2, 2002/12/EC, Article 10 and 
93/22/EC, Article 3, paragraph 5, respectively and  Directive 2006/123/EC, Article 13, 
paragraph 3. 
119 See the regime embodied in Article 7 of Directive 2005/36/EC, on the procedures for 
a professional service provider who moves from one Member State to another. 
120 See Article 10 of Directive 2002/20/EC, on the authorization of electronic 
communications, which also contains numerous provisions on the duration of the 
proceeding. 
121 See the norms cited supra, at note 110, as well as Article 15, paragraph 2, of 
Directive 95/18/EC, on licensing rail carriers, and Article 13 of Regulation 2407/92/EC, on 
licensing air carriers. 
122 See Article 5, paragraph 3, Directive 2002/20/EC, on users’ rights relating to 
electronic communications networks and services. 
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 123temporal dimension at all).   In the absence of specific time limits, it is 
necessary only that the length of the proceeding be “reasonable,” and that 
any eventually dilatory activities by the State can be concretely verified.  
Community law governing procedural duration ultimately sets forth rules 
for the suspension or the deferral of proceedings in relation to specific 
procedural needs.124  
 
4. Institutional organisation and the administrative proceeding: 
transparency and the simplification of competences 
 
In principle, the Treaty and secondary Community law respect the 
organisational autonomy of the Member States.125 The structure of national 
administrative institutions, nonetheless, may be more or less coherent with 
the substantive and procedural rules required by the Treaty.  We have seen 
that the Court has derived from the general principles a basic rule requiring 
the independence of the regulator from the regulated.126 The secondary law 
includes additional requirements for national organisations, to further the 
transparency of proceedings in the area of the regulation of services. 
An initial example is provided by the rules governing electronic 
communications, which require Member States – in assigning regulatory 
functions to national authorities – to formally publicise the authorities 
charged with exercising these functions.127 This communication may take 
the form of publication in an easily accessible form or notification of both 
the interested undertakings and the Commission.128  
Member States may allocate regulatory functions among multiple 
authorities. This can be derived precisely from the provisions of the 
secondary legislation which mention national regulatory authorities, always 
defined as one or more “bodies,”129 as well as from some provisions setting 
forth duties of “internal” cooperation between national authorities and 
transparency in the division of competences. These provisions make sense 
only if we allow that the Member States may assign regulatory functions to 
multiple authorities.130
                                                 
123 See Directives 2003/54/EC and 2003/55/EC, on electrical energy and gas, 
respectively, which do not address time limits for authorisation procedures.  
124 See Article 10 of the banking directive 2002/12/EC and Article 7, paragraph 4, of 
Directive 2002/22/EC. This is recognised in the “Services” Directive, which establishes the 
terms and conditions for the extension of the procedure set time period (Article 13, 
paragraph 3, Directive 2006/123/EC). 
125 S. CASSESE, L’influenza del diritto amministrativo comunitario sui diritti 
amministrativi nazionali, in Riv. ital. dir. pubbl. comunitario, 1993, 329-330. In the case 
law, see ECJ, 14 January 1988, Commission v. Belgium, in Joined cases C-227/85-230/85, 
at paragraph 9. 
126 Supra, section 2.2. 
127 See, for example, Directive 2002/21/EC, Article 3. 
128 Id. 
129 Article 2, paragraph 1, letter g). 
130 Art.icle 3, paragraph 4. See infra. This is recognised in the decision 2002/627/EC 
establishing the European Regulators Group, which affirms in the third whereas that 
“Detailed responsibilities and tasks of the national regulatory authorities differ among the 
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 Whenever a Member State opts for this path, it assumes the burden of 
transparency in its relations with both the Community and the targets of the 
regulation. The Commission must be punctually notified of who is assigned 
to do what, so that it may oversee the functioning of both the whole and its 
individual parts.131 The targets of the regulation must also be enabled to 
fully know their rights as well as the fora in which they might exercise 
them. Without this, interested parties might be dissuaded from undertaking 
transboundary service activities, which the Community is instead supposed 
to encourage. From the perspective of economic analysis, it can also be said 
that the goal is to remove or limit as much as possible the hidden burden of 
“administrative complication” present in the cost structure of Community 
undertakings132. 
This logic is reflected in other norms which do not establish rules for the 
transparency of competences, but do provide for bureaucratic simplification 
through the centralisation of relationships with Community service 
providers. The most important cases at such regard are the “contact points” 
in the recognition of professional qualifications and the “ points of single 
contact” established for the  performance of bureaucratic formalities in 
services. The first ones have to provide information and assistance to 
citizens and the contact points in other Member States.133 The collection of 
the information upon which the activity of the contact points is based is 
assigned to another organisational figure, the “coordinator for the activities 
of the authorities.”134 The points of single contact are, instead, the offices 
that Member States have to establish as to centralize, in the relationships 
with providers of services, the procedures and the formalities needed for 
access to the market135 The points of single contact have also functions of 
information and assistance similar to those of the points of contact136. 
  
5. The conformation of national administrative proceedings  
 
5.1. Common features 
 
The principles emerging from both the Court’s jurisprudence and the 
secondary legislation addressing national proceedings would appear similar 
to the principles applied by the Court for Community proceedings (for 
example, the duty to state reasons, reasonable time limit, right to defence). 
                                                                                                                                               
various Member States, but all of them have at least one national regulatory authority who 
is charged with application of the rules once they have been transposed into national law”. 
131 This explains the provision for the separation of competences, which must not only 
be published, but must also be communicated to the Commission: Article 3, comma 6, of 
Directive 2002/21/EC. 
132 This  ratio is made explicit in Directive 2006/123/EC, at whereas (43). 
133 Directive 2005/36/EC, Article. 57. 
134 Id., Article 56, paragraph 4. 
135 Directive 2006/123/EC, Article 6. The establishment of points of single contact does 
not affect the allocation of functions and powers among the authorities within the national 
systems (see paragraph 2 of the mentioned Article  6). 
136 See Article 7, Directive 2006/123/EC. On this, see also A. TONETTI, Harmonisation 
and equivalence in the european services regulation, cit., paragraph 3. 
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 Some of these principles, in turn, are the legacy of at least some of the 
Member States,137 even though it is difficult to trace them back to a single 
origin. Principles such as “good administration” have distant roots in natural 
law,138 while others have been transplanted from different areas of national 
law.139  
Whatever the origin of these principles, their similarities suggest the 
existence of a certain degree of osmosis between the different systems, in 
many respects inevitable considering that the Court can and does interpret 
the Treaty in light of the general principles of national legal systems.140 The 
Court exercises a certain freedom in performing this analysis. Sometimes it 
elevates principles which are affirmed in only some Member States (or, in 
extreme cases, in just one) to the status of common principles.141 Here the 
Court comparatively analyses different national systems, determines the 
solutions which seem to be the best and requires the rest of the system to 
adapt to them.142 Other times the Court takes a greater distance from 
national traditions and, working essentially with the Community law of the 
Treaty, puts forward combinations which gain autonomy  from national 
legal systems.143
The outcome of this interpretation informs the action of both Community 
institutions and the Member States. But the way that Community principles 
are reflected in national procedures varies according to whether the national 
regulatory function is embedded in Community systems of common 
administration. In one case, the regulatory functions are harmonised only for 
the purpose of avoiding discrimination against Community undertakings or 
barriers to national markets. Here, the case law and secondary legislation 
make a selective application of doctrines of transparency, participation and 
the guarantee of the rule of law. For example, there is a duty to state reasons 
                                                 
137 On the similarities and differences between Community and national principles of 
administrative procedure, see C. FRANCHINI, I principi applicabili ai procedimenti 
amministrativi europei, in Il procedimento amministrativo nel diritto europeo, S. CASSESE, 
F. BIGNAMI (eds.), Milano, 2004, pp. 281, 293-297. 
138 Cf.. B. SCHWARTZ, Administrative procedure and natural law, in Notre Dame L. 
Rev., 1952-1953, vol. 28, pp. 169, 177. Along these lines, cf. M. D’ALBERTI, La visione e la 
voce: le garanzie di partecipazione ai procedimenti amministrativi, in Riv. trim. dir. 
pubblico, 2000, pp. 5-6. On the relationship between certain Community principles and the 
rule of law, see M. HERDEGEN, The origins and development of the general principles of 
Community law, in U. BERNITZ, J. NERGELIUS (eds), General principles of European 
Community law, The Hague, 2000, pp. 3-23. 
139 In virtue of these and other criteria of distinction, academic commentary has 
proposed various classifications of the general principles of Community law. Cf., H.G. 
SCHERMERS, D. WAELBROECK, Judicial Protection in the European Union, The Hague, 
2001, pp. 28-30;  B.J. BOULOIS, Droit institutionnel des Communautés Européennes, Paris, 
1993,  p. 208 and the following section. 
140 Cf. T. TRIDIMAS, The General Principles of EU Law, Oxford, 2006, p. 4.  
141 See, for example, the case of the principle of proportionality, described in J. 
SCHWARZE, I principi dello Stato di diritto per l’azione amministrativa nella «vecchia» e 
nella «nuova» Unione europea, in Riv. it. dir. pubbl. comunitario, 2004, pp. 1283-1284.  
142 This is a customary approach to legal unification, on which see K.D. KERAMEUS, 
Procedural Harmonization in Europe, in Am. J. Comp. L., 1995, vol. 43, 401-402. See also 
J. SCHWARZE, id., p. 1282, who writes of “evaluative comparison.” 
143 A typical example of this is the precautionary principle.  
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 only for national decisions that hinder the undertaking from accessing the 
market of a Member State, while this is required for all Community 
decisions. Similarly, procedural time limits are regulated to prevent 
administrative inertia from delaying an enterprise’s market access, not to 
guarantee determinate time limits for every kind of administrative activity. 
In another case – which is not however a specific object of this study – 
the application of Community principles to national proceedings is an 
expression of Community policies to involve national administrations in the 
various forms of indirect or joint implementation common in the 
Community legal system. In this case, Community procedural principles can 
be imposed as such upon national proceedings or upon the national phases 
of composite proceedings.144 The rule is that the different jurisdictional 
locations of the proceeding ought not to influence the procedural protection 
accorded to the parties.  
In both of these cases, the duties of transparency imposed by Community 
law upon national regulation create a certain degree of uniformity in 
national procedures. In the first case described above, however, such 
uniformity could essentially be defined as “derivative”: it is pursued only if 
and to the extent that there is a need to guarantee the homogeneity of 
substantive standards.145 This harmonisation is hardly ever justified by the 
mere need for identical or at least similar procedures in the different 
Member States, a need that does in fact arise when the national 
administrations are involved in the exercise of Community functions146. 
This suggests that the Community law for national regulatory 
proceedings does not as a rule constitute an autonomous system, but rather a 
set of standards and doctrines for the integration of national administrative 
laws.147  Beyond the general principles established by the Court, integration 
varies in intensity from sector to sector, so that it usually leaves sufficiently 
wide space to national rules.148
A second common feature has to do with the nature of the procedural 
burdens placed upon the Member States, and the consequences of their not 
satisfying them. The Court’s jurisprudence, affirming the incompatibility 
                                                 
144 On the extension of the principles of Community law to the activities of national 
administrations, see ECJ, 26 April 1988, Hauptzollamt Hamburg-Jonas v. Firma P. 
Kruecken, Case 316/86, at paragraph 22. For academic commentary, see E. CHITI, C. 
FRANCHINI, L’integrazione amministrativa europea, op. cit., p. 110. 
145 On the distinction between autonomous and derivative procedural harmonization, see 
K.D. KERAMEUS, Procedural Harmonization in Europe, op. cit., p. 407.   
146 Accordingly, see Directive 2006/123/Ec at whereas (42): “The rules relating to 
administrative procedures should not aim at harmonising administrative procedures, but at 
removing overly burdensome authorisation schemes, procedures and formalities that hinder 
the freedom of establishment and the creation of service undertakings therefrom”. 
147 From this, the awareness that the standards of “good administration” tend not to 
overlap perfectly with those standards generally invoked with reference to Community 
administrative activity. See supra, at note 63. Directive 2006/123/EC, at whereas (43), 
comes into contact with the Community “good administrative practice” in the principles of 
simplification of procedures. 
148 E. CHITI, Diritto europeo e diritto amministrativo nazionale nella disciplina 
procedurale dei «sistemi comuni», in G. FALCON (ed.), Il diritto amministrativo dei paesi 
europei, Milan, 2005, pp. 65, 68. 
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 with the Treaty of national norms lacking determinate procedural 
protections, would seem an essentially formalistic evaluation. The lack of 
such protections would thus be sufficient grounds for invalidating national 
regulatory decisions, without going to the decision’s substantive merits (and 
without considering how respect for these protections would have 
influenced the decision). 
Community jurisprudence, however, also includes principled 
affirmations of the irrelevance of procedural defects that have not influenced 
the outcome of a decision.149 This approach, incidentally consistent with 
recent Italian legislation,150 seems to emerge in the secondary legislation as 
well.  As we have seen,151 the secondary legislation seems at times to focus 
its attention on the relationship between the national regulatory authority 
and national undertakings, rather than on the administrative proceeding and 
the decision that comes out of it. 
However, the Court’s formalism seems to be inspired by a different logic, 
ultimately consistent with its substantive approach to Community 
proceedings. The Court, in its decisions on the proportionality of national 
regulations of services,152 has addressed the fact that national regulations 
can discourage the intra-Community provision of services153. The Court has 
evaluated this discouragement in the abstract, and in light of formal legal 
norms. This perspective is intrinsically indifferent to the specific 
consequences of the procedural defects. 
A final common feature is that Community law reveals a certain 
indifference with respect to the formal legal categories used by the Member 
States, and considers national doctrines in light of their effects.  In 
determining the exercise of rights, for example, Community law does not 
care whether domestic norms set up a system of concessions or 
authorisations, but only whether the exercise of a certain activity is formally 
conditioned by a governmental decision.154 Equally irrelevant is whether the 
                                                 
149 ECJ, 10 July 1980, Distillers company limited v. Commission, Case C-30/78, at 
paragraph 25 and the following sections. 
150 See the new Article 21-octies, section 2, of Law n. 241/1990. 
151 Supra, sections 3.1. and 3.3. 
152 Supra, section 2.3. 
153 The topic is resumed by Directive 2006/123/EC, at whereas (43): “such modernising 
action, while maintaining the requirements on transparency and updating of information 
relating to operators, is intended to eliminate the delays, costs and dissuasive effects that 
arise, for example, from unnecessary or excessively complex and burdensome 
procedures,the duplication of procedures, the “red tape” involved in submitting documents, 
the arbitrary use of powers by the competent authorities, indeterminate or excessively long 
periods before a response is given,the limited duration of validity of authorisations granted, 
and disproportionate fees and penalties.” 
154 On this point, see the affirmation of Article 4, paragraph 1, Directive 2003/55/EC, 
that “In circumstances where an authorisation (e.g. licence, permission, concession, consent 
or approval) is required for the construction or operation of natural gas facilities[…].”More 
generally, Directive 2006/123/EC, Article 4, nr. 6, defines as authorisation scheme “any 
procedure under which a provider or recipient is in effect required to take steps  in order to 
obtain from the competent authority a formal decision or an implied decision, concerning 
access to a service activity or the exercise thereof”. The Directive includes in the implied 
decisions either the silence from the competent authority or those mechanisms similar to 
our “declaration of commencement of an activity” (see whereas 39). 
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 governmental power exercised in the domestic system is legislative or 
executive in nature.155
 
5.2. The minimum standard of “good administration” in national 
administrative proceedings 
 
Starting from the Court-articulated Treaty principles and the secondary 
norms, we can construct a minimum standard of “good administration” for 
those national regulatory proceedings which yield decisions creating (or 
preserving) obstacles to the intra-Community market in services. 
One aspect of this minimum standard at the level of organisational 
structure is that national regulatory authorities must not have economic 
interests in the markets that they regulate. The authorities ought therefore to 
be formally and substantively independent from the regulated enterprises. 
They must have their own resources, which are not intermingled with those 
of the targets of the regulation. So, for example, when a Member State is 
entrusted with the property of one or more regulated entities, it must respect 
an “adequate structural separation” between its functions as a regulator and 
its functions as a property-holder.  
The regulatory authority must not itself constitute an obstacle to the 
exercise of community freedoms.  The Member States have the duty to 
guarantee “easy access” procedures, which also means avoiding excessive 
complication and opacity in the allocation of administrative competences, 
which can discourage or obstruct the average economic operator. 
National proceedings must be preceded by a determination of the 
decision-making criteria, which themselves must be made public, or at least 
reasonably knowable to potentially interested actors. If the number of 
service providers is limited, due to natural limits or limits otherwise 
compatible with the Treaty, the duty of publicity assumes an even greater 
formal and symbolic importance. This duty obtains for both the general 
decision to limit the number of service providers as well as the selection of 
specific service providers to be granted rights to exercise an activity (see the 
case of service concessions).  
The degree of the participation of interested parties depends on the nature 
of the proceeding. The right to be heard is not an indispensable requirement 
in authorisation proceedings, even though it might be implied by the duty to 
guarantee “objective and impartial” treatment. Even in the secondary 
legislation, the defence of the interested party within an administrative 
proceeding is provided by a relatively limited number of norms. More 
numerous instead are the cases in which the defence before the Courts is 
privileged.  
The final decision must be issued within a reasonable time, meaning at 
the least that the proceeding not be so protracted as to itself constitute an 
obstacle to market access. The secondary law sets forth different time 
frames in different areas, none of which however exceed a few months. 
There may be some flexibility in the determination of the final time limit, 
                                                 
155 See the definition of special and exclusive rights in Directive 2002/77/EC, Article 1, 
n. 6. 
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 including the possibility of extensions and suspensions to meet specific 
procedural needs.  
Decisions that adversely affect the free provision of services must be 
motivated by reasons. The stated reasons must be sufficient to guide the 
formulation of a judicial appeal,156 which is itself another fixed requirement 
in both the Court’s jurisprudence and the secondary legislation. 
 
5.3. Sectoral requirements in the national regulation of services  
 
The standard of “good administration” discussed above derives from 
general Treaty principles. Good administration is a minimal standard, in the 
sense that it ought to be respected in every national proceeding potentially 
influencing the freedom of circulation or right of establishment.  
The secondary law, however, imposes more exacting standards in 
specific sectors. The sectoral requirements do vary by sector, and they reach 
an high degree of complexity in the models of European joint administration 
which involve the national administrations157
Some procedural doctrines or institutions recur in various sectors, and 
perform (in whole or in part, and independently of the administrative model 
in which they reside) the function of protecting the enterprises of one 
Member State hosted in another.  Limiting our analysis to these cases, there 
are basically two categories of doctrines or institutions to consider: 
participation and the institutional links between national administrations and 
the Commission and other Member States. 
Looking at participation, this doctrine is rather widespread in the 
secondary law, in reference to general regulatory measures (see the 
examples of the communications sector, airport services and technical 
norms). Other sectors, though more recently regulated, do not mention it, 
not even in reference to proceedings before national regulatory authorities 
(see the examples of electrical energy and gas sectors, which do however 
hold public consultations for the decisions of intermediate bodies, like the 
European Regulators’ Group.)158  
National regulatory measures do not necessarily create obstacles to the 
exercise of the basic freedoms provided by the Treaty, and even if they did, 
some obstacles could be justified by the national interests that the Treaty 
itself recognises or by the mandatory requirements recognised in the 
Community jurisprudence. The purpose of participation in the policy-
formation phase, for example, is not defence but rather collaboration, as has 
                                                 
156 The relationship between motivation and legal action for the decisions of 
Community institutions is affirmed in the case law. See Court of First Instance, 19 July 
1999, Rothmans International BV v. Commission, in Case T-188/97, according to which 
“the obligation to state reasons means that the reasoning of the Community authority which 
adopted the contested measure must be shown clearly and unequivocally so as to enable the 
persons concerned to ascertain the reasons for the measure in order to protect their rights 
and the Community judicature to exercise its power of review”; likewise, Court of First 
Instance, 6 February 1998, Interporc v. Commission, in Case T-124/96, paragraph 53). 
157 The most important example is the communications sector, which manifests the 
newest generation of Commuity administrative models. 
158 See Commission Decision 2003/796/EC, Article 4. 
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 been mentioned, and increasing the number of observers able to exercise a 
certain control.   
This is a useful fortress against obstacles to the free circulation of 
services, but it moves the protection back to a time in which the prejudice to 
intra-Community trade is merely speculative. It does not therefore seem 
possible to generalise the application of such participation beyond the 
specific provisions of the secondary law.  Doctrines of participation could 
evolve along the lines of good administration, with its holistic application to 
the activities of national administrations which perform Community 
functions. But this is still quite a hypothetical scenario.159  
It can however be said with more certainty that participation rights affect 
regulatory proceedings in an indirect (and unexpressed) way, specifically in 
influencing the reasons given for the final decisions. Opening up the 
proceeding to the observations, comments and information provided by the 
public – or even by more limited categories of interested parties – has a 
“useful effect” only if the consideration given to that participation is 
embodied in the final decision.  This argument has already been recognized 
in the Italian jurisprudence, which has applied the duty to state reasons even 
to the kinds of measures that would have been otherwise excluded on the 
mere basis of the domestic law.160    
The other practice recurring in multiple sectors is the creation 
institutional links between the host Member State, on the one hand, and the 
Commission and other Member States, on the other, for certain categories of 
national decisions. While this link may directly involve the competent 
authorities within each Member State, this does not change the features 
relevant to our purposes. These links are characterised by mutual obligations 
of providing timely information. 
We can see similar practices in the area of decisions revoking 
authorisation, decisions adopting regulatory measures having a great impact 
on markets, and for the derogations which, in certain circumstances, 
national authorities can give for obligations arising out of Community 
law.161 For these kinds of decisions – clearly chosen for their particular 
ability to hinder foreign enterprises from accessing national markets – the 
vertical and horizontal opening of the proceeding increases the degree of 
transparency and intra-Community deliberation, and exposes the national 
decision – or in some cases, the draft decision – to a timely challenge by the 
Commission or other Member States.162 The other Member States, in 
particular, can play a role in the defence of their domestic businesses, not 
only representing them and promoting their interests, but also advancing 
technical arguments as to the coherence of the national decision with the 
Community norms of reference. 
                                                 
159 On a possible new generation of Commuity rights to participe in the formation of 
legislative and administrative policies, see F. BIGNAMI, Tre generazioni di diritti di 
partecipazione, in Il procedimento amministrativo nel diritto europeo, S. CASSESE, F. 
BIGNAMI (eds.), op. cit., pp. 87 , 103 and the following sections. 
160 Italian Council of State, n. 2007/2006, op. cit.. 
161 See sections 3.1 and 3.3, respectively. 
162 It is assumed that this phase is not proceduralised and that it is not therefore part of a 
composite proceeding (at least not necessarily). 
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 The institutional links, and in particular the duties of timely information 
that accompany them, seem capable of going beyond the individual norms 
of the secondary law providing for them. The fact that a Member State is 
obliged to notify the Commission and other Member States of a specific 
measure can be seen as an expression of the principle of “good faith 
cooperation.”163 This is a cardinal principle of the EC Treaty (in general, 
judicially-derived from Article 10), which imposes reciprocal obligations of 
action and abstention upon the Member States and Community 
authorities,164 within the limits fixed by the Treaty and the secondary 
law.165 Even from this point of view, the secondary law has codified a 
judge-created obligation, applying it in the context of the duty of 
consultation, information and more generally, to duties not typically 
comprehended by mutual cooperation.166 The connotation is essentially 
formal in this case, because the directives only lay down procedural rules, 
and disregard their concrete outcomes in the Member States.  Substantive 
features are left to the Commission, which may exercise its powers of 
policy-making and veto. These powers may play a role in preventing or 
correcting procedural defects effected at the national level. 
  
6. The interaction of Community principles with the national regulation 
of services 
 
Bearing in mind the mechanism for the formation of Community 
principles,167 we can also see (abstracting and simplifying somewhat) that 
these principles interact with the national regulation of services in two ways.  
In the first case, the Community principles are addressed to procedural 
protections that are already provided by the national administrative law, and 
they serve to affirm, reinforce or extend the otherwise national protections. 
In the second case, Community law introduces new procedural protections, 
otherwise unknown to national legal systems as such or to individual 
Member States (which can have further and not necessarily desirable 
effects, from the standpoint of the Community law). The limits of this study 
preclude a comparison of the different national legal systems. But an 
examination of the Italian legal system enables us to deepen our 
understanding of both modes of interaction. 
                                                 
163 On good faith cooperation as a form for the functioning of polycentric powers, cf. F. 
MERLONI, La leale collaborazione nella repubblica della autonomie, in Dir. pubbl., 2002, 
3, passim. 
164 The administrative (and not only constitutional) relevance of this principle is 
demonstrated in E. CHITI, C. FRANCHINI, L'integrazione amministrativa europea, op. cit., 
pp. 110-111. In the case law, cf. the ECJ decisions of 8 July 1999, Maria Amélia Nunes e 
Evangelina de Matos, in Case C-186/98, paragraph 13, and 14 July 1994, Milchwerke 
Koeln/Wuppertal Eg v. Hauptzollamt Koeln-Rheinau, in Case C-352/92, paragraph 23.  
165 On the intregrative function of the prinicple of good faith cooperation, cf. ECJ, 14 
May 2002, n. 383, Commission v. Germany, in Case C-383/2000. The duties of cooperation 
have an independent foundation and their proper fulfilment can be subject to judicial 
review. Cf. ECJ, 13 July 1990 (Order of the Court), Zwartveld, Case C-2/88, paragraph 24. 
166 See whereas 35-37 and Articles 3 and 16 of Directive 2002/21/EC.  
167 Supra, section 5.1. 
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 Italian law recognises such procedural protections as the prior 
determination and the publicity of decision-making criteria. Community law 
attributes a particular weight to these principles in the protection against 
arbitrary treatment and discrimination. We have also seen that Community 
law makes these principles applicable to every decision affecting the entry 
of a Community enterprise into the market of another Member State. From 
this standpoint, it does not matter whether the relevant proceeding is for the 
granting of an authorisation, a concession of services or the awarding of a 
procurement contract. All of these decisions are subject to Community law 
because of their practical ability to influence market entry or presence.  
In principle, the situation should not be any different under Italian 
national law. In procurement contracts, for example, the requirements for 
the predetermination and publicity of the selection criteria have solid roots 
and can be applied even when precise legal and regulatory rules are lacking, 
so that it falls upon the adjudicating commission to apply them to the 
particular case.168 But there are many situations, in addition to public 
tendering procedures, in which Italian law has downplayed the requirement 
of open and transparent procedures.  
Illustrative are the cases of airport services, telecommunications services 
and local public services. In all three, the national law sets forth rules 
regulating the competition for market access, but it also contains exceptions 
related to the public nature of the enterprise169 or a public interest not based 
on “transparent and objective” criteria.170 Concessions of airport services, 
for example, have traditionally been assigned through the direct 
entrustments provided by special laws.   
These are the criteria employed by the Italian domestic system. 
Concessions decisions are highly discretionary, aimed at protecting a 
plurality of public interests; public undertakings cannot be equated with 
private corporations. But these criteria cannot be reconciled with the Treaty 
requirements of equal treatment and open national markets. According to 
the Treaty, foreign enterprises’ access to the Italian market can be limited 
only in proportion to “mandatory requirements,” a condition not satisfied by 
a wide discretion, unfettered by predetermined criteria, nor by the arbitrary 
preference for a national enterprise, albeit a public one. 
The relationship between the modes of interaction – national conformity 
with Community law by reinforcing national procedural protections – can 
be seen even at the semantic level, where Community principles and 
                                                 
168 Of the recent decisions, see Council of State, sez. V, 21 November 2003, n. 7581, in 
Foro amm.-Cons. Stato, 2003, 3388. 
169 For telecommunications, see the Presidential Decree of 29 March 1973, n. 156, art. 
198, according to which “The Administration, whenever it intends to give a concession of 
telecommunications services, shall invite organisations, companies and specialised firms 
meeting the requirements for obtaining the concession to set forth the conditions upon 
which they would be willing to perform the service, taking into account the specifications 
prepared by the Administration itself.” For local public services, in the case of mixed 
public-private companies, cf. the Legislative Decree of 18 August 2000, n. 267, art. 113, 
co. 5. 
170 This is true for the entrustment of aeronautical property. See the Italian Navigation 
Code, art. 37, co. 3. 
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 171concepts are invoked by national norms.  National protections of “good 
administration” can also be carefully designed to meet the minimum 
requirements of the Community standard of market access. In practice, the 
openness of national proceedings is tailored to the Community standard, 
through its incorporation into national law.172
The conformity of national regulations to Community law, as we have 
seen, is not limited to tweaking the procedural protections already present in 
the domestic administrative law. There are situations in which Community 
law introduces wholly new protections into a national system, or 
universalises protections that are applied only in individual Member States 
or in different sectors. This can be illustrated by the principle of regulatory 
independence, which is affirmed by the Community case law as an 
expression of the principle of non-discrimination and is widely applied in 
the secondary law. 
The Court’s justification for this principle and the individual norms 
determining its scope indicate that the purpose of the duty of separation is to 
avoid potential conflicts of interest. This is thus an application of the 
procedural principle, nemo iudex in causa propria, the origins of which 
trace back to natural law, placing it on the same level as the principle of 
audi alteram partem.173
But the principle of the independence of the decision-making body, in 
contrast with the right to be heard, has not been independently developed by 
Italian administrative law.174 Italian administrative law recognises the 
principle of impartiality with respect to the public and private interests 
involved in the proceeding, but this does not prevent two contrasting public 
interests from existing within a single administrative authority.175 The 
                                                 
171 For airport concessions, see art. 704, co. 2, of the Navigation Code, as updated by the 
Legislative Decree of 15 March 2006. On public service concessions in general, see the 
Legislative Decree of 12 April 2006, n. 163, art. 30, co. 3. 
172 See the Legislative Decree n. 267/2000, art. 113, co. 5, lett. c), taking up the Teckal 
clause from the ECJ’s jurisprudence. The evolution of the Court’s jurisprudence, moreover, 
seems to have almost completely eroded the scope for the application of this norm. See 
ECJ, 11 January 2006, Stadt Halle, in Case C-26/03, as well as Consorzio Aziende Metano 
v. Comune di Cingia de’ Botti, op. cit.. 
173 The relationship to natural law is particularly meaningful in common law systems. 
See S.A. DE SMITH, The right to a hearing in English administrative law, op. cit., p. 569; B. 
SCHWARTZ, Administrative procedure and natural law, op. cit., p. 177. Likewise, cf. M. 
D’ALBERTI, La visione e la voce: le garanzie di partecipazione ai procedimenti 
amministrativi, op. cit., pp. 5-6. On the role of the principle nemo iudex in causa sua in 
English procedural law, see V. VARANO, Organizzazione e garanzie nella giustizia civile 
nell’Inghilterra moderna, Milan, 1973, p. 257 and the following section. 
174 The right to be heard, in its early applications in administrative jurisprudence, was 
expressly tied to a requirement of natural justice. See Council of State, 8 January 1891, n. 
1, G.A., 1891, I, 22 ss, cited by A. SCOGNAMIGLIO, Il diritto di difesa nel procedimento 
amministrativo, Milan, 2004, 6. For the French system, see Cons. Et, 20 June 1913, Tèry, 
Rec. 763, in Le grands arrêts de la jurispudence administrative¸ Paris, 2005, 161-162. 
175 The independence of the regulator from the operator should not be confused, on the 
conceptual level, with the independence of administrative authorities from political bodies, 
which characterises many different recently established administrative authorities, but 
which is not based on Community law. In the Italian system, independence has been 
associated with a precaution to be taken in the privatisation process, in order to balance the 
loss of ownership control by the State (Law n. 474/1994). The logic of Community law is 
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 prohibition against interested bodies or functionaries taking part in specific 
decisions can take various forms, such as incompatibility or the duty of 
abstention.176 But the administrative body as such can be both an enterprise 
and the regulator of other enterprises,177 specifically for the purpose of 
striking a balance between the governmental interest (in economic profit) 
and the interest of the users of the services. 
  
7. The beneficiaries of Community standards: the transboundary 
application of procedural protections and the balancing of interests  
 
The Treaty principles of non-discrimination and freedom of circulation – 
from which the Community standards for the national regulation of services 
mainly emerge — are structured in such a way as to protect enterprises in 
one Member State when they seek to provide services to citizens in another 
Member State, either through transboundary trade or by establishing a 
permanent agent in another Member State. The legal situations that emerge 
from the Treaty and the secondary law are thus by nature “transboundary.” 
The procedural features of these legal situations have some peculiar 
functions, some of which have already been examined.  
Some procedural doctrines seek to enable actors from other Member 
States who wish to exercise a Community freedom to protect their legal 
position in an autonomous and effective way. All of the doctrines of 
transparency and protections in individual proceedings that we have 
examined can be associated with this purpose: the awareness of the 
proceedings and their rules, the opportunity to be heard, the right to a 
response within a reasonable time and, in the case of a negative response, 
the right to reasons in order to develop the arguments for a judicial or quasi-
judicial appeal. The right to judicial review is a gap-closing norm, insofar as 
questions originating in national courts can be brought all the way up to the 
Court of Justice, in order to be resolved in conformity with the Treaty. Here, 
conformity with Community standards does not change the structure of 
national proceedings, but just affects individual segments of them. Simply 
put, there is a widening of the typical targets of the norms.  
The other procedural protections mentioned above seem to have 
additional motivations and implications.  
                                                                                                                                               
contrary to this, because the regulator has to be independent from the administration 
holding shares in the regulated enterprise until the shares are passed to private parties. 
While these two concepts of independence might overlap, this is just a coincidence. 
176 See Council of State  sez. II, 20 October 2004, n. 8487/04, in Cons. Stato, 2004, I, 
2288, according to which “Impugning situations of conflict of interest in the system of 
public law is not optional, but such conflicts can be raised one at a time, in relation to the 
violation of the principles of impartiality and good administration embodied by Article 97 
of the Constitution, when there is a conflict and an incompatibility, albeit only potential, 
between the subject and the functions attributed to it.” 
177 A case that has long been very frequent. See the case of postal services in the rules 
provided by Presidential Decree n. 156/1973. Currently, this double role is played by the 
Independent Agency for State Monopolies, which both operates and regulates gambling 
activities (Law 18 October 2001, n. 383, art. 12; Presidential Decree 24 January 2002, n. 
33; Law 8 July 2002, n. 138).  
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 The duties of timely information and the institutional links with the 
Commission and both public and private bodies in other Member States all 
characterise the more complex systems of Community administration.  Here 
the purpose is not only basic legal regulation but also the balance of the 
relevant interests (for example, in electronic communications, energy 
markets or airport and groundhandling services).178
In such systems, the issue is not only discrimination or hindered access in 
the entry of individual entrepreneurs into the markets of other Member 
States. In addition to this more traditional issue, there is the further problem 
that the regulations of the individual Member States can create undesirable 
effects upon the markets of other Community Member States.179 This is 
illustrated by the decisions on the division of air traffic or passenger routes, 
or also by the evaluation of markets and dominant enterprises in the 
telecommunications sector.180   
The interested administrations can react to these indirect effects in a 
competitive or a cooperative way, and through the exchange of 
information.181  In each case – when the Community recognises a certain 
zone of subsidiarity and declines to issue detailed rules – the procedural 
openings provide a space for sharing knowledge, preventing and addressing 
controversies in the exercise of national powers, and for the direct 
involvement of interested private actors. With respect to this process, the 
Community institutions promote the working together of different national 
powers and step in to make final decisions when this collaboration fails.182
 
8. The domestic application of Community procedural standards 
 
The Community standard for national regulatory proceedings enjoys a 
remarkably wide reach in applying to a broad scope of actors. While 
operating through different techniques, it has extended its scope to now 
include almost every possible combination of nationalities involved in the 
provision of services, including those involved in controversies otherwise 
governed exclusively by domestic law.  
We are not interested here in the effect of the secondary law.  This law, 
both when it seeks the approximation of national legislation and in the less 
frequent case in which it operates directly through regulations, is inherently 
able to attribute rights to individual citizens, independently of the 
transboundary or domestic character of the proceeding. If, for example, a 
                                                 
178 On regulatory proceedings as mechanisms for bringing together private interests, see 
E. CHITI, La disciplina procedurale della regolazione, Riv. trim. dir. pubbl., 2004, 678. 
179 An analogous situation can be seen in environmental law. On this, cf. MACRORY, 
TURNER, Participatory rights, transboundary environmental governance and EC law, op. 
cit., p. 495. 
180 Supra, section 3.3. 
181 For this classification, cf. D. LAZER, Global and Domestic Governance: Modes of 
Interdependence in Regulatory Policymaking, in European Law Journal, 2006, pp. 455–
468.  
182 On the representation of interests in the creation of Community norms, see D. 
OBRADOVIC, J.M. ALONSO VIZCAINO, Good governance requirements concerning the 
participation of interest groups in EU consultations, in CML Rev., 2006, 1049. 
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 secondary norm fixes a specific procedural rule, the violation of this rule 
can be impugned by any enterprise within the Community, in any State in 
which it operates, including its State of origin. 
The situation is more complicated when there are no specific Community 
implementation measures. Here, Community jurisprudence has played an 
essential role in filling the gap. The Court, in particular, has progressively 
expanded its criteria in order to extend Treaty obligations even to the 
provision of services which, from the point of view of the actors involved, 
would hardly seem to have a transboundary character.183
Putting aside the criticisms that can be lodged against this judicial trend – 
not so much for its outcomes as for the forced interpretations upon which it 
is based184 — it is worth noting that in the Court’s jurisprudence, even a 
merely indirect and hypothetical connection is now sufficient to trigger the 
Treaty standard of protection (including for purposes of transparency, 
participation and rule of law).  
The Court has employed another technique, which sets aside this analysis 
of the transboundary character of the facts of the specific case 
(notwithstanding its very liberal standard for characterising a controversy as 
such) when the national law grants citizens rights that would, in virtue of 
Community law, have to be granted to citizens of other Member States.185 
This immediately affects controversies that have an exclusively domestic 
character. This appeal to Community law in challenging a national law also 
pushes the Court in its pursuit of a uniform interpretation of Community 
law. 
Cases such as those hypothesised by the Court can also be seen in the 
Italian legal system, though not expressly in the form of “reverse 
discrimination.” It can instead happen that principles of Community law are 
invoked in national norms regulating services, a sort of general reference 
which has to be completed, case by case, on the basis of the substantive 
content of the principles involved. In these cases – which frequently arise, 
for example, in the concession of services in general, and local public 
services in particular – one can argue whether the Community principles 
ought to be extended to controversies which, in their objective dimension, 
would not have any Community relevance.  It is however certain that the 
subjective designation of a controversy as merely domestic is increasingly 
irrelevant. The Court, in its part, could always give its interpretative support 
to a national court seeking to apply Community law, not because of the 
                                                 
183 This approach is described in P. OLIVER, W.H. ROTH, The internal market and the 
four freedoms, in CML Rev., 2004, pp. 407,  429-434. Of the decisions marking this 
evolution, see ECJ, 10 May 1995, Alpine Investments, in Case C-384/93; ECJ, 7 May 1997, 
Pistre, Joined Cases C-321/94, C-322/94, C-323/94 and C-324/94, paragraphs 44-45; ECJ, 
6 June 2000, Angonese, in Case C-281/97, and 6 June 2002, Sapod Audic, in Case C-
159/00; ECJ, 11 luglio 2002, Mary Carpenter, in Case C-60/00, paragraphs 28-30. 
184 See, among the many works, N. REICH, Citizenship and family on trial: a fairly 
optimistic overview of recent court practice with regard to free movement of persons, in 
CML Rev., 2002, pp. 615, 628.  
185 ECJ, Servizi ausiliari dottori commercialisti, cit., paragraph 29. For a recent 
precedent, see also ECJ, 17 February 2005, Court Order, Mauri, in Case C-250/03. 
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 intrinsic force of the law itself, but in virtue of the national provision 
granting its jurisdiction. 
The dialogue between Italian judges and the European Court of Justice 
on the importation of Community principles into national controversies 
could, because of a recent decision of the Italian Parliament, come to have 
broad implications. Administrative activity, according to the most recent 
legislation, “shall pursue the ends set forth by the law and shall be grounded 
in [among other things] the principles of Community law.”186 This 
formulation is so wide as to eventually comprehend even the principles 
guiding Community administrative procedure, to the point that (however 
much it might be willed by the national legislature) the distinction between 
Community principles and the more restricted set of national principles of 
administrative procedure would erode.187   
 
9. Conclusion  
 
This analysis of Community legislative norms and jurisprudence suggests 
the following conclusions.  
First, there is a minimum standard of transparency, participation and rule 
of law that Community law sets forth for all national regulatory proceedings 
which could generate discriminations on the basis of nationality or hinder 
the exercise of Community freedoms. This procedural standard is both 
derived by the Court of Justice from certain substantive principles of the 
Treaty (in particular, the principles of non-discrimination and 
proportionality) and is also widely present in the secondary legislation. It 
includes doctrines and principles of procedural protection – like the 
transparency of the decision-making criteria, the right of defence, the duty 
to state reasons, the independence of the regulator – with which Community 
law supplements national procedural law where necessary. This has not 
(yet) become a general procedural model, to substitute the corresponding 
national models, but is rather a body of procedural protections to be applied 
as required by economic integration. 
Nevertheless, in the secondary law, the conformation of national 
regulatory proceedings to Community standards can become much more 
complicated, though varying from sector to sector. In the most advanced 
models of Community administration, the secondary law introduces 
principles of participation in the creation of national regulations as well as 
institutional and procedural links with the Commission and the 
administrations of other Member States. These solutions increase the degree 
of procedural transparency and enable a transboundary discussion which 
multiplies the fora  in which national regulations may be reviewed. 
Regulatory proceedings thus become sites for an encounter between the 
many different interests affected by the regulations. 
                                                 
186 Art. 1, co. 1, l. 7 August 1990, n. 241, as modifyed by the Law of 11 febbraio 2005, 
n. 15. 
187 For a specific application of this possibility, see, F. MERUSI, Il diritto amministrativo 
comune nelle comunicazioni elettroniche, op. cit., 1273. 
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 The interaction of Community standards with national proceedings can 
take different forms. On the objective level, the Community standard for 
procedural protections reinforces and universalises any analogous national 
procedural protections. Conformity with Community law also introduces 
new principles – either original or adapted from individual national systems 
– or principles already applied, but in different regulatory sectors. On the 
subjective level, Community law extends the number of subjects protected 
by its procedural standard and anticipates the participation of interested 
parties in resolving their differences to the early stage in which the national 
regulations are deliberated. Still at the subjective level, national conformity 
to Community procedural standards enables national bodies to transcend the 
limits deriving from the nationality of the interested parties, making possible 
the application of Community standards even in exclusively domestic cases. 
These developments are paralleled in the national law, which incorporates 
individual principles of Community law and applies them as such to 
national proceedings.  
And it is thus – in a gradual and, in certain respects, spontaneous way – 
that Community law is starting to define a common procedural model in the 
regulation of services, a model which does not depend on either the 
exclusively domestic or the transboundary character of the exchanges at 
issue. 
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1. Goal of this study and methodology 
 
The States members of the World Trade Organization have committed to 
respecting the rules established by the multilateral Agreements, sharing the 
idea (expressed for example in the Preamble to the GATS) that international 
liberalisation can contribute to growth and development of the world 
economy. By adhering to this Agreement, each State gives up a degree of its 
sovereignty in managing its own trade policy in the area of services. 
Participation in the WTO implies that the Member States must adapt their 
own national laws to WTO law, with the consequence that conflicting 
domestic measures must be brought into conformity.  
One of the difficulties in the GATS thus consists in balancing two 
contrasting needs: to protect national authorities’ right to regulate, including 
both the formulation of national policy goals and their development, on the 
one hand; and to limit this power, in order to guarantee the maximum 
openness of national markets, on the other. 
The States are thus required to refrain from adopting measures restricting 
the trade in services; at the same time, by invoking certain exceptions, they 
may be able to derogate from the rules imposed by the global regulation and 
thus enjoy some autonomy. On the basis of these exceptions, the signatories 
of the GATS may adopt measures that would otherwise be illegitimate, thus 
regaining some discretionary power.  
The balance between the free market and the other interests pursued by 
individual States is not calculated in the abstract by a global legislator. 
Because it must be determined in light of the specific, concrete case, it is 
left to the judgment of the Dispute Settlement Body. The form and depth of 
its scrutiny represents a further limit upon national discretion. 
                                                 
∗ This work is the result of a joint effort by Mariangela Benedetti and Sabrina Quintili. 
Mariangela Benedetti wrote the sections on the review of discretion in general, the review 
of discretion in the WTO system, on the necessity of protective measures, comparative 
evaluations and the conclusion; the sections on necessity, in reviewing regulatory measures 
in general and in the law governing the accountancy sector in particular, were written by 
Sabrina Quintili. 
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 This study examines the relationship between the “authority” exercised 
by individual Member States as part of their own sovereign power and the 
“freedom” guaranteed to the economic operators of the 149 parties to the 
GATS. This relationship can be seen by looking at the standard of review 
employed by the Dispute Settlement Body in resolving controversies arising 
from the tension that exists between national goals and the international goal 
of liberalisation. The examination of the exercise of judicial review enables 
us to see the degree of deference paid by the adjudicating body to the 
national authorities, the depth of this global judicial review, and finally, the 
extent to which States have ceded their sovereign power to regulate their 
own economic and social policies. 
After briefly outlining the mechanisms for reviewing national discretion, 
we will examine the techniques employed in the global context. This 
analysis focuses on the necessity test set forth by the GATS for evaluating 
the legitimacy of both protective measures taken in application of the 
exceptions clauses (Article XIV) and national regulations (Article VI). 
Some conclusions will follow. 
 
2. The review of discretionary power 
 
Market freedom and regulatory autonomy can often conflict with each 
other. Decisions and rules adopted at the State level can indirectly restrict 
market access, even if they do not have directly protectionist goals. It is hard 
to define the demarcation line between an intentionally protectionist 
measure, which aims at imposing discriminatory and unjustified costs upon 
a free market, and a non-protectionist measure, which also happens to 
restrict the market in an attempt to protect national values. This complexity 
has increased with sovereign States’ assumption of international free trade 
obligations. The pursuit of free trade creates a need to reconcile the different 
legal and administrative systems of individual Member States. National 
measures and behaviours must now simultaneously respect domestic 
“internal” goals and supranational “external” goals. The incompatibility 
between goals governed by different rules can be resolved by means of both 
legislative instruments and judicial review. In the case of legislative 
instruments, global rules establish a point of reference, providing a set of 
values which States are obliged to pursue and the possibility that national 
objectives may justify an exception to them.  
In the case of judicial review, supranational bodies must evaluate the 
trade-off between the harm to global values and the benefit to national 
public policies. In the absence of a predetermined legal criteria for assigning 
priority among the interests in conflict, it falls upon the adjudicating body to 
“develop an appropriate, balanced criteria for distinguishing the measures 
which constitute a legitimate exercise of sovereignty by the Member States 
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 from those which constitute an unjustified detriment to the subjective 
positions guaranteed by the Agreement”1.  
The review of discretionary power is one of the central issues in both 
civil law and common law legal systems. Its importance depends mainly on 
the inverse relationship between ‘discretionary power’ on the one hand, and 
‘civil rights and civil liberties’ on the other2. 
In the national context, the analysis of the balance between the ends to be 
pursued and the means adopted to reach them is especially familiar in the 
continental droit administratif tradition. Though characterised by an uneven 
application of the principle of the separation of powers, these legal systems 
do exemplify this most clearly in their determination of the figure of 
détournement de pouvoir and in their instruments for ascertaining it3. 
In federal systems in which multiple legal systems co-exist, the review of 
discretionary authority takes place within the context of a delicate allocation 
of powers between different levels of government, all pursuing their own 
policies. In this perspective, the instruments which have developed in the 
American and European areas (with different degrees of maturity) are 
significant. In more than thirty years of applying the dormant commerce 
clause,4 American courts have developed a test to determine the consistency 
of state rules with the federal regulation of interstate commerce. This test is 
articulated in two phases: the first determines whether the state rule is 
discriminatory, the second applies a standard of review which varies 
according to the degree of the burden on interstate commerce. A 
discriminary rule is considered per se illegitimate. For this reason, it cannot 
be upheld unless the State can demonstrate “under rigorous scrutiny, that it 
                                                 
1 See E. CANNIZZARO, Il principio della proporzionalità nell’ordinamento 
internazionale, Milano, 2000, p. 15. 
2 M.S. GIANNINI, Diritto amministrativo, vol. II, Milano, 1993, p. 229: “if, using verbal 
syntheses derived from philosophy and sociology, we agree to regard as freedom the active 
situations that advantage private persons […], we can also say that the exercise of authority 
necessarily reduces such freedoms, and in reducing authority, freedom re-expands in the 
areas that it had lost. We can thus agree with the sociologists who see, in the concepts of 
authority and freedom, two moments in a continuous dialectical process”. 
3 The concept of the excess of power is familiar in common law countries as well. In the 
United States, under section 706 of the Administrative Procedure Act, an agency action can 
be voided when it exceeds of the agency’s statutory powers. The tool used to determine this 
excess of power is the arbitrary and capricious test. See B. MARCHETTI, Pubblica 
Amministrazione e corti negli Stati Uniti. Il judicial review sulle adminsitrative agencies, 
Padova, 2005, p. 220; M. BUCKLEY, Administrative Law: De Novo Review of 
Administrative Action-What Are The Limits?, in 15 Washburn Law Journal (1976) 477. 
4 See D.H. REGAN, The Supreme Court and State Protectionism: Making Sense of the 
Dormant Commerce Clause, in 84 Michigan Law Review (1986) 1091 et. seq.; T.W. 
MERRILL, Toward a principled interpretation of the commerce clause, in 22 Harvard 
Journal of Law & Public Policy (1998-1999) 31 et. seq.;  L.J. PETRICONE, Dormant 
Commerce Clause, in 27 Santa Clara Law Review (1987) 443 et. seq.; N.T. DOWLING, 
Interstate Commerce and State Power-Revised Version, in 47 Columbia Law Review (1947) 
547 et. seq. 
 79
 5has no other means to advance a legitimate local interest” . By contrast, if 
the rule is not discriminatory, but incidentally produces “an undue burden 
on interstate commerce” it is presumptively legitimate and can be struck 
down only if “the burden imposed on such commerce is clearly excessive in 
relation to the putative local benefits”6. This kind of analysis, known as the 
Pike test, requires the court to review the validity of the state rule by 
balancing between its costs to interstate commerce and its benefits7. Only 
when the benefits outweigh the costs may the state rule be held consistent 
with the dormant commerce clause.  
In the absense of an unambiguous standard for comparing “the burdens 
on intestate commerce” with “the benefits to the state or local government,” 
American courts using the Pike test have subjected state rules to different 
levels of scrutiny or tests: ‘rational basis’8 9, ‘rational basis with bite’ , 
‘intermediate scrutiny’10 11 and ‘strict scrutiny’ . 
The European Court of Justice, by contrast, uses the principle of 
proportionality12 to ensure that the discretion of the individual Member 
States is exercised with respect for Community objectives. Proportionality 
                                                 
5 C&A CARBONE, Inc. v. Town of Clarkstown, New York, 511 U.S. 383 (1994). See J.D. 
FOX, State Benefits Under The Pike Balancing Test of The Dormant Commerce Clause: 
Pòutative or Actual, in 1 Ave Maria Law Review (2003) 186 et. seq. 
6 Pike v. Bruce Church, Inc., 397 U.S. 137, 142 (1970). 
7 Pike v. Bruce Church, cit., p. 3: “Where the statute regulates even-handedly to 
effectuate a legitimate local public interest, and its effects on intestate commerce are only 
incidental, it will be upheld unless the burden imposed on such commerce is clearly 
excessive in relation to the putative local benefits. If a legitimate local purpose is found, 
then the question becomes one of degree. And the extent of the burden that will be tolerated 
will of course depend on the nature of the local interest involved and on whether it could be 
promoted as well with a lesser impact on interstate activities”.  
8 J.D. FOX, State Benefits Under The Pike, cit., p. 191: “to pass the rational basis test a 
law must pursue a legitimate state objective. Further, there must at least be a rational 
relationship between these goals and the means chosen to preserve them; that is, the 
legislature must not have acted in a completely arbitrary or irrational way”. See Exxon Corp 
v. Governor of Maryland, 437 U.S. 117 (1978). 
9 J.D. FOX, State Benefits Under The Pike, cit., p. 191: “to pass the rational basis with 
bite test a law must advance a legitimate government interest, even if the law seems unwise 
or worked to the disadvantage of a particular group, or if the rationale for it seems tenuous. 
The law must be narrow enough in scope and grounded in a sufficient factual context to 
ascertain some relation between the law and the purpose it serves”. 
10 Ibid.: “to pass the intermediate scrutiny test the law must serve important 
governmental objectives and must be substantially related to the achievement of those 
objectives”. 
11 Ibid.: “to pass the strict scrutiny test a law must be justified by a compelling state 
interest and the means employed to meet this interest must be substantially effective, 
necessary, and the least restrictive means available of accomplishing the goal”. 
12 Originating in the German legal system, in the area of police law and then extended to 
the entire sphere of administrative law. See D.U. GALETTA, Principio di proporzionalità e 
sindacato giurisdizionale nel diritto amministrativo, Milano, 1998, p. 11 et. seq.; A. 
SANDULLI, La proporzionalità dell’azione amministrativa, Padova, 1998; J. UEDA and M. 
ANDENAS, Proportionality in EU environmental law, in www.soc.nii.ac.jp/eusa-
japan/download/eusa_ap/paper_MadsAndenas_JunkoUeda.pdf; S. MORETTINI, Community 
principles affecting the exercise of discretionary power by national authorities in the 
service sector, in this volume. 
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 implies an analysis of the proper intensity of a State’s measure, made by 
evaluating its conformity to three parameters: suitability, necessity and 
adequacy13. In other words, conceding that one interest can be privileged 
over others, it is necessary to determine the degree to which this is 
legitimate. This principle, which until recently overlapped with 
reasonableness in the Italian system14, implies that “the public 
administration must adopt the proper and adequate solution, implying the 
least possible sacrifice of the participating interests”15.  
 
2.1. WTO review of discretionary power 
 
Beyond the national borders, managing the dialectical relationship 
between freedom and authority requires the adaptation of doctrines and 
institutions developed in other contexts. As in federal systems, participation 
in a supranational agreement such as the GATS obliges Member States to 
take interests beyond the merely domestic into account in determining 
national policies. On the basis of this obligation, the WTO Dispute 
Settlement Body (hereafter DSB) is charged with resolving cases “in which 
a Member considers that any benefit accruing to it directly or indirectly 
under the cover agreements are being impaired by measures taken by other 
Members”16. WTO judicial review presents some particularities with 
respect to other legal systems17. For example, the WTO’s review regards 
only ‘vertical’ relationships, in which a hierarchically superior body 
examines an act or decision of an ‘inferior body,’ in light of its conformity 
                                                 
13 See D.U. GALETTA, Principio di proporzionalità, cit., p. 359 et. seq. 
14 See the decisions of the Regional Administrative Tribunal (TAR), Lecce, Bari, sez. 
III, from 2483/04 to 2493/04 in http://www.giustizia-amministrativa.it. For commentary, 
see the recent contribution of D.U. GALETTA, La proporzionalità quale principio generale 
dell’ordinamento, in Giornale di diritto amministrativo, 2006, n. 10, p. 1106 et. seq. 
15 Consiglio di Stato, sez. IV, 22 giugno 2004, Decisione n. 4381, paragraph 3: “With 
regard to the censure arising out of an imbalance between private sacrifice and public 
interest, which could be satisfied by other means, the College observes that, on the basis of 
the principle of proportionality, the realisation of the public interest has to imply the least 
possible sacrifice of private interests. The principle of proportionality is a general principle 
of the Italian legal system: it implies that the public administration must adopt the proper 
and adequate solution, implying the least possible sacrifice of the participating interests” in 
http://www.giustizia-amministrativa.it . 
16 Dispute Settlement Understanding, Article 3.2. 
17 On this topic, see T. COTTIER and K.N. SCHEFER, The Relationship between World 
Trade Organization Law, National and Regional Law, in 1 Journal of International 
Economic Law (1998) 83-122; W.F. DAVEY, Has the WTO Dispute Settlement System 
Exceeded Its Authority? A Consideration of Deference Shown by The System to Member 
Government Decisions and Its Use of Issue-Avoidance Techniques, in 79 Journal of 
International Economic Law (2001) 79-110. 
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 18with the law dictated by the superior  and not ‘horizontal’ relationships as 
well19.  
The DSB’s power to review national measures depends on two factors: 
the first is the standard of review, established by the law to limit the scope 
of the judicial review; the second is the judicially-developed test for 
determining the correspondence between national measures and the criteria 
fixed by the global law.  
The GATT (1944) system did not make any provisions regarding 
standards of review20, and most of the signatories of the Uruguay Round 
likewise opposed the introduction of an explicit reasonableness standard, 
out of fear of imposing “too many constraints on the panels and 
undermin[ing] the consistency of GATT/WTO law by granting the national 
administrations a very wide margin of discretion to develop their own 
particular approach vis-à-vis international obligations”21.  
Only the Anti-Dumping Agreement defines the standard applicable to the 
relative procedures22. The Anti-Dumping provision, which to some 
commentators23 24 draws on the American Chevron doctrine  for the judicial 
review of agency decisions, prohibits the panel “from overturning the 
national authorities even though it may have reached a different 
                                                 
18 C.M. VAZQUEZ, Judicial Review in the United States and in the WTO: Some 
Similarities and Differences, in 36 George Washington International Law Review (2004) 
595. 
19 C.M. VAZQUEZ, Judicial Review, cit., p. 596: “Horizontal review is the judicial 
review of the acts of the federal legislative branch for conformity with constitution. […] 
horizontal review is largely unknown in the WTO system. It is difficult to conceive how 
such review might develop. The most controversial form of such review – review of the 
legislative act of a coordinate branch – is possible only if the legal system includes a 
legislative power and if that power is subject to limits”. 
20 T.W. MERRILL, Judicial Deference to Executive Precedent, in 101 Yale Law Journal 
(1992) 971: “The attitude of courts toward administrative interpretations of statutes has 
ranged between two extremes. At one pole, courts ignore the administrative view [...] at the 
other pole, courts frame the inquiry in terms of whether the administrative interpretation is 
one that a reasonable interpreter might embrace. In this deference mode, a court implicitly 
acknowledges that the statute is susceptible to multiple readings”. 
21 S. ZLEPTNIG, The Standard of Review in WTO Law. An Analysis of Law, Legitimacy 
and the Distribution of Legal and Political Authority, in http://eiop.or.at/eiop/texte/2002-
017.htm; see S.P. CROLEY and J.H. JACKSON, WTO Dispute Procedures, Standard of 
Review, and Deference to National Governments, in 90 The American Journal of 
International Law (1996) 199. 
22 Article 17.9 of the Anti-Dumping Agreement provides that: “the panel shall interpret 
the relevant provisions of the agreement in accordance with customary rules of 
interpretation of public international law. Where the panel finds that a relevant provision of 
the Agreement admits of more than one permissible interpretation, the panel shall find the 
authorities’ measure to be in conformity with the Agreement if it rests upon one of those 
permissible interpretations”. 
23 D.K TARULLO, The Hidden Costs of InternationalDispute Settlement: WTO Review of 
Domestic Anti-Dumping Decisions, in 34 Law & Policy in International Business (2002-
2003) 109. In contrast, see C.M. VAZQUEZ, Judicial Review in the United States and in the 
WTO, cit., p. 587 et. seq. 
24 Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837 
(1984). 
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 conclusion.” The law takes a restrictive approach to the WTO DSB’s scope 
of review, requiring it to defer to the decisions taken at the national level25. 
So, with this one exception, the WTO Agreements are not concerned with 
defining the standard of review, and leave its determination mainly up to the 
DSB’s judicial lawmaking process. The DSB, in the Underwear Report, 
identifies Article 1126 of the Dispute Settlement Understanding as the 
source of law27 applicable to all of the Agreements; in its report of the EC-
Hormones controversy, it rejects both de novo review as well as the total 
deference to the Member States28. 
The standard of review at the global level thus defines not only the role 
of the adjudicative body in relation to the other actors in the system, but also 
delineates the delicate relationship of power between the norms produced by 
the international organisation and the sovereignty of its Member States29. 
The application of this parameter enables us to analyse the content of the 
norms adopted by the Member States, in the sense of determining the 
correspondence between the global rules and the national measures adopted 
in pursuit of public ends. The necessity (or ‘cost effectiveness’) test aims at 
determining whether a measure is necessary to the pursuit of a 
predetermined objective or, in other words, if there are commercially less 
costly means to its pursuit. 
                                                 
25 H. SPAMANN, Standard of Review for World Trade Organization Panels in Trade 
Remedy Cases: a Critical Analysis, in 38 Journal of World Trade (2004) 511. 
26 Some scholars argue that the source of law of the WTO standard of review ought to 
be traced to Article 3.2 of the DSU. See J.H. JACKSON, WTO Dispute Procedures, Standard 
of Review and Deference to National Governments, in J.H. JACKSON, The Jurisprudence of 
GATT and the WTO. Insights on Treaty Law and Economic Relations, Cambridge, 2000. 
27 WTO, PANEL REPORT, United States – Restrictions on imports of cotton and man-
made fibre Underwear, WT/DS24/R, 8 February 1996, paragraph 7.10. See S. ZLEPTNIG, 
The Standard of Review in WTO law, cit., p. 433: “concluding that art. 11 DSU provides for 
an appropriate standard of review, the panel pronounced that its review should neither 
completely substitute the national determinations (de novo review), nor totally defer to the 
member states’ findings. Applying an objective assessment test, the underwear panel 
provided a more precise meaning for art. 11 DSU. The panel asked whether the national 
authorities (1) had examined all the relevant facts before it; (2) had given an adequate 
explanation of how the facts supported the determinations and (3) whether the 
determination made was consistent with the international obligations of the member state”. 
28 WTO, APPELLATE BODY REPORT, EC Measures Concerning Meat and Meat Products 
(Hormones), WT/DS26/AB/R, WT/DS48/AB/R, 16 January 1998, paragraph 116: “so far as 
fact-finding by panels is concerned, their activities are always constrained by the mandate 
of Article 11 of the DSU: the applicable standard is neither de novo review as such, nor 
total deference, but rather the objective assessment of the facts. Many panels have in the 
past refused to undertake de novo review, wisely, since under current practice and systems, 
they are in any case poorly suited to engage in such a review. On the other hand, total 
deference to the findings of the national authorities, it has been said, could not ensure an 
objective assessment as foreseen by Article 11 of the DSU”. 
29 H. SPAMANN, Standard of Review for World Trade Organization, cit., p. 511: “In the 
international context of the World Trade Organization (WTO), it therefore partly defines 
the relationship between the nation state Members and the international organization WTO 
(and, by the same token, the scope of the obligations binding Members vis-à-vis each other 
under the WTO agreements)”. 
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 The sections that follow illustrate the test provided by the GATS, 
according to the two contexts in which it is provided: Article XIV (general 
exceptions) and Article VI (domestic regulation). 
 
3. The interpretation of necessity in justifying  protective measures 
 
The international liberalisation of services requires the removal of all 
barriers to competition. Depending on the nature of the obstacles to market 
entrance, this can imply the modification of the content of national 
regulations. In the sectors in which States have spontaneously assumed 
specific commitments, any protectionist measure is presumptively 
illegitimate. Article XVI, paragraph 2 of the GATS sets forth the limitations 
that are presumed to be illegal for their violation of the market access 
principle. Such measures cannot be maintained or adopted – neither on a 
regional nor on a national basis – unless there is a provision to the contrary 
in one of the individual schedules30.  
In wholly liberalised sectors, the GATS allows Member States to 
preserve protectionist measures that are directed towards one of the specific 
goals set forth by the global law31.  
Where a Member requests the activation of a panel to challenge a 
national measure for its restrictive effects, the State interested in its 
preservation is obliged to justify its particular choice. This justification 
implies the demonstration of the necessity of the measure adopted with 
respect to the social policy goals that it seeks to pursue. 
The GATS does not allow just any interest to justify a derogation from 
the liberalisation regime; on the contrary, Article XIV sets forth an 
exhaustive list of the goals that States can legitimately invoke as exceptions 
to the rule, in order to defend their contested measures. Its provisions are 
formulated in a way that makes them ‘almost equivalent’32 to those of 
                                                 
30 A concrete example is provided by Legge 29 dicembre 1994, n. 747, Ratifica ed 
esecuzione degli atti concernenti i risultati dei negoziati dell’Uruguay Round. 
31 Exceptions to this principle are set forth in GATS, Article XIV, paragraph 2: “(a) 
necessary to protect public morals or to maintain public order; (b) necessary to protect 
human, animal or plant life or health; (c) necessary to secure compliance with laws or 
regulations which are not inconsistent with the provisions of this Agreement including 
those relating to: (i) the prevention of deceptive and fraudulent practices or to deal with the 
effects of a default on services contracts; (ii) the protection of the privacy of individuals in 
relation to the processing and dissemination of personal data and the protection of 
confidentiality of individual records and accounts; (iii) safety; (d) inconsistent with Article 
XVII, provided that the difference in treatment is aimed at ensuring the equitable or 
effective imposition or collection of direct taxes in respect of services or service suppliers 
of other Members; (e) inconsistent with Article II, provided that the difference in treatment 
is the result of an agreement on the avoidance of double taxation or provisions on the 
avoidance of double taxation in any other international agreement or arrangement by which 
the Member is bound”. 
32 P. DELIMATSIS, Towards a Necessity Test for Services: Completing the GATS Article 
VI.4 Mandate A Little Less Conversation, a Little More Action, Please!, NCCR Trade 
Regulation, Working Paper n. 16, 2006, in http://www.nccr-
trade.org/images/stories/publications/IP8/WTF_necessity_paper_FINAL_DELIMATSIS.pd
f, p. 17: “One important difference in the wording of the two provisions is that Art. XIV(a) 
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 33GATT Article XX : both GATT and GATS use a similar language and 
make similar provisions in their respective chapeaux, recognising Member 
States’ right to pursue certain domestic policies.  
An overall coherence between the two Agreements seems to be 
confirmed by an analysis of the case-law. In its only decision in the area of 
services34, the DSB evaluates the exceptions provided by Article XIV in 
light of concepts and interpretations developed in the area of GATT Article 
XX.  
In analysing the ‘necessity’ of the (federal and state) laws preventing 
internet gambling, both the Panel and the Appellate Body35 evaluate the 
‘public morals’ exception provided by Article XIV (a), making reference to 
the analysis in the Korea-Various Measures on Beef case36, in the GATT 
context. The Appellate body explains that the standard of necessity ought to 
be understood by means of “a comparison between the challanged measure 
and possibile alternatives” and that “the results of such comparison should 
be considered in the light of the importance of the interest at issue.” This 
comparison ought to demonstrate that there exists no “reasonably available 
WTO-consistent alternative measure”37.  
After the Korea decision (the “most important of the post-Uruguay round 
on the subject of necessity”38), determining the necessity of a protective 
                                                                                                                                               
GATS considers as GATS consistent a measure that is necessary not only for the protection 
of public morals, but also for the maintenance of public order. The public order exception is 
broadly defined to allow its invocation when a genuine and sufficiently serious threat is 
posed to one of the fundamental interests of society. According to Matsushita et al., this 
additional element in Art. XIV GATS makes this provision more inclusive than Art. XX 
GATS and hence the list of possible measures that could fall under this provision is wider. 
Viewed from this perspective, then, Art. XIV allows for greater regulatory flexibility and 
can hardly regarded as a provision imposing some kind of deregulation”.  
33 GENERAL AGREEMENT ON TARIFFS AND TRADE, Article XX. 
34 So far, only two cases in the area of services have led to the activation of a panel: 
WTO, PANEL REPORT, Mexico – Measures affecting telecommunications services, 
WT/DS204/R, 2 April 2004 and WTO, PANEL REPORT, United States-Measures affecting 
the cross-border supply of gambling and betting services, WT/D285/R, 10 November 2004. 
It is only in the latter case however that the DSB decided on the merits of the Article XIV 
exceptions clause.  
35 WTO, APPELLATE BODY REPORT, United States-Measures affecting the cross-border 
supply of gambling and betting services, WT/DS285/AB/R, 7 April 2005, paragraph 312. 
36 WTO, APPELLATE BODY REPORT, Korea-Various Measures on Beef, 
WT/DS161/AB/R, 11 December 2000, paragraph 164. On this subject, see J. NEUMANN 
and E. TURK, Necessity Revisited: Proportionality in World Trade Organization Law After 
Korea-Beef, EC-Asbestos and EC-Sardines, in 1 Journal World Trade (2003) 199 et. seq. 
37 The determination of a reasonably available WTO-consistent alternative does not 
imply the often impossible reconstruction of the whole universe of trade-restrictive 
alternative measures by the responding party. Rather, the complainant party must signal the 
concrete existence of a WTO-compatible reasonable alternative, while the responding party 
must demonstrate that this alternative is not reasonably available, does not guarantee the 
same level of protection or does not meet the goal pursued. See WTO, APPELLATE BODY 
REPORT, United States-Gambling, cit., paragraph 309-311; WTO, APPELLATE BODY 
REPORT, Japan-Measures Affecting Agricultural Products, WT/DS76/AB/R, 19 March 
1999, paragraph 137. 
38 P. DELIMATSIS, Towards a Necessity Test for Services, cit., p. 13. 
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 measure taken in the services sector now means undertaking a process of 
weighing and balancing a number of factors. Preeminent among these 
factors are the measure’s contribution to the application of the law or 
regulation, the relative importance of the interests and values pursued, and 
finally, the measure’s restrictive impact on trade. Concretely, the WTO DSB 
performs a two-tiered analysis. First, it determines whether the measure is 
directed at one of the goals set forth in Article XIV. This requires a complex 
evaluation aimed at determining that the measure is designed39 to meet the 
pursued objective and is also ‘necessary’ to its pursuit. 
At the second level, the DSB examines “the way in which the measure is 
applied”40, through the reasonableness requirements set forth in the 
chapeaux (‘opening clauses’)41. The responding party must demonstrate that 
the measure does not constitute an ‘arbitrary’ or ‘unjustifiable’ 
discrimination, nor a ‘disguised restriction on trade in service,’ and thus an 
abuse of the derogation allowed by the exceptions clause42. This requires 
both that the measure pursues the interest set forth by one of the paragraphs 
of the article and that there exists a sufficient connection between the 
measure and the interest43.  
The restrictive and literal interpretation of the doctrine of necessity in the 
US-Gambling decision, like that in the Korea-Beef decision, modifies the 
interpretation of the exceptions clause (GATT Article XX). The 
interpretation, aimed at guaranteeing the application of the derogation in the 
goods sector, defines the delicate relationship between the DSB’s standard 
of review and the degree of deference that it must guarantee to national 
governments. Attempts to apply this interpretation have raised doubts and 
significant changes of direction.  
44The Panel report in the case United States-337 of the Tariff Act of 1930 , 
was the first to clarify the kinds of review applicable when the principle of 
necessity figures into the evaluation of the controversy45. The 1989 decision 
                                                 
39 WTO, APPELLATE BODY REPORT, US-Gambling, cit., paragraph 294. 
40 WTO, APPELLATE BODY REPORT, United States – Standards for Reformulated and 
Conventional Gasoline, WT/DS2/AB/R, 29 April 1996, p. 22: “the chapeau by its express 
terms addresses, not so much the questioned measure or its specific contents as such, but 
rather the manner in which that measure is applied”. 
41 WTO, APPELLATE BODY REPORT, US – Gasoline, cit., p. 15. 
42 WTO, APPELLATE BODY REPORT, US – Gasoline, cit., p. 22: “In order that the 
justifying protection of Article XX may be extended to it, the measure at issue must not 
only come under one or another of the particular exceptions - paragraphs (a) to (j) - listed 
under Article XX; it must also satisfy the requirement imposed by the opening clauses of 
Article XX. The analysis is, in other words, two-tiered:  first, provisional justification by 
reason of characterization of the measure under XX (g); second further appraisal of the 
same measure under the introductory clauses of Article XX”. 
43 This relationship is specified through the use of various terms like ‘relating to,’ 
‘involving’ or ‘necessary to’. See WTO, APPELLATE BODY REPORT, US-Gambling, cit., 
paragraph 292. 
44 GATT PANEL REPORT, United States-Section 337 of the Tariff Act of 1930, BISD 
36S/345, 7 November 1989. 
45 GATT PANEL REPORT, United States-Section 337, cit., paragraph 5.26: “It was clear to 
the Panel that a contracting party cannot justify a measure inconsistent with another GATT 
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 views the existence of alternative measures as the main criteria in 
determining the necessity of the contested measure. The analysis seems to 
take the form of a “least trade restrictive alternative test”46 which considers 
a measure to be necessary and thus legitimate only if it is indispensible to 
the pursuit of national domestic policies. This criteria renders the analysis 
particularly severe and pointed: it limits States’ freedom to avail themselves 
of the exceptions clause by going beyond the ordinary meaning47 of the 
term necessity and requiring them to meeet the higher burden of establishing 
the measure’s indispensibility48. The reason for the GATT dispute 
resolution body’s insensibility to the goals of national legislators can 
perhaps be attributed to the 1947 GATT’s particular view of the conditions 
that would have guaranteed the creation of a free common market49. As an 
instrument protecting the liberalisation commitments assumed by the 
signatories, the determination of the standard of necessity was focused on 
minimising and controlling harmful effects on trade. In line with this 
framework, the judicial analysis “used the effects on trade as a benchmark 
to calibrate the less GATT-inconsistent measure”50, thus adopting a policy 
of intolerance for all but the measures strictly indispensible to the pursuit of 
the objective.  
This interpretation was partially modified, first in the 1990’s and then 
with the constitution of the World Trade Organization. Many reports 
adopted by dispute resolution panels seem to accept a less rigid framework 
for the determination of necessity. In the US – Gasoline report51, the 
                                                                                                                                               
provision as necessary in terms of Article XX (d) if an alternative measure which it could 
reasonably be expected to employ and which is not inconsistent with other GATT 
provisions is available to it. By the same token, in cases where a measure consistent with 
other GATT provisions is not reasonably available, a contracting party is bound to use, 
among the measures reasonably available to it, that which entails the least degree of 
inconsistency with other GATT provisions. The Panel wished to make it clear to this does 
not mean that a contracting party could be asked to change its substantive patent law or its 
desired level of enforcement of that law, provided that such law and such level of 
enforcement are the same for imported and domestically produced products. However, it 
does mean that, if a contracting party could reasonably secure that level of enforcement in a 
manner that is not inconsistent with other GATT provision, it would be required to do so”. 
46 See P. DELIMATSIS, Towards a Necessity Test for Services, cit., p. 13. 
47 Vienna Convention, Article 31. 
48 The New Shorter Oxford English Dictionary, (Clarendon Press, 1993), vol. II, p. 
1895: “The word necessary normally denotes something that cannot be dispensed with or 
done without, requisite, essential, needful”. See WTO, PANEL REPORT, United States – 
Restriction on Imports of Tuna (Tuna Dolphin II), 16 June 1994, paragraph 3.15: “It was 
necessary to interpret Article XX (b), in its context, in accordance with the rules of treaty 
interpretation expressed in the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties”. 
49 See E. RUOZZI, I principi di necessità e di proporzionalità all’interno dell’articolo 
XX GATT, in Il Diritto dell’Economia, vol. 1, 2007, p. 142. 
50 D.A. OSIRO, GATT/WTO Necessity Analysis: Evolutionary Interpretation and Its 
impact on the Autonomy of Domestic Regulation, in 29 Legal Issues of Economic 
Integration (2002) 127. 
51 WTO, APPELLATE BODY REPORT, U.S. –  Gasoline, cit., p. 28: “It is of some 
importance that the Appellate Body point out what this does not mean. It does not mean, or 
imply, that the ability of any WTO Member to take measures to control air pollution or, 
more generally, to protect the environment, is at issue. That would be to ignore the fact that 
Article XX of the General Agreement contains provisions designed to permit important 
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 Appellate Body affirmed that, in determining a measure’s necessity, account 
had to be taken not only of its indispensibility to the objective but also of its 
ability to reach it52; in its Korea-Beef report, it openly observes that “while 
one meaning of necessary in ordinary language is indispensabile this is not 
the only meaning”53. Thus it passes from a ‘least-trade restrictive approach’ 
to a ‘less-trade restrictive test’54. 
The inclusion of a reasonably available alternative among the elements to 
consider in a balancing process also reflects a greater deference to the 
States. Though the DSB must evaluate “whether a WTO-consistent 
alternative measure is reasonably available”55, the alternative measure 
appears to be reasonably available when, for example, it can be effectively 
implemented in the State56, or it is just as able as the discriminatory measure 
to meet the goals established by the Member State57. In the EC-Asbestos 
decision, the Appellate Body again invoked Korea-Beef58, to argue that the 
importance of objective that the measure was designed to obtain was one of 
the factors to consider in determining its WTO-consistency.  
We can thus argue that the WTO’s attention to the public policies 
invoked under the exceptions clause to justify national discretion has 
                                                                                                                                               
state interests - including the protection of human health, as well as the conservation of 
exhaustible natural resources - to find expression. The provisions of Article XX were not 
changed as a result of the Uruguay Round of Multilateral Trade Negotiations. Indeed, in the 
preamble to the WTO Agreement and in the Decision on Trade and Environment, there is 
specific acknowledgement to be found about the importance of coordinating policies on 
trade and the environment. WTO Members have a large measure of autonomy to determine 
their own policies on the environment (including its relationship with trade), their 
environmental objectives and the environmental legislation they enact and implement. So 
far as concerns the WTO, that autonomy is circumscribed only by the need to respect the 
requirements of the General Agreement and the other covered agreements”. 
52 WTO, APPELLATE BODY REPORT, Korea-Various Measures, cit., paragraph 159: “we 
believe that, as used in the context of Article XX (d), the reach of the word necessary is not 
limited to that which is indispensable or of absolute necessity or inevitable. Measures 
which are indispensable or of absolute necessity or inevitable to secure compliance 
certainly fulfil the requirements of Article XX (d). but other measures, too, may fall within 
the ambit of this exception. As used in Article XX (d) the term necessary refers, in our 
view, to a range of degrees of necessity. At one end of this continuum lies necessary 
understood as indispensable, at the other end, is necessary taken to mean as making a 
contribution to. We consider that a necessary measure is, in this continuum, located 
significantly closer to the pole of indispensable than to the opposite pole of simply making 
a contribution to”. 
53 WTO, APPELLATE BODY REPORT, Korea-Various Measures, cit., paragraph 161. 
54 WTO SECRETARIAT, GATT/WTO Dispute Settlement Practice relating to GATT 
Article XX, WT/CTE/W/203, paragraph 42. 
55 WTO, APPELLATE BODY REPORT, Korea-Various Measures, cit., paragraph 165. 
56 See WTO, PANEL REPORT, United States – Standards for Reformulated and 
Conventional Gasoline, WT/DS2/R, 29 January 1996, paragraph 3.40 et. seq.  
57 In the Gambling decision, the panel, in order to determine the ‘reasonably available 
measure’ required a consultation of the interested States. It intended the consultation to be 
the place to evaluate and negotiate the alternative measure for the pursuit of a certain public 
interest, thus becoming an indispensible element of its reasonableness.  
58 WTO, APPELLATE BODY REPORT, Korea-Various Measures, cit., paragraph 162: “the 
more vital or important the common interests or values pursued, the easier it would be to 
accept as necessary measures designed to achieve those ends”. 
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 changed over the years. This change, hastened by the impact of sectoral 
rules protecting non-trade domestic policy (in particular, the TBT and 
SPS)59, can be understood through the different interpretative approach of 
the judicial bodies. The greater deference given to domestic policy choices 
has generated a test that is increasingly respectful of national legislative 
choices. As demonstrated by some observers, the basic doctrine of the 
Korea-Beef case illustrates this change; the Appellate Body stresses that 
“there are situations where the claim may be that a measure is indispensable, 
i.e. the only available measure to achieve a member’s chosen level of 
protection, and there are other situations in which a member may be able to 
justify its measure as necessary within the meaning of Article XX even if 
the fit is not that close”60. So the Member State may therefore demonstrate 
the necessity of a non-indispensable measure as well61. 
The innovative aspect of the Korea decision is thus the greater margin of 
flexibility in evaluating the parameters of necessity. This flexibility creates 
an ‘additional margin of appreciation’ in the regulatory policies adopted by 
the States in pursuit of the goals set forth in Article XX. The case-law and 
academic commentary62 in this area demonstrate that today the importance 
of the public policies listed in the exceptions clause is such as to prohibit 
their sacrifice tout-court in the face of harm to the free movement in 
services. It cannot, for example, “be required that a Member replace one of 
                                                 
59 On this subject, see G. MARCEAU and J.P TRACHTMAN, The Technical Barriers to 
Trade Agreement, the Sanitary and Phytosanitary Measures Agreement, and the General 
Agreement on Tariffs and Trade, in 36 Journal of World Trade (2002) p. 811 et seq.; F. 
FRANCIONI, Environment, Human Rights and the liberalization of international trade, 
Portland, 2001. 
60 R. HOWSE and E. TUERK, The WTO impact on internal regulations-a case study of the 
Canada-EC asbestos dispute, in G.A. BERMANN and P.C. MAVROIDIS, Trade and Human 
Health and Safety, New York, 2006, p. 324. 
61 SOUTH CENTRE ANALYTICAL NOTE, GATS Dispute Settlement Case: Practical 
Implication for Developing Countries, SC/TADP/AN/SV/10 SC/TADP/AN/DS/1, January 
2005, paragraph 7: “The analysis for this necessity test involved weighing and balancing 
several factors, namely: the importance of the interests or values that the measure is 
intended to protect; the extent to which the challenged measure contributes to the 
realization of the end pursued; and the trade impact of the measure, including whether a 
reasonably available WTO-consistent alternative measure exists. The important thing to 
note here is that the Panel found that public morals and public order can be very important 
societal interests, which can be characterized as vital and important in the highest degree. 
This puts the two interests at par with the protection of human life and health. The 
importance of this is that the higher the interest or value pursued by a measure, the more 
likely it is that the measure will be seen as necessary. It should be recalled that the footnote 
to Article XIV (a) provides that the public order exception may be invoked only where a 
genuine and sufficiently serious threat is posed to one of the fundamental interests of 
society. The Panel did not address this footnote expressly, but merely found that public 
order is a very important societal interest. To some extent, this makes it easier for Members 
to invoke the public order exception. And, by holding public morals and public order in 
such high regard, the Panel has widened the scope for Members to pursue these non-trade 
objectives”. 
62 See WTO, WPDR, Necessity tests in the WTO, Note by the Secretariat, S/WPDR/W/27, 
2 December 2003; F. ORTINO, From Non-Discrimination To Reasonableness: A Paradigm 
Shift In International Economic Law?, in Jean Monnet Working Paper, n. 1, 2005, in 
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=922524. 
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 its measures with an alternative that is both less trade restrictive but also less 
protective”63 64 than the one under examination .  
 
4. The interpretation of necessity in justifying national regulatory 
measures  
 
In respect of Members’ right to regulate the supply of services within 
their territories, the Preamble to the General Agreement on Trade in 
Services recognises: 
 
“[...] the right of members to regulate, and to introduce new regulations, 
on the supply of services within their territories in order to meet national 
policy objectives and, given asymmetries existing with respect to the degree 
of development of services regulation in different countries the particular 
need of developing countries to exercise this right”. 
 
National regulations can affect trade in services, sometimes generating 
commercial barriers65. The determination of rules that prevent the 
protectionist use of domestic regulations is thus vital, but such rule must not 
deprive national regulators of the freedom to pursue legitimate social 
objectives66. Article VI introduces provisions aimed at preventing 
‘qualitative’ measures of domestic regulation67 from being used to conceal 
                                                 
63 M. KENNET, J. NEUMANN and E. TUERK, Second Guessing National Level Policy 
Choices: Necessity, Proportionality and Balance in the WTO Services Negotiations, Center 
for International Environmental Law, August 2003, in 
www.//ciel.org/Publications/necessity_3Sep03.pdf, p. 3: “a Member cannot be required to 
substitute a measure for an alternative that is less protective simply because it is also less 
trade restrictive. Importantly this interpretation of necessity only applies to measures that 
are not indispensable for the attainment of a legitimate goal and for the particular level of 
protection”. 
64 The EC-Asbestos case confirms this. The Appellate Body not only upheld the French 
measure defending an established margin of protection, but also observed that “the more 
vital or important the common interests or values pursued the easier it would be to accept, 
as necessary measures designed to achieve those ends”. See WTO, APPELLATE BODY 
REPORT, EC-Asbestos, WT/DS135/AB/R, 5 April 2001, paragraph 162. 
65 Regarding the influence of domestic regulation on trade in services, see for example, 
European Commission Report to the Council and European Parliament, The state of the 
internal market in services, COM (2002) 441 def., 30 July 2002, p. 6: “[s]ervices are much 
more prone to Internal Market barriers than goods and are harder hit. Because of the 
complex and intangible nature of services and the importance of the know-how and the 
qualifications of the service provider, the provision of services is often subject to much 
more complex rules covering the entire service activity than is the case for goods”. 
66 On this topic, see M. KRAJWESKI, National Regulation and Trade Liberalization in 
Services: The Legal Impact of the General Agreement on Trade in Services (GATS) on 
National Regulatory Autonomy, London-New York, 2003; P. SAUVÉ and A. MATTOO, 
Domestic regulation and Services Trade Liberalization, Washington,  2003; M. 
DJORDJEVIC, Domestic Regulation and Free Trade in Services - A Balancing Act, in 29 
Legal Issues on Economic Integration (2002) 305-322. 
67 The GATS, as we have discussed in section 4, also addresses quantitative or 
numerical restrictions in Articles XVI-XVII, regarding them as protectionist measures and 
subjecting them to scheduling obligations. For case-law on this point, see WTO, PANEL 
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 protectionist ends and thus create useless barriers to trade. This rule, 
balancing the right to regulate with the goal of trade liberalisation, applies a 
‘policed decentralization’, so that “regulators can operate independently in 
different jurisdictions and may adopt substantive regulations but must do so 
subject to a number of constraints”68. This policy does not create 
substantive obligations, but requires the Member States to adopt provisions 
that are consistent, rather than requiring them to respect specific criteria that 
would rein in their regulatory power69. 
Article VI imposes a series of obligations on state authorities, in both 
adjudication as well as in rule-making proceedings. With regard to the 
former, Article VI, paragraph 1 requires that, in the sectors for which no 
specific commitments have been undertaken, state authorities must 
administer all measures of general application “in a reasonable, objective 
and impartial manner”70. In reference to the latter, paragraph 4 mandates a 
WTO administrative body, the Council for Trade in Services (hereafter, 
GATS Council) – which makes use of an expert committee, the Working 
Party on Domestic Regulation (hereafter the WPDR)71 – to develop the 
global disciplines:  
 
“with a view to ensuring that measures relating to qualification 
requirements and procedures, technical standards and licensing 
requirements do not constitute unnecessary barriers to trade in services. 
Such disciplines shall aim to ensure that such requirements are, inter alia: 
(a) based on objective and transparent criteria, such as competence and 
the ability to supply the service; 
(b) not more burdensome than necessary to ensure the quality of the 
service; 
(c) in the case of licensing procedures, not in themselves a restriction on 
the supply of the service. 
 
                                                                                                                                               
REPORT, US-Gambling, cit. and, for commentary, see J. PAUWELYN, Rien Ne Va Plus?, 4 
World Trade Review (2005) 131-170; P. DELIMATSIS, Towards A Necessity Test For 
Services, cit., p. 5-12. 
68 F. KOKOTT, H. HAUSER and H. NETTESHEIM, Electronic Services: Its Regulatory 
Barriers and the Role of the WTO, St. Gallen, July 2001, in 
www.cid.harvard.edu/cidtrade/Papers/wunsch.pdf, p. 31. 
69 On this topic, see M. KENNET, J. NEUMANN and E. TUERK, Second Guessing National 
Level Policy Choices, cit. 
70 GATS, Article VI: “In sectors where specific commitments are undertaken, each 
Member shall ensure that all measures of general application affecting trade in services are 
administered in a reasonable, objective and impartial manner”. On this topic, see B. 
CIMINO, Reasonableness, impartiality, objectiveness and participation: the Gats standards, 
in this volume.  
71 See WTO, CTS, Decision on Domestic Regulation, Adopted by the Council for Trade 
in Services on 26 april 1999, S/L/70, 28 April 1999; this group of experts is empowered “to 
develop any necessary disciplines to ensure that measures relating to licensing requirements 
and procedures, technical standards and qualification requirements and procedures do not 
constitute unnecessary barriers to trade”. The WPDR replaced the previous Working Party 
on Professional Services (or WPPS), established by the decision of 1995. See WTO, CTS, 
Decision on Professional Services, Adopted by the Council for Trade in Services on 1 
March 1995, S/L/3, 4 April 1995. 
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 Paragraph 5 of Article VI specifies moreover that, in the period 
preceding the adoption of these disciplines, the States must refrain from 
introducing new national measures that could undermine or compromise the 
basic ends set forth in paragraph 472.  
The global disciplines on domestic regulation to be developed by the 
WPDR73 74 aim at binding the Member States , with respect to the different 
steps taken in the process of liberalisation.  Recognising state sovereignty 
and regulatory automony, they allow that state action be considered 
legitimate in principle, absent a demonstration that it is more restrictive than 
necessary to ensure the quality of the service. Confirming the benevolent 
treatment accorded to domestic norms75, the burden of proof rests upon the 
States challenging the conformity of another State’s  regulation.  
The ‘new’ disciplines on domestic regulation, once adopted, will affect 
measures relative to “qualification requirements and procedures, technical 
standards and licensing requirements”76. The four categories of measures 
                                                 
72 GATS, Article VI, paragraph 5: “(a) In sectors in which a Member has undertaken 
specific commitments, pending the entry into force of disciplines developed in these sectors 
pursuant to paragraph 4, the Member shall not apply licensing and qualification 
requirements and technical standards that nullify or impair such specific commitments in a 
manner which: (i) does not comply with the criteria outlined in subparagraphs 4(a), (b) or 
(c); and (ii) could not reasonably have been expected of that Member at the time the 
specific commitments in those sectors were made”. 
73 The only discipline in the sense of Article VI, paragraph 4, presented so far in regards 
the accountancy sector (see WTO, CTS, Disciplines on Domestic Regulation in the 
Accountancy Sector, Adopted by the Council for Trade in Services on 14 December 1998, 
S/L/64, 17 dicembre 1998); see section 4.1, supra. 
74 On this topic, see E. GOULD, How the GATS Undermines the Right to Regulate, 
Canadian Centre for Policy Alternatives, Briefing Paper, vol. 6, 2005 in 
http://policyalternatives.ca/documents/National_Office_Pubs/2005/brief6_4_GATS_and_G
ambling.pdf; J.P. TRATCHMAN, International Trade as a Vector in Domestic Regulatory 
Reform: Discrimination, Cost Benefit Analysis, and Negotiation, in 24 Fordham 
International Law Journal (2000) 726.  
75 Because the rules governing commercial trade are designed to ensure the freedom of 
market access, and only indirectly to promote efficiency or social well-being, some 
Member States – especially developing countries – are concerned that the future disciplines 
might impede States’ discretion in choosing legitimate policy objectives of domestic 
regulation. See L.A. MAJLUF, Domestic Regulation and the GATS: Challenges for 
Developing Countries, Policy Paper on Trade in Services and Substainable Development: 
Domestic Regulation, in http://www.ictsd.org/dlogue/2006-02-28/Dom_Reg.pdf. On the 
possible intrusion of the WTO into the Member States’ freedom to regulate beyond the 
original meaning ot the GATS Agreement, we can distinguish two different positions. On 
the one hand, there is the extreme position that “there should be no role for the WTO in 
over-seeing non-discriminatory regulation. This exercise represents a wholly unwarranted 
intrusion of trade law into important domestic public safety laws” (see Canadian 
Environmental Law Association, CELA Report 397 (2000), General Agreement on Trade 
in Services: Negotiations Concerning Domestic Regulation under GATS Article VI(4), 
submitted to the Department of Foreign Affairs and International Trade and to Industry 
Canada, November, p. 1); on the other hand, there are those who argue that the disciplines 
on domestic regulation are necessary to complete the market access obligations that could 
otherwise be undermined by regulations applied strictly for protectionist purposes. 
76 See WTO, WPDR, Disciplines on Domestic Regulation pursuant to GATS Article VI:4, 
Consolidated Working Paper, Note by the Chairman, JOB(06)/225, July 2006, p. 
4:“Licensing requirements are substantive requirements, other than qualification 
requirements and technical standards, with a service supplier is required to comply in order 
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 indicated by the Agreement include a vast number of domestic 
regulations77 78, defined by both the WPDR Secretariat  and by the Members 
themselves79.  
The States’ regulatory “measures relating to qualification requirements 
and procedures, technical standards and licensing requirements” must 
therefore respect the criteria of objectivity, transparency and necessity set 
forth in paragraph 4 which, in this sense, constitutes a genuine derogation 
norm. More specifically, paragraph 4(a) provides that the regulation must be 
based on objective80 and transparent criteria. The required standard of 
                                                                                                                                               
to obtain or renew authorization to supply a service. Licensing procedures are 
administrative or procedural rules relating to the administration of licensing requirements 
for the supply of a service, including those relating to submission and processing of an 
application for a license or renewal thereof. Qualifications requirements are substantive 
requirements relating to the competence to supply a service supplier is required to 
demonstrate prior to obtaining authorization to supply a service. Qualification procedures 
are administrative or procedural rules relating to the administration of qualification 
requirements, including those aiming at verifying the compliance of candidates with 
qualification requirements as well as those relating to acquiring or supplementing such 
qualifications. Technical standards are measures that lay down the characteristics of a 
service or the manner in which it is supplied. Technical standards also include the 
procedures relating to the enforcement of such standards”.  
77 Qualification and licensing requirements involve both substantive and procedural law. 
Qualifications include the prerequisites that a provider must possess in order to provide the 
service (for example, passing a qualification exam or possessing an authorisation); 
licensing, by contrast, concerns the administrative rules governing the proceedings for the 
granting of licenses and certificates (for example, the payment of taxes or the registration of 
a business. The technical standards consist in a series of parameters inherent to the 
characteristics of the service (for example, the prescriptions of a professional code of 
conduct).  
78 The Secretariat, in part, asking for the contribution of the Member States and in part 
taking up the work of the WPPS, included as licensing requirements: “Restrictive 
regulations relating to zoning and operating hours, to protect small storse. Federal and sub-
federal licensing and qualification requirements and procedures are different, making a 
license or qualification recognition obtained in one state not valid in other states. Too many 
licenses required in order to operate a business. Overly burdensome licensing requirements 
(e.g. minimum age required for a physiotherapist 25 years old).  Branches of a foreign 
company are required to regularly submit plan of activities to the government authority in 
order to be eligible to renew registration. Lengthy censorship procedures; too many 
censoring agencies with different criteria”. Qualification requirements include: “Only 
persons who have specific certification from a government agency can take up managerial 
posts (e.g. managers of an insurance company must have certification from the insurance 
agency in that country). Requirement for fluency in language of the host country which in 
some cases not relevant to ensure the quality of service. Different sub-federal regulations 
for recognition of qualifications. Minimum requirements for local hiring (accountancy)”. 
See WTO, WPDR, Examples of measures to addressed by disciplines under GATS Article 
VI:4, Informal Note by the Secretariat, Job (02)/20/REV.7, 22 September 2003; see also 
WTO, WPDR, Report on the Meeting Held on 3 december 2003, Note by the Secretariat, 
S/WPDR/M/24, 22 January 2004 and WTO, WPDR, Report on the Meeting Held on 2 
october 2001, Note by the Secretariat, S/WPDR/M/13, 21 November 2001. 
79 See WTO, WPDR, Definitions of Qualification Requirements, Qualification 
Procedures, Licensing Requirements, Licensing Procedures and Technical Standards, 
Communication from the Separate Customs Territory of Taiwan, Penghu, Kinmen and 
Matsu, S/WPDR/W/37, 6 October 2005. 
80 The expression ‘based on’ implies a relationship between the regulatory measure and 
objective criteria that are external to the regulation. This formulation is logical when a 
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 objectivity, still up for discussion within the WPDR, does not have a precise 
meaning and includes the following qualities: “not arbitrary, not biased, 
relevant to the ability to perform or supply the service, not subjective, the 
least-trade-restrictive alternative”81. In particular, a non arbitrary would 
allow differential treatment only if justified by the different characteristics 
of the service providers82; according to the American terminology, the 
measure must not be “capricious, or not otherwise in accordance with the 
law”83. Not biased would imply a prohibition upon the national regulator 
from favouring one party to the detriment of another in the decision-making 
process84. Finally, the determination of the measure least-trade-restrictive 
alternative implies a comparison between the less available alternative 
measures. Not subjective means the elimination of individual discretion85. 
Domestic regulations must not be “more burdensome86 than necessary to 
ensure the quality of the service”87. The principle of necessity affects the 
                                                                                                                                               
regulatory measure is based on a body of scientific knowledge (for example, risk 
assessment) or on a standard (for example food safety standards). Problems arise when a 
law gives regulators full power to decide whether a license is fair, reasonable or designed to 
a public interest. 
81 Memorandum of 1 March 2007 regarding the GATS proposal that domestic 
regulations must be “objective”, Harrison Institute, p. 3 (available at 
http://www.tradeobservatory.org/library.cfm?refID=97673).  
82 European Communities and their Member States, Schedule of Specific Commitments, 
Supplement 3, GATS/SC/31/Suppl.3, 11 April 1997. 
83 See L. GIANI, Spunti di riflessione in tema di controllo della discrezionalità 
nell’ordinamento giuridico statunitense, in Diritto Amministrativo, 1996, vol. 2, p. 769 et. 
seq.; G.A. BERMANN, Standards for the Exercise of Discretion in American Administrative 
Law, in 26 American Journal of Comparative Law (1977-78) 416 et seq. 
84 European Community, Report on United States Barriers to Trade and Investment, 
December 2004, paragraph 44: “This definition is more intrusive than ‘not arbitrary’ 
because laws like small business preferences or affirmative action were enacted specifically 
to create preferences in order to overcome historical disadvantages or market failures. The 
European Commission has specifically questioned the trade restrictive effects of 
“[a]ffirmative action schemes favouring small business or particular types of business (e.g. 
minority-owned) (available at 
http://trade.ec.europa.eu/doclib/docs/2006/february/tradoc_121929.pdf).  
85 This fourth quality was taken up by the Philippines in the WPDR, in response to the 
Colombian proposal for procedures for granting a visa, affirming “that if there was 
discretion not based on objective criteria in the application of visa procedures, these 
became the subject of the work under Article VI:4, i.e. the development of disciplines to 
ensure that such administrative procedures were based on transparent and objective 
criteria”. See WTO, WPDR, Report on the Meeting Held on 24 September 2004, 
S/WPDR/M/27, 15 November 2004, paragraph 45. 
86 Interpretative doubts arise surrounding the concept of ‘burdensome’. During the work 
of the WPDR, the European Community, taking up the NAFTA Agreement (which, having 
similar rules in the area of services, provides for the illegitimacy of national measures that 
are “more burdensome than necessary to business”), proposed to read the phrase “no more 
burdensome than necessary” as “no more trade restrictive than necessary”. See WTO, 
WPDR, Report on the Meeting Held on 3 July 2001, S/WPDR/M/12, 16 August 2001. 
87 The Member States cooperate with the Secretariat of the Council for Trade in 
Services in the periodic development of a list indicating the measures potentially “more 
burdensome than necessary to ensure the quality of the service” and thus incompatible with 
the Agreement. Among the qualification requirements included in this list are: “requirement 
for fluency in language of the host country; different sub-federal regulations for recognition 
of qualifications; minimum requirements for local hiring; need for in-country experience 
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 substantive content of the national disciplines, constraining policy choices 
and limiting the determination of legitimate national objectives88 and the 
relative level of protection. Regarding licensing requirements89, and the 
residency requirement in particular, the necessity test implies a duty upon 
individual Member States to determine the existence of means which are 
less trade restrictive while still enabling the pursuit of the same objectives 
sought by the requirement90. In relation to the qualification requirements, 
States are obliged to ensure that the procedures for the verification and 
evaluation of the service provider’s qualifications are based on pre-
determined and objective criteria, and applied to both local and non-local 
applicants alike91. It then requires that the competent authorities carrying 
out such verification and evaluation procedures consider both professional 
                                                                                                                                               
before sitting examinations; requirements of previous working experiences in host markets: 
natural persons applying for professional licenses should have certain years of working 
experiences in the host markets”. The list of disfavored procedures for licensing 
requirements includes: the “absence of pre-determined, clear criteria for licensing 
requirements (including postal and courier, and distribution services); restrictive licensing 
practices (tourism); unreasonable restrictions on licensing (legal services); unclear licensing 
and approval requirements (energy services); restrictions on registration (e.g. residency 
requirements), which prevents foreign engineers from signing off on drawings and 
managing projects”. See WTO, WPDR, Examples of measures to addressed by disciplines 
under GATS Article VI:4, Informal Note by the Secretariat, Job(02)/20/REV.2, 18 October, 
2002. 
88 The Accountancy disciplines include an open-ended list of legitimate objectives that 
each Member may invoke to justify the necessity of its own regulatory measures. 
89 This expression includes every substantive requirement for the attainment of 
authorisation to provide a service. It includes not only the “licensing of professionals, but 
also licensing or concessions for companies to operate (e.g., utilities, transportation or 
education)”. As argued by the United States, this would also comprehend “permits related 
to construction, operation or use of facilities, use of natural resources, or that service to 
implement and enforce certain laws, e.g., food safety inspections, vehicle safety and 
emission inspection, environmental protection, etc”. See Briefing Memo of 28 May 2007, 
regarding the WPDR chairman’s third draft on domestic regulation of 18 April 2007, 
Harrison Institute (available at http://www.tradeobservatory.org).  
90 See WTO, WPDR, Communication from Australia; Chile; Hong Kong; China; The 
separate customs territory of Taiwan; Penghu; Kinmen and Matsu, Article VI:4 Disciplines 
– Proposal for Draft Text, JOB(06)/193, 19 June 2006, paragraph 29: “Where residency 
requirements not subject to scheduling under Article XVII of the GATS apply in 
qualification requirements, each Member shall consider whether alternative less trade 
restrictive means could be employed to achieve the purposes for which these requirements 
were established. Residency requirements non subject to scheduling under Article XVII of 
the GATS shall not be a pre-requisite for taking part in competency assessment including 
examinations”. This discipline will create a significant limitation on regulators. For this 
reason, some states, including Australia, have proposed the use of temporary licensing as a 
less trade-restrictive alternative than the residency requirement (see WTO, WPDR, 
Communication from Australia, Development of Disciplines on Domestic Regulation for 
the Legal and Engineering Sectors, S/WPDR/W/34, 6 September 2005). 
91 See WTO, WPDR, Communication from Australia; Chile; Hong Kong; China; The 
separate customs territory of Taiwan; Penghu; Kinmen and Matsu, cit., paragraph 23: 
“Where qualification requirements are applied to the supply of a service, each Member 
shall ensure that mechanisms exist for the verification and assessment of qualifications held 
by services suppliers including those of any other Members. Such mechanisms shall be 
based on criteria that are pre-established and objective and apply to both local and non-
local qualifications”.  
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 experience, as a complement to academic qualifications, as well as the 
applicant’s membership in important professional organisations in the 
country of origin or in a third country92.  
On the basis of paragraph 4 of Article VI, the objective justifying the 
burden imposed by  “qualification requirements and procedures, technical 
standards and licensing requirements” is its necessity in ensuring the 
‘quality of the service’. The inconsistency of national measures is gauged 
not only in relation to their capacity to negatively affect free trade, but also 
to their inadequacy in ensuring the quality of the service.  More specifically, 
the necessity test applied to national regulations implies a three-step 
analysis: first, a determination of the degree of trade restrictiveness; second, 
the adequacy of the measure in ensuring the quality of the service; third, the 
existence of available alternative means for attaining the same quality of 
services93.  
A non-discriminatory national measure, which negatively affects free 
trade, can thus be maintained if its trade restrictive effect is justified by the 
need to ensure the levels of quality fixed by States exercising their full 
powers of discretion. By providing as such, the Agreement defers to the 
policies animating state regulation.  
 
4.1. The interpretation of necessity in justifying national regulatory 
measures: the Accountancy Sector disciplines 
 
Article VI, paragraph 4, charges the Council for Trade in Services, 
through the WPDR, with developing global disciplines on “qualification 
requirements and procedures, technical standards and licensing 
requirements”; presently, the only disciplines adopted regard the 
accountancy sector94. With regard to the principle of necessity, the focus of 
this study, paragraph 2 of the Accountancy disciplines provides that:  
                                                 
92 See WTO, WPDR, Communication from Australia; Chile; Hong Kong; China; The 
separate customs territory of Taiwan; Penghu; Kinmen and Matsu; cit., paragraph 26: 
“Each Member shall ensure that, in verifying and assessing qualifications, the competent 
authorities take into account professional experience of the applicant as complement to 
academic qualifications, and also take into account the membership of the applicant in the 
relevant professional associations in the home country or a third country”. 
93 L.A. MAJLUF, Domestic Regulation and the GATS: Challenges for Developing 
Countries, cit., p. 20-21: “To assess a particular measure it would not be enough to 
demonstrate that a measure is more burdensome, or costly, than necessary and directly 
deriving from that fact that it is a trade restrictive measure, as some tend to suggest. A 
measure can be burdensome but not necessarily trade restrictive. The notion of more 
burdensome than necessary should be understood in the context of Article VI:4 as referring 
to ‘more trade restrictive than necessary’. Once a measure is found to be trade restrictive, 
the following test would be to determine if it is more restrictive than necessary to achieve 
the policy objective. Determining necessity in this context is certainly a very complex 
issue”. 
94 See WTO, CTS, Disciplines on Domestic Regulation in the Accountancy Sector, 
S/L/64, cit.; WTO, CTS, Decision on Disciplines Relating to the Accountancy Sector, 
S/L/63, 15 December 1998; WTO, WPPS, Guidelines for Mutual Recognition Agreements 
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“Members shall ensure that measures not subject to scheduling under 
Articles XVI or XVII of the GATS, relating to licensing requirements and 
procedures, technical standards and qualification requirements and 
procedures are not prepared, adopted or applied with a view to or with the 
effect of creating unnecessary barriers to trade in accountancy services. For 
this purpose, Members shall ensure that such measures are not more trade-
restrictive than necessary to fulfil a legitimate objective. Legitimate 
objectives are, inter alia, the protection of consumers (which includes all 
users of accounting services and the public generally), the quality of the 
service, professional competence, and the integrity of the profession” (italics 
added). 
 
This provision affects the substantive content of state regulation, setting 
forth an ‘open’ list of objectives, including consumer protection, the quality 
of the service, professional competence and integrity95, that a Member State 
may legitimately pursue by means of domestic regulation measures96.  
The formulation of paragraph 2 of the Accountancy sector disciplines 
seems identical to that contained in Article 2.2. of the Agreement on 
Technical Barriers to Trade (TBT)97. In this context as well, the list of 
legitimate national objectives is preceded by an inter alia clause, providing 
that: 
 
“Members shall ensure that technical regulations are not prepared, 
adopted or applied with a view to or with the effect of creating unnecessary 
obstacles to international trade. For this purpose, technical regulations shall 
                                                                                                                                               
or Arrangements in the Accountancy Sector – Revision, S/WPPS/W/12/REV.1, 20 May 
1997; WTO, WPPS, Recommendation of the Working Party on Domestic on Professional 
Services to the Council of Trade in Services, S/WPPS/W/14/REV.1, 15 May 1997; WPPS, 
Recommendation of the Working Party on Domestic on Professional Services to the 
Council of Trade in Services,  S/WPPS/W/14/REV.1/Corr.1, 22 May 1997. 
95 As in the TBT Agreement, there are doubts about the possibility of calibrating a 
domestic measure’s effects on trade, in light of the importance of the legitimate objective 
pursued, without reviewing its validity. The presence of an open list of legitimate 
objectives would seem in fact to attribute greater discretionary power to the dispute 
resolution body. On the basis of studies undertaken in the area of the TBT, many authors 
argue that the provision of an open list of legitimate objectives could therefore increase the 
judicial review of the DSB, allowing it to review the ‘legitimacy of pre-determined 
objectives’ as well. 
96 The States have thus agreed upon four objectives that the DSB ought to consider as 
‘legitimate’ when examining the necessity of the measure adopted.  
97 Both of these Agreements, out of respect for the different social, cultural and legal 
characteristic of the 149 WTO Members, do not in fact list the objectives in an exhaustive 
way, but use an open formula of exemplification. The presence of similar wording in the 
TBT and the Accountancy disciplines not only enables their comparison, but also the use of 
TBT jurisprudence in interpreting the meaning of the necessity embodied in Article VI, 
paragraph 4. 
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 not be more trade-restrictive than necessary to fulfil a legitimate objective, 
taking account of the risks non-fulfilment would create. Such legitimate 
objectives are, inter alia: national security requirements; the prevention of 
deceptive practices; protection of human health or safety, animal or plant 
life or health, or the environment. In assessing such risks, relevant elements 
of consideration are, inter alia: available scientific and technical 
information, related processing technology or intended end-uses of 
products” (italics added). 
 
Using the inter alia clause, and thus leaving the Member States the 
possibility of exercising their discretion to increase the number of legitimate 
objectives98, the global law grants deference to the States. At the same time, 
this provision would seem to legitimate a more searching review by the 
global judicial body, aimed not only at evaluating whether the means 
adopted are fitted to the objective pursued, but also the objective itself. The 
provision of an open list of objectives to pursue in fact implies a widened 
scope of judicial review to include a review of the wisdom of the chosen 
objectives99. The review of necessity would thus bring it closer to 
                                                 
98 With regard to future Article VI, paragraph 4, disciplines, Australia, by contrast, has 
argued in favour of the introduction of a illustrative list of objectives (WTO, WPDR, 
Communication from Australia, S/WPDR/W/1, 19 July 1999, paragraph 5; WTO, WPDR, 
Communication from Australia, Necessity and Transaprency, S/WPDR/W/8, 15 September 
2000, paragraph 4-5), proposing the inclusion of professional competence, professional 
integrity, administrative efficiency and fairness. Paragraph 5 reads: “The necessity test will 
be used to determine whether measures to implement a policy objective are the least trade-
restrictive available.  In Australia's judgement, Members should draft a necessity test 
which, while drawing on the concepts of Article VI:4 (a-c), is narrower and more consistent 
with other WTO Agreements.  Members need to establish what would constitute a 
necessary barrier to trade in services.  For example, the following definition of the 
necessity test in the SPS Agreement could be revised so that it applied to services:  ‘a 
measure is not more trade-restrictive than required unless there is another measure, 
reasonably available taking into account technical and economic feasibility, that achieves 
the appropriate level of sanitary or phytosanitary protection and is significantly less 
restrictive to trade’ (SPS Article 5, footnote). For ‘the appropriate level of sanitary or 
phytosanitary protection’, Members could consider substituting ‘a legitimate policy 
objective’. Although the SPS language is similar to that in TBT Article 2.2, the former is 
more concise and the concepts are more relevant to services” (WTO, WPDR, Communication 
from Australia, S/WPDR/W/1, cit.). 
99 J. NEUMANN AND E. TURK, Necessity revisited: proportionality in World Trade 
Organization Law after Korea-Beef, EC-Asbestos and EC-Sardines, in 1 Journal of World 
Trade (2003) 218. 
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 100proportionality, that form of review so dear in Europe , with a consequent 
diminuation of deference to the States101.  
To conclude, the analysis of the substantive review of regulatory 
measures, together with the sparse jurisprudence in the area102, highlights 
the instability of a sector in which the balance between States’ right to 
regulate and the purpose of avoiding ‘unnecessary barriers to trade in 
services’ is hard to achieve. The delicacy of this area is also demonstrated 
by States’ reluctance to accept limitations upon their national policies 
affecting fundamental, rather than merely market, values (so called ‘trade-
ands’)103. 
                                                 
100 According to the EC, a measure that is not the least restrictive, but is still 
proportionate to the established objective, ought to be understood as necessary. It argues 
that the validity, rationality or adequacy of policy objectives ought not to be reviewed by 
the WTO judicial body. Its proposed necessity test takes various factors into account, 
including the risk of not reaching the objective, a given State’s level of development and 
the specific nature of the sector in question (see WTO, WPDR, Communication from 
Australia, Domestic regulation: Necessity and trasparency, S/WPDR/W/8, cit., and WTO, 
WPDR, Report on the Meeting Held on 3 July 2001, cit., paragraph 52). 
101 See WTO, WPDR, Communication from Japan, Draft Annex on Domestic Regulation, 
Revision Job, (03)/45/REV/.1, 2 May 2003. The Japanese proposal is peculiar, in as much 
as it contains a series of necessity tests, each one of which is formulated in a different way 
and applicable to different types and aspects of domestic regulation. For example, for all 
measures of a general application in relation to “licensing requirements and procedures, 
qualification requirements and procedures, as well as technical standards”, paragraph 6 
establishes that “each Member shall ensure […] that measures of general application [...] 
are not prepared, adopted or applied with a view to or with the effect of creating 
unnecessary barriers to trade in services” and that to this end, every Member shall ensure 
that such measures “are not more burdensome than necessary in order to fulfil its national 
policy objectives”. Paragraph 7 moreover provides that “each Member shall examine […] 
the possibility of modifying or terminating existing measures of general application [...] if 
the circumstances or objectives giving rise to their adoption no longer exist or if new 
circumstances or objectives can be addressed in a less trade restrictive manner”. On the 
other side, See WTO, WPDR, Communication from the United States, Outlines of US 
Position on a Draft Consolidated Text in WPDR, JOB(06)223, 11 July 2006, paragraph 3: 
“We do not support any type of operational necessity test or standard in any new disciplines 
for domestic regulation. However, we share the concerns raised by many Members that the 
right to regulate should not be used in practice to avoid trade obligations. In the regard, we 
are open to discussing non-operational language in the preamble, expressing that Members’ 
objective in developing any new disciplines is to establish that principle”.  
102 The panel and the Appellate Body also preferred to evaluate the U.S. rules in light of 
the exceptions clause, rather than in light of Article VI. 4 on domestic regulation in the US-
Gambling case as well. 
103 This tension can be seen in the difficulty of adopting disciplines in other sectors 
besides the accountancy sector. In the attempt to overcome this impasse, the WPDR is 
discussing the wisdom of adopting a horizontal approach aimed at the development of a 
common discipline for all services (see a WTO, WPDR, Report on the Meeting Held on 17 
May 1999, Note by the Secretariat, S/WPDR/M/1, 14 June 1999; WTO, WPDR, Report on 
the Meeting Held on 14 July 1999, Note by the Secretariat, S/WPDR/M/2, 2 September 
1999; WTO, CTS, Article VI:4 of the GATS: Disciplines on Domestic Regulation Applicable 
to All Services, Note by the Secretariat, S/C/W/96, 1 March 1999 and WTO, CTS, 
International Regulatory Initiatives in Services, Note by the Secretariat, S/C/W/97, 1 
March 1999; South Centre, The development dimension of the GATS Domestic Regulation 
Negotiations, 2006, in http://www.southcentre.org). According to some authors, the 
benefits of a horizontal approach are expressed in terms of political economy, economising 
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5. Comparative evaluations 
 
So far we have examined the necessity test, distinguishing the test 
employed for protective measures from that applied to regulatory measures.  
This distinction seems justified by both the legal provision for the review 
of necessity in the paragraphs dedicated to exceptions clauses and domestic 
regulation, as well as by the different nature of the measures adopted and 
subjected to review104.  
These differences ought to manifest themselves in the type of judicial 
scrutiny carried out as well. In the United States, for example, the judicial 
application of the dormant commerce clause implies a ‘less strict’ 
scrutiny105 when measures that are characterised by a ‘stronger presumption 
of validity’106 are under review, and ‘strict’ scrutiny for measures that are 
tout-court illegitimate for being clearly discriminatory. Analogously, at the 
global level it is possible to imagine that the judicial body would vary its 
scrutiny according to the type of measure adopted by the Member State. 
When the measure is per se illegitimate, the review ought to be particularly 
searching, and ultimately uphold only those national measures that create 
less significant restrictions on trade. Such measure ought to represent an 
extrema ratio, in the sense that the State that has adopted it must concretely 
demonstrate the impossibility of pursuing its national interests by other 
means. This interpretation, which conflates the term necessity with 
indispensability, rests on the determination of possible alternative measures 
that are less restrictive to trade. By contrast, when necessity comes into 
conflict with the recognition of national legislative or regulatory autonomy, 
the DSB ought to grant greater deference to the State. The exercise of 
regulatory power is not a derogation from an international obligation, but 
                                                                                                                                               
the costs of negotiations, enabling the creation of disciplines for all service sectors and 
lowering the risk that the negotiations register only group sectoral interests. On the 
inadequacy of the sectoral approach, see G. FEKETEKUTY, Assessing and Improving the 
Architecture of GATS, in P. SAUVÉ and R.M. STERN, GATS 2000: New Directions in 
Services Trade Liberalization, Washington, 2000, p. 85-111. In favour of a horizontal 
approach, see instead A. MATTOO, Shaping Future Rules For Trade In Services: Lessons 
From The GATS, cit., p. 11: “A horizontal approach will economize negotiating efforts, 
would lead to the creation of disciplines for all services sectors rather than only for 
politically important ones, and would also reduce the likelihood that negotiations will be 
captured by powerful sectoral interests groups” (available at 
http://www.heisummer.ch/pdf/shaping%20future%20rules.pdf). 
104 Note that protective measures are illegitimate at birth, in as much as they constitute a 
violation of the norms of the Agreement, and can thus be tolerated only if their connection 
to a limited number of objectives, listed in the Agreement (public order, protection of life 
and health), can be demonstrated. Domestic regulation, by contrast, involves a right 
expressly granted to States to satisfy potentially unlimited domestic policy needs. Domestic 
regulations are thus legitimate, unless it can be demonstrated that they are excessively 
burdensome in relation to the objective pursued. These different perspectives are 
manifested at the procedural level: in challenging protective measures, the respondant party 
bears the burden of proof; for regulatory measures, it is borne by the complainant party. 
105 L.J. PETRICONE, The Dormant Commerce Clause, cit., p. 10. 
106 L.J. PETRICONE, The Dormant Commerce Clause, cit., p. 10. 
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 rather the legitimate exercise of a State’s own sovereign power. So the 
judicial review of regulatory measures ought not to end with the mere 
determination of the measure’s indispensibility, but rather undertake a more 
complex evaluation which takes additional elements, like the measure’s 
adequacy in relation to the result obtained, into account. 
The different nature of the measures under analysis ought therefore to 
condition the level of judicial scrutiny, modulating the degree of the 
review’s stringency and its instrusiveness into national soveign power.  
The analysis of necessity in the GATS, though unilluminated by 
significant case-law in the area of regulatory measures, suggests that the 
distinction between the scrutiny of protective measures and the scrutiny of 
regulatory measures is not so clear-cut. The discussion of the jurisprudential 
evolution in the interpretation of protective measures has shown that the 
concept of necessity is no longer limited to indispensibility. In evaluating 
these measures, the DSB has paid increasing respect to national policies, 
like environmental protection, the protection of public health and safety, 
that could justify the measure’s adoption. This attention has made the 
necessity test more sophisticated as well as more deferential. More 
specifically, up until now, the DSB has taken three factors into 
consideration in determining the necessity of a measure: the importance of 
the common interests or values protected by that law or regulation; the 
measure’s ability to protect those interests and values; the measure’s impact 
on international trade.  
After analysing these conditions, the judicial body must examine the 
measure’s conformity with the chapeau of Article XIV; this provides that no 
measure shall be adopted whose application would constitute an arbitrary or 
unjustifiable discrimination.  
107According to some commentators , this test would bring the standard of 
necessity closer to the standard of proportionality108, which is applied in a 
particular way in the Community area. This is supported both by scholarly 
views109, and by the jurisprudence of the DSB. The dispute resolution 
bodies specifically use the term disproportionate110 to indicate that a 
                                                 
107 See A. DESMEDT, Proportionality In WTO Law, in 4 Journal of International 
Economic Law (2001) 441 et. seq.; M. KENNET, J. NEUMANN and E. TUERK, Second 
Guessing National Level Policy Choices: Necessity, cit., p. 324 et. seq. 
108 The judicial body of the European Community has over time developed an 
articulated proportionality test, that can be broken down into three distinct analyses: 
adequacy (the measure must be appropriate for fulfilling the purpose); necessity (the 
purpose cannot be pursued by a less trade-restrictive alternative measure than the one 
adopted); proportionality stricto sensu (the measure’s effects must not be disproportionate 
or excessive in relation to the interests pursued). Proportionality is in fact used both as a 
parameter of reasonableness in the determination of the discretionary standard set by the 
Member State, and also as a parameter of necessity with respect to the acts adopted in 
realisation of this standard. 
109 S. ZLEPTNIG, The Standard of Review in WTO Law, cit., p. 449: “measures remain 
lawful when they are enacted in a reasonable and proportionate manner”. 
110 See WTO, APPELLATE BODY REPORT, United States - Import Prohibition of Certain 
Shrimp and Shrimp Products, WT/DS58/AB/R, 12 October 1998, paragraph 141: “focusing 
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 measure does not fall under the one of the derogations provided by the 
exceptions clauses; it also pays increasing attention to the way in which the 
measure is applied111, and thus to its suitability.  
A direct consequence of this sophistication is that the judicial body 
becomes able to evaluate both measures which are per se discriminatory as 
well as those that are at legitimate at birth. The sensitivity of the necessity 
standard to values beyond the strictly commercial makes it appropriate for 
the evaluation of protectionist discriminatory measures, and even more so 
for the analysis of measures adopted in the free exercise of state sovereign 
power. The change is reflected in the type of review exercised over state 
discretion.  
This analysis suggests that the DSB’s judicial scrutiny is characterised by 
a greater complexity and a greater deference to the Member States than that 
carried out in the past112. 
In light of these considerations, it is therefore possible to argue that the 
differences between the level of scrutiny could ultimately turn on whether or 
not the measure pursues an interest recognised by the supranational law (be 
it a protective or a regulatory measure), rather than its characterisation as 
regulatory or protective. Judical review in this case would imply a greater 
penetration into state discretion, requiring an initial determination of the 
reasonableness of the purposes that the State claims to pursue.  
 
6. Conclusion 
 
                                                                                                                                               
on the design of the measure here at stake it appears to us that Section 609, cum 
implementing guidelines is not disproportionately wide in its scope and reach in relation to 
the policy objective of protection and conservation of sea turtle species. The means are, in 
principle, reasonably related to the ends. The means and ends relationship between Section 
609 (that is, the measure at issue) and the legitimate policy of conserving and exhaustible, 
and in fact, endangered species, is observably a close and real one”.  
111 WTO, APPELLATE BODY REPORT, U.S.-Gasoline, cit., p. 22: “the chapeau by its 
express terms addresses, not so much the questioned measure or its specific contents as 
such, but rather the manner in which that measure is applied”. 
112 However, in the only discipline adopted in application of Article VI. 4 on domestic 
regulation, the inter alia clause recognises the States’ rights to pursue an unlimited number 
of objectives. Understanding the impossibility of making a closed list of the ends that could 
be legitimately pursued by the 149 Members of the WTO, it grants deference to the States. 
The inter alia clause permits the States, at least in theory, to increase the list of objectives 
at their discretion. This legislative recognition of the impossibility of reining in States’ 
freedom to pursue national policies, however, could correspond to a decrease of judicial 
deference. The Accountancy sector rules would in fact expand the scope of judicial 
scrutiny, which would be justified in evaluating not only the measure adopted, but also the 
purpose chosen by every single member. In this way, the judicial body would come to 
determine not only the measure’s adequacy in relation to the objective pursued but also the 
sincerity of the objective itself. In the absence of jurisprudence giving a basis to these 
theories, it is only possible to argue that, for regulatory measures, the Agreement’s greater 
deference to States is manifested in a scrutiny that places reasonableness at the centre of its 
evaluation of the both the measure adopted and the end pursued. 
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 WTO law sets forth standards of behaviour for its Members. They are 
obliged to adopt legal and administrative measures which conform to rules 
fixed at the supranational level. In light of this obligation, the goal of this 
study has been to determine the existence and content of the limits imposed 
by the global law upon the discretion of national authorities in the regulation 
of services. We specifically sought to determine the degree of the 
adjudicating body’s deference to national authorities, the penetration of 
global judicial review and, finally, the extent to which State sovereign 
power to regulate social and economic policies has been eroded. We have 
looked at the substantive review of national measures by the WTO dispute 
resolution bodies. This review seeks to determine the correspondence of 
national rules and measures to the public ends pursued. This study has 
focused on a discussion of the standard used by the ‘judicial’ bodies to 
determine the legitimacy of national measures. To this end, GATS Articles 
XIV (on general exceptions) and VI, par. 4 (on domestic regulations) were 
analysed in depth.  
With reference to discriminatory measures, we discussed the fact that the 
GATS directly embodies the necessity test. The principle of necessity is 
thus supposed to condition the action of Member States in pursuit of public 
interests that conflict with the economic freedoms protected by the 
Agreements, by defining the validity of the acts adopted to that end. The 
discussion of the standard applied to these measures demonstrates that the 
WTO is presently paying greater attention to national policies and thus 
granting greater deference to the Member States pursuing them. 
Demonstrating this recognition is the adoption of a very refined and detailed 
standard of scrutiny, compared to the one employed by the dispute 
resolution body prior to 1994, supporting – though not with unanimity113 – 
the application of the principle of proportionality within the WTO. Setting 
aside questions about the effective supranational application of a principle 
originating in German law, a national provision restricting freedom of 
movement of services can be compatible with global law not only when it 
does not create greater limitations than those strictly indispensible to 
meeting the goals set by supranational law. Thanks to the judicial 
application of a necessity test, in the form of weighing and balancing, the 
global judicial body can recognise even a national provision that is not 
indispensible as necessary nonetheless.  
The effect of this is to widen the scope of State autonomy, in as much as 
the national provision aimed at protecting public non-economic interests can 
be legitimate as long as it is ‘proportionate’. In this analysis, the principle of 
necessity can be read as a ‘criteria of administrative validity’ which 
guarantees the protection of the rights of foreign service providers against 
the abuse of administrative, legislative and judicial powers by the host State. 
To counterbalance this deference, however, a judicial review which 
scrutinises the importance of the values protected by the adopted measure 
could promote a ‘particular judicial activism and a situation of legal 
uncertainty’. The attention paid to non-economic objectives and the 
                                                 
113 Of a different opinion is D.A. OSIRO, Proportionality in the WTO, cit., p. 232. 
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 evaluation of their weight could in fact open the door to an ‘analysis 
differentiated according to the subject matter in question’114. 
With reference to non-discriminatory measures, this study has shown that 
the GATS does not directly provide for a necessity test, but entrusts the 
Council for Trade in Services with the job of adopting disciplines aimed at 
ensuring that domestic regulations do not create “unnecessary barriers to 
trade in services”. So far, only the accountancy sector discipline has been 
adopted. In this sector, the global law has conditioned the content of 
national regulatory measures upon the pursuit of three specific public 
interests: consumer protection, the quality of the service and professional 
competence and integrity. 
In determining that measures regarding qualification requirements and 
procedures, technical standards and accreditation requirements do not 
constitute unnecessary barriers to trade, the dispute resolution body must 
determine that they have been adopted in such a way as to ensure the 
realisation of the public interests established by the negotiations. Though we 
lack concrete confirmation, the study of the judicial application of the 
necessity standard does suggest that judicial review is aimed at determining 
the appropriateness of the decision to pursue the protected public interest. In 
other words, this scrutiny would investigate whether, in the process of the 
formation and implementation of national policies, there were circumstances 
demonstrating or suggesting that the public interest was not being properly 
pursued. In this way, the review would be sensitive to excesses of power, as 
in continental droit administratif. National administrative discretion would 
in fact be conditioned upon a proper decision-making process carried out 
within the general parameter of logic and reasonableness aimed at avoiding 
the abus de droit.  
We have also addressed the discussions being held within the Working 
Party on Domestic Regulation on proposals to extend the Accountancy 
regulation to other sectors. The difficulty of developing other disciplines 
signals States’ reluctance to subject otherwise legitimate national regulatory 
measures to judicial review. The proposals set forth in the Consolidated 
Draft put out by the Chairman and in the informal proposals of the 
Secretariat signal the search for ‘symptomatic figures’ that can help national 
legislators to avoid adopting measures that constitute disguised restrictions 
on trade in services. The WTO’s position seems in fact to address state 
action in a moment prior to the adoption of the regulation, signaling those 
situations that can constitute improper restrictions on trade.  
Supranational review of national discretion in the adoption of domestic 
regulation measures thus seems to be ambivalent. On the one hand, the 
supranational law’s provision of a necessity test for regulatory measures 
reduces the scope of national autonomy in as much as it conditions the 
legitimacy of State action upon a standard; on the other hand, the global law 
seems reluctant to recognise the degree of judicial review that it does carry 
out for protective measures. The particular attention paid to such provisions 
                                                 
114 E. RUOZZI, I principi di necessità e di proporzionalità, cit., p. 160. 
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 as those for transparency and objective criteria seems aimed at avoiding the 
judicial scrutiny of the decision-making phase of state regulation.  
For domestic regulation measures, it is now possible to recognise a 
progressive reining in of national discretion, not so much by the global 
judicial body, which has not yet been called upon to exercise judicial review 
of these acts, as by the law-makers115. 
This affirmation could however be destined to change. The comparative 
analysis carried out above demonstrates how the tools currently being used 
by the WTO dispute resolution bodies is so refined and evolved as to bring 
it closer to those instruments adopted by other courts – both national and 
supranational – like reasonableness and proportionality. This change creates 
new spaces for global judicial review. Global judicial review has an 
increasing number of tools for evaluating national regulatory measures that 
can be in conflict with each other, in so far as they seek different objectives. 
In this sense, the passage from necessity to proportionality can be 
interpreted as a tool for enabling judicial bodies to define the new 
boundaries of national discretion in the area of domestic regulation. 
                                                 
115 The scope of this conditioning can be appreciated by an analysis of the informal 
proposals of the WPDR Secretariat. These proposals regard an increasing variety of 
governmental regulation measures, like professional accreditation, certification of 
competence, television licenses, university accreditation, hospital certifications and garbage 
disposal permits, applied in all of the service sectors, and thus not only those in which the 
Member States are involved. The increase of the measures subjected to such determination 
opens new doors in particular to those essential public services that ought to be protected 
from the allocational inefficiencies of the market. In Canada, where there is a public health 
service, a coalition of private hospitals in the United States has argued that the fees required 
by the Canadian health system were the equivalent of a commercial transaction and as such, 
prevented United States enterprises from entering the Canadian market, thus denying them 
of their NAFTA right to exploit that market (North American Free Trade Agreement – 
NAFTA, the GATS’s twin brother). 
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1. Introduction 
 
1 2In looking at the European integration process , the internal market  can 
be analysed through two different lenses3. The internal market is, first of all, 
a political goal that Community institutions are charged to pursue. It also 
represents a limitation upon the action of Community institutions and 
Member States, in the sense that both can limit the free circulation of goods, 
persons, services and capital in the pursuit of their policies only within the 
limits embodied in the EC Treaty, the Directives and the jurisprudence of 
the European Court of Justice. 
This signifies that the Member States, independently of Community 
harmonisation measures addressed to national law-makers, are obliged to 
remove internal barriers to the Community freedoms of circulation, as they 
hinder market integration. 
This study seeks to examine the concept of the internal market as a limit 
upon the action of the Member States in relation to the freedom to provide 
services. 
In the regulation of this freedom, Community law aims to prevent the 
erection of legal and administrative barriers which hinder free circulation by 
providing for different treatment of services originating in other Member 
States. 
                                                 
1 See W. MOLLE, The Economic of European Integration. Theory, Practice, Policy, 
Vermont, Ashgate, 1997, p. 16. According to the Author: “The main objective of the 
European Union is to enhance the allocational efficiency of the economies of the member 
states by removing barriers to the movement of goods, services and production factors”. 
Likewise, see J. SNELL, Goods and Services in EC Law. A Study of the Relationship 
Between the Freedoms, Oxford, 2002, p. 89. 
2 The terms “common market,” “single market” and “internal market” have succeeded 
each other over time, without it being possible however to determine relevant legal 
differences in their meaning. 
3 See J. BAQUERO CRUZ, Between Competition and Free Movement. The Economic 
Constitutional Law of the European Community, Oxford, 2002, pp. 67-68. 
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 4The realisation of the free movement of services  has encountered more 
complicated problems than the realisation of the other freedoms of 
circulation envisaged by the Treaty5. The area of services in fact presents 
some peculiar characteristics compared to goods, labour and capital. In the 
area of services, national barriers and differences are both stronger and more 
difficult to eliminate or neutralise, because they affect not only the service 
provider’s access to the market, but also domestic administrative practices 
for providing that service and the relationship with that service’s 
beneficiaries6. 
To give just one example, local authorisation provisions imply that in 
order to perform an activity in the domestic national territory of a Member 
State, multiple permits must be obtained, which is certainly more difficult 
for a business originating in another State than for a national one7. 
The principle difficulties in the achievement of the internal market in 
services are not the mere differences of national laws, but rather the 
behaviour of some administrations and the differences in administrative 
practices and procedures, particularly the discretionary power of national 
administrations, the complexity of some formal requirements and the 
allocation of decision-making powers to many different actors. 
It is significant that regulatory and administrative burdens in the Member 
States are, to this day, the main reason that the internal market in services 
has not yet been achieved in the European Union8. 
This situation has given rise to a significant number of legal disputes in 
the area of the free circulation of services that has enabled the Court of 
Justice to articulate general principles, usually in favour of enlarging the 
Community competence and consequently narrowing the discretionary 
power of the Member States. 
 
1.1. The goal of this study 
 
This study seeks to analyse the ways and the extent to which Community 
rules and principles affect the discretionary choices of national 
administrative authorities in the regulation of services. 
                                                 
4 See the Proposal for a Directive of the European Parliament and of the Council on 
services in the internal market, COM (2004) 2 def., pp. 5-6. 
5 On the subject of the internal market, see L. DANIELE, Il diritto materiale della 
Comunità europea: introduzione allo studio del mercato interno e delle politiche 
comunitarie, Milano, 2000; P. CRAIG e G. DE BURCA (eds.), The Evolution of EU Law, 
Oxford, 1999; K. MORTELMANS, The common market, the internal market and the single 
market, what’s in a market?, in Common Market Law Review, 35, 1, 1998, pp. 101-136. 
6 For example, the provision of services, insofar as it is an activity and not a product, 
creates a stable relationship between a provider and service user, located in different 
Member States, that does not exist instead for the importation and exportation of goods. In 
particular, on this point, see L. TORCHIA, Il governo delle differenze. Il principio di 
equivalenza nell’ordinamento europeo, Bologna, 2006, p. 100. 
7 European Commission Report to the Council and European Parliament, The state of 
the internal market in services, COM (2002) 441 def., p. 6. 
8 See the Opinion of the European Economic and Social Committee on the subject, 
Better implementation of EU legislation, 2006/C 24/13 of 28 September 2005, paragraph 
1.4. 
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 We have already seen that the discretionary power of national 
administrative authorities lies at the origin of numerous restrictions, since it 
makes the national authority’s final decision unpredictable and enables it, 
behind a mask of neutrality, to make decisions disadvantaging operators 
from other Member States 
To give an example: in regulating the procedure for granting an 
authorisation, the administrative authority can request the intervention of 
bodies which include competing operators, already present in the national 
territory. 
The criteria for the granting of an authorisation or a license thus confer a 
significant margin of discretion upon the competent authorities and, though 
doing this in a less obvious way than would a prima facie discriminatory 
policy, they still have the effect of favouring established operators over new 
ones. Moreover, excessive formalism, costly procedures and the lack of 
transparency all have a particularly discouraging effect on service providers 
from other Member States, since they are not as familiar with the 
administrative culture of other countries. For example: some administrations 
may require certificates that do not exist in the provider’s country of origin 
or translations certified by a qualified translator in the country in which the 
service is provided. Another example: to obtain a certificate, a real estate 
developer must personally appear before the artisans’ council in the town in 
which the service is to be provided. It is clear that all of these requirements 
can be fulfilled much more easily by a national provider than by a provider 
from another Member State. 
Testifying to the scope of these kinds of problems, the Court of Justice 
has repeatedly evaluated these new administrative practices, addressing both 
the discretionary interpretation as well as the high cost and excessive burden 
of certain authorisation procedures.  
The Court of Justice has thus begun to review the wide discretionary 
power that national legislation leaves to administrative authorities in 
establishing domestic methods and procedures for the implementation of 
Community law. National administrative authorities must also be required 
to conform to the Community objectives for the free circulation of services. 
Regulation, like legislation, must assume the burden of determining the 
most appropriate measure for pursuing the predetermined policy objective.  
In other words, national administrations, as an integral part of the 
European Union, have the duty to act in good faith to fulfil their specific 
duties and enable the realisation of the Community’s tasks without 
compromising the objectives set forth in Article 10 of the EC Treaty. 
Community law thus requires both national legislatures and national 
administrations to further the protection of a determinate public interest and 
conditions the legitimacy of the domestic least restrictive measure upon its 
congruence with goal. 
In this light, it is interesting to examine the parameters employed by the 
Court of Justice in reviewing the consistency of national administrative 
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 measures restricting the free provision of services with the public end 
pursued. 
What are the limits of the judicial review of the national administrative 
discretion exercised by the European Court? What are the parameters and 
the evaluation criteria used by the Court of Justice to review such 
discretion? Is there, as under the domestic law, an area that is immune from 
judicial review? 
These are the issues that this study seeks to address. 
 
1.2. Methodology 
 
This primary objective of this examination is to assess how the freedom 
to provide cross-border services, set out in Article 49 and following sections 
of the EC Treaty, limits the discretionary power of the administrative 
authorities of the Member States. 
To do this, it will first be necessary to conduct a preliminary analysis of 
the Community limitations upon the discretion of national legislatures. 
There are two reasons for this. The first is that, especially in the non-
harmonised sectors, the review of legislative discretion is often preliminary 
to the review of the discretion of administrative authorities. The second is 
that the technique used by Community courts to review the restrictive 
national measure is useful in understanding the type of control they exercise 
over the national administrative scheme. 
To this end, I will examine five court cases which discuss the 
compatibility of Community law with different formal administrative 
requirements (administrative authorisation, licence, entry on a professional 
registry) determined by national legislatures to be necessary in performing 
or using a particular service outside the national boundaries, or applicable to 
foreign operators on the national territory. 
9The first case  derives from a referral presented by the Commission, on 
the basis of EC Treaty Article 226, for a declaration that the Italian 
Republic, in requiring that tour guides travelling with tourists from other 
Member States be licensed, violated the duties required of it by Article 49 of 
the Treaty. 
10The second case  originates from the appeal presented by a certain Mrs. 
Smits, a Dutch citizen affected by Parkinson’s disease, against the decision 
of the national insurance authority denying her reimbursement for the 
expenses incurred for medical treatment in a German clinic. The 
Community court was asked, in substance, to determine whether national 
rules requiring a prior authorisation from the national sickness insurance 
fund in order to claim entitlement benefits for treatment in a clinic outside 
the Member State were compatible with Community law. 
                                                 
9 ECJ, 26 February 1991, Case C-180/89, Commission v. Italian Republic. 
10 ECJ, 12 July 2001, Case C-157/99, Smits and Peerbooms. 
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 11In the third case , Mr. Corsten, a self-employed architect, contracted 
with an undertaking established in the Netherlands to lay floors as part of a 
building project based in Germany. The undertaking entrusted with the work 
lawfully carried out such work legally in the Netherlands, but was not 
entered on the Skilled Trades Register in Germany. The undertaking 
charged a price per square metre for laying floors that was considerably 
lower than the price that would have been charged by German skilled trade 
undertakings for the same work. The competent German Workplace 
Inspectorate imposed an administrative penalty for breach of the German 
legislation against black market work. Mr. Corsten challenged that decision, 
raising doubts as to the compatibility of the German rules, in particular with 
regard to the requirement of entry on the Register, with the Community law 
on freedom to provide services. 
12In the fourth case , the association, Analir had asked a Spanish court for 
the annulment of Royal Decree n. 1466, for being inconsistent with 
Community law, in particular Regulation No 3577/92, concerning the 
application of the principle of the freedom to provide services to maritime 
transport within Member States (maritime cabotage), insofar as it permits 
the provision of island cabotage services by undertakings covering regular 
shipping lines to be made subject to prior administrative authorisation. 
13Finally, in the last case , Canal Satélite Digital challenged Article 2 of 
Spanish Royal Decree 136/1997, approving the Technical Regulation on 
Provision of Satellite Telecommunications Service, for violating 
Community law. According to this rule, the Spanish authorities would have 
created a compulsory register in which operators of conditional-access 
services would have not only to be registered, but also to provide 
information about the type and model of the conditional-access 
telecommunications apparatus, equipment, devices or systems which they 
offer or market. Registration in that register is by no means automatic, but is 
subject to a prior administrative decision which may be negative. The 
referring Court thus asked the European Court of Justice whether Article 49 
of the Treaty, combined with the provisions of Articles 1-5 of Directive 
95/47/EC, precludes a national rule subjecting operators of conditional-
access services to the aforementioned administrative requirements. 
Through an examination of these decisions, we will be able to analyse the 
parameters and evaluation criteria used by the Court of Justice in reviewing 
the discretion of both national legislatures and national administrations. In 
particular, we will see that the Community court does in fact review the 
discretionary power of the legislature whether (an) to adopt a certain 
provision into the domestic law in the first place as well as the form and 
content of the particular provision (quid). Finally, we will see that the Court 
can also review the discretionary decisions of national administrative 
authorities determining the concrete implementation of national legislation 
adopted in conformity with Community law (quomodo). 
 
                                                 
11 ECJ, 3 October 2000, Case C-58/98, Josef Corsten. 
12 ECJ, 20 February 2001, Case C-205/99, Analir et al. 
13 ECJ, 22 January 2002, Case C-390/99, Canal Satélite Digital Sl. 
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 2. Community limits on the discretionary power of national lawmakers 
 
The European Community legal system, created specifically to guarantee 
the total mobility of productive factors between Member States, is grounded 
in a general prohibition of national legislation restricting the provision of 
services14. 
It is thus necessary to examine from the outset the restrictiveness of a 
national provision, on the basis of the principle of non-discrimination. 
It is then necessary to verify whether that restriction falls under those 
derogations permitted by the Treaty or by the jurisprudence of the Court of 
Justice. It is only within the scope of these derogations that national 
lawmakers are in fact able to exercise discretion. 
Still, even if embraced within the national discretionary power, a 
restrictive measure is compatible with Community law only if it is 
consistent with the public-interest objective pursued. 
Therefore, a third limit on national discretion can be derived from the 
breadth of the Court of Justice’s review of the consistency of national 
legislation, through the balanced application of the principle of 
proportionality. The Court of Justice, in fact, considers this to be a principle 
of general application, directed at reducing the discretion of national 
institutions in relation to the public end pursued. 
 
2.1. The principle of non-discrimination 
 
The Court of Justice must first decide whether a national prior 
authorisation scheme for performing a service or using that service is a 
restriction on the freedom to provide services, in the sense of Article 49 of 
the Treaty. 
In interpreting Community law, the Court of Justice has progressively 
extended the concept of restrictions in the sense of Art 49 EC Treaty, thus 
extending the limits upon the Member States’ competences and 
discretionary power. 
First of all, the States cannot introduce de jure discriminatory measures 
into their domestic law. Secondly, they are equally prohibited from 
introducing measures of a general application that undermine the freedom to 
provide services or are de facto discriminatory or, in the case of restrictions 
upon the provision of services imposed by the country of origin, measures 
which hinder access to foreign markets. Finally, in virtue of the principle of 
mutual recognition, States may not apply their own law to an activity that is 
                                                 
14 For scholarly analysis, see: P.J. SLOT, Harmonisation, in Eur. Law Rev., 1996, p. 378; 
S. WEATHERILL, Law and integration in the European Union, Oxford, 1995, p. 49 et. seq.; 
K.D. KERAMUS, Procedural Harmonization in Europe, 43 Am. J. Comp. Law (1995) 401 et. 
seq.; N. BERNARD, Discrimination and free movement in EC Law, in 45 Int. Comp. Law 
Quart. (1996) 82 et. seq.; U. DRAETTA, Elementi di diritto comunitario, Padova, 1997, p. 
68 et. seq.; J. STEINER, L. WOODS, Textbook on EC Law, Oxford, 8th ed., 2003, p. 259 et. 
seq. In particular, see A. TONETTI, Harmonisation and equivalence in the European service 
regulation, in this volume. 
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 15already governed by the rules of another legal system . On this subject, it is 
worth remembering that, according to settled case-law, Article 49 of the 
Treaty prohibits the application of any national measure that has the effect 
of making the provision of services between Member States more difficult 
than the purely domestic provision of services within one Member State16. 
In its judgment in Commission v. Italy, the Court of Justice held that the 
licensing requirement contained in the Italian law constituted a restriction. 
In fact, “by subordinating the provision of services of a tour guide, 
travelling with a group of tourists from another Member State, to the 
possession of a specific qualification, the Italian rule prevented both tour 
companies from providing this service using their own employees and 
prevented independent tour guides from offering their services to these 
companies in the course of organised tours”17. Moreover, this rule prevented 
tourists participating in such organised tours from freely choosing the 
services in question. 
18In the Smits  case, the Court of Justice held that Dutch legislation, in 
requiring a prior authorisation from the national sickness insurance fund in 
order to claim entitlement benefits for treatment in a clinic outside the 
Member State, did in fact deter, or even prevent, insured persons from 
applying to providers of medical services established in another Member 
State and thus constituted, both for insured persons and service providers, a 
barrier to freedom to provide services19. 
Under the facts in Corsten, the Court of Justice affirmed that the duty, 
imposed upon an undertaking established in one Member State which 
sought to exercise its freedom to provide services in practicing a skilled 
trade in another Member State, to enter on the trades register of the host 
State, constitutes a restriction, in the sense of Article 49 of the Treaty20. 
In the Analir judgment, the Court of Justice concluded that a national 
measure, such as Article 4 of the Spanish Royal Decree No 1466, which 
conditions the provision of marine cabotage services on prior administrative 
authorisation, effectively impedes or renders less attractive the provision of 
services, and therefore constitutes a restriction on the freedom to provide 
them21. 
Finally, in the Canal Satélite Digital case, the Court of Justice held that 
the compulsory register in which operators of conditional-access services 
would have not only to be registered, but also to provide information about 
                                                 
15 See V. HATZOPOULOS, Le principe communautaire d’équivalence et de 
reconnaissance mutuelle dans la libre prestation de services, Athènes Bruxelles, 1999, p. 
177. 
16 ECJ, 5 October 1994, Case C-381/93, Commission v. France, paragraph 17 and Smits, 
cit., paragraph 61. 
17 Judgment Commission Italian Republic, cit., paragraph 16. 
18 Judgment Smits, cit., paragraph 69. 
19 See, in this sense, ECJ, 28 January 1992, Case C-204/90, Bachmann, paragraph 31 
and 28 April 1998, Case C-158/96, Kohll, paragraph 35. 
20 Judgment Corsten, cit., paragraph 34. 
21 See Analir judgment, cit., paragraph 22. See, in this sense, ECJ, 9 august 1994, Case 
C-43/93, Vander Elst, paragraph 15 and 9 March 2000, Case C-355/98, Commission v. 
Belgium, paragraph 35. 
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 the type and model of the conditional-access telecommunications apparatus, 
equipment, devices or systems which they offer or market constitutes a 
restriction on the freedom to provide services22. 
According to the Court of Justice, therefore, every measure which has the 
effect of prohibiting, impeding or simply rendering less attractive the 
provision of services between Member States constitutes a restriction23. 
In other words, from the examination of these judgments we can 
conclude that, according to the Court of Justice, scheme requiring formal 
administrative obligations (such as prior administrative authorisation, 
granting of a license, compulsory entry in a professional register) always 
constitutes a restriction on the freedom to provide services. 
That having been established, the next step in the analysis is to determine 
whether such restrictive measure can be objectively justified. 
 
2.2. The evaluation of overriding needs 
 
It is necessary, in the second place, to consider whether a prior 
administrative authorisation scheme, however restrictive, may be justified as 
a means for the pursuit of public or general interest objectives. Speaking of 
this, it is worth remembering that the freedom to provide services, insofar as 
it is a fundamental principle of the Treaty, can only be limited by norms 
justified by imperative reasons of public interest and that this applies to 
every person or undertaking that exercises an activity on the territory of the 
host Member State24. 
For this, we first need to identify the imperative or overriding needs or 
requirements that can be taken into consideration in order to justify the 
barriers to the freedom to provide services in a specific area. Then, taking 
such imperative needs into account, we have to determine whether the prior 
authorisation scheme can be justified. 
Measures that limit the freedom of the circulation of services can be 
adopted in the cases expressly provided by Article 46 of the EC Treaty, that 
is for reasons of public policy, public security and public health; they can 
also be adopted for reasons, set forth in the jurisprudence of the Court of 
Justice, regarding the concept of “imperative needs of a general interest”25. 
These two kinds of derogations apply in different contexts. The reasons 
expressly provided by the Treaty are able to justify any kind of restrictive 
norm, even if discriminatory de jure. Imperative needs of a public interest, 
                                                 
22 See Canal Satélite Digital judgment, cit., paragraph 29. 
23 See judgment of the ECJ, 5 October 1994, Case C-381/93, Commission v. France, 
paragraph 17 and Kohll, cit., paragraph 33. 
24 See the key judgments of the ECJ: 17 December 1981, Case C-279/80, Webb, 
paragraph 17; 25 July 1991, Case C- 76/90, Säger, paragraph 15; Vander Elst, cit., 
paragraph 16. 
25 The concept of "imperative reasons of a general interest" has been progressively 
elaborated by the Court of Justice in its EC Treaty, Articles 43 and 49 jurisprudence, and 
could continue to evolve. 
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 by contrast, can only justify measures of a general application that are not 
prima facie discriminatory26. 
In the Commission v. Italy case, the Italian government tried to justify the 
restrictive measures for tour guides as aimed to protect the general interest, 
specifically in protecting consumers and preserving the national artistic and 
historical heritage. In particular, “in the specific case of an organized tour of 
foreign tourists, the protection of that interest is important inasmuch as, 
regard being had to their different cultural origins and the limited duration 
of such visits, the tourists retain only such image and knowledge of the 
cultural asset as may be conveyed to them by the tourist guide”27. In light of 
these arguments, the Court observed that the general interest in consumer 
protection and in the conservation of the national historical and artistic 
heritage can constitute an overriding reason justifying a restriction on the 
freedom to provide services. 
In the context of medical and hospital services, the Court of Justice in the 
Smits case held that “it cannot be excluded that the possible risk of seriously 
undermining a social security system's financial balance may constitute an 
overriding reason in the general interest capable of justifying a barrier to the 
principle of freedom to provide services”28. The Court recognised that, as 
regards the government’s objective of maintaining a balanced medical and 
hospital service open to all, that objective, even if intrinsically linked to the 
method of financing the social security system, may also fall within the 
derogations on grounds of public health under Article 46 EC Treaty, to 
which Article 55 refers, in so far as it contributes to the attainment of a high 
level of health protection29. 
In the Corsten judgment, the Court recognised that the objective of 
guaranteeing the quality of skilled trade work and of protecting those who 
have commissioned such work is an overriding requirement relating to the 
public interest capable of justifying a restriction on freedom to provide 
services30. 
In the Analir judgment in the area of maritime cabotage, the Court had to 
recognise in the first place that the objective pursued, namely to ensure the 
adequacy of regular maritime transport services to, from and between 
islands, is a legitimate public interest31. 
Finally, in the Canal Satélite Digital case, the Court held that it is 
undisputed that informing and protecting consumers, as users of products or 
services, constitute legitimate grounds of public interest which are in 
principle capable of justifying restrictions on the fundamental freedoms 
guaranteed by the Treaty32. 
                                                 
26 In its judgment of 16 January 2003, Case C-388/01, Commission v. Italy, paragaph 
19, the Court confirmed that discriminatory measures “are compatible with Community law 
only if they can be covered by an express derogating provision, such as Article 46 EC 
Treaty …namely public policy, public security or public health.”. 
27 See Commission v. Italian Republic judgement, cit., paragraph 19. 
28 See Smits judgment, cit., paragraph 72. 
29 See Smits judgment, cit., paragraph 73 and Kohll, cit., paragraph 50. 
30 See Corsten judgment, cit., paragraph 38. 
31 See Analir judgment, cit, paragraph 27. 
32 See Canal Satélite Digital judgment, cit., paragraph 34. 
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 Nevertheless, the fact that a measure (such as a prior administrative 
authorisation requirement), restricting the freedom to provide services, is 
justified by the reasons permitted by Article 46 EC Treaty or by overriding 
requirements relating to the public interest is not by itself sufficient to 
render it compatible with Community law. 
In this regard, it is important to recall that, according to the Court, the 
justifications that can be asserted by a Member State, in order to be 
legitimate, must be backed up by an analysis of the appropriateness and the 
proportionality of the restrictive measure adopted by that State in the 
particular case33. 
For this reason, a restrictive national provision can be justified by the 
reasons permitted by Article 46 EC Treaty34 or by imperative needs of a 
general interest only if they are proportionate35. 
 
3. Community judicial review of the discretionary power of national 
lawmakers 
 
According to settled case-law, even when the restriction can be justified 
by the Treaty or as an overriding or imperative need of general interest, it is 
still necessary to ensure that the national measures adopted in that sense do 
not exceed that which is objectively necessary and that they are proportional 
to the public-interest objective pursued, meaning that this objective could 
not be achieved using measures less restrictive of the free circulation of 
services36. 
The balancing between the single market and other interests cannot be 
carried out by the legislator in the abstract, since it has to be determined in 
light of the specific, concrete case. Under Community law, this concrete 
balancing is undertaken by means of a proportionality test37, which has 
three levels of analysis. First, is the national measure suitable for the 
achievement of a legitimate end (suitability test)? Second, is the measure 
necessary to reach the goal and is it the least restrictive measure capable of 
                                                 
33 See, in this sense, the judgments of the ECJ of 30 November 1995, Case C-55/94, 
Geghard, 26 November 2002, Case C-100/01, Oteiza Olazabal and 13 November 2003, 
Case C-42/02, Lindman. 
34 In the Omega judgment of 14 October 2004, Case C-36/02, the Court asserted in 
paragraph 36 that “measures which restrict the freedom to provide services may be justified 
on public policy grounds only if they are necessary for the protection of the interests which 
they are intended to guarantee and only in so far as those objectives cannot be attained by 
less restrictive measures.” 
35 See J.H. JANS, Proportionality Revisited, 3 Legal Issues of Economic Integration 
(2000) 239-265. 
36 See judgments of the ECJ, 4 December 1986, Case C-205/84, Commission v. 
Germany, paragraphs 27 and 29; 20 May 1992, Case C-106/91, Ramrath, paragraphs 30-
31, as well as Smits, cit., paragraph 75. 
37 See F. ORTINO, Basic Legal Instruments for the Liberalisation of Trade, A 
Comparative Analysis of EC and WTO Law, Oxford and Portland Oregon, 2004, p. 402 et. 
seq. According to the Author, the principle of proportionality “generally requires that a 
Member State’s measure be appropriate and necessary to achieve its objectives or, put 
somewhat differently, that there be a reasonable relationship between a particular objective 
and the administrative or legislative means used to achieve that objective”. 
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 producing the same result (the necessity, or least restrictive alternative test)? 
Third, even if there are no less restrictive alternatives, it still has to be 
proved that the measure does not have an excessive effect on the 
Community interest (proportionality stricto sensu). 
 
3.1. Application of the proportionality test 
 
Let us now turn to the application of the proportionality test in the five 
cases described above. 
In the Commission v. Italy judgment, according to the Court, the 
requirement in question contained in the Italian legislation went beyond 
what is necessary to ensure the safeguarding of that interest inasmuch as it 
makes the activities of a tourist guide accompanying groups of tourists from 
another Member State subject to possession of a licence. A licence 
requirement imposed by the Member State of destination has the effect of 
reducing the number of tourist guides qualified to accompany tourists in a 
closed group, which may lead a tour operator to have recourse instead to 
local guides employed or established in the Member State in which the 
service is to be performed. However, that consequence may have the 
drawback that tourists who are the recipients of the services in question do 
not have a guide who is familiar with their language, their interests and their 
specific expectations. It follows that in view of the scale of the restrictions it 
imposes, the legislation in issue is disproportionate in relation to the 
objective pursued38. 
In the Smits case, the Court of Justice argued that a requirement that the 
assumption of costs, under a national social security system, of hospital 
treatment provided in another Member State must be subject to prior 
authorisation appears to be a measure which is both necessary and 
reasonable. In particular, the Court considered that the number of hospitals, 
their geographical distribution, the mode of their organisation and the 
equipment with which they are provided, and even the nature of the medical 
services which they are able to offer, are all matters for which planning 
must be possible. This kind of planning therefore broadly meets a variety of 
concerns. For one thing, it seeks to achieve the aim of ensuring that there is 
sufficient and permanent access to a balanced range of high-quality hospital 
treatment in the State concerned. For another thing, it assists in meeting a 
desire to control costs and to prevent, as far as possible, any wastage of 
financial, technical and human resources39. 
The Corsten judgment affirmed that a Member State may not make the 
provision of services in its territory subject to compliance with all the 
conditions required for establishment and thereby deprive of all practical 
effectiveness the provisions of the Treaty whose object is, precisely, to 
guarantee the freedom to provide services.40. In this case, the national law of 
the host Member State made no distinction, as regards undertakings of other 
Member States wishing to provide skilled trade services in the host State, 
                                                 
38 See Commission v. Italian Republic judgement, cit., paragraphs 22-24. 
39 See Smits judgment, cit., paragraphs 76-80. 
40 See Säger judgment, cit., paragraph 13. 
 116
 between those who are established only in the Member State from which 
they come and those who are also established in the host Member State. 
Those two categories of undertaking are subject in the same way to the 
requirement of entry on the Register before they can carry out skilled trade 
work in the host Member State. Even if “the requirement of entry on that 
Register, entailing compulsory membership of the Chamber of Skilled 
Trades for the undertakings concerned and therefore payment of the related 
subscription, could be justified in the case of establishment in the host 
Member State, which was not the situation in the main proceedings, the 
same is not true for undertakings which intend to provide services in the 
host Member State only on an occasional basis, indeed perhaps only 
once”41. For these reasons, the Court held that the rules in question go 
beyond what is necessary attain such objectives. 
The Court in Analir did not directly resolve the question of the necessity 
of a prior authorisation requirement with respect to the objective pursued in 
the case at hand, but rather limited itself to formulating guidelines for what 
the principle of proportionality requires, leaving the application of this 
principle on the basis of the specific circumstance of the concrete case to the 
national court. The Court of Justice, in particular, established that, in the 
case in question, the combined provisions of Articles 1 and 4 of Regulation 
No 3577/92 permit the provision of regular maritime cabotage services to, 
from and between islands to be made subject to prior administrative 
authorisation only if: “a real public service need arising from the inadequacy 
of the regular transport services under conditions of free competition can be 
demonstrated; it is also demonstrated that that prior administrative 
authorisation scheme is necessary and proportionate to the aim pursued; 
such a scheme is based on objective, non-discriminatory criteria which are 
known in advance to the undertakings concerned”42. 
Finally, in the Canal Satélite Digital case, the Court was asked to 
evaluate the proportionality of a national rule subjecting the provision of 
services by operator of conditional-access services to a prior authorisation 
procedure. In this case as well, the Court held that it fell to the national court 
to evaluate whether the national norms impugned in this case complied with 
that principle. The Court limited itself to formulating the following general 
criteria. First of all, a measure introduced by a Member State cannot be 
regarded as necessary to achieve the aim pursued if it essentially duplicates 
controls which have already been carried out in the context of other 
procedures, either in the same State or in another Member State. Second, it 
is incompatible in principle with the freedom to provide services to make a 
provider subject to restrictions for safeguarding the public interest in so far 
as that interest is already safeguarded by the rules to which the provider is 
subject in the Member State where he is established43. 
 
                                                 
41 See Corsten judgment, cit., paragraph 45. 
42 See Analir judgment, cit, paragraphs 34-36. 
43 See, in particular, Canal Satélite Digital judgment, cit., paragraph 34 and ECJ, 17 
December 1981, Case C-279/80 Webb, paragraph 17; 23 November 1999, Case C-369/96, 
Arblade, paragraph 34. 
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 3.2. Observations 
 
The three-level proportionality test has been confirmed in the case-law 
over time44. Still, the Court of Justice often underestimates the hierarchical 
relationship traditionally linking the three constitutive elements of the 
principle, overturning their order of application45. 
The Court of Justice often applies only the suitability and necessity 
tests46, without arriving at an examination of the third level, in the following 
way: “that national measures liable to hinder or make less attractive the 
exercise of fundamental freedoms guaranteed by the Treaty must…be 
suitable for securing the attainment of the objective which they pursue; and 
they must not go beyond what is necessary in order to attain it”47. 
The level of intensity varies, moreover, according to the public interest 
pursued by the national legislation. For example, in the cases of restrictions 
justified by the protection of domestic public health and safety, the review is 
less searching, insofar as these areas are closely related to national 
sovereignty and there is not always unanimity between the States as to the 
adequate level of protection48 49. In the case of consumer protection , by 
contrast, the Community court is able to carry out a more penetrating 
review, insofar as this is an area of Community competence and there is 
agreement among the Member States as to the appropriate level of 
protection50. 
To recapitulate, the application of the principle of proportionality by the 
Court of Justice is characterised by a wide flexibility, which varies 
according to the interests in play. This analysis has shown that there is not 
just one uniform test in the Community law, insofar as the principle is very 
flexible in its application and “it has been applied differently in different 
                                                 
44 See, for example, ECJ 4 October 1991, Case C-159/90, Grogan and 11 November 
1990, Case C-331/88, Fischeries and Food. 
45 See F. ORTINO, Basic Legal Instruments for the Liberalisation of Trade, A 
Comparative Analysis of EC and WTO Law, cit., p. 412. According to the Author: “the 
three normative criteria constituting the proportionality principle are like the famous 
Russian dolls, where the smaller doll fits in the bigger doll. If a measure is deemed to be 
“necessary” or the “least restrictive” alternative to achieve a certain objective, it is also 
implicit in such a finding that that same measure is also “suitable”. Similarly, a finding that 
a measure complies with the “proportionality stricto sensu” test should be understood as 
also complying with both the suitability and necessity criteria. Clearly, the opposite is not 
true”. 
46 See, T. TRIDIMAS, Proportionality in Community Law: Searching for the Appropriate 
Standard of Scrutiny, in E. ELLIS (ed.), The Principle of Proportionality in the Laws of 
Europe, Oxford, 1999, p. 69. According to the Author: “Because of that distinct 
characteristic, proportionality is often perceived to be the most far-reaching ground of 
review, the most potent weapon in the arsenal of the public law judge”. 
47 See Geghard judgment, cit., paragraph 37. 
48 See, for example, Smits judgment, cit. 
49 See, for example, Commission v. Italian Republic judgment, cit. 
50 See F. ORTINO, Basic Legal Instruments for the Liberalisation of Trade, A 
Comparative Analysis of EC and WTO Law, cit., p. 417. According to the Author: “The 
Court recognises a wider margin of discretion to Member States with regard to public 
safety regulation than for environmental protection laws, connected with the division of 
labour between the Community and the Member States themselves”. 
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 contexts to protect different interests and entails varying degrees of judicial 
review”51. Many factors play a role in the Court’s evaluation. For example: 
the purpose of the measure and the kind of interest that it seeks to protect 
(public health requires less scrutiny than would merely economic interests); 
the temporal duration of the measure (temporary restrictions are easier to 
justify); the urgency of the situation (a pressing need to regulate the market 
justifies a greater national discretion). The Court is also more reluctant to 
intervene in technical areas that require a high level of experience. 
This flexibility and uncertainty has negative consequences at the national 
level. In fact, national courts often find it difficult to review the 
proportionality of a national restrictive measure independently, without 
referring the case to the Court of Justice to obtain guidelines which they can 
then apply in the concrete case52. 
 
4. Community limitations on the discretionary power of national 
administrative authorities 
 
Member States are thus allowed to require a prior administrative 
authorisation for the practice of an activity in their legitimate pursuit of 
public interest needs, as long as the relevant restrictive measure is held by 
the Court to be consistent, proportionate and necessary to attain the 
legitimate objectives indicated by the national legislator. 
However, we have also seen how domestic administrative procedures for 
granting authorisations can create barriers to the free provision of services. 
Also relevant from this perspective are the discretion of administrations and 
the lack of transparency of their procedures. Fulfilment of the administrative 
burdens implies a higher cost of market entry, in particular when, for 
example, it implies that the enterprise must make use of professional 
services. Moreover, when authorisation procedures are not transparent and 
not based on objective criteria, the barriers to market entry can become quite 
insidious. A particularly wide discretionary power of national 
administrations can therefore represent a serious limitation on the free 
movement of services. 
In light of the above considerations, the Court of Justice has begun to 
limit the discretionary power of national administrations both where there 
was a total lack of a minimal administrative norms as well as where there 
was a sectoral directive, but this directive contained no provisions on the 
administrative procedures for the implementation of the obligations 
incumbent on the Member States by virtue of the directive itself53. 
                                                 
51 J. SNELL, Goods and Services in EC Law, A Study of the Relationship Between the 
Freedoms, cit., p. 217. 
52 J. SNELL, Goods and Services in EC Law, A Study of the Relationship Between the 
Freedoms, cit., according to the Author: “It will be very difficult for a national court to 
decide a case concerning the free movements of goods or services if it is unclear how to 
define the concept of proportionality, whether it contains two or three elements and whether 
(and, if so, to what extent) it has a different content depending on the situation, that is to 
say, primarily on the nature of interests involved”. 
53 See R. C.A. WHITE, Workers, Establishment and Services in the European Union, 
Oxford, 2004, p. 49. According to the Author: “In some areas, Community law has 
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 This can be illustrated with some examples. In the area of the realisation 
of the internal market in advanced television technology, Directive 95/47 
aims at encouraging an accelerated development of wide-screen (16:9) 
television services and the introduction of High Definition Television in 
Europe. To this end, it makes provisions relative to the new market in 
conditional-access television services (“pay television”), including 
provisions on the duties of conditional-access service operators and the 
characteristics of the equipment rented or sold by them. Directive 95/47 
does not however contain any provision for the administrative procedures 
followed in the implementation of the duties incumbent on Member States 
in virtue of this directive. This fact, as we have seen in the Canal Satélite 
Digital case, does not mean that the Member States cannot establish an prior 
authorisation procedure consisting in a compulsory registration 
accompanied by a prior opinion or technical report of the national 
authorities. Still, as we will see, in establishing an administrative procedure 
of this kind, the authorities of the Member States must always ensure 
respect for the fundamental freedoms guaranteed by the Treaty. 
Another example is Directive 64/427, which concerned only the 
recognition of activities as part of examination of the substantive conditions 
relating to the exercise, for the first time, of an activity in another Member 
State, but did not regulate the procedure for being entered on the trades 
register. Still, according to the interpretation of the Court of Justice, the host 
Member State does not have complete freedom in this matter, but is required 
to lay down the procedure for the grant of authorisation in such a way as to 
ensure that Directive 64/427 is not deprived of its effectiveness54. 
In other words, the administrative authorities of the Member States have 
to exercise their discretionary powers in respect of both the fundamental 
freedoms guaranteed by EC Treaty Article 49, as well as of the effectiveness 
of a directive laying down transitional measures55. This applies not only to 
the substantive conditions governing access to those activities, but also to 
the requirements of a procedural nature provided for by national law. 
The Court of Justice, after evaluating whether registry in the skilled 
trades register is proportional, then has to examine whether the national 
administrative authority’s procedure for granting authorisation is consistent 
with the principle of the free provision of services and does not prejudice 
the effectiveness of the sectoral directive56. It is therefore necessary that 
even the discretionary choices of national administrations on the merits of 
granting such authorisation are justified with regard to the overriding needs 
described above and that they satisfy the proportionality requirement57. 
In the presence of formal requirements, the Court first reviews the 
national measure’s proportionality and consistency with Community law, 
                                                                                                                                               
intervened and harmonized the applicable rules, but in other cases matters remain very 
firmly in the hands of the Member States”. 
54 See Corsten judgment, cit., paragraph 30 and 29 October 1998, Joined Cases C-
193/97 and C-194/97, De Castro Freitas and Escallier, paragraph 19. 
55 See De Castro Freitas e Escallier judgment, cit., paragraph 23. 
56 See Corsten judgment, cit. 
57 See ECJ, 4 December 1986, Case 205/84, Commission v. Germany, paragraphs 27 
and 29; Commission v. Italy, cit., paragraphs 17-18 and Ramrath, cit., paragraphs 30-31. 
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 and then goes on to review the discretionary power of the national 
administrative authorities (known as quomodo discretion). 
 
4.1. Evaluation of the proportionality of administrative restrictions 
 
In four of the five selected judgments, the Court of Justice held the 
normative provisions of the formal administrative requirements 
(administrative authorisation, licence, entry in a professional register), 
considered by national legislators to be necessary to perform or utilise a 
specific service outside the national borders, to be consistent with 
Community law. 
Still, as we have seen, even the domestic administrative procedures for 
granting authorisations can create obstacles to the free provision of services. 
Let us therefore examine the parameters and criteria used by the Court of 
Justice in reviewing the discretionary power of national administrations in 
relation to the criteria and methods employed for the granting of such 
authorisations. 
In the Corsten judgment, the Court of Justice held that the examination 
prior to the grant of exceptional authorisation to be entered on the Register 
can be one of form alone, since it must be confined to ascertaining whether 
the conditions laid down in Article 3 of Directive 64/427 are met. The 
authorisation procedure instituted by the host Member State should neither 
delay nor complicate exercise of the right of persons established in another 
Member State to provide their services on the territory of the first State 
where examination of the conditions governing access to the activities 
concerned has been carried out and it has been established that those 
conditions are satisfied. Moreover, any requirement of entry on the trades 
register of the host Member State, assuming it was justified, should neither 
give rise to additional administrative expense nor entail compulsory 
payment of subscriptions to the chamber of trades. The Court declared that 
“considerations of a purely of an administrative nature cannot justify 
derogation by a Member State from the rules of Community law, especially 
where the derogation in question amounts to preventing or restricting the 
exercise of one of the fundamental freedoms of Community law”58. 
In the Analir judgment, the Court affirmed that a prior-authorisation 
scheme cannot render legitimate discretionary conduct on the part of the 
national authorities which is liable to negate the effectiveness of provisions 
of Community law, in particular those relating to a fundamental freedom 
such as that at issue in the main proceedings59. Therefore, if a prior 
administrative authorisation scheme is to be justified even though it 
derogates from a fundamental freedom, it must, in any event, be based on 
objective, non-discriminatory criteria which are known in advance to the 
                                                 
58 See Corsten judgment, cit., paragraph 42. See, in particular, ECJ, 26 January 1999, 
Case C-18/95, Terhoeve, paragraph 45 and Arblade et al., cit., paragraph 37. 
59 See Analir judgment, cit., paragraph 37. See, to that effect, ECJ, 23 February 1995, 
Joined Cases C-358/93 and C-416/93, Bordessa and Others, paragraph 25 and 14 
December 1995, Joined Cases C-163/94, C-165/94 e C-250/94, Sanz de Lera, paragraph 25. 
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 undertakings concerned, in such a way as to circumscribe the exercise of the 
national authorities' discretion, so that it is not used arbitrarily. Accordingly, 
the nature and the scope of the public service obligations to be imposed by 
means of a prior administrative authorisation scheme must be specified in 
advance to the undertakings concerned. Furthermore, all persons affected by 
a restrictive measure based on such a derogation must have a legal remedy 
available to them. According to the Court of Justice, it is for the national 
court to consider and determine whether the prior administrative 
authorisation scheme at issue in the case before it satisfies those conditions 
and those criteria. 
In its Canal Satélite Digital judgment, the Court held that once 
examination of the conditions for obtaining registration has been carried out 
and it has been established that those conditions have been satisfied, the 
requirement to obtain certification for the apparatus, equipment or 
conditional-access telecommunication systems after that registration 
procedure must neither delay nor complicate exercise of the right of the 
undertaking concerned to market those products and related services. 
Moreover, the requirements of entry on a register and the obtaining of 
certification, assuming they are justified, must not give rise to 
disproportionate administrative expenses 60. 
Recapitulating, the Court of Justice, in the judgments described above, 
sets forth general parameters for the abstract evaluation of whether a 
national administrative procedure is consistent or not with the principle of 
the freedom to provide services, leaving it to the national court to apply 
these criteria to the concrete case. 
Specifically, the referring court, in reviewing the discretion of national 
administrations, ought to take the following factors into consideration: 1) for 
a prior administrative authorisation scheme to be justified even though it 
derogates from those fundamental freedoms, it must, in any event, be based 
on objective, non-discriminatory criteria which are known in advance, in 
such a way as to circumscribe the exercise of the national authorities' 
discretion, so that it is not used arbitrarily; 2) a prior authorisation procedure 
does not comply with the fundamental principles of the free movement of 
goods and the freedom to provide services if, on account of its duration and 
the disproportionate costs to which it gives rise, it is such as to deter the 
operators concerned from pursuing their business plan. 
In these cases, therefore, the Court of Justice establishes standards for 
national courts to use in reviewing the discretionary power of their own 
national administrative authorities, as it considers the national courts to be 
more competent to undertake the balancing exercise that is the essence of 
the principle of proportionality. 
In the Smits judgment, by contrast, the Court of Justice assumes a 
different posture. In this case, after having held the condition of prior 
authorisation by the sickness fund to claim entitlement to reimbursement for 
the cost of treatment outside the Member State to be consistent with 
                                                 
60 See Canal Satélite judgment, cit., paragraph 42. 
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 Community law, the Court of Justice went on to review the criteria 
employed by the national administrative authority for the granting of such 
authorisation. The Dutch norms subjected the granting of this authorisation 
upon the double condition that the treatment could be considered as “as 
normal in professional circles” and that “the treatment abroad must be 
necessary in terms of the medical condition of the person concerned”. 
The Court reasoned from settled case-law that a scheme of prior 
authorisation cannot legitimise discretionary decisions taken by the national 
authorities which are liable to negate the effectiveness of provisions of 
Community law, in particular those relating to a fundamental freedom such 
as that at issue in the main proceedings61.. Therefore, in order for a prior 
administrative authorisation scheme to be justified even though it derogates 
from such a fundamental freedom, it must, in any event, be based on 
objective, non-discriminatory criteria which are known in advance, in such a 
way as to circumscribe the exercise of the national authorities' discretion, so 
that it is not used arbitrarily. Such a prior administrative authorisation 
scheme must likewise be based on a procedural system which is easily 
accessible and capable of ensuring that a request for authorisation will be 
dealt with objectively and impartially within a reasonable time and refusals 
to grant authorisation must also be capable of being challenged in judicial or 
quasi-judicial proceedings. 
The Court then applied the above general criteria to authorisation 
conditions imposed by the national administration in the specific case. It 
follows from the those requirements that the institution of a system such as 
that at issue in the main proceedings, under which the authorisation decision 
needed to undergo hospital treatment in another Member State is entrusted 
to the sickness insurance funds, means that the criteria which those funds 
must apply in reaching that decision must be objective and independent 
where the providers of treatment are established. In other words, to the 
Court of Justice, the condition that the proposed treatment be normal gives a 
particularly wide discretionary power to the national administration, which 
can constitute a serious limitation to the free movement of services. 
Such criteria can in fact have various interpretations, depending in 
particular upon whether it is considered that regard should be had to what is 
considered normal only in Netherlands medical circles or, on the other hand, 
to what is considered normal according to the state of international medical 
science and medical standards generally accepted at international level. 
Moreover, considering only treatment habitually carried out on national 
territory and scientific views prevailing in national medical circles to 
determine what is or is not normal will make it likely that Netherlands 
providers of treatment will always be preferred in practice. The Court thus 
considers it necessary to provide an interpretation of the condition that the 
proposed treatment be normal that is more consistent with Community law. 
The Court specifically affirms that only an interpretation on the basis of 
what is sufficiently tried and tested by international medical science can be 
                                                 
61 See, to that effect, judgments Bordessa, cit., paragraph 25; Sanz de Lera, cit., 
paragraphs 23 to 28 and Analir, cit., paragraph 37. 
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 62regarded as satisfying the requirements set out in the judgment . Only this 
condition, which is objective and applies without distinction to treatment 
provided in the national territory and to treatment provided abroad, is 
justifiable in view of the need to maintain an adequate, balanced and 
permanent supply of hospital care on national territory and to ensure the 
financial stability of the sickness insurance system. 
Therefore, according to the Court’s interpretation, national administrative 
authorities “called on to decide, for authorisation purposes, whether hospital 
treatment provided in another Member States satisfies that criterion must 
take into consideration all the relevant available information, including, in 
particular, existing scientific literature and studies, the authorised opinions 
of specialists and the fact that the proposed treatment is covered or not 
covered by the sickness insurance system of the Member State in which the 
treatment is provided”63. 
Moreover, in the case under examination, the grant of authorisation 
allowing assumption of the costs of a medical service provided abroad is 
subject to a second condition, namely that it be proved that “the insured 
person's medical treatment requires that service.” In other words, according 
to the Court, “this condition concerning the necessity of the treatment, laid 
down by the rules at issue in the main proceedings, can be justified under 
Article 49 of the Treaty, provided that the condition is construed to the 
effect that authorisation to receive treatment in another Member State may 
be refused on that ground only if the same or equally effective treatment can 
be obtained without undue delay from an establishment with which the 
insured person's sickness insurance fund has contractual arrangements”64. 
In this context, the Court specified furthermore that “in order to 
determine whether equally effective treatment can be obtained without 
undue delay from an establishment having contractual arrangements with 
the insured person's fund, the national authorities are required to have regard 
to all the circumstances of each specific case and to take due account not 
only of the patient's medical condition at the time when authorisation is 
sought but also of his past record”65. 
The Smits judgment is emblematic in so far as the Court did not limit 
itself here to putting forward the abstract conditions under which a domestic 
administrative procedure for granting an authorisation could be consistent 
with Community law and then remand the concrete evaluation to the 
national court. On the contrary, in this judgment, the Court of Justice 
directly reviewed whether the conditions for the granting of such an 
authorisation were justified with regard to the overriding needs and whether 
they satisfied the requirement of proportionality. The Court, in substance, 
held that the discretionary power granted by the Dutch legislator to the 
sickness insurance to be excessive and dangerous. In fact, the conditions for 
the granting of an authorisation, as formulated in the state norm, lent 
themselves to multiple interpretations and thus could not be considered 
                                                 
 
63 See Smits judgment, cit., paragraph 98. 
64 See Smits judgment, cit., paragraph 103. 
65 See Smits judgment, cit., paragraph 104. 
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 compatible with Community law. The Court of Justice thus intervened to 
protect the free movement of services, interpreting the above-mentioned 
conditions restrictively and narrowing in this way the margin of discretion 
left by the state legislator to the national administrative authorities. 
 
4.2. Observations 
 
In the judgments under examination, the Court of Justice emphasised that 
authorisations schemes’ consistency with Community law depends on 
whether the procedure, in addition to being justified, is also easily 
comprehensible and does not imply excessive burdens66. Thus, for example, 
for the exercise of professional activity it says that if the access 
requirements are satisfied, it is inconsistent with Community law to subject 
the provision of the service to an authorising procedure which could delay 
or complicate the exercise. A national requirement of entry on the register, 
even if justified, should neither give rise to additional administrative 
expense nor entail specific payments67. 
To recapitulate, according to the Court, an authorisation scheme, in order 
to be consistent with Community law, must be based on criteria that are 
non-discriminatory, objectively justified by the general interest and 
proportional (specific, unambiguous, objective and knowable ahead of time 
by the interested enterprises). There ought to be the possibility for the 
judicial review of decisions to refuse authorisation68. 
The Court, moreover, has intervened directly to limit the discretionary 
power of administrative authorities in some cases, while in others it only 
gave national courts guidelines to follow. But in both situations, the Court 
of Justice went so far as to evaluate administrative discretion and procedural 
transparency at the national level, by means of a proportionality test. 
The principle of proportionality is meant as a bulwark against arbitrary 
decisions, by both national legislative and executive powers, which hinder 
the free provision of services by enterprises and individuals. As such, this 
principle represents the most suitable legal doctrine for distinguishing 
permitted activities from forbidden ones (abuse of power) in the scope of 
particular areas69. 
In particular, according to some writers, “its development as a ground of 
review can be seen as the judiciary’s response to the growth of 
administrative powers and the augmentation of administrative discretion”70. 
The Court of Justice thus tends to exercise an ever more substantive 
review of the discretionary power of national administrations; this review is 
                                                 
66 ECJ, 31 May 1993, Case C-19/92, Kraus. 
67 See Corsten judgment, cit.. 
68 See Analir judgment, cit., paragraph 27. 
69 See M.C. CICIRIELLO, Il principio di proporzionalità nel diritto comunitario, 
Editoriale scientifica, Napoli, 1999, p. 169. 
70 See T. TRIDIMAS, Proportionality in Community Law: Searching for the Appropriate 
Standard of Scrutiny, cit., p. 65. According to the Author: “The usefulness of the 
proportionality test lies in the fact that it gives the courts maximum flexibility in reviewing 
administrative discretion within acceptable limits”. 
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 aimed at evaluating their respect for the principles that ought to govern 
administrative action, especially reasonableness and proportionality. 
Such review was exercised by the Court of Justice in a recent 
judgment71, delivered in response to a referral by the Commission against 
the Grand Duchy of Luxemburg, in the area of the freedom of establishment 
for European lawyers. In this case, the Court considered whether the 
national law, requiring a European lawyer wishing to practice law in 
Luxemburg to annually produce a certificate of registration with the 
competent authority in the home Member State, violated Directive 98/5/CE, 
aimed to facilitate the permanent exercise of the legal profession in a 
Member State other than that in which the professional qualification was 
obtained.  The Court observed, first of all, that the obligation to produce 
each year a certificate of registration imposes an obligation that has not been 
directly provided by Directive 98/5. Moreover, this burden is contrary to the 
objectives pursued by this Directive and the means used to achieve it. The 
Directive embodies the principle of mutual assistance according to which 
the competent authority of the Member State of origin must inform the host 
Member State that a disciplinary proceeding has been initiated against a 
European lawyer. In the opinion of the Court, the obligation imposed by 
Luxemburg law constitutes a disproportionate administrative burden with 
respect to the objective pursued and is thus unjustified under the 
Community directive. 
 
5. The limits upon the discretionary power of national administrative 
authorities introduced by Community legislation: sectoral directives 
 
Since the mid-1990’s, the free movement of services has experienced 
important developments due to the adoption of numerous instruments of 
secondary legislation. In particular, Community legislation began to 
harmonise the essential requirements in important sectors, such as financial 
services, and extended mutual recognition and control of the State of origin 
(which had already been introduced by the Court). Through the active 
harmonisation of the law of the Member States, Community law became 
more like national legislative and administrative law in the area of services, 
reducing the diversity that had previously existed between the different 
national norms. 
Nevertheless, even in the harmonised sectors, Community law recognises 
the power of the Member States to adopt more stringent national (legislative 
and administrative) measures than those required by the minimum standards 
set forth in the directive, for the protection of specific interests, as long as 
they are objectively justifiable and proportionate. 
                                                 
71 ECJ, 12 September 2006, Case C-193/05, Commission v. Grand Duchy of 
Luxemburg. 
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 72So, for example , Directive 2005/36/EC of the European Parliament and 
of the Council of 7 September 2005 on the recognition of professional 
qualifications73, provides for a number of limitations upon the discretionary 
power of the Member States, but at the same time, is without prejudice to 
measures necessary to ensure a high level of health and consumer 
protection74. In fact, the Community legislation recognises the possibility 
that host Member States might impose upon the migrant professional non-
discriminatory conditions of pursuit, “provided that these are objectively 
justified and proportionate”75. Host Member States may, where necessary 
and in accordance with Community law, provide for declaration 
requirements. These requirements should not lead to a disproportionate 
burden on service providers nor hinder or render less attractive the exercise 
of the freedom to provide services. The need for such requirements should 
be reviewed periodically76. In the absence of harmonisation of the minimum 
training conditions for access to the professions governed by the general 
system, it should be possible for the host Member State to impose a 
compensation measure. This measure should be proportionate and, in 
particular, take account of the applicant's professional experience. 
Experience shows that requiring the migrant to choose between an aptitude 
test or an adaptation period offers adequate safeguards as regards the latter's 
level of qualification, “so that any derogation from that choice should in 
each case be justified by an imperative requirement in the general 
interest”77. Finally, the Directive establishes that, for the first provision of 
services, in the case of regulated professions having public health or safety 
implications, the competent authority of the host Member State may check 
the professional qualifications of the service provider prior to the first 
provision of services. Such a prior check shall be possible “only where the 
purpose of the check is to avoid serious damage to the health or safety of the 
service recipient due to a lack of professional qualification of the service 
                                                 
72 The examples are countless. See Directive 2000/12/EC of the European Parliament 
and of the Council of 20 March 2000 relating to the taking up and pursuit of the business of 
credit institutions, Article 30, paragraph 9. “In addition, notwithstanding the provisions 
referred to in paragraphs 1 and 4, the Member States may, by virtue of provisions laid down 
by law, authorise the disclosure of certain information to other departments of their central 
government administrations responsible for legislation on the supervision of credit 
institutions financial institutions, investment services and insurance companies and to 
inspectors acting on behalf of those departments. However, such disclosures may be made 
only where necessary for reasons of prudential control”. Another example is Directive 
2004/18/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 31 March 2004 on the 
coordination of procedures for the award of public works contracts, public supply contracts 
and public service contracts, Article 14 “This Directive shall not apply to public contracts 
when they are declared to be secret, when their performance must be accompanied by 
special security measures in accordance with the laws, regulations or administrative 
provisions in force in the Member State concerned, or when the protection of the essential 
interests of that Member State so requires.” 
73 See A. TONETTI, Harmonisation and equivalence in the European service regulation, 
in this volume.
74 See whereas 44. 
75 See whereas 3. 
76 See whereas 7. 
77 See whereas 15. 
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 provider and where this does not go beyond what is necessary for that 
purpose”78. 
79Council Directive 2004/113/EC of 13 December 2004 , provides that 
differences in treatment in the access to goods and services and in the 
provision of goods and services are acceptable “only if they are justified by 
a legitimate aim. A legitimate aim may, for example, be the protection of 
victims of sex-related violence, reasons of privacy and decency, the 
promotion of gender equality or of the interests of men or women, the 
freedom of association, and the organisation of sporting activities. Any 
limitation should nevertheless be appropriate and necessary in accordance 
with the criteria derived from case law of the Court of Justice of the 
European Communities”80. 
Another example is Directive 97/13/EC in the area of 
telecommunications, in which the Community legislator took the principles 
of proportionality, transparency and non discrimination into account in 
order to create an environment consistent with the freedom to provide 
services81. This Directive does not regulate the licenses that the States may 
grant, as long as an efficient use and sufficient number of radio frequencies 
is ensured. Articles 6 and 11 of this Directive, addressing fees and charges, 
further the policy of favouring competition in the telecommunications 
market by prohibiting any fees or charges beyond what is “strictly 
necessary, out of respect for the principles of proportionality, objectivity, 
non-discrimination and transparency”82. 
The basic requirements for obtaining an authorisation are governed by 
the secondary legislation. Thus, in these cases, the authorities of both the 
State of origin and the destination State carry out the direct implementation 
of European law. 
The secondary legislation thus limits the administration’s very ability to 
evaluate, consequently shrinking its discretionary sphere. In many sectors, 
directives have given normative form to principles articulated by the Court 
of Justice in relation to non-harmonised services, as we have seen above. 
The secondary legislation has in fact been able to do what case-law, by 
its very nature, cannot: construct a stable system of clear rules and 
procedures, valid in an expressly defined field and not subject to ad hoc 
decisions. Even in the harmonised sectors, national administrative 
authorities’ discretionary power is constrained by the burden of proving the 
necessity and proportionality of the rule or practice, in light of the specific 
imperative needs that cannot be satisfied by any alternative measure. 
                                                 
78 See Article 7, paragraph 4. 
79 Implementing the principle of equal treatment between men and women in the access 
to and supply of goods and services. 
80 See whereas 16. See also Article 4, paragraph 5, “This Directive shall not preclude 
differences in treatment, if the provision of the goods and services exclusively or primarily 
to members of one sex is justified by a legitimate aim and the means of achieving that aim 
are appropriate and necessary.” 
81 See whereas 1, 2, 4 and 11; Article 3, n. 2. 
82 See whereas 12. 
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 Therefore, the justifications that can in fact be invoked by a Member State 
to legitimise such rules and procedures must be accompanied by an analysis 
of the effectiveness and proportionality of the restrictive measures adopted 
by that State in the particular case. 
Still, the main problem that emerges from looking only at the sectoral 
directives is the lack of a uniform system at the Community level for 
evaluating the consistency of Member States’ legal and administrative 
restrictions on the freedom to provide services. If fact, national courts often 
have trouble reviewing the proportionality of a domestic legal or 
administrative decision on their own, and often turn to the Court of Justice 
for guidelines to apply in the concrete case83. 
 
5.1. The Directive on the internal market for services: a possible solution 
to the problem of administrative restrictions? 
 
Up until now, the analysis has shown that Member States’ legal and 
administrative restrictions upon competition can significantly prevent or 
slow the development of the internal market for services in the European 
Union84. Community institutions have sought to remedy this problem 
through Community legislation aimed at establishing and governing a 
genuine internal market for services85. On 12 December 2006, the Council 
definitively adopted the “Services Directive,” 2006/123/EC86. Thus was 
concluded a debate that had lasted more than two years87. The purpose of 
                                                 
83 J. SNELL, Goods and Services in EC Law, A Study of the Relationship Between the 
Freedoms, cit. According to the Author: “It will be very difficult for a national court to 
decide a case concerning the free movements of goods or services if it is unclear how to 
define the concept of proportionality, whether it contains two or three elements and whether 
(and, if so, to what extent) it has a different content depending on the situation, that is to 
say, primarily on the nature of interests involved”. 
84 The barriers preventing or slowing the development of services between the Member 
States have many common features including the fact that they often derive from 
excessively burdensome administrative procedures, the legal uncertainty characterising 
trans-border activity and the lack of mutual trust between the Member States. See, in this 
regard, the conclusions of European Commission Report to the Council and European 
Parliament, The state of the internal market in services, cit. 
85 See whereas 6, of the Services Directive. 
86 For more information, visit http://europa.eu/scadplus/leg/it/lvb/l33237.htm 
87 In the framework of the Lisbon Strategy, the Commission responded to the Council’s 
invitation to develop a policy to surpress the barriers to the free circulation of services and 
the free establishment of service providers. The Commission thus adopted on 13 January 
2004 a "Proposal for a Directive of the European Parliament and of the Council on 
services in the internal market" (COM(2004) 2), also known as the Services Directive.  On 
16 February 2006, the European Parliament adopted by a wide majority a number of 
amendments to the draft law. The compromised reached by the Parliament was taken up by 
the Commission in its amended proposal for a directive of 4 April 2006 (COM(2006) 160 
def.), which constituted the basis of the common position of the Council adopted on 24 July 
2006. The Parliament voted on 15 November 2006, without substantial change to the 
common position, and the Council definitively adopted the Directive on 12 December 
2006. The implementation by the Member States is supposed to take place by the end of 
2009. Undoubtedly, this Directive represents one of the most important texts recently 
adopted by the European Union. 
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 the Community legislation is to realise a genuine internal market for 
services by establishing a legal framework aimed at eliminating 
administrative and regulatory barriers to the freedom of establishment of 
service providers and the barriers to the free provision of services between 
Member States88. 
The Services Directive applies solely to the requirements that influence 
access to services or their exercise. To this end, it defines the concept of 
authorisation scheme which ought to cover, inter alia, the administrative 
procedures for granting authorisations, licences, approvals or concessions, 
and also the obligation, in order to be eligible to exercise the activity, to be 
registered as a member of a profession or entered in a register, roll or 
database, to be officially appointed to a body or to obtain a card attesting to 
membership of a particular profession89. It also establishes that the 
possibility of gaining access to a service activity should be made subject to 
authorisation by the competent authorities only if that decision satisfies the 
criteria of non-discrimination, necessity and proportionality. That means, in 
particular, that authorisation schemes should be permissible only where an a 
posteriori inspection would not be effective because of the impossibility of 
ascertaining the defects of the services concerned a posteriori, due account 
being taken of the risks and dangers which could arise in the absence of a 
prior inspection. Moreover, it affirms that public health, consumer 
protection, animal health and the protection of the urban environment 
constitute overriding reasons relating to the public interest. Such overriding 
reasons may justify the application of authorisation schemes and other 
restrictions. However, no such authorisation scheme or restriction should 
discriminate on grounds of nationality. 
The Directive also requires the Member States to simplify procedures 
and formalities to facilitate access to service activities and their exercise in 
the internal market90. According to the Directive, the rules relating to 
administrative procedures should not aim at harmonising administrative 
procedures but at removing overly burdensome authorisation schemes, 
procedures and formalities that hinder the freedom of establishment and the 
creation of new service undertakings therefrom. The Directive aims in fact 
to eliminate the delays, costs and dissuasive effects which arise, for 
example, from unnecessary or excessively complex and burdensome 
procedures, the duplication of procedures, the "red tape" involved in 
submitting documents, the arbitrary use of powers by the competent 
authorities, indeterminate or excessively long periods before a response is 
given, the limited duration of validity of authorisations granted and 
                                                 
88 In view of the realisation of an internal market for services, the Directive puts forward 
four main objectives: to facilitate the freedom of establishment and freedom to provide 
services in the EU; to strengthen the rights of service users; to promote the quality of the 
services; and to establish effective administrative cooperation between the Member States. 
89 See whereas 39 of the Services Directive. 
90 This Directive applies only to requirements which affect the access to, or the exercise 
of, a service activity. This Directive concerns only providers established in a Member State 
and does not cover external aspects. It does not concern negotiations within international 
organisations on trade in services, in particular in the framework of the General Agreement 
on Trade in Services (GATS). 
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 91disproportionate fees and penalties .To this end, Member States are obliged 
to simplify administrative procedures and formalities92, establish points of 
single contact where service providers may be able to complete the 
necessary requirements93, ensure that the necessary information is easily 
available94 and introduce electronic means for completing the formalities. 
According to the Directive, the criteria for granting authorisations must 
be such as to preclude the competent authorities from exercising their power 
of assessment in an arbitrary manner; specifically, the criteria must be non-
discriminatory, justified by an overriding reason relating to the public 
interest, proportionate to that public interest objective, clear and 
unambiguous, objective and made public in advance. Member States are 
obliged to review their authorisation schemes to evaluate whether they 
might be eliminated or replaced by an a posteriori inspection95. 
The Directive fixes minimum quality standards for the administrative 
procedures and practices to be followed in granting authorisations. 
Procedural rules shall be clear, made public in advance and be such as to 
provide the applicants with a guarantee that their application will be dealt 
with objectively and impartially; they shall not be dissuasive and shall not 
unduly complicate or delay the provision of the service; applicants shall be 
guaranteed that their application will be processed as quickly as possible 
and within a reasonable period. Possible negative responses shall be 
motivated and subject to judicial review. 
The Directive introduces an presumption that some common restrictions 
on competition violate the requirements of necessity and proportionality and 
are thus always forbidden96. For example, Member States shall not: a) 
condition the granting of an authorisation upon positive demonstration of an 
economic need or market demand; b) involve competing operators in the 
procedure for the granting of the authorisation to enter the market (an 
exception is provided for professional organisations; c) require entry for a 
determinate period in the registers of the State in question or require the 
exercise of the activity on the territory for a given period; d) provide for a 
total ban on advertising; e) impose prohibitions on multidisciplinary 
activities, exercised by individuals or jointly or in partnership, except for 
regulated professions and certification, accreditation and technical control. 
Other restrictions, set forth in a kind of “grey list,” cannot be adopted or 
maintained unless they are expressly justified by the Member State as 
                                                 
91 See also, in this sense, the Communication from the Commission to the Council, the 
European Parliament, the European Economic and Social Committee and the Committee of 
the Regions - Action Programme for Reducing Administrative Burdens in the European 
Union, Brussels, 24.01.2007, COM (2007) 23 def., according to which “Unnecessary and 
disproportionate administrative burdens can have a real economic impact. They are also 
seen as an irritant and a distraction for business and are often identified as a priority target 
for simplification.” 
92 See Chapter II, Article 5, Services Directive. 
93 See Article 6, Services Directive. 
94 See Article 7, Services Directive. See, also, G. FONDERICO, in this volume. 
95 See Article 9, Services Directive 
96 This might be any obligation, prohibition, condition or limit established by law, 
regulation or administrative procedure of the Member State or derived from its 
jurisprudence, administrative practice or the rules of professional bodies. 
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 necessary and proportionate. The Member States are required to notify the 
Commission of the “grey listed” restrictions that they intend to maintain or 
adopt ex novo, setting forth the reasons for their choice. The reports 
presented by each Member State will be forwarded by the Commission to 
the other Member States for a multilateral evaluation. For the proposal of 
new “grey listed” restrictions, the Commission, after an evaluation of their 
compatibility with Community law, may ask the interested State to forgo 
adoption of the measure, or in the case that it has already been adopted, to 
return to the pre-existing situation. 
From this analysis of the text of the Directive, we can clearly see the 
legislator’s purpose of realising a uniform system at the Community level 
for determining the consistency of the legal and administrative restrictions 
on competition established by the individual Member States97. In particular, 
the Directive seeks to eliminate the many discriminatory bureaucratic 
restrictions in place in the various national systems, and set minimum 
standards for the quality of national administrative procedures and practices 
to be followed in granting authorisations.  In this way, the secondary 
legislation seeks to limit the scope of the judgment of national 
administrations, consequently reducing their sphere of discretion, even for 
the many services that are not and will never be addressed by specific 
Community directives. It is precisely the Service Directive’s horizontal 
character that ought to make it more difficult for national legislators and 
administrations to adopt and maintain restrictions that are unjustified, 
disproportionate and unnecessary. 
 
6. The European network of Solvit centres 
 
To facilitate the removal of obstacles to the internal market for services, 
many alternative mechanisms have been studied in recent years at the 
Community level. Among these, the creation of the Solvit network merits 
particular attention98. 
We have seen that bureaucratic requirements and the national 
administrations’ resistance to simplifying their procedures constitute serious 
challenges to the freedom to provide services. Citizens and businesses often 
encounter problems that derive not so much from restrictive national laws 
but rather from the improper application of the internal market norms by the 
public administration of other States. 
The European Union is supposed to respect the diversity of the Member 
States, as well as the complicated administrative traditions, legal cultures 
and political systems that characterise them. But in order to avoid distortion 
                                                 
97 See Articles 14-15 of the Services Directive. 
98 Solvit, which has been functioning since 2002, is a network for the on line resolution 
of problems, in which the Member States cooperate to concretely resolve problems deriving 
from the improper applicaiton of internal market norms by public administrations. The 
Solvit centres, present in every State of the European Union, respond to the complaints of 
citizens and enterprises. There services are free of cost, and they cooperate to solve 
problems quickly (the maximum time for a resolution is ten weeks) and informally. For 
more information, see the Solvit website at http://www.europa.eu.int/solvit. 
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 or discrimination, it is essential that the different cultures and traditions do 
not undermine the effective implementation of Community norms. 
The Solvit centres specifically aim to identify and resolve the problems 
encountered by persons and businesses, established or operating in a 
Member State different from their own, when administrative barriers limit 
the exercise of the free movement of services. This apparatus seeks to 
operate through the responsible national administrations and with the 
European Commission to resolve concrete problems99. 
Solvit can take on any trans-boundary problem between an enterprise or 
citizen, on the one hand, and a national public administration, on the other, 
that regards possible improper application of Community legislation. The 
kinds of problems faced by citizens and enterprises that can be resolved by 
Solvit include: the recognition of professional qualifications, access to 
education, permits to stay, voting rights, border controls, social security, 
motor vehicle registration, rights to work, access to the market for goods 
and services, public works contracts, tax returns, establishment as an 
autonomous worker or business and the free movement of capital and 
payments. 
Most of the cases handled by Solvit regard the failure to recognise 
profession qualifications100. For example, a French toxicologist with a 
French degree and two years of work experience in Italy did not obtain 
recognition of her qualifications by the Belgian authority. In justification of 
its refusal, the Belgian authority argued that the applicant had earned 
insufficient grades in her course of study. The Belgian Solvit centre 
convinced the Belgian administrative authorities that, the grades being 
sufficient to earn her degree and the toxicologist being able to demonstrate a 
sufficient work experience, the refusal of recognition would have been 
contrary to Community law101. 
In another case, an Icelandic doctor, with professional experience 
acquired in Sweden, Norway and Iceland, was offered a position in the 
United Kingdom. Before accepting it, he had to have his professional 
qualification recognised by the General Medical Council (disciplinary and 
regulatory body for the medical profession in the United Kingdom) which, 
despite his professional experience in different Member States, refused to 
recognise his qualifications. When the British Solvit centre asserted that the 
refusal was contrary to Community norms, the General Medical Council 
changed its view and agreed to recognise his qualifications102. 
103So far, the results of the Solvit centres are significant  and could 
certainly become more so with a greater awareness of this resource and its 
                                                 
99 See Commission Staff Working Paper, Report on the application of internal market 
rules to health services, 28.07.2003, Sec (2003) 900. 
100 The most recent report of cases handled by the Solvit centres revealed that over 50% 
of them regard the recognition of professional qualifications, products’ access to markets, 
the registration of motor vehicles and permits to stay. 
101 The applicant obtained a favourable decision in nine weeks. 
102 The case was resolved in the applicant’s favour in ten weeks. 
103 Last year, the network examined 465 cases, 61% more than in the previous year. 
71% were cases brought by citizens, the rest by enterprises. 77% of the cases were 
resolved, over half of these in ten weeks or less. Data derived from the 2005 Solvit Report. 
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 potential. It is significant that the Community has created its own 
institutional network to evaluate the discretionary choices of individual 
national administrations, however much in an informal and extra-judicial 
way. It is not surprising that, in the end, this evaluation is carried out within 
the parameters, set forth by the Court of Justice, of proportionality, 
necessity and reasonableness. 
 
7. Final observations 
 
The initial scope of this study was to analyse how Community principles 
and rules affect the discretionary choices of national administrative 
authorities in the regulation of services. After having examined the 
jurisprudence, legislative norms and the work of Community institutions, it 
is possible to put forward the following conclusions. 
The freedom of movement of services is guaranteed by the EC Treaty 
and by the secondary Community legislation; it is to be achieved through 
the gradual elimination of restrictive measures introduced the Member 
States into their respective legal systems. 
From the above analysis, we saw that the main difficulties in the 
realisation of the internal market for services derive not only from 
differences between national laws, but also from the behaviour of individual 
administrations and from differing administrative practices and procedures 
(specifically, the administration’s discretionary power and the complexity of 
some formal requirements). 
To address this issue, the Court of Justice will review the wide scope of 
discretionary power that national legislatures leave to administrative 
authorities in establishing domestic procedures in the application of 
Community law. 
The Court of Justice was the first Community organ to exercise a control 
upon the discretionary choices of national administrative authorities in the 
regulation of services. 
From an analysis of its jurisprudence we have seen that the Court, in 
addition to reviewing the discretionary power of the legislator over whether 
or not (an) to adopt restrictive domestic provisions, and over the form and 
content of the provisions themselves (quid), also exercises review over the 
discretion of national administrations over the procedures (quomodo) used 
in giving concrete application to the national provisions. 
The examination of the judgments enables us moreover to specify the 
parameters and criteria of evaluation employed by the Court of Justice in 
reviewing the discretion of both national legislators and national 
administrations. 
In this regard, the Court has affirmed that the discretionary power of 
national administrations (just like that of national legislators) ought always 
to be exercised in conformity with the general principle of proportionality. 
This principle specifically implies that the public administration ought to 
adopt that appropriate and adequate solution which involves the least 
possible sacrifice of the relevant interests. In substance, this means that 
national authorities may not use administrative decisions to impose duties 
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 and restrictions limiting the individual freedoms guaranteed by Community 
law more than is strictly necessary to attain the purposes that the authorities 
are obliged to realise (proportionality). In other words, according to the 
Court, an authorisations scheme must be based on criteria that are non-
discriminatory, objectively justified by needs of a general interest and 
proportionate (specific, unambiguous, objective and known in advance by 
the interested undertakings) in order to be in conformity with Community 
law. There must be the possibility to pursue judicial review of decisions to 
refuse authorisation. The application of the principle of proportionality thus 
enables the European court to rectify arbitrary harms wrought by both 
national legislators and national administrations in regulating services. 
A second control is exercised by the Community legislative power, 
which uses sectoral directives to limit the discretionary power of national 
administrative authorities. Often, even in the harmonised sectors, national 
administrative authorities’ discretionary powers are circumscribed by the 
burden of proving the necessity and the proportionality of the rule or 
practice they seek to introduce, in light of specific imperative needs that 
cannot be met by using alternative means. 
Recapitulating, both in the harmonised and non-harmonised sectors, 
Community law conditions the scope and legitimacy of possibly 
discriminatory national administrative measures upon their proportionality. 
Still, the main problem that emerges here is the lack of a uniform system at 
the Community level for ascertaining the consistency of legislative and 
administrative restrictions on the freedom to provide services. For this 
reason, even in the harmonised sectors, the national courts often find it 
difficult to review the proportionality of a domestic legislative and/or 
administrative act, without turning to the Court of Justice for guidelines to 
apply to the concrete case. 
The Court of Justice’s evaluation has thus been essential to both the 
harmonised and non-harmonised sectors. Its application of the principle of 
proportionality has, however, shown that there does not exist a uniform test, 
in so far as the principle varies in its application according to the interests in 
play: “It has been applied differently in different contexts to protect 
different interests and entails varying degrees of judicial review”104. 
The Court, moreover, generally limits itself to providing guidelines, that 
the national court must then adapt to the concrete case. Still, in some cases, 
the Court of Justice does intervene directly to review the proportionality of 
national administrative measures, thus reviewing not only their basic 
legitimacy but their merits as well. 
It has thus emerged from this study that, of the Community principles 
affecting the discretionary choices of national administrative authorities in 
their regulation of services, proportionality assumes a peculiar role. This 
principle is applied directly by the Court of Justice in evaluating the 
compatibility of national administrative choices with the articles of the EC 
Treaty and is expressly invoked by Community legislation in individual 
                                                 
104 J. SNELL, Goods and Services in EC Law, A Study of the Relationship Between the 
Freedoms, cit., p. 217. 
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 sectoral directives as a criterion to guide domestic administrative 
authorities. 
In any case, we have seen that the traditional strategy for reviewing the 
discretion of national administrations, based on the ad hoc application of 
Articles 43 and 49 of the EC Treaty by the Court of Justice and the adoption 
of sectoral directives by the Parliament and Council, would be seriously 
deficient. It has clearly emerged that the control exercised by the Court of 
Justice and the Community law-makers is not, by itself, able to eliminate the 
plurality and diversity within the internal market of as many different 
national laws as there are different state legal systems. And, in particular, it 
is not able to eliminate the exercise of discretionary power by the 
administrative authorities of the Member States. 
There are two reasons for this. First, the Court can intervene only in a 
limited number of cases and its intervention is in any case inadequate when 
the removal of barriers requires the coordination of the legal systems of the 
Member States and administrative cooperation. Secondly, the affected 
services are countless as well as changeable over time; they are therefore ill-
suited to being regulated by specific sectoral directives. 
Community institutions have sought to remedy this situation by 
providing alternative tools. 
In particular, to encourage the cooperation between national 
administrative authorities in removing barriers to the movement of services, 
Solvit was established. This European network can be defined therefore as 
another institution capable of reviewing – though in an informal and 
extrajudicial way – the discretionary choices of national administrations in 
the regulation of services.  
To overcome instead the more specific problem of the limited character 
of sectoral directives, Community institutions have proposed the adoption of 
a single, “horizontal” directive on the internal market for services. With the 
final version of the recently approved Bolkestein Directive, the law-makers 
have finally succeeded in realising a uniform system at the Community level 
for controlling the consistency of individual Member States’ legal and 
administrative restrictions on competition, even for the many services which 
are not and will never be addressed by specific Community directives. 
From the framework set forth here, we can conclude that the European 
institutions, though in many different ways and at many different levels, 
exercise a substantial control on the exercise of discretionary power by 
national administrations, a control aimed at ensuring respect for the 
principles that ought to govern administrative activity, reasonableness and 
proportionality. 
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 HARMONISATION AND MUTUAL RECOGNITION IN THE GENERAL 
AGREEMENT ON TRADE IN SERVICES 
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up.  
 
1. Object of the study and research methodology 
 
Global law affects the legislative and administrative power of States through 
techniques that can be organised under two categories: control and substitution. 
In the first case, global law recognises national authorities’ right to regulate, but 
subjects it to certain conditions, which are determined at the global level, and to 
a review by global bodies. In the second case, national regulators are required 
to cede their power to define the content of domestic laws, letting rules defined 
beyond its territory come into the national legal order2. 
Substitution may be implemented through mechanisms that operate in 
various directions.  Substitution can take a “vertical” direction, where a 
standard set forth by a supranational body is incorporated into the national law. 
It might also take a “horizontal” direction: this happens when national 
authorities, pressed by global law, agree to embody rules established by another 
State into their own legal systems, because of the principle of equivalence. 
This essay examines how the two main substitution techniques, 
harmonisation (of the substantive content of the law, given that the imposition 
of procedural rules like notice and comment procedures would fall under the 
control category rather than the substitution one) and equivalence, work within 
the scope of the General Agreement on Trade in Services (GATS) 3. This 
                                                 
1 MAURIZIA DE BELLIS wrote paragraphs. 1 and 2, while ELISABETTA MORLINO wrote 
paragraph 3 and 4. Paragraph 5 is the result of a common work. 
2 About the distinction between control techniques and substitution techniques, see S. 
BATTINI, La globalizzazione del diritto pubblico, Riv. Trim. Dir. Pubbl. (2006) 325 et seq., at 
332 et seq. 
3 For an overview of the GATS agreement, C. ARUP, The new world trade organization 
agreements – globalizing law through services and intellectual property, Cambridge, 
Cambridge University Press (2000) 95 et seq.; P. PICONE, A. LIGUSTRO, Diritto 
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 analysis thus aims at isolating the main features of two of the core techniques 
for the globalisation of public law, within a specific sector: international trade 
in services. The work is divided into two parts: in the first one, the use of 
international standards within the context of the GATS (i.e. the principle of 
harmonisation) will be examined; in the second one, mutual recognition 
agreements (i.e. the principle of equivalence) will be taken into account.  
 
2. The principle of harmonisation in the GATS 
 
In the agreements on Sanitary and Phytosanitary Measures (SPS) and 
Technical Barriers to Trade (TBT), the reference to international standards is 
formulated in such a way as to foster a genuine shift of the right to regulate, 
from the States in favour of global standard setters, through the substitution of 
global rules to national ones. In fact, these agreements contain a comprehensive 
body of rules relating to the use of international standards. As has been 
observed by the Secretariat4, in this discipline there seem to be three essential 
elements.  
First, Member States must use the standards as a basis for their domestic 
regulation5. An exception is made for the possibility of adopting measures that 
require a higher level of health protection than the one which would be 
guaranteed by the global standard (or of adopting technical standards which do 
not conform to the global ones) 6, but in this case Member States must 
demonstrate that there is a scientific ground for this choice7 and they must 
respect a detailed notice and comment procedure8. 
Moreover – and this is the second core element of the discipline concerning 
international standards in the TBT and SPS agreements – it is presumed that 
national norms conforming to international standards respect the obligations 
binding the States in consequence of their membership in the WTO9. Though 
                                                                                                                                                    
dell’organizzazione mondiale del commercio, Padova, Cedam, (2000) 361 et seq.; M. 
TREBILCOCK, R. HOWSE, The Regulation of International Trade, 2nd ed., London – New York, 
Routledge (1999) 270 et seq. Analysing the impact of the agreement, from a critical 
perspective, P. SAUVÉ, Assessing the General Agreement on Trade in Services: Half-Full or 
Half-Empty?, 29 Journal of World Trade 4  (1995) 125 et seq.; L. ALTINGER, A. ENDERS, The 
Scope and Depth of GATS Commitments, 19 The World Economy 3 (1996) 307 et seq.; M. 
KRAJEWSKI, National Regulation and Trade Liberalization in Services: The Legal Impact of the 
General Agreement on Trade in Services (GATS) on National Regulatory Autonomy, The 
Hague – London - New York, Kluwer Law International (2003). 
4 Article VI:4 of the GATS: Disciplines of Domestic Regulation Applicable to all Services, 
Note by the Secretariat, S/C/W/96, 1 March 1999, paragraph 35-42.  
5 Art.2.4 Tbt and 3.1 Sps. 
6 Art. 3.3. Sps; artt. 2.5 and 2.9 Tbt. 
7 Art. 3.3. Sps. (partially diverging from art. 2.5 Tbt, which refers to the necessity of 
«explain the justification»). As the APPELLATE BODY REPORT, Japan-Measures Affecting the 
Importation of Apples, WT/DS245/AB/R, 26 November 2003, shows, it is not easy to prove the 
scientific justification behind the State’s decision. 
8 Art. 2.9 Tbt and Annex B, art. 5 Sps. 
9 Srt. 2.5 Tbt and 3.2 Sps. 
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 Member States are not obliged to adopt laws that conform to international 
standards, there are thus strong incentives for them to do so: alongside those set 
forth above, of particular importance is the chance (which the presumption 
mentioned at the outset seems to foster) of a State’s preventing its national 
regulations from being challenged before the WTO’s dispute resolution 
system10. 
In addition to the measures concerning the use of international standards by 
the Member States, there is a third element: measures requiring State 
representatives to participate in the preparation of standards by the relevant 
international organisations11. 
The GATS, by contrast, embodies only two measures about international 
standards. The absence in the GATS of a framework analogous to that for 
sanitary measures and technical norms has led the Secretariat to state that “The 
current provisions in the GATS do not go as far as the TBT agreement in laying 
down a general obligation on Members to use international standards when they 
are available, thereby establishing a rebuttable presumption that any measure 
which is consistent with international standards would be considered not to 
create an unnecessary obstacle to trade. Nevertheless, the GATS obligations in 
this area do seem to point in a similar direction.” 12 Thus, according to the 
subsidiary body of the WTO, the GATS norms concerning international 
standards do seek the same goal as the more detailed law contained in the SPS 
and TBT agreements, specifically, harmonisation (however limited) in the 
services sector13. But to what extent is this realised? 
                                                 
10 Underlines this problem and the cost of process within the WTO dispute settlement 
system, M.A. LIVERMORE, Authority and Legitimacy in Global Governance: Deliberation, 
Institutional Diffentiation, and the Codex Alimentarius, 81 New York University Law Review 
(2006) 766 et seq., here at 776. See also H. NORDSTROM, The cost of Wto Litigation, Legal Aid 
and Small Claim Procedures, paper presented to the conference Wto Dispute Settlement and 
Developing Countries, University of Wisconsin – Madison, 5 June 2005, available at 
http://www.wage.wisc.edu/uploads/WTO%20Conference/nordstroem_update.pdf 
11 Art. 2.6 TBT, 3.4 and 3.5 SPS. 
12 See The Relevance of the Disciplines of the Agreements on Technical Barriers to Trade 
(TBT) and on Import Licensing Procedures to Article VI.4 of the General Agreement on Trade 
in Services, Note by the Secretariat, S/WPPS/W/9, 11 September 1996, paragraph II (iii). 
13 About the principle of harmonization within the WTO, see D. KALDERIMIS, Problems of 
WTO Harmonization and the Virtues of Shields over Swords, 13 Minn. J. Global Trade (2004) 
305 et seq.; G. MAYEDA, Developing Disharmony? The SPS And TBT Agreements And The 
Impact Of Harmonisation On Developing Countries, 7 Journal of International Economic Law 
(2004) 737; A. REICH, The WTO as a Law-Harmonizing Institution, in 25 U. Pa. J. Int’l Econ. 
L. (2004), p. 321 et seq.; A. O. SYKES, The (Limited) Role of Regulatory Harmonization in 
International Goods and Services Markets, 2 Journal of International Economic Law (1999) 49 
et seq.; L. M. WALLACH, Accountable Governance in the Era of Globalization: The WTO, 
NAFTA, and International Harmonization of Standards, 50 U. Kan. L. Rev., (2001-2002) 823 
et seq. 
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 The GATS embodies two explicit references to international standards. We 
find the first one in Article VI, about Domestic Regulation14. The fourth 
paragraph of this norm demands to the Council for Trade in Services to 
establish disciplines for domestic regulation, in order to guarantee that national 
regulations in the area of “licensing and qualification requirements and 
technical standards” do not constitute an unnecessary obstacle to trade in 
services15. The next disposition of Article VI sets forth a transitory rule, to be 
applied until the entry into force of the disciplines: and it is in the context of 
this transitory norm that the reference to international standards can be found.  
According to Article VI, paragraph 5(a), until the disciplines enter into force, 
Member States must not apply national measures in the area of licenses and 
other technical norms in such a way as to violate the GATS criteria for the 
application of the necessity test (and they must be specified within the 
disciplines)16; next, paragraph 5(b) specifies that, in this analysis, “account 
shall be taken of international standards of relevant international organizations 
applied by that Member.” To determine whether a State is respecting its GATS 
obligations, account must be taken of that State’s application of international 
standards. 
The second reference to international standards can be found in Article VII, 
which concerns primarily mutual recognition agreements. Article VII, 
paragraph 5 specifies that the Member States “shall work in cooperation with 
relevant intergovernmental and non-governmental organizations towards the 
establishment and adoption of common international standards and criteria for 
recognition and common international standards for the practice of relevant 
services trades and professions.” While Article VI, paragraph 5(b) sets forth the 
scope and the limits upon the use of standards in the context of the GATS, 
                                                 
14 About domestic regulation in the GATS, see also L. ABUGATTAS MAJLUF, Domestic 
Regulation and the GATS: Challenges for Developing Countries, draft paper, available at 
www.ictsd.org; A. MATTOO AND P. SAUVÉ (eds.), Domestic Regulation and Service Trade 
Liberalization, Washington, World Bank and Oxford University Press (2003). 
15 Art. VI.4: «With a view to ensuring that measures relating to qualification requirements 
and procedures, technical standards and licensing requirements do not constitute unnecessary 
barriers to trade in services, the Council for Trade in Services shall, through appropriate bodies 
it may establish, develop any necessary disciplines. Such disciplines shall aim to ensure that 
such requirements are, inter alia: (a) based on objective and transparent criteria, such as 
competence and the ability to supply the service; (b) not more burdensome than necessary to 
ensure the quality of the service; (c) in the case of licensing procedures, not in themselves a 
restriction on the supply of the service». Therefore, the GATS takes into account the possibility 
that restrictions to trade might be related to non discriminatory measures: in this case, the WTO 
demands to future negotiations between the States the disciplines which must be applied, but, at 
the same time, it establishes the minimum requirements that these disciplines must ensure.  
16 Art. VI.5 (a): « In sectors in which a Member has undertaken specific commitments, 
pending the entry into force of disciplines developed in these sectors pursuant to paragraph 4, 
the  Member shall not apply licensing and qualification requirements and technical standards 
that nullify or impair such specific commitments in a manner which: (i) does not comply with 
the criteria outlined in subparagraphs 4(a), (b) or (c)» (for these criteria, see footnote above). 
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 Article VII addresses the cooperation with the global bodies in charge of the 
standard setting procedure.  
The GATS norms about international standards seem thus to differ strongly 
from the more comprehensive framework of the harmonisation principle within 
the context of the SPS and TBT agreements. Taking into account this contrast, 
the paper seeks to examine which limits the principle of harmonisation 
encounters in the area of trade in services, compared to trade in goods, and to 
verify which reasons can explain this difference. To this end, the analysis will 
be divided into three parts. 
First of all, we will try to determine what are the international standards in 
the services sector which may be used in the context of the GATS.  This is 
necessary for a number of reasons. In particular, as we will see, there is a 
widespread belief that the narrower reference to standards within the GATS is 
the result and consequence of a lesser diffusion of global standards for services.  
But is this true? Secondly, knowing which kind of standards can be referred to 
in the context of GATS is necessary in order to understand the consequences 
coming from this reference. Third, the scope and object of the standards 
relevant for services can help in clarifying the differences existing between the 
reference to international standards within the GATS, on the one side, and the 
SPS and TBT, on the other side. Therefore, the first step of the analysis will 
aim at examining which standards are relevant for the services sector, and what 
are their main features. 
The second part of this study aims instead to verify which can be the scope 
of the reference to standards in the context of the GATS: to this end, we will 
first look at the modalities and limits of the Article VI, paragraph 5(b) 
reference; then we will examine the possible options for applying the principle 
of harmonisation within the GATS, which result from the sectoral disciplines, 
for the accountancy sector and telecommunications, and the proposals presented 
in recent years by the Member States. 
A third problem is closely related to this topic: the definition of the features 
a standard setting body must have in order to be considered relevant by the 
GATS. As standards first established by international organisations are 
increasingly implemented at the domestic level, fostering WTO Member States’ 
participation in the standard setting process proves crucial. However, some 
countries, especially developing ones, are excluded from this: as a result, they 
are pushing for the GATS to recognise as standard setters only those 
organisations in which participation is open to all WTO members. In this 
perspective, the third part of the analysis will look at the debate about the 
definition of international standard setting organisation, recognised by the 
GATS, and at the proposals aimed at amending it: in this way, we will see 
which kind of features the GATS requires in order to recognize a standard 
setter, and, therefore, it will be possible to check to what extent the WTO can 
promote greater transparency and openness of global regulators. Finally, we 
will also examine the forms of cooperation established thus far between the 
WTO bodies and the standard setters for services. 
 141
 We would like to specify from the outset that, in the course of this 
examination, we will pay special attention to the negotiations carried out by 
three different subsidiary bodies of the WTO: the Council for Trade in Services 
(CTS), the Committee on Trade in Financial Services (CTFS) and the Working 
Party on Domestic Regulation (WPDR). 
 
2.1. Which standards are relevant for the services sector?  
 
There are frequent criticisms of the general lack, if not the genuine absence 
of international standards for services, in contrast to the marked diffusion of 
such standards for trade in goods. According to some opinions, this would 
explain the differences between the weak reference to standards in the GATS 
and the stronger one in the TBT and SPS agreements; moreover, it has been 
invoked in the course of negotiations on the future disciplines, in order to 
exclude a different formulation of the reference, more similar to the one of the 
sanitary and phytosanitary measures and the technical barriers sectors17. 
However, a closer examination of the service sectors paints a very different 
picture. 
The sector in which there is the greatest diffusion of international standards 
seems to be financial services: in fact, the International Monetary Fund (IMF)18 
and the OECD19 establish standards for fiscal and monetary transparency and 
corporate governance, while transnational regulatory networks, like the Basel 
Committee for Banking Supervision (BCBS)20, the International Organization 
of Securities Commissioners (IOSCO)21, the International Association of 
Insurance Supervisors (IAIS)22, set forth rules in the areas of banking, 
securities and insurance. This helps us to understand why the issue of how the 
GATS should refer to global standards and foster their use by Member States 
was first raised within the Committee on Trade in Financial Services23. 
                                                 
17 See Thailandia and Singapore’s opinions in WORKING PARTY ON DOMESTIC REGULATION 
- Report on the Meeting Held on 22 November 2004 - Note by the Secretariat, S/WPDR/M/28 
(25 Jan. 2005), parr.11 and 21; and, agreeing, Singapore, EU, Japan, India and Colombia, in 
WORKING PARTY ON DOMESTIC REGULATION - Report on the Meeting Held on 7 and 18 
February 2005 - Note by the Secretariat, S/WPDR/M/29, 11 July 2005, paragraph 14, 16, 22, 
26 and 30. 
18 About the IMF’s standard setting activity see 
http://www.imf.org/external/standards/index.htm. 
19 See http://www.oecd.org. 
20 See http://www.bis.org/bcbs/index.htm. 
21 See http://www.iosco.org. 
22 About Iais, see http://www.iaisweb.org. 
23 The debate on this point took place during the meetings of the Committee on Trade in 
Financial Services - CTFS of 6 October 2003, 25 June 2004, 28 September 2004 and 23 
November 2004, S/FIN/M/42-45-46-47. Besides, the discussion within the CTFS seems to have 
deeply influenced the evolution of the debate within the WPDR. As a matter of fact, during the 
meetings of the CTFS was argued that the subject of standards needed to be discussed in the 
context of the disciplines negotiations, and therefore within the WPDR: it looks like the 
discussion, first started in the CTFS, later on moved in the forum which was more appropriate 
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 Moreover, two communications to the GATS Council, from the European 
Union24 25 and Switzerland , have argued for the use of rules set forth by such 
bodies within the WTO.  
We see a similar situation in the accountancy sector (so far the only one for 
which disciplines have been developed): the International Accounting 
Standards Board (IASB)26 and the International Federation of Accountants 
(IFAC)27 set forth rules, recognised at the global level, for accountancy and 
auditing respectively. Both of these bodies were heard by the WPPS during the 
negotiations over the accountancy disciplines28, though the disciplines do not 
expressly mention IAS and the ISA (which are the standards set forth by the 
IASB and the IFAC). 
29The International Bar Association (IBA)  plays a principal role in 
developing international standards for legal services, while the Accord on 
Recommended International Standards of Professionalism in Architectural 
                                                                                                                                                    
to the object of the negotiations: see Mexico’s opinion in the meeting of the CTFS, 6 October 
2003, S/FIN/M/42, paragraph 58: « the document [of Antigua and Barbuda et al.) dealt with 
two very important issues: the steps that a WTO Member had to take when drawing up a 
technical standard; and the requirements that a body had to fulfill in order to be considered an 
international body. […] With regard to the first of the issues, Mexico believed that it was 
broader than what was contained in this proposal, and should therefore be part of the disciplines 
being developed under Article VI:4 of the GATS in the Working Party on Domestic 
Regulation». The first comprehensive proposal on the subject of technical standards and 
international standards has been put forth by Mexico, within the WPDR, in September 2004.  
24 See COUNCIL FOR TRADE IN SERVICES - SPECIAL SESSION - Communication from the 
European Communities and their Member States - GATS 2000: Financial Services, 
S/CSS/W/39, 22 December 2000, p. 5,: according to the EU, «It is our view that one pre-
requisite for a successful and orderly opening of financial markets is the existence of an 
appropriate regulatory structure, as well as the ability of local supervisory authorities to monitor 
a more complex market. The EC emphasise its support for regulation that is transparent, 
proportionate and necessary. WTO work on regulatory issues will be useful in supporting 
domestic regulatory reform efforts, and should reflect upon the consideration of international 
standards as developed by the competent international organisations (IOSCO, IAIS, the Basle 
Committee, IMF, World Bank, etc.). The WTO shall in no way seek to replace or take up the 
role of these competent international organisations; rather, the work of the WTO and of these 
other international organisations should be mutually supportive». 
25 See COUNCIL FOR TRADE IN SERVICES - SPECIAL SESSION - Communication from 
Switzerland - GATS 2000: Financial Services, S/CSS/W/71, 4 May 2001, p. 3, paragraph 18-
19, arguing that «From a strictly commercial point of view, we recommend the increased use of 
the standards developed in the relevant international forums (the Basel Committee, the 
International Association of Insurance Supervisors, the International Organization of Securities 
Commissions and the Joint Forum on Financial Conglomerates). We encourage the CTFS to 
keep abreast of the work of these organizations to the extent that it affects trade in financial 
services». 
26 See http://www.iasc.org.uk/. 
27 See http://www.ifac.org. 
28 This fact is mentioned in the document The Relevance of the Disciplines of the 
Agreements on Technical Barriers to Trade (TBT) and on Import Licensing Procedures to 
Article VI.4 of the General Agreement on Trade in Services, Note by the Secretariat, 
S/WPPS/W/9, paragraph II (iii). 
29 See http://www.ibanet.org/ 
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 30Practice of the Union Internationale des Architectes (UIA)  is important for 
the architectural profession. Both of these standard setters took part in a 2004 
workshop on domestic regulation, organised by the WPDR31; moreover, there 
have been some proposals aimed at promoting the inclusion of rules produced 
by such bodies within the disciplines32. 
With regard to network services, the International Telecommunication Union 
(ITU)33 sets forth standards for telecommunications and the Universal Postal 
Union (UPU)34 establishes principles and guidelines for postal services, while 
air and maritime transport are addressed by the significant activity of the 
International Civil Aviation Organization (ICAO)35 and the International 
Maritime Organization (IMO)36 respectively. While the ITU is expressly 
mentioned as a cooperating international organisation by the GATS Annex on 
Telecommunications, there is currently a debate over the approval of a 
Memorandum of Understanding for the cooperation between the WTO and 
UPU37.  Moreover, there are some initiatives aimed at promoting cooperation 
with the ICAO and the IMO38.  
                                                 
30 See http://www.uia-architectes.org/. 
31 See CTFS, COMMITTEE ON TRADE IN FINANCIAL SERVICES, Report of the meeting held on 
11 October 2001, Note by the Secretariat, S/FIN/M/32, 9 November 2001, and WORKING 
PARTY ON DOMESTIC REGULATION - Report on the Meeting Held on 31 March 2004, Note by 
the Secretariat, S/WPDR/M/25, 18 May 2004. 
32 About IBA and its involvement in the development of the disciplines see, L. S. TERRY, 
Lawyers, GATS, and the WTO "Accountancy Disciplines": the History of the WTO's 
Consultation, the "IBA GATS Forum" and the September 2003 IBA Resolutions, 22 Penn State 
International Law Review 4 (2004) 695 et seq. The relevance of UIA’s activity for the 
disciplines has been first mentioned by the Secretariat: see COUNCIL FOR TRADE IN SERVICES, 
International Regulatory Initiatives in Services, Background Note by the Secretariat, S/C/W/97, 
1 March 1999, p. 11. Moreover, some proposals presented during the WPDR meetings in 2000 
further argued the opportunity of using UIA standards within the disciplines: see WORKING 
PARTY ON DOMESTIC REGULATION, Communication from Japan - Report of the Results of 
Research on Professional Services, S/WPDR/W/6 (19 May, 2000), paragraph 71, WORKING 
PARTY ON DOMESTIC REGULATION, Communication from the Republic of Korea - Disciplines 
on Domestic Regulation for Professional Services - Results of Consultation with Professional 
Sectors, S/WPDR/W/10 (2 October, 2000), paragraph 7 and WORKING PARTY ON DOMESTIC 
REGULATION, Communication from Canada - Disciplines on Domestic Regulation for 
Professional Services - Results of Consultations with Professional Sectors, S/WPDR/W/13 (16 
March, 2001), paragraph 5. See also a proposal set forth by Australia (Job No. 3262, 25 May 
2000): this document, non accessible to the public, is cross referred (underlining the point 
concerning the use of UIA’s standards) in WORKING PARTY ON DOMESTIC REGULATION, Report 
on the Meeting Held on 3 July 2001 - Note by the Secretariat, S/WPDR/M/12 (16 August, 
2001), paragraph 69. 
33 About ITU, see http://www.itu.int/net/home/index.aspx. 
34 See http://www.upu.int/. 
35 See http://www.icao.int/. 
36 About Imo, see http://www.imo.org/HOME.html.  
37 CTS, Proposal for Memorandum of Understanding on cooperation between the Wto and 
the Universal Postal Union, S/C/W/180, 23 November 2000. 
38 One of the documents prepared by the Secretariat at the beginning of the WPDR 
negotiations explicitly links the regulatory activity of these organizations with the technical 
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 There are many standards for the tourism sector, set forth by: the World 
Tourism Organization39, the ICAO, the International Air Transport Association, 
the Commission on Sustainable Development, the Convention on Biological 
Diversity and the World Travel and Tourism Council40. Some Latin American 
countries submitted a proposal in this area, which seeks to promote recognition 
of the international standards for sustainable tourism set forth by these 
organisations, and to strengthen their cooperation with the WTO41.  
For advertising services, a Secretariat document mentions the Code of 
Standards for Advertising Practice, set forth by the International Chamber of 
Commerce (ICC) 42 in 1938, and some recommendations of the World Health 
                                                                                                                                                    
standards which had to be established within the disciplines: see Background Note by the 
Secretariat, International Regulatory Initiatives in Services, 1 March 1999, paragraph 17 – 19. 
Moreover, Norway proposed to foster the use of standards for the accountancy and maritime 
and air transport: see COUNCIL FOR TRADE IN SERVICES - SPECIAL SESSION, Communication 
from Norway, The Negotiations on Trade in Services, paragraph 19 («WTO work on regulatory 
issues should, insofar as possible, be based on international standards which are well developed 
for specific service sectors, for instance, the ISA - International Standards on Auditing and the 
IAS - International Accounting Standards»), paragraph 34 («A proper WTO solution for 
maritime transport would contribute to reinforcing efforts being made by many countries, 
including Norway, to stimulate a shift of transport from road to sea for environmental reasons. 
[…] At the same time, Norway remains firmly committed to dealing with environmental 
challenges in the fields of maritime transportation itself, and will co-operate actively with other 
nations in the IMO and other relevant fora in order to improve international safety and 
environmental regulations») and paragraph 44 and 46 («Norway emphasizes that any agreement 
for this sector needs to be in full conformity with international standards and regulatory 
measures, as established by the ICAO – International Civil Aviation Organization and/or the 
ECAC – European Civil Aviation Conference» and « Norway proposes that the 1st and 2nd 
freedoms of traffic rights of the ICAO Air Transit Agreement (1944) also be included as 
horizontal commitments of Members»). 
39 Background Note by the Secretariat, International Regulatory Initiatives in Services, cit., 
p. 14. 
40 See COUNCIL FOR TRADE IN SERVICES - SPECIAL SESSION, Communication by Bolivia, 
Dominican Republic, Ecuador, El Salvador, Honduras, Nicaragua, Panama, Peru and 
Venezuela, Draft Annex on Tourism, cit. 
41 COUNCIL FOR TRADE IN SERVICES - SPECIAL SESSION, Communication by Bolivia, 
Dominican Republic, Ecuador, El Salvador, Honduras, Nicaragua, Panama, Peru and 
Venezuela, Draft Annex on Tourism, S/CSS/W/107, 26 September 2001, p. 4: «Members 
recognize the importance of international standards for the sustainable development of tourism 
and undertake to promote the adoption and continued upgrading of such standards through the 
work of relevant international bodies and non-governmental organizations, including the World 
Tourism Organization, the International Civil Aviation Organization, the International Air 
Transport Association, the International Organization for Standardization, the Commission on 
Sustainable Development, the Convention on Biological Diversity and the World Travel and 
Tourism Council. Members recognize the role of international organizations and non-
governmental organizations in ensuring the safe and efficient operation of all activities in the 
tourism sector, in particular the International Civil Aviation Organization, the World Tourism 
Organization, the World Health Organization and the International Air Transport Association. 
Members shall consult, where necessary, with such organizations on matters arising from the 
implementation of this Annex».  
42 See http://www.iccwbo.org/. 
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 43 44Organization (WHO)  and the FAO  on the control of advertising of products 
affecting health and food security45. More controversial is the area of health 
services: some countries argue that the activity of the WHO could be taken into 
consideration; however, neither the documents of the WTO subsidiary bodies 
nor the formal proposals of Member States make any reference to it46. 
Finally, it is worth mentioning how the ISO, in recent years, has set forth 
rules applicable to services, addressed to specific sectors (for example, there are 
many dedicated to tourism) as well as general rules applicable universally: this 
is true of the 9000 and 14000 series of ISO standards relative to quality 
management and environmental management, respectively47. These ISO 
standards are not addressed to the characteristics of products, but rather the 
quality and environmental sustainability of business activities, which may also 
operate in the services sector. The determination of standards for services by 
the ISO is destined to become more frequent: in fact, the ISO’s strategic plan 
for the 2005-2010 period expressly mentions the services sector as one of its 
objectives48. 
From this brief overview, we can see that there are international standards 
for services, but they are distributed unevenly from one sector to another. 
Moreover, we can remark that the number of standards for services has 
increased significantly in recent years, and presume that this tendency will 
continue in the future49. For the purposes of our study, the observation of the 
number and the characteristics of the existing international standards in the 
                                                 
43 See http://www.who.int/en/. 
44 See http://www.fao.org/. 
45 Background Note by the Secretariat, International Regulatory Initiatives in Services, cit., 
p. 13. 
46 During WPDR negotiations, South Africa argued that «some sectors, e.g. health, had 
important international standards»: see WORKING PARTY ON DOMESTIC REGULATION, Report on 
the Meeting Held on 7 and 18 February 2005 - Note by the Secretariat, S/WPDR/M/29, 
paragraph 25; however, this view has never been transposed in a formal proposal, and can 
therefore be regarded as an isolated position. 
47 See K.T. HALLSTRÖM, Organizing international standardization. ISO and the IASC in 
quest of authority, Chelthenham, UK – Northampton, MA, USA, Edgward Elgar Publishing 
(2004) 4 -7. According to N. BRUNSSON, B. JACOBBSON, The Contemporary Expansion of 
Standardization, in Id. (ed.), A world of Standards, cit., 2, ISO 9000 set «standards for 
administrative processes». 
48 ISO general secretary Alan Bryder’s hearing, took place during WPDR thirtieth meeting: 
see WORKING PARTY ON DOMESTIC REGULATION, Report on the Meeting Held on 22 June 2005 
- Note by the Secretariat, S/WPDR/M/30 (6 September 2005), paragraph 168. 
49 As ISO’s representative commented during his hearing, there are several reasons for this 
phenomenon: see WPDR, S/WPDR/M/30, paragraph 164 et seq.; and in particular paragraph 
166: « Elements that had generated a growing need for international standards for services 
included: (i) the deregulation and privatization of public services in areas such as energy, 
transportation, telecoms, postal services, water; (ii) the delocalization of the supply of some 
services such as health services, IT assistance and call centres; (iii) the pressure by consumers 
and citizens on quality, environment and safety, with a corresponding increase in consumer 
protection legislation covering services; (iv) the expansion of web-based services such as 
tourism, financial services, webstores and on-line purchasing». 
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 services sector, and of the kinds of bodies that create them, is important for 
many reasons.  
First of all, the relative immaturity of international standards in the services 
sector, compared to trade in goods, seems to be able to explain why the 
reference to international standards in the GATS is less detailed than parallel 
references contained in other agreements like the SPS and TBT.  Still, as we 
have seen, we are now witnessing a growing production of this kind of rules in 
the services sector as well: as a result, the delay in the production of standards 
does not exclude their use in the future, within the disciplines, through a 
possible reinforcement of the reference to them, on the model of the agreements 
on technical barriers and health measures. 
We believe that this kind of initiatives must take the existing standards for 
the services sector into account. We also believe that the different degree of 
diffusion of international standards in different sectors favours the elaboration 
of the disciplines on a sectoral basis50. 
Another element influencing the development of the disciplines, and their 
reference to international standards, is the number and type of global regulators.  
While the SPS agreement refers to the activity of three international 
organisations (the Codex, the IOE and the IPPC) and the TBT agreement refers 
to two (ISO and the IEC), we have seen that there are more than twenty 
standard setters in the services sector.  This is not without consequences for the 
feasible mechanisms of cooperation between the WTO and the standard setter, 
making this more complex for services than for goods51.  
 
2.2. Reference to standards in the GATS: current conditions and options 
for the future 
 
                                                 
50 For example, during WPDR negotiations it has been proposed to improve the reference to 
international standards within the disciplines starting from the financial services sector, in order 
to check the opportunity of applying the same criteria also in other sectors: see Antigua and 
Barbuda’ s intervention in WORKING PARTY ON DOMESTIC REGULATION, Report on the Meeting 
Held on 7 and 18 February 2005 - Note by the Secretariat, S/WPDR/M/29, paragraph 21, «the 
delegation suggested financial services might be used as a “laboratory” to test the application of 
disciplines». The same countries presented a similar proposal within CTFS negotiations. 
51 It is well known that SPS and TBT application had a significant impact over the standard 
setters’ decision making and on States’ behavior during the standard setting process. For 
example, it has been shown that in the Codex Alimentarius Commission there are now 
oppositions between the same States that are conflicting during WTO agriculture negotiations. 
This happens because States are concerned that decision taken within the Codex may have a far 
reaching effect because of the SPS mechanism of reference to Codex standards: see F. 
VEGGELAND, S.O. BORGEN, Negotiating International Food Standards: the World Trade 
Organization’s Impact on the Codex Alimentarius Commission, 18 Governance 4 (2005) 675 et 
seq., at 695. Concerns over international trade have thus significantly affected a standard setting 
process that should aim primarily at securing food safety. However, a similar effort from WTO 
Member States – aimed at putting pressure on international standard setter so as to guarantee 
that they take into account free trade issue – may face some obstacles because of the high 
number of standard setters within the services sector.  
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 As we have seen, Article VI, paragraph 5(b) of the GATS sets forth a 
typology of reference to international standards which is very different from 
that contained in the SPS and TBT agreements52. The GATS reference is 
limited to providing that the use of standards by the Member States must be 
taken into account in evaluating whether national measures respect the criteria 
of transparency and proportionality required by the agreement, and do not 
restrict trade more than is necessary. In its current formulation, the GATS 
seems to affect States’ right to regulate in a less incisive way than the TBT or 
SPS do. 
However, the effective impact of this norm does not depend merely upon its 
text. We do not yet have decisions by the WTO Appellate Body that address 
these provisions: the only decision concerning the GATS application, in the 
Gambling case53, merely specifies the difference between market access and 
domestic regulation, but it does not involve the issue of international 
standards54.  At the same time, in the past years the AB interpreted the 
international standards provisions in the TBT and SPS agreements in an 
expansive way55.  Through the jurisprudential activity of the AB, therefore, the 
GATS reference to international standards could gain a further reaching effect, 
than the one its literal text seems to envisage. 
Moreover, the very uncertainty regarding the precise scope and effect of the 
obligation imposed over States because of the GATS reference to standards 
could lead the Member States to adopt these standards anyway, pending the 
exact definition of this burden. For example, it has been shown that compliance 
                                                 
52 Remarking this opposition, see M. KRAJEWSKI, National Regulation and Trade 
Liberalization in Services: The Legal Impact of the General Agreement on Trade in Services 
(GATS) on National Regulatory Autonomy, The Hague – London - New York, Kluwer Law 
International (2003); S. CHARNOVITZ, International Standards and the WTO, The George 
Washington Law School Public Law and Legal Theory Working Paper No. 133, available at 
http://ssrn.com/abstract=694346. 
53 See APPELLATE BODY REPORT, United States – Measures Affecting the Cross-Border 
Supply of Gambling and Betting Service, WT/DS285/AB/R, 7 April 2005. 
54 About the Gambling decision, see J. P. TRACHTMAN, Survey on United States – Measures 
Affecting the Cross-Border Supply of Gambling and Betting Services, available at 
www.ejil.org/journal/ curdevs/sr47.html; J. PAUWELYN, WTO Condemnation of U.S. Ban on 
Internet Gambling Pits Free Trade against Moral Values, ASIL Insight, available at 
www.asil.org/insights/2004/11/insight041117.html; J. PAUWELYN, WTO Softens Earlier 
Condemnation of U.S. Ban on Internet Gambling, but Confirms Broad Reach into Sensitive 
Domestic Regulation, ASIL Insight, available at www.asil.org/insights/2005/04/ 
insight050412.html; J. PAUWELYN, Rien ne Va Plus? Distinguishing Domestic Regulation from 
Market Access in GATT and GATS, 4:2 World Trade Review (2005) 131 et seq. 
55 See APPELLATE BODY REPORT, European Communities-Trade Description of Sardines, 
WT/DS231/AB/R, adopted 23 October 2002; about this decision, see R. HOWSE, A new device 
for creating international legal normativity: the WTO technical barriers to trade agreement 
and international standards, mimeo.  
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 with Codex standards began to increase even before 1994, during the 
negotiations prior to the definitive formulation of the SPS agreement56. 
The question of the effect of the current GATS reference to standards thus 
remains open. Moreover, during recent WTO negotiations the issue of 
including in the disciplines a stronger reference to international standards has 
been frequently discussed.  
The Decision on Professional Services, adopted by the Council for Trade in 
Services on 4 April 1995, seems to point international standards as a core 
element of the future disciplines57. This decision established the Working Party 
on Professional Services (WPPS), which was given the job of drafting the 
disciplines provided by Article VI, paragraph 4, starting from the accountancy 
sector. In addition to the necessity test and the determination of guidelines for 
the recognition of professional qualifications, this subsidiary organ of the WTO 
must also concentrate on “the use of international standards,” specifying that 
“in doing so, it shall encourage the cooperation with the relevant international 
organizations as defined under paragraph 5(b) of Article VI, so as to give full 
effect to paragraph 5 of Article VII.” 58
Following this, in a document presented at the opening of the work of the 
WPDR59, the Secretariat (in so doing, showing to agree with some legal 
scholars’ opinion60) expressed its support for the inclusion of a rebuttable 
presumption of conformity with WTO obligation for national measures in 
                                                 
56 F. VEGGELAND, S.O. BORGEN, Negotiating International Food Standards: the World 
Trade Organization’s Impact on the Codex Alimentarius Commission, 699. 
57 W/S/L/3, Decision on Professional Services, adopted by the Council on 1 March 1995. 
58 In so doing, the Council for trade in services achieves two objectives: on the one hand, 
international standards are considered as a core element of the disciplines (therefore solving the 
doubts coming from the fact that the reference to standards is in a disposition - art. VI.5 – which 
has provisional nature); on the other hand, the two norms relating to standards, i.e. articles VI.5 
(b) and VII.5, result strongly linked. About the second objective, see G. NIELSON, Short cut or 
long road? Equivalence, international standards and the GATS, WTO Workshop on Domestic 
Regulation, Geneva 29 March 2004, available at www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/serv_e/ 
workshop_march04_e/sess2_nielson_oecd1_e.ppt 
59 Article VI:4 of the GATS: Disciplines of Domestic Regulation Applicable to all Services, 
Note by the Secretariat, S/C/W/96, paragraph 35 – 42: « This provision (l’art. VI.5) falls short 
of creating a presumption of “necessity” in favour of requirements based on international 
standards. A presumption in favour of international standards could facilitate the application of 
the necessity test and would also constitute a strong incentive for the use of international 
standards» and che « The presumption in favour of domestic regulatory measures based on 
international standards which exists in the TBT and SPS Agreements creates an important 
benchmark for the necessity test by pointing at the least trade-restrictive measures which are 
adequate to secure the policy objective in view. In this respect, the TBT and SPS rules appear to 
be more focused than the existing reference to international standards in Article VI:5(b)». 
60 Seem to agree on this point most of the essays in A. MATTOO AND P. SAUVÉ (eds.), 
Domestic Regulation and Service Trade Liberalization, cit.: see, in particular, J. TRACHTMAN, 
Lessons for the GATS from Existing Wto Rules on Domestic Regulation, 57 et seq., at 78; R. 
JANDA, GATS regulatory disciplines meet global public goods: the case of transportation 
services, 109 et seq., at 119 (about ICAO’s and IMO’s standards); A. MATTOO, P. SAUVÈ, 
Domestic Regulation and Trade in Services: Looking Ahead, 221 et seq., at 222 and 228.  
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 accordance with international standards for services, which is analogous to the 
presumption operating in the SPS and TBT agreements. 
The possible solutions considered up until now for the formulation of the 
reference to international standards within both the sectoral regulations and the 
WPDR proposals can be grouped along three lines: the first group reiterates the 
reference in the same terms as the GATS text; the second group of proposals, 
instead, seeks to shape a more comprehensive framework for the principle of 
harmonisation within the agreement; finally, the most recent initiatives seem to 
oscillate between these different alternatives.  
The documents following the CTS Decision on Professional Services do not 
seem to go a step ahead from the GATS, but simply reiterate its already 
ambiguous formulation. This is true of the Disciplines for the accountancy 
sector61. This orientation can also be seen in recent proposals before the 
WPDR, confirming the difficulty of Member States to reach a new agreement 
on this point. For example, Australia put forward a proposal for the legal and 
engineering professions that was limited to repeating that the disciplines ought 
to take international standards into consideration62. 
In the telecommunications sector, the reference is framed in such a way as to 
bind the Member States even less than the GATS does. The Annex on 
Telecommunications does not mention the necessity of taking international 
                                                 
61 Disciplines on Domestic Regulation in the Accountancy Sector, S/L/64 (17 Dec. 1998),  
paragraph 26: «In determining whether a measure is in conformity with the obligations under 
paragraph 2 (i.e., in determining whether domestic regulations do not affect trade more than 
what is necessary in order to pursue a legitimate objective), account shall be taken of 
internationally recognized standards of relevant international organizations applied by that 
Member». The choice of not changing the reference formulation is a clear signal. As a matter of 
fact, during WPPS negotiations it has been proposed to write in the accountancy disciplines a 
reference to international standards built on the example of the TBT one: but this norm 
disappears in the definitive draft, because of the opposition of national regulators: see C. 
TROLLIET, J. HEGARTY, Regulatory Reform and Trade Liberalization in Accountancy Services, 
Domestic Regulation and Service Trade Liberalization, ed. by A. Mattoo - P.Sauve, 147 et seq., 
for this point 150. See also the Secretariat’s intervention in WORKING PARTY ON DOMESTIC 
REGULATION, Report on the Meeting Held on 22 November 2004 - Note by the Secretariat, 
S/WPDR/M/28 (25 Jan. 2005), paragraph 25: «The treatment of technical standards proved 
quite difficult in the creation of the Accountancy Disciplines, and members could agree only on 
two paragraphs. The main difficulty was that, although much international effort had been made 
to create international standards for accountancy, sensitivity to any perceived threat to 
regulatory sovereignty was still an important element». 
62 WORKING PARTY ON DOMESTIC REGULATION, Communication from Australia. 
Development of Disciplines on Domestic Regulation for the Legal and Engineering Sectors, 
S/WPDR/W/34, 6 September 2005, paragraph 29 and 30. The only point which is diverging 
concerns the scope of technical standards, including also ethical rules and rules of professional 
conduct: in this way, the proposal from Australia takes into account the opinion the 
international organizations for professional services formulated during WTO negotiations and 
during the Workshop on Domestic Regulation of March 2004.  
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 standards into account in evaluating the conformity of national regulation, but 
limits itself to “recognising [their] importance.” 63
The proposals that aim most vigorously at elaborating a general principle of 
harmonisation within the GATS are instead two communications, one by 
Mexico, which first called for the Member States’ consideration over this issue, 
and the other by Switzerland, which presented a general discipline for technical 
standards. 
Mexico’s communication, while not proposing a text of the provisions on 
standards to include in the disciplines, introduced into the debate the possibility 
of including in the disciplines a presumption of conformity to WTO obligations 
for national regulations in line with the standards64. 
65Very different from Mexico’s proposal is the one from Switzerland , which 
contains a first draft of the provisions for technical standards to be included in 
the disciplines66. It seeks to introduce a comprehensive framework for the 
harmonization principle, like the one in the SPS and TBT agreements, and is 
made up of three elements. First of all, it would require the Member States to 
                                                 
63 «Members recognize the importance of international standards for global compatibility 
and inter-operability of telecommunication networks and services». 
64 WORKING PARTY ON DOMESTIC REGULATION, Communication from Mexico. Mexico's 
Experience of Disciplines on Technical Standards and Regulations in Services, S/WPDR/W/30 
(24 Sept. 2004), paragraph 15 (e): « In developing disciplines to apply to technical standards 
and regulations on services, it will be particularly important to discuss the way in which 
harmonization with international standards should be linked to fulfilment of the objectives set 
forth in Article VI.4 of the GATS and hence to the presumption that a technical standard or 
regulation that is in line with an international standard does not create an unnecessary barrier to 
trade». 
65 WORKING PARTY ON DOMESTIC REGULATION, Communication from Switzerland. 
Proposal for Disciplines on Technical Standards in Services, S/WPDR/W/32 (1 Feb. 2005). 
66 Switzerland’s proposal is made up of seven parts: general provisions; equivalency; 
international standards and the relation to international organizations and agreements; 
transparency;  fees (for acquiring the texts of technical standards); special and differential 
treatment for developing countries; technical assistance. As explicitly stated in a footnote, 
Switzerland’s text is based on existing WTO texts, adapted to the services sector: in particular, 
Article VI and the Annex on Telecommunications of the GATS, the Disciplines on Domestic 
Regulation in the Accountancy Sector and the Agreement on Technical Barriers to Trade 
(hereafter TBT) have been used. About the cooperation with international standard setters, the 
Swiss text is analogous to GATS and the Annex on Telecommunications: see Communication 
from Switzerland. Proposal for Disciplines on Technical Standards in Services, cit., parr. 21 and 
22: « Members shall work in cooperation with relevant intergovernmental and non-
governmental organizations towards the establishment and adoption of common international 
standards for the practice of relevant services trades and professions, and undertake to promote 
such standards through the work of relevant international organizations. [GATS VII:5; AT 
7(a)]» and « Members recognize the role played by relevant international bodies 
(intergovernmental and non-governmental organizations) in establishing and promoting 
international best practices to ensure the efficient trade in services. [GATS AT 7(b) adapted]». 
Also the definition of “relevant international organizations” is the same as the one in the 
footnote to art.VI.5(b) GATS. 
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 67use international standards as a basis for national regulations , except when 
these are inappropriate for the pursuit of specific legitimate objectives of public 
interest68. There is also the presumption of conformity to WTO obligations for 
the domestic regulations in accordance with international standards69. Finally, 
an exception may be made for developing countries, when the implementation 
of the global rules would have high compliance costs70.  
71The most recent initiatives  seem to oscillate between the two positions 
illustrated above: between the disciplines on accountancy and some sectoral 
proposals, which just reiterate the ambiguous formulation of the GATS, on the 
one hand, and the transversal proposals of Mexico and Australia, on the other, 
which apply a general principle of harmonisation, on the model of the TBT, to 
the services sector as well.  
                                                 
67 Communication from Switzerland. Proposal for Disciplines on Technical Standards in 
Services, paragraph 20: «Where technical standards are required and relevant international 
standards exist or the completion is imminent, Members shall use them or the relevant parts of 
them, as a basis for their technical standards, except when such international standards or 
relevant part would be an ineffective or inappropriate means for the fulfilment of the legitimate 
national policy objective pursued, for instance because of infant institutional development or 
fundamental technological problems. [TBT 2.4 adapted]». 
68 Anyway, in Switzerland’s proposal the legitimate objectives differ slightly from the TBT 
text: while both texts mention the «fundamental technological problems», the draft text includes 
also the “infant institutional development”, instead of “fundamental climatic or geographical 
factors”: see art. 2.4 TBT: «Where technical regulations are required and relevant international 
standards exist or their completion is imminent, Members shall use them, or the relevant parts 
of them, as a basis for their technical regulations except when such international standards or 
relevant parts would be an ineffective or inappropriate means for the fulfillment of the 
legitimate objectives pursued, for instance because of fundamental climatic or geographical 
factors or fundamental technological problems». 
69 «Whenever a technical standard is prepared, adopted or applied for one of the legitimate 
objectives explicitly mentioned in paragraph 3, and is in accordance with relevant international 
standards of relevant international organizations, it shall be rebuttably presumed not to create an 
unnecessary obstacle to international trade. [TBT 2.5]»: Communication from Switzerland. 
Proposal for Disciplines on Technical Standards in Services, paragraph 23. 
70 «Developing countries may request special and differential treatment in cases where 
international standards entail high compliance costs and result in policies and institutions that 
are ill suited to a Member's legal and institutional development level. Members therefore 
recognize that in this case developing country Members should not be expected to use 
international standards as a basis for their technical standards, which are not appropriate to their 
development, financial and trade needs. [second sentence: TBT 12.4]»: Communication from 
Switzerland. Proposal for Disciplines on Technical Standards in Services, paragraph 29. 
71 With the purpose of answering to the objections raised during WPDR negotiations, 
Switzerland and Mexico presented a joint proposal about technical standards: see  WORKING 
PARTY ON DOMESTIC REGULATION, Communication from Switzerland and Mexico. Proposal 
for Disciplines on Technical Standards in Services. Revision, S/WPDR/W/32/Rev.1 (28 
October 2005). The joint proposed Disciplines on Technical Standards are organized in a 
structure diverging from the first Swiss text, but the point of our interest – the reference to 
international standards – does not differ significantly form the first draft: in particular, the three 
core elements mentioned above (standards as a basis for domestic regulation, presumption of 
conformity, special and differential treatment for developing countries) have not been changed: 
see paragraph 10-13 and 19. 
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 The new WPDR Chairman has submitted an Illustrative List of Possible 
Elements for Article VI:4 Disciplines72, which seems to agree with the proposal 
of taking into account the two elements characterising the model set forth by 
the TBT agreement (the use of international standards as a basis of domestic 
regulations and the presumption of conformity with WTO obligations for 
national laws which are based on the standards) 73. 
The next available document, the Consolidated Working Paper relative to the 
Disciplines on Domestic Regulation Pursuant to GATS Article VI.4, presented 
by the Chairman in July 200674, seems however to point in a different direction 
than the Illustrative List mentioned above. One the one hand, this paper argues 
that the States ought to “draw on international standards as a basis” (rather than 
“use international standards as a basis” 75); on the other hand, it makes no 
reference to a presumption of WTO compliance for domestic regulations which 
conform to international standards. The consolidated text thus seems to take an 
intermediate position compared to the two options put forward earlier, either 
the mere reiteration of the GATS formula or a general discipline for the 
principle of harmonisation. 
The most recent working draft on domestic regulation, of February 2007, 
seems to reflect an even more cautious orientation76. It provides that the States 
“should take international standards into account” in determining their own 
                                                 
72 WORKING PARTY ON DOMESTIC REGULATION, Domestic Regulation: Preparation for the 
Sixth Ministerial Conference. Note by the Chaiirman, JOB(05)/260, 25 October 2005, and the 
two annexes Draft Ministerial Declaration – Chairman’s Proposed Text on Domestic 
Regulation, and Illustrative List of Possible Elements for Article VI:4 Disciplines. In the Hong 
Kong Ministerial Declaration a strong support for the Illustrative List has been expressed, and 
the List is the starting point for the ongoing negotiations: «Members shall develop disciplines 
on domestic regulation pursuant to the mandate under Article VI:4 of the GATS before the end 
of the current round of negotiations. We call upon Members to develop text for adoption. In so 
doing, Members shall consider proposals and the illustrative list of possible elements for Article 
VI:4 disciplines»: Ministerial Conference, Sixth Session, Hong Kong, 13 - 18 December 2005, 
Ministerial Declaration, adopted on 18 December 2005, WT/MIN(05)/DEC (22 December 
2005), Annex C, paragraph 5. 
73 The «use of relevant international standards and deviation from such international 
standards» and the «presumption of consistency with the disciplines if in compliance with 
international standards» have been explicitly mentioned between the elements to be included in 
the disciplines: see Illustrative List of Possible Elements for Article VI:4 Disciplines, cit., p. 5. 
74 Disciplines On Domestic Regulation Pursuant To Gats Article Vi:4, Consolidated 
Working Paper, Note by the Chairman – July 2006, JOB(06)/225, available at 
http://www.tradeobservatory.org/library.cfm?refID=88479. 
75 «Where technical standards are required and relevant international standards exist or their 
completion is imminent, Members shall draw on them or the relevant parts of them as a basis 
for their technical standards, except when such international standards or relevant parts would 
be an ineffective or inappropriate means for the fulfilment of the legitimate national policy 
objective pursued»: Disciplines On Domestic Regulation Pursuant To Gats Article Vi:4, 
Consolidated Working Paper5, paragraph J.5, p. 10.  
76 CHAIR OF WORKING PARTY ON DOMESTIC REGULATION, Chairs Work in Progress 
Document - Domestic Regulation GATS, February 21, 2007, available at 
http://www.tradeobservatory.org/library.cfm?refID=97441.  
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 77domestic regulations   (by using the conditional verb “should take into 
account,” instead of “shall take into account,” this formula seems even more 
cautious than the one currently contained in the GATS) 78. 
The debate within the WPDR has yet to yield stable, shared positions. Still, 
there seems to be a trend towards a less demanding reference to standards, 
which reflects the resistance of some States jealous of their right to regulate.  
 Beyond the objections that call for the different context in which measures 
originally developed for the goods sector would have to operate79, the most 
frequent objections stress how difficult it would be for less developed countries, 
which are lacking the necessary economic resources and expertise, to 
effectively participate in the standard setting process80.  However, not only less 
developed countries have been strongly rejecting the Swiss text, but also United 
States and countries close to it, like Australia81. During recent negotiations, 
therefore, there doesn’t seem to be an homogenous group of countries calling 
for a stronger use of international standards: this is opposite to what happened 
at the moment of the SPS agreement negotiations, when United States, EU and 
the Cairns Group all together were in favour, and there was no opposition by 
less developed countries82.  
                                                 
77 «Where technical standards are required and relevant international standards exist or their 
completion is imminent, Members should take them or the relevant parts of them into account 
in formulating their technical standards, except when such international standards or relevant 
parts would be an ineffective or inappropriate means for the fulfilment of the legitimate national 
policy objective pursued»: WPDR, Chair’s Working Draft on Domestic Regulation, Technical 
Standards, paragraph 4. 
78 Anyway, some commentators argue that the provision for which technical standards must 
be based upon objectives criteria may give a way to draw a new link between domestic 
regulations and global standards, as «one definition of “objective” in WTO documents is 
consistency with international standards»: HARRISON INSTITUTE FOR PUBLIC LAW, 
GEORGETOWN UNIVERSITY, Memo on new Domestic Regulation working paper,  available at 
http://www.tradeobservatory.org/library.cfm?refID=97672, p. 8. 
79 See WORKING PARTY ON DOMESTIC REGULATION, Report on the Meeting Held on 7 and 
18 February 2005.- Note by the Secretariat, S/WPDR/M/29, cit., paragraph 17 and 37. 
80 See the opinions of Egypt in WORKING PARTY ON DOMESTIC REGULATION, Report on the 
Meeting Held on 24 September 2004. Note by the Secretariat, S/WPDR/M/27 (15 Nov. 2004), 
paragraph 75, of Colombia in WORKING PARTY ON DOMESTIC REGULATION, Report on the 
Meeting Held on 7 and 18 February 2005.- Note by the Secretariat, S/WPDR/M/29, cit., 
paragraph 30 and of Malaysia in WORKING PARTY ON DOMESTIC REGULATION, Report on the 
Meeting Held on 22 June 2005 - Note by the Secretariat, S/WPDR/M/30 (6 September 2005), 
paragraph 127. 
81 See, in particular, WORKING PARTY ON DOMESTIC REGULATION, Report on the Meeting 
Held on 22 June 2005 - Note by the Secretariat, S/WPDR/M/30 (6 September 2005), paragraph 
120, 123, 124, 125 and 129. 
82 See S. ZARILLI, WTO Sanitary and Phytosanitary Agreement: Issues for Developing 
Countries, Trade Related Agenda, Development and Equity Working Paper (1999), available at 
http://www.acp-eu-
trade.org/library/files/Zarrilli%20%20July%201999%20%20WTO%20Sanitary%20and%20Ph
ytosanitary%20Agreement%20Issues%20for%20Developing%20Countries.pdf. 
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 The objection of some WTO Member States to a greater use of standards 
could perhaps be overcome if such a change was matched by a broader 
discipline of the international standard setters recognised by GATS, aimed at 
increasing their transparency.  It is thus worth focusing, in the next part of this 
study, on the problems of participation in the standard setting bodies and of 
their cooperation with the WTO. 
 
2.3. The definition of international standard setting organisations in the 
GATS and the cooperation between the WTO and the standard setters 
 
The GATS does not specify which are the international organisations 
establishing standards relevant for the services sector. This contrasts to other 
agreements: as mentioned above, the SPS explicitly identifies the Codex 
Alimentarius Commission, the IOE and the IPPC, while the Annex on 
Telecommunications names the ITU and the ISO as standard setters with which 
to cooperate83. In the lack of a clear recognition of the relevant standard setters, 
it gets critical to interpret the provisions of the agreement defining the notion of 
international organisations. 
According to a footnote to Article VI, paragraph 5(b), the “relevant 
international organizations” whose standards shall be taken into account are the 
“international bodies whose membership is open to the relevant bodies of at 
least all Members of the WTO.” Article VII, paragraph 5 then encourages 
Member States’ cooperation with “intergovernmental and non-governmental” 
organisations. So, a quick reading of the agreement reveals the following 
features of the international organisations establishing standards that may be 
relevant for the GATS: they must be “open to the relevant bodies of at least all 
Members of the WTO”; and they can also be non-governmental.  
Also the current negotiations on the disciplines can help in detecting the 
exact meaning of the notion of international organisations, according to the 
footnote to Article VI, paragraph 584. 
The debates within the WPDR and the CTFS seem to signal a restrictive 
interpretation of the above definition, so that the international organisations that 
set standards relevant for the application of the GATS can only be those having 
a universal character.  For example, during the negotiations regarding the 
disciplines for professional services, the WPDR sent a communication to the 
international organisations operating in the sector. On this occasion, it had been 
proposed to consult regional organisations as well, but after extensive 
                                                 
83 Annex on Telecommunications, paragraph7, lett. a. 
84 A less questioned issue concerns the recognition of private global regulator as relevant 
standard setters according to GATS. The agreement explicitly mentions also non-governmental 
organizations; and the Annex on Telecommunications points in a similar direction (art. 7, lett. b: 
«Members recognize the role played by intergovernmental and non-governmental organizations 
and agreements in ensuring the efficient operation of domestic and global telecommunications 
services»). It is therefore feasible that the GATS may refer also to standards coming from 
private global regulators, such as IFAC and IASB.  
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 85negotiations, these were excluded . And yet, on this occasion, the scope of the 
initiative was merely to gather information useful to the normative activity of 
the WPDR, and not to identify the global regulators whose standards could be 
referred to86. Most of the WTO Member States thus seem to exclude 
cooperation with regional standard setters even in view of mere consultations, 
and not only for the purposes of the reference contained in the GATS. 
Some States’ concern about being excluded from the international standard 
setting activity explains some of the proposals to the CTFS. They argue that 
even when an international organisation is formally open to the participation of 
all States, some countries (especially developing ones) do not have the 
necessary resources and expertise to concretely participate. In order to remedy 
this exclusion, they propose to recognise as standard setters only those 
organisations that effectively guarantee participation, such as by establishing 
programs of technical assistance to developing countries87. 
Finally, among the prerequisites that could be required for recognising an 
international organisation according to GATS, some have suggested including 
the respect for certain procedural principles, based on the model of the 
Principles for the Development of International Standards, Guides and 
Recommendations, formulated by the Committee on Technical Barriers to 
Trade in 200088.  These apply the principles of participation and transparency, 
and require standard setters to use a procedure of notice and comment.   
                                                 
85 The relevant documents about this point are the minutes of some WPDR meetings (from 
the forth to the eights): WORKING PARTY ON DOMESTIC REGULATION, Report on the Meeting 
Held on 24 February 2000 - Note by the Secretariat, S/WPDR/M/4 (6 April, 2000), WORKING 
PARTY ON DOMESTIC REGULATION, Report on the Meeting Held on 13 April 2000 - Note by the 
Secretariat, S/WPDR/M/5 (18 May, 2000), WORKING PARTY ON DOMESTIC REGULATION, 
Report on the Meeting Held on 25 May 2000 - Note by the Secretariat, S/WPDR/M/6 (29 June, 
2000), WORKING PARTY ON DOMESTIC REGULATION, Report on the Meeting Held on 12 July 
2000 - Note by the Secretariat, S/WPDR/M/7 (19 September, 2000) and WORKING PARTY ON 
DOMESTIC REGULATION, Report on the Meeting Held on 2 October, 2000 - Note by the 
Secretariat, S/WPDR/M/8 (17 November, 2000).  
86 As Thailandia pointed out during the fifth WPDR meeting «[in this case] the goal of 
consultations was to consider the potential horizontal applicability of the accountancy 
disciplines, not to harmonize standards across nations. Therefore, the definition of international 
organizations contained in the footnote to GATS article VI.5 (b) was probably not applicable to 
the Working Party in that case» (S/WPDR/M/7, par. 17); anyway, later on it was decided not to 
consult regional organizations. 
87 COMMITTEE ON TRADE IN FINANCIAL SERVICES, Communication from Antigua and 
Barbuda, Belize, Fiji Islands, Guyana, Papua New Guinea, the Maldives, Solomon Islands and 
St Kitts and Nevis, S/FIN/W/29/Rev.1, 17 September 2003, p. 4, proposing to modify the text of 
the footnote to art. VI.5 (b), in order to recognize as international organizations open to 
participation by all the members of WTO only those organizations for which: «(a) the terms of 
accession to that body are not dependent in fact or law on the level of development of the 
applicant and, (b) the international body provides a programme of technical assistance to assure 
the full participation of all affected developing countries in the standard setting body». 
88 Decision of the Committee on Principles for the Development of International Standards, 
Guides and Reccomandations with relation to Articles 2.5 and Annex 3 of the Agreement, 
Annex 4, taken during the COMMITTEE ON TECHNICAL BARRIERS TO TRADE, Second Triennal 
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 As we have seen, according to GATS Article VII, paragraph 5, WTO 
Member States shall cooperate with the organisations – governmental and non – 
that establish standards for the services sector. What are the forms of this 
cooperation? And what is the purpose of the cooperation that has already taken 
place between the WTO and global regulators operating in the services sector?  
According to some legal scholars, there is a risk: the WTO, whose primary 
aim is to achieve free trade, may be referring to the standard setting activity of 
international organizations pursuing objectives which are different from its 
own, and which can therefore be in conflict with it89. For example, global 
regulators for the financial sector aim to guarantee global financial stability, and 
this objective can contrast with the full opening of some services to the 
competition. These types of conflicts can be seen, for example, also with 
respect to air and maritime transport safety. From this perspective, the intent is 
to establish mechanisms through which the WTO can control and influence the 
activity of the global regulators whose rules it utilises, in order to ensure that 
they do not conflict with the goal of liberalisation. 
Some developing countries argue that the WTO, being an international 
organisation of a universal character, might be an instrument to check the 
activity of global regulators that have a limited membership by the States that 
are excluded from it. Some of the proposals mentioned above, and the one 
aimed at limiting the international organisations considered relevant for the 
purposes of the GATS to those that effectively guarantee the participation of 
the less developed countries, through such mechanisms as providing for 
assistance and training, share the same perspective: to promote the inclusion of 
all States in the activity of standard setting currently taking place in a number 
of international organisations90. 
                                                                                                                                                    
Review of the Operation and Implementation of the Agreement on Technical Barriers to Trade, 
G/TBT/9, 13 November 2000. 
89 See J.P. TRACHTMAN, Addressing Regulatory Divergence through International 
Standards: Financial Services, in Domestic Regulation and Service Trade Liberalization, ed. by 
A. MATTOO - P. SAUVÈ, 27 et seq., on this point p. 30-31: «So the Wto has, to varying degrees 
and with varying degrees of formality, “delegated” to specific functional organizations the task 
of establishing standards to facilitate the free movement of accountancy services. This 
particular delegation is not inconsistent with prior practice in other particular areas, such as 
food safety standards […]. The further question, however, is how will the WTO ensure that 
these organizations reflect appropriately the trade perspectives that concern the WTO? This is 
an agency problem: to the extent that these functional organizations are acting as agents of the 
WTO, how can the WTO ensure that they are faithful and diligent agents whose incentives are 
congruent with those of the WTO? The WTO, or more correctly its member States, must review 
the structures and goals of these organizations before determining the scope of the delegation. 
Perhaps the best way to think of these problems is o recognize that the member States are the 
ultimate principals: these are multiple-principal – multiple agent problems» (italics added). 
90 In presenting to the Committee on Trade in Financial Services the already mentioned 
Communication from Antigua and Barbuda, Belize, Fiji Islands, Guyana, Papua New Guinea, 
the Maldives, Solomon Islands and St Kitts and Nevis, S/FIN/W/29/Rev.1, the representative of 
Antigua and Barbuda stated clearly this point of view: « Over the past few years, the financial 
community had seen an unprecedented growth in the number of codes, standards and guidelines 
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 At first glance, we can argue that the cooperation between the WTO and 
standard setters is more difficult in the services sector than it is for trade in 
goods, because the Member States’ resistance to greater cooperation is even 
more pronounced in this area, for many different reasons. 
Raw data can be drawn from the number of organisations that have obtained 
observer status in the subsidiary bodies of the WTO, competent in the area of 
services91: in the WTO subsidiary bodies that implement the TBT and SPS 
agreements, the standards setters referred to in the agreement (the Codex 
Commission, the FAO, the IEC, the OIE and the ISO) have observer status, but 
only two of the regulators (the ITU and the ICAO) which develop rules for the 
services sector have gained such status92. 
There have instead been some informal contacts between the WTO and the 
standard setters operating in the services sector93. Still, the debates preceding 
                                                                                                                                                    
that were fashioned entirely by these plurilateral groups and with which they expected 
conformity from others. These included financial standards relating to money laundering, 
capital adequacy requirements, cross-border taxation and exchange of information. The 
proposal's objective was to limit the impact of these plurilateral standards on WTO Members, 
and to promote the greater inclusiveness of small states in the process of formulating these 
standards by placing them under the umbrella of the WTO instead of in the bosom of 
plurilateral organisations with limited membership», italics added (COMMITTEE ON TRADE IN 
FINANCIAL SERVICES, Report of the meeting held on 6 October 2003, Note by the Secretariat, 
S/FIN/M/42, 12 November 2003, paragraph 52). 
91 Have observer status within the Council for Trade in Services the IMF, the World Bank, 
UN, UNCTAD, the International Trade Centre – ITC, ITU, ICAO, WHO and the World 
Tourism Organization (the last three have ad hoc observer status, which means that their 
participation to CTS meetings is approved on a time to time basis, according to the issue which 
is going to be discussed); within the Committee on Trade in Financial Services and the 
Working Party on Domestic Regulation, are observers, besides the IMF, the World Bank, UN, 
UNCTAD, also the OECD and  the African, Caribbean and Pacific Group of States – ACP. 
92 See, for the examination of the International Association for Insurance Supervision 
(IAIS)’s request to gain the observer status within the WORKING PARTY ON DOMESTIC 
REGULATION, Report on the Meeting Held on 24 February 2000 - Note by the Secretariat, 
S/WPDR/M/4 (6 April, 2000) and WORKING PARTY ON DOMESTIC REGULATION, Report on the 
Meeting Held on 2 October, 2000 - Note by the Secretariat, S/WPDR/M/8 (17 November, 
2000); within the CTFS, COMMITTEE ON TRADE IN FINANCIAL SERVICES, Report of the meeting 
held on 13 April 2000, Note by the Secretariat, S/FIN/M/25, 8 May 2000, and COMMITTEE ON 
TRADE IN FINANCIAL SERVICES, Report of the meeting held on 9 October 2000, Note by the 
Secretariat, S/FIN/M/28, 20 November 2000. 
93 During the negotiations for the adoption of the accountancy disciplines, IASB and IFAC 
held a hearing within the WPPS: see The Relevance of the Disciplines of the Agreements on 
Technical Barriers to Trade (TBT) and on Import Licensing Procedures to Article VI.4 of the 
General Agreement on Trade in Services, Note by the Secretariat, S/WPPS/W/9, paragraph II 
(iii). In 2001, the Basel Committee, IOSCO and IAIS were invited during the negotiations in 
front of the Council on Trade in Financial Services, while in 2004 the WPDR organized a 
workshop where also representatives from international organizations for the professional 
services sector intervened (in particular, IBA, which, has already mentioned, is drafting  
guidelines for the legal services, and UIA, setting standards for architects, were invited): see 
CTFS, COMMITTEE ON TRADE IN FINANCIAL SERVICES, Report of the meeting held on 11 
October 2001, Note by the Secretariat, S/FIN/M/32, 9 November 2001 (the briefing took place 
on 10 October 2001), and WORKING PARTY ON DOMESTIC REGULATION, Report on the Meeting 
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 these informal meetings were aimed at limiting the number of participating 
organisations and, most importantly, the scope of the meetings. Thus, the 
hearing of the global regulators for financial services, initially proposed as a 
first step towards a more stable cooperation, was approved only after it was 
clarified that it would have a merely informational purpose94.  The Member 
States were particularly concerned that the introduction of forms of cooperation 
with such organisations would make these organisations’ standards effectively 
binding on the States through their recognition of the WTO95; in other words, 
that the outcomes of this cooperation would ultimately “impinge on the right of 
national governments to take prudential measures independently.” 96  The 
limited willingness to introduce stable forms of cooperation with the 
international organisations establishing standards for services seems therefore 
to reflect the fear of some WTO Member States that this would lead to an 
erosion of their national regulatory autonomy. 
At first glance, this looks like an opposite view to that put forward by 
Antigua and Barbuda, mentioned above (supra, footnote 87), that aims to use 
the WTO as an instrument to check international bodies whose membership is 
restricted and that, establishing standards for services, interfere with States’ 
right to regulate. In this case, however, as we have seen (supra, para. 2.3.1.), a 
change to the GATS definition of international organisation was introduced: 
global regulators, in order to be recognised by the WTO, would have to assure 
the effective and not merely formal participation of all States, through 
assistance programs for example. Because the cooperation between the WTO 
and the standard setter can help strengthen the participation of developing 
countries in global regulatory bodies, an express amendment to the GATS text 
would be necessary. In the absence of such amendment, given the actual brevity 
of the norm, the Member States remain concerned about the possibility that a 
closer cooperation with international bodies competent for services would lead 
to a further erosion of national regulatory autonomy. 
 
3. Recognition and the agreements 
 
In the context of the liberalisation of trade in services promoted by the 
WTO, the presence of many different systems of national regulation constitutes 
the main obstacle to trade, limiting and discouraging the provision of services 
outside the national territory by businesses and individuals. The problem is 
rendered even more complex by a series of factors, including the expansion of 
                                                                                                                                                    
Held on 31 March 2004 - Note by the Secretariat, S/WPDR/M/25, 18 May 2004 (the workshop 
took place on 29-30 March 2004). Within the WPDR also a representative from ISO, as 
mentioned above, intervened.  
94 The debate over this point can be followed reading the minutes of the CTFS meetings 
which took place between July 200 and November 2001 (S/FIN/M/27-28-29-30-31 and 32). 
95 See Korea’s intervention, S/FIN/M/29, paragraph 21. 
96 Malaysia representative’s statement, in  S/FIN/M/29, paragraph 22. 
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 economic globalisation, lower costs of transportation and communications and 
migratory flows. 
In this context, the mutual recognition of professional training, certification 
and qualifications is one of the most effective ways to regulate the 
differences.97
This section aims to respond to three questions. The first: how do the GATS 
norms govern mutual recognition? The second: how is recognition formulated 
in the agreements? The third: what limitations do the GATS norms and the 
agreements imply for the States? 
To answer these questions, we will analyse the GATS norms that refer to 
recognition; we will then examine the mutual recognition agreements made on 
the basis of Article VII GATS; finally, we will address the problem of the 
limitation of sovereignty deriving from the agreements, from both the 
normative and the administrative perspectives.  
 
3.1 Recognition in the GATS norms 
 
In the WTO system, the principle of mutual recognition is established in 
three agreements: the SPS, the TBT and the GATS.  
The GATS contains various references to recognition. In fact, article VII, 
specifically dedicated to and entitled “Recognition,” can be linked with Article 
VI, which concerns “Domestic Regulation,” and with Article V on “Economic 
Integration.”  
The first paragraph of Article VII suggests three features, having to do with 
the nature of the recognition (obligatory/optional),  its object and how it is to 
take place, respectively. 
Recognition is an option open to the States. Each Member “may recognize 
the education or experience obtained, requirements met, or licenses or 
certifications granted in a particular country.”  GATS recognises the utility of 
recognition but, in contrast to what happens in the European context (where 
there is a presumption of the equivalence of national laws) 98, there is no 
automatic duty of recognition falling upon the host State.  Participation in 
GATS and in the WTO system does not automatically require recognition. This 
optional character of recognition is significant: the goal of the free movement of 
services is pursued through the creation of a loose system that interferes with 
the legislative power and administrative system of individual States only 
pursuant to their specific and repeated (for every single agreement and for every 
unilateral recognition agreement) consent.  
                                                 
97 See J. NIELSON, Trade Agreements and Recognition, in Quality and Recognition in 
Higher Education, published by the OECD, 2004, p.155-202, also available at 
http://www.oecd.org/dataoecd/39/7/33729996.pdf. 
98 See L. TORCHIA, Il governo delle differenze, Bologna, Il Mulino, p.21 et seq. e p.91 et 
seq. 
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 The recognition may be addressed to the “education or experience obtained,” 
the “requirements met” or the “licences or certifications granted in a particular 
country.” There are two ways in which recognition may operate. It may be 
reciprocal and based on an agreement between two or more States, or it might 
be given unilaterally. The final paragraph of Article VII adds, however, that 
“[w]herever appropriate, recognition should be based on multilaterally agreed 
criteria.” Moreover, States parties to recognition agreements are obliged to 
guarantee an adequate opportunity of accession to other Members as well. 
These agreements, though bilateral, must remain “open.” And when accession 
is not possible, the States parties to bilateral agreements must try to negotiate 
analogous agreements with other States. These provisions express a preference 
not only for the form of the agreement, but also for a certain type of agreement, 
specifically multilateral rather than bilateral. 99 This is confirmed by the fact 
that, in cases where the recognition is unilateral, it cannot be exclusive and 
must leave open the possibility of recognition by other Member States.100 There 
are at least two reasons for this preference. First of all, as Beviglia Zampetti 
argues, recognition, both in the context of goods as well as services, requires an 
intense technical activity of evaluation and comparison between the domestic 
and the foreign rules. This activity is best carried out through the cooperation 
between the interested States, rather than unilaterally. Secondly, Article VII in 
itself constitutes a derogation to the most favourite nation principle (see infra).  
In this view, multilateral agreements limit the scope of the derogation by 
increasing the number of parties involved and thus “most favoured.” 
The recognition provision represents a derogation from the most favoured 
nation principle of the GATS. Article II of the agreement establishes that no 
State can accord a less favourable treatment to services and service suppliers 
than it accords to like services and service suppliers of any other country.  The 
derogation can be explained by considering that, given the wide variety of 
regulatory requirements in the national legal systems of the Member States in 
the area of services, it is more realistic and efficient to allow bilateral or 
multilateral agreements (with a preference for the latter) than to require the 
automatic extension of recognition to all of the other Member States, once 
recognition is expressed only towards one of them. 101
Still, the derogation is limited in its scope. Recognition cannot be used as an 
instrument of discrimination. 102The State must follow the procedure set forth 
                                                 
99 Ibid. p.298-299. 
100 On the lack of transparency induced by notifications under art.V, instead of art.VII, see 
infra. 
101 See J. NIELSON, cit., p.158-160. The consequences of the principle of the most favoured 
nation in the GATS are also discussed in A. MATOO, MFN and the GATS, paper presented at 
the World Trade Forum Conference on the ‘Most Favoured Nation (MFN): Past and Present’, 
Neuchatel, 28-29 August, 1999. 
102 For an analysis on the relationship between recognition and the principle of non 
discrimination see K. NICOLAIDIS, Non-Discrimination, Mutual Recognition: An Oxymoron in 
the New WTO Lexicon? in T. COTTIER,  P.C. MAVROIDIS (eds.), Regulatory Barriers and the 
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 in paragraph 4 of Article VII.  This guarantees the necessary transparency and 
publicity to enable the possible participation of another State.  Each State shall 
inform the Council for Trade in Services of its existing recognition measures, 
the opening of negotiations and the modification of existing agreements. This 
gives every Member of the WTO the opportunity to express its own interest in 
participating. The notifications of the agreements should be drafted in such a 
way as to indicate the Member State that is notifying; the article upon which the 
notification is based; the date in which the agreement entered into force and the 
duration of the agreement; the agency or body responsible; a description of the 
regulatory content of the agreement; modifications to the existing regulatory 
measures; the ways in which the agreement’s text may be consulted. In effect, 
every notification presents peculiarities that take account of these guidelines 
only in part. Specifically, with regard to the description of the content of the 
agreement, the interpretations range from general indications like “mutual 
recognition agreement in the area of the legal profession” to more detailed 
descriptions.  Moreover, where one agreement gives rise to multiple 
notifications, the differences are even more evident: the content of the 
agreement or the level of information provided are often heterogeneous. 
Furthermore, the procedures set forth in Article VII have in fact been widely 
ignored by the Member States. GATS Article V, on Economic Integration, 
admits (out of  respect for the principle of non-discrimination) the possibility 
that the Member States might be party to or enter into an agreement liberalizing 
trade in services. This is addressed not to Mutual Recognition Agreements but 
rather to Regional Trade Agreements (RTA).  This possibility has led many 
States to notify agreements that are substantially mutual recognition agreements 
in the context of Article V rather than Article VII.  As the Working Party of 
Trade Committee has underscored, this practice falsifies the general framework 
of the existing mutual recognition agreements, neutralising the Article VII, 
paragraph 4 duties of transparency and publicity aimed at ensuring the 
possibility of accession to the agreements to countries not involved in their 
negotiation. 
States prefer a notification based on Article V rather than Article VII for 
reasons that are related to the possibility of avoiding the non-discrimination 
requirement, to which Article V is an exception. Respect for the prohibition on 
discriminatory treatment and the duty to keep agreements “open” implies the 
possible accession of countries with very different traditions and regulations 
from those of the original parties to the agreement. In this case, the cessation of 
the right to regulate to another State implies a  more significant renunciation of 
state sovereignty than where the State merely receives into its own legal order 
rules more or less similar to its own. Thus, recourse to Article V seems to 
indicate a certain resistance to the erosion of state sovereignty implied by 
participation in mutual recognition agreements. 
                                                                                                                                                    
Principle of Non-Discrimination in World TradeLaw, Ann Arbor, University of Michigan 
Press, 2000, p. 267-300. 
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 In alternative to Article VII, there is Article VI of the GATS which 
establishes: [w]ith a view to ensuring that measures relating to qualification 
requirements and procedures, technical standards and licensing requirements do 
not constitute unnecessary barriers to trade in services, the Council for Trade in 
Services shall, through appropriate bodies it may establish, develop any 
necessary disciplines.»  This suggests that though the disciplines may include 
areas that are subject to mutual recognition agreements, they are not covered by 
them.  In application of Article VI, in December 1998, the Working Party on 
Professional Services adopted the Disciplines on Domestic Regulation in the 
Accountancy Sector.103 This document constitutes a first step in the 
development of the disciplines for the domestic regulation of services. 
Specifically, these apply to all the Member States that have assumed 
obligations in the accountancy sector and regard the development of procedures 
for granting licenses and certifications, as well the determination of technical 
standards. 
The GATS rules thus offer two paths towards the elimination of barriers to 
trade in services. The first is represented by the establishment of common 
disciplines by WTO bodies.104 The second is represented by individual Member 
States’ adoption of mutual recognition agreements, which can be based on a 
reference to international standards. In the first case, Member States’ domestic 
norms are fully substituted by the WTO rules. In the second case, national law-
makers retain a measure of autonomy in recognising norms established by 
another State or by a standard setter and admitting them into the national legal 
system. 
The GATS norms were supplemented in 1997 by the Guidelines on Mutual 
Recognition Agreements or Arrangements in the Accountancy Sector put 
forward by the Council of the Working Party on Professional Services. 105 
These provide a practical guide to governments and anyone else concluding 
mutual recognition agreements in the area of accountancy services. They give 
                                                 
103 WTO, PRESS RELEASE, WTO adopts disciplines on Domestic Regulation for the 
Accountancy Sector, at http://www.wto.org/english/news_e/pres98_e/pr118_e.htm 
104 Furthermore, art.VI can be deemed relevant for recognition under another profile. As 
stated in art.VI, paragraph4, “[w]ith a view to ensuring that measures relating to qualification 
requirements and procedures, technical standards and licensing requirements do not constitute 
unnecessary barriers to trade in services, the Council for Trade in Services shall, through 
appropriate bodies it may establish, develop any necessary disciplines. Such disciplines shall 
aim to ensure that such requirements are, inter alia: (a) based on objective and transparent 
criteria […]; (b) not more burdensome than necessary […]; (c) in the case of licensing 
procedures, not in themselves a restriction on the supply of the service”. Therefore, the 
necessity test becomes applicable also to MRAs, as long as they regard the recognition of 
qualification requirements and procedures, technical standards and licensing requirements. On 
this point see K. NICOLAIDIS, J. TRACHTMAN, Liberalization, Regulation and Recognition for 
Services Trade, in S.M. STEPHENSON (ed.), Services Trade in the Western Hemisphere: 
Liberalization, Integration and Reform, Washington DC, Brookings Institute Press, 2000, p.43-
71. 
105 WTO, WPPS, Guidelines on Mutual Recognition Agreements or Arrangements in the 
Accountancy Sector, S/L/38, 18 May 1997.   
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 procedural and substantive direction, suggesting the possible content of these 
agreements and the duties of notification and checking that could fall upon the 
parties to them.  
The following conclusions may be drawn from the normative content of the 
GATS and related instruments. First, the GATS offers two paths to the 
elimination of barriers to trade in services, one internal to the organisation and 
the other left to the determination of individual States.  The internal path 
consists in the establishment of general rules by WTO organs, the second, 
external path consists in the conclusion of mutual recognition agreements 
(though we have also seen that the recognition may be unilateral) by individual 
States. In both cases, the GATS rules permit the reference to standards 
determined by external organisations.  
Second, the specific norms on recognition can be characterised by their 
flexibility. Article VII leaves open the possibility of concluding mutual 
recognition agreements or not, without requiring their adoption. In line with this 
flexibility, the Guidelines for Recognition of Qualifications in the Accountancy 
Sector are non-binding examples rather than exhaustive obligations. These 
norms moreover do not affect the substance of the agreements nor do they 
oblige States to negotiate and conclude them in a particular way. The only 
limitations upon these agreements are the principle of non-discrimination and 
the guarantee of the possibility of accession by third party countries.  
 
3.2   Mutual recognition agreements in the GATS: appearance and reality 
 
There are 148 mutual recognition agreements in the strict sense, that is in the 
sense of those notified on the basis of Article VII and subject to the rules 
governing recognition; the relative notifications are only 43, and the latest of 
these, by Armenia, goes back to October 2004. They are mainly agreements 
between States concerning higher education that were concluded prior to the 
birth of the WTO.106  The more recent notified agreements however reveal a 
different tendency, both in terms of the parties to these agreements and their 
objects. The new agreements are mainly concluded by private organisations, 
either with or without a delegation of authority by the government, and are 
sectoral rather than transversal, in that they refer to specific professional areas. 
In truth, the situation of the GATS notifications does not adequately reflect 
the importance of the mutual recognition agreements for services in the global 
legal space. There is therefore a disconnect between the “apparent” situation 
resulting from the notifications, and the real one. As highlighted by the 
Working Party of the Trade Committee, neither the number of notified 
agreements, nor the number of notifications presented in application of Article 
                                                 
106 For an accurate listing and brief description of the agreements see J. NIELSON, OECD, 
Service Providers on the Move: A Closer Look at Labour Mobility and the GATS, TD/TC/WP 
(2001)/26/FINAL. 
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 VII give a clear picture of the agreements actually in force between the 
countries belonging to the WTO. From a wide-ranging analysis, it seems that 
most of the new mutual recognition agreements in the area of services have not 
been notified and therefore, at least formally, do not fall under the GATS 
umbrella. 
There are many reasons for the absence of notification. First: there is a 
tendency to conclude economic (or regional) integration agreements, such as 
NAFTA, ASEAN, APEC, which themselves include recognition provisions and 
upon which the recognition agreements between their Member States are then 
anchored (such is the case for the mutual recognition agreement between 
Australia and Japan within the APEC).107 Regional agreements are governed by 
Article V and therefore avoid the Article VII transparency rules requiring 
notification. 
Second: most of the sectoral agreements are negotiated and stipulated by 
private, in the sense of non-governmental, professional organisations. Many 
States have held that, even in the presence of government delegations of 
authority to these associations, their activities are not attributable to the State 
and therefore, they do not trigger a duty to notify. 
108Third: each of these notifications may cover more than one agreement.  
 Fourth: some States have held that the notification of the other State party to 
the agreement exempts them from notifying the WTO. However, the GATS 
does not exempt them explicitly nor implicitly from the necessity to notify an 
agreement. Confirmation of this can be seen in the cases of duplication of the 
notifications that have been made in different agreements. 109
Fifth: the Working Party of the Trade Committee has interpreted the 
phenomenon as a «lack of awareness of the obligation to notify by, or the 
limited administrative capacity of, the competent authorities.» 
 In practice, when the problem was raised before the Council for Trade in 
Services  by India,110 most of the developing countries held that the reason for 
                                                 
107 See infra par. 4 on ‘Standards in mutual recognition agreements’. 
108 Among the most evident cases, Colombia has a notification for 25 agreements (WTO, 
CTS, Notification pursuant to Article VII of the General Agreement of Trade in Services, 
Colombia,S/C/N/21, 9 September 1996). Brazil: a notification for 19 agreements (WTO, CTS, 
Notification pursuant to Article VII of the General Agreement of Trade in Services, Brazil, 
S/C/N/18, 27 June 1996); Costa Rica: a notification for 11 agreements (WTO, CTS, Notification 
pursuant to Article VII of the General Agreement of Trade in Services, Costa Rica, S/C/N/122, 
22 June 2000). In general, Latin-American countries, in which the tradition of mutual 
recognition is consolidated and widespread, have used one or few notifications for a whole 
group of agreements concluded before the entry into force of the GATS. 
109 See, for example, the agreement between Brazil and Colombia or the UNESCO 
Convention on the Recognition of Studies, Diplomas and Degrees in Higher Education between 
Latin-American countries and countries of the Caribbean. 
110 WTO, CTS, Communication from India, Implementation of Article VII of GATS, 
JOB(03)120, 24 June 2003. In the last decade India has gone through radical changes in the 
service sector and is among the countries that most of all suffered from the absence of 
recognition. On the specific matter see A. MATOO, D. MISHRA, A. SHINGAL, Sustaining India’s 
Services Revolution: Access to Foreign Markets, Domestic Reform and International 
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 the absence of notifications was the party States’ reluctance to hold open 
accession to third countries. While States are interested in entering into the 
agreements, they are not interested in giving notification of them.111 This would 
also explain the phenomenon of regional agreements containing recognition 
provisions. 112 
 
3.3. The material scope of the agreements and the type of recognition 
 
The material scope of the agreements varies according to the period in which 
those were adopted. The earlier agreements are characterised by a transversal 
approach. These are mostly agreements for the general recognition of primary 
school, secondary school and university diplomas, based on a judgment of 
substantive equivalence between the programs of study and the institutions 
offering them. Most of the agreements between the Latin American countries 
goes in this direction.  A similar recognition is sometimes addressed to the 
general pursuit of specialised studies, in other cases it is specifically provided 
for further professional qualifications or for the exercise of a profession.  
The recent agreements, by contrast, refer to specific sectors. The more 
exportable professions (architecture, engineering, accountancy), those less tied 
to national peculiarities, find a source of regulation in the agreements.  
                                                                                                                                                    
Negotiations, Washington D.C., The World Bank Publications, 2004. On the problems that the 
GATS poses to developing countries see A. GABRIELE, International Trade in services and the 
Evolving Position of Developing Countries, in Journal of Economic Integration, 19, 2004, 780 
et seq.; A. MATOO, A.SUBRAMANIAN, What Would a Development-Friendly WTO Architecture 
Really Look Like?, IMF Working Paper, WP/03/153, Washington D.C., August 2003 and by 
the same authors, The WTO and the Poorest Countries: The Stark Reality, IMF Working Paper, 
WP/04/81, Washington D.C., May 2004. 
111 “[I]t would seem that adequate opportunities have not been provided to other Members to 
indicate their interest in participating in these negotiations and negotiating their accession to 
such agreements or negotiating comparable ones with Member(s) concerned, as required under 
Article VII.2”, WTO, CTS, Communication from India, cit., p.2. 
112 On the other hand, countries such as Japan, the United States and the European 
Community argue that the major difficulties do not derive from lack of awareness on the 
existence of on-going negotiations, but rather because mutual recognition agreements are per se 
difficult to be reached. The United States delegation stated that “MRAs posed a pratical 
challenge to reconciling wide variations in qualification requirements and required a shared 
commitment to reconcile such differences”, in WTO, CTS, Report on meeting held on 23 
September 2004, Note by the Secretariat, S/C/M/74, 10 November 2004, paragraph18. The 
problem of the scarse presence of notifications and of the absence of certain countries as part of 
the agreements does not hide political strategy finalized to exclude some States and include 
others, but simply reflects the intrinsic impracticability of recognition. This is the main reason 
why States would prefer to leave out of any commitments vast areas of activity: “[the] lack of 
MRAs […] was probably linked to insufficiency of market access commitments in relevant 
areas”. See the opinion expressed by the European Community, ibid., paragraph9. The Japanese 
delegation follows on the same point: “the reason why few notifications had been made under 
article VII might be lack of MRAs, rather then lack of awareness”, ibid., paragraph27. 
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 Agreements for the professions of lawyer, insurer and paramedic are instead 
less frequent. 113
The recognition mechanism is automatic or semiautomatic in a few recent 
cases. For example, the agreement between Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania 
establishes that «[t]he Contracting Parties agree to recognize each other’s 
higher education qualifications and qualifications giving access to higher 
education unless there is evidence of substantial differences.»114
Most of the agreements however provide for forms of recognition filtered by 
state intervention. Sometimes, they require prerequisites or summary 
procedures, or they incorporate mechanisms for facilitating the access to the 
professions. In the case of the agreements concluded by Macau, a lawyer 
admitted to the bar in another State does not need a law degree or training 
period in order to practice in Macau (as its own citizens would need to practice 
law), but must take an “adaptation course,” whose duration may be reduced if 
the applicant already has a law degree in a country with a similar legal system 
to Macau. For other countries, the recognition is limited to general forms of 
cooperation or dialogue.  The thrust of many Latin American agreements is in 
this direction.115
The consideration of the heterogeneity of the recognition formulas holds for 
the initiatives adopted by professional organisations as well. There are cases in 
which the applicant automatically acquires membership in the professional 
organisation attached to a host State that has concluded the agreement. In the 
agreement between Australia and New Zealand, it is established that 
«[a]rchitects registered in New Zealand will be registered in any Jurisdiction in 
Australia, following confirmation from the New Zealand authority that the 
applicant has a current practising certificate»116 and an analogous provision in 
the agreement between the United States and Canada for the accreditation of 
                                                 
113 Regarding the legal professions, there were only two notifications, one by Norway (WTO, 
CTS, Notification pursuant to Article VII of the General Agreement of Trade in Services, 
Norway, S/C/N/14, February 28, 1996.) and the other by Macau (WTO, CTS, Notification 
pursuant to Article VII of the General Agreement of Trade in Services, Macau, S/C/N/15, 1 
March 1996). In both cases the recognition was unilateral. 
114 Emphasis added. WTO, CTS, Notification pursuant to Article VII of the General 
Agreement of Trade in Services, Latvia, S/C/N/185, 22 January 2002. For the content of the 
agreement see Agreement between the Government of the Republic of Latvia, the Government 
of the Republic of Estonia, and the Government of the Republic of Lithuania on the Academic 
Recognition of Educational Qualifications in the Baltic Educational Space,18 February 2000, 
available at http://www.aic.lv/rec/Eng/leg_en/LV_lik/balt_en.doc . 
115 While some agreements use titles and denominations which give a precise idea of their 
content (for instance: ‘Agreement on the Recognition of Professional Qualifications’), in many 
cases elements of recognition are included in more general agreements on ‘cultural exchange 
and cooperation’ which do not give any useful insight into the type of recognition and on how 
this is carried out. On this point see J. NIELSON, cit., p.20. 
116 WTO, CTS, Notification pursuant to Article VII of the General Agreement of Trade in 
Services, Australia, S/C/N/101,2  January 1999. 
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 117engineers.  In other cases, the recognition consists in the professional 
organisation’s acceptance of the equivalence of the examinations and 
accreditation procedures administered by analogous organisations in other 
States party to the agreement.118
Finally, the forms of recognition also vary in the context of more far-
reaching regional agreements. Some of these, like the EU/EEA or the Trans-
Tasman Mutual Recognition Arrangement between Australia and New 
Zealand,119 have given semi-automatic recognition to the professional licenses 
obtained in the other country.  Most regional accords however are limited to 
encouraging the conclusion of mutual recognition agreements, establishing a 
rather wide regulatory framework without translating this into concrete 
initiatives for the negotiation of such agreements. 
 
3.4 Limitations upon state sovereignty  
 
The analysis of the GATS norms and the notified general recognition 
agreements gives us the raw normative and empirical material with which to 
respond to the central question of this study: what limitations do the norms and 
the agreements impose upon the normative and administrative power of States? 
In the two sections that follow, we will consider the effects on State regulatory 
autonomy and then move on to administrative autonomy.   
 
3.5. States and private actors in the exercise of regulatory powers 
 
The problem of the cessation of the right to regulate will be approached from 
two perspectives: the first, the determination of the actors towards whom 
regulatory powers are transferred, second, the modalities of this transfer. 
Article VII makes reference to the “Members” whose governments may 
carry out the recognition, that is the States party to the WTO who have also 
joined the GATS. However, an examination of the agreements notified under 
this Article reveals the existence of a double channel: some agreements (the 
older ones) are stipulated by the States, while most of the more recent 
agreements (though notified by the individual States to the Council for Trade in 
Services) are drafted and negotiated by professional organisations working in 
the same sector, with or without delegated authority.  
Setting aside for now the differences in terms of the type of recognition 
(automatic or not), the mechanism of the traditional agreements operates along 
a merely horizontal plane, between formally equal, public actors: the States. So, 
                                                 
117 WTO, CTS, Notification pursuant to Article VII of the General Agreement of Trade in 
Services, Engineering (Washington Accord), United States, S/C/N/53, 10 February 1997. 
118 “Under the Washington Accord, institutions which are members agree to recognise the 
substantial equivalence or comparability of accreditation processes used by other institutions in 
relation to engineering qualifications”, ibid. 
119 Of which the agreements notified by Australia represent specific examples. 
 
 168
 for example, the agreements for the recognition of educational titles, 
widespread in the Latin American area and beyond, are defined, stipulated and 
administered by States. The norms that are indirectly “recognised” by means of 
the agreement are those that the public law-makers have enacted to govern the 
education of their own citizens. So, the foreign country, recognising for 
example the validity of a university diploma, creates spaces in its own legal 
system for the authority of foreign norms.  
The new agreements unfold instead along a vertical axis as well as the 
traditional horizontal one. These agreements are concluded by actors that may 
belong to different levels, ultimately anchored in the private sphere as well as in 
the public one.  
The subjective dimension (the public or private nature of the parties to 
mutual recognition agreements) is relevant as a criteria for the distinction 
between traditional agreements and the more recent ones, and for creating 
further classifications in the context of the more recent ones. Furthermore, the 
determination of multiple types of agreements is useful for understanding the 
terms in which the problem of the cessation of regulatory power is posited. 
The subjective criteria suggests three main categories: fully public 
agreements between different States, mixed agreements between States and 
professional organisations, and fully “private” agreements, between different 
international organisations. 
In the area of the mixed agreements, we can distinguish the cases in which 
the professional organisations have a global or a regional dimension from those 
which merely represent the national sphere; among the national organisations, 
there are those that operate on the basis of a governmental delegation of 
authority and those that perform their activities without such a delegation. 
In the agreements between different professional organisations, we can 
distinguish the agreements in which both organisations have a national 
dimension from those in which one of the two organisations has a 
global/regional relevance.  We can also distinguish between the cases in which 
both organisations have a governmental delegation of authority, both operate 
without one and finally the cases in which there are organisations both with a 
delegation and without one.  
The resulting picture is much more complicated compared to the traditional 
vision, which is dominated exclusively by public actors. The figure that follows 
illustrates these classifications and the distinctions proposed above. See Figure 
1. 
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Figure 1:  Old and new types of agreements 
 
The introduction of non-state actors into the activity of recognition leads us 
to consider the State’s cessation of regulatory power in new terms. There are at 
least three observations that can be made in this respect.  
First, with reference to the external dimension, the mixed agreements, 
between States and professional organisations, and those between different 
international organisations, imply a transfer of the right to regulate to actors that 
are not only geographically beyond the range of the recognising State, but are 
characterised by their non-state nature. Concretely, private professional 
organisations, be they national, regional or global, regulate specific professional 
sectors operating within state legal frameworks: they fix standards for the 
provision of services, draft codes of conduct, guarantee the necessary 
certifications, fix the conditions of recognition and hear possible appeals. The 
State’s renunciation of this regulatory power opens the national legal system up 
to rules formulated by private foreign bodies.  
Secondly, relative to the internal dimension of this phenomenon, States 
delegate or attribute their own regulatory power to private national 
organisations. These may operate with or without an express governmental 
delegation of authority – as we will see, the delegation is relevant for the 
purposes of respect of the GATS duties of transparency – and even where a 
delegated authority has not been explicitly conferred, States do in fact admit of 
the legitimacy of the exercise of public functions by private professional 
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 organisations: often, though the professional organisations define the content of 
recognition, the state administrations work on their implementation. This 
feature was evidenced by the United States delegation in a communication to 
the Working Party on Domestic Regulation, 120 affirming that «MRAs were 
negotiated by representatives of the professions in cooperation with 
representatives of the competent authorities, while the ultimate authority for 
implementation rested with the State bodies that did not directly participate in 
negotiations.»121  For example, the agreement between Australia and Japan, 
concluded by States and professional organisations and relative to the exercise 
of the engineering profession, does not specify the state organs responsible for 
implementation, but does speak generically of “country” as distinct from 
“signatories,” the term indicating the professional organisations. In one of the 
communications to the Council for Trade in Services, Australia clarifies the 
nature and role of the private organisation, Engineers Australia: «Engineers 
Australia is the primary professional association for the engineering profession 
and is constituted by Royal Charter. Engineers Australia does not act under 
delegated authority from the Australian Government but administers the 
National Professional Engineers Register (NPER) […] has a national, regulated 
role in relation to assessment of engineers.»122 The relationship between private 
organisations and States is, moreover, explained in intervention by the United 
States clarifying the mechanisms of the Washington Agreement. The 
certification of private accrediting organisations enables the state authorities of 
the host country to grant licenses for the exercise of the profession of engineer. 
Engineers from countries that have signed the agreement automatically fulfil 
the training requirements necessary for obtaining the license.  
Thirdly, the legitimate exercise of public functions by private organisations 
raises doubts about their accountability and their real pursuit of the public 
interest. In some cases, the internal statutes that regulate the formation and 
activity of these organisations introduce procedures aimed at insuring a certain 
degree of accountability, at least in relation to the organisation’s own members, 
and provide for ex post controls by the States. Still, these instruments do not 
seem sufficient to counterbalance the autonomy of these private bodies. 
The fourth aspect, related to the previous one, regards the interpretation of 
the GATS norms.  We have seen that the Article VII rules impose a duty of 
transparency to publicise the negotiation procedures by means of a notification.  
But, we can question the substantive scope of these norms and the way in which 
                                                 
120 WTO, WPDR, Communication from United States, Professional Services, Mutual 
Recognition Agreements (MRAs), S/WPDR/W/23,10 March 2003. 
121 The content of the communication is reported to the Council for Trade in Services in 
WTO, CTS, Report on meeting held on 23 September 2004, cit., paragraph 18. 
122 WTO, CTS, Communication from Australia, JOB (04)/85, 24 June 2004, paragraph 5. As 
we will see more in deep infra, the NPER is a national registration system which has a public as 
well as a private component. Indeed, it “includes State and Territory Government nominees, 
representatives of community and professional associations and Engineers Australia”, ibid., 
paragraph8. 
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 they affect the “privatisation” of the agreements. The Article VII rules seem 
prima facie limited to the state sphere. However, these norms must be read 
together with Article I, paragraph 3 of GATS, which explains that: «[f]or the 
purposes of this Agreement: (a) "measures by Members" means measures taken 
by: (i) central, regional or local governments and authorities; and (ii) non-
governmental bodies in the exercise of powers delegated by central, regional or 
local governments or authorities.»123 The function of professional 
organisations, where there is a delegation of governmental authority, is thus 
imputable to the responsible State. The Article goes on to specify that: «[i]n 
fulfilling its obligations and commitments under the Agreement, each Member 
shall take such reasonable measures as may be available to it to ensure their 
observance by regional and local governments and authorities and non-
governmental bodies within its territory.» 124 Moreover, Article I, paragraph 3 
of the GATS establishes that each State is obliged to guarantee the respect for 
the GATS norms by non-governmental bodies operating on its territory. 
The question has however been discussed within the Council for Trade in 
Services, with results that can hardly be said to be unequivocal. India raised the 
problem of the participation of professional organisations and of the 
verification of their effective delegated authority. It argued that the low number 
of notifications was related to the circumstance that the new agreements had 
been concluded by professional organisations. The more or less culpable failure 
to notify could be explained by the circumstance that, being professional 
organisations rather than state organs, the interested country did not feel 
obliged to fulfil its Article VII duties. The following passage clarifies the 
reasoning behind this: «[h]e125 said that there could be the view that some of 
these agreements had not been notified because they were considered to be 
between private professional bodies, and that they were subsequently not 
measures under the GATS. However, he thought that this might require further 
examination as to whether such professional bodies had been delegated powers 
by federal or state governments to conduct the process of recognition of 
professional qualifications. In the case of such delegated powers, his delegation 
felt that they would fall under government measures and would need to be 
notified under Article VII of the GATS.»126  A different choice could basically 
conceal a different objective: to avoid the participation of third States in the 
negotiations and circumvent the GATS norms. On the contrary, it is opportune 
that «even in cases where the bodies involved had no explicit delegated 
authority, there still might be a bearing on the actual recognition, as regulatory 
authorities did make use of mutual recognition arrangements that had been 
made.»127 The relationship between the agreements concluded between non-
                                                 
123 Art. I, paragraph3 GATS. Emphasis added. 
124 Ibid. 
125 The representative of the Indian delegation. 
126 WTO, CTS, Communication from Australia, cit., paragraph19. 
127 WTO, CTS, Report on meeting held on 23 September 2004, cit., paragraph32.   
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 governmental organisations and their effects on governments is so close as to 
imply a duty of notification upon the States themselves in these cases.  Whether 
or not these professional organisations have delegated authority is evidently a 
question that must be examined on a case by case basis.  
At this meeting, the United States responded to the Indian delegation’s 
arguments, confirming that most of the mutual recognition agreements 
regarding American citizens had been concluded by private entities and that for 
this reason had not been regarded as triggering the duty to notify: «[h]er 
delegation took note of India's point that many MRAs were concluded by 
private entities, and stated that this was often the case for United States, which 
explained why no notifications of those agreements had been made in 
accordance with Article VII, as the later spoke of arrangements between 
Members.»128  For example, even though the United States had notified the 
Washington Agreement, neither it nor the other party States had a duty to 
notify, as this was ultimately an agreement between private bodies.  
To summarise, the tendency of recent agreements has been in the direction 
of privatisation.  More professional organisations have promoted recognition 
initiatives, establishing criteria and procedures.  Though recognition is often 
regarded as implying the horizontal erosion of sovereignty between states, in as 
much as the State cedes its right to regulate to another equal foreign actor, it 
also implies a vertical cession of sovereignty internal to each State -the State 
steps back in the initial phase of the agreement, leaving space to its own 
national organisations which exercise the power to regulate a particular area- 
and an additional kind of horizontal cession of sovereignty when within a 
mixed mutual recognition agreement, the State cedes its own regulatory power 
to a professional organisation, global, regional or belonging to another State. 
The risk lies in the limited accountability of these organisations and in a 
possible “escape” from the GATS norms requiring transparency and non-
discrimination. 
 
3.6. Recognition: automatic and subject to the right to scrutinise 
 
Mutual recognition might be automatic or subject to a right to scrutinise. The 
“horizontal” cessation of sovereignty is thus realised by means of two 
mechanisms. It can be integral: after a procedure for the evaluation of 
compatibility, a State recognises the equivalence between its own standards 
(and thus between its own laws and regulations) and those of the State in which 
the service provider originates.  It can, by contrast, be mediated: each state 
maintains its own standards, and recognises no others (and thus recognises only 
its own laws and regulations) and thus allows foreign services providers to 
exercise their activity on its territory, but subjects this to procedures of 
certification and ascertainment as agreed with the other party State.  In the first 
                                                 
128 Ibid., paragraph36. 
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 case, one has an immediate and relatively inexpensive solution.  In the second 
case, mediated recognition is more costly, in so far as the host State must 
ascertain the equivalence with its own standards. But in the first case of integral 
recognition, the renunciation of sovereignty is more consistent, while in the 
second, the transfer of sovereignty is more limited and the costs are transferred 
to the host State. This first category is exemplified by the agreements 
recognising unconditionally the documents and decisions (diplomas, 
certificates) of the service provider’s State of origin, without further controls. 
The second category comprehends all of the cases in which the service 
provider’s activity remains subject to the ascertainment and oversight of the 
competent authorities of the host State. 
The European Commission recently commented on this distinction, 
expressing its preference for integral and immediate mutual recognition 
agreements, in contrast to the other type of “traditional” ones.129  The Court of 
Justice, deciding cases concerning professional services providers, has 
intensified the duty to take the equivalence of professional qualifications into 
account and narrowing the space for ascertaining their equivalence. 130
In the context of mutual recognition agreements notified in the sense of the 
GATS norms, we can distinguish between two different, but mutually related 
types. The first has to do with the different tendencies followed in the choice 
between traditional agreements and the new, enhanced ones; the second has to 
do with the reasons for which a particular choice has been made. One the one 
hand, it is true that GATS agreements often follow the more traditional forms, 
which imply greater administrative costs but more deference to the integrity of 
national legislation, while more recent agreements do include various forms of 
automatic mutual recognition. On the other hand, the temporal factor is not 
always decisive.  Where there is greater cultural and ethnic homogeneity and a 
greater degree of natural harmonisation between the norms, agreements of the 
second type have been chosen from the beginning, for example in the 
agreements between the Latin American countries for the recognition of titles.  
The mechanism for automatic recognition can be understood through an 
examination of some of the agreements notified on the basis of Article VII.  
                                                 
129 According to the definition given by Nicolaidis and Shaffer these are ‘enhanced 
agreements’. The distinction between ‘enhanced’ e ‘traditional agreements’ is described as 
follow: “[a]s a result of its experience with conformity assessment under a number of MRAs -- 
in particular, the 1997 U.S.-E.U. MRA -- the European Commission published a paper in 
August 2004 that assessed lessons it had drawn. The Commission made a distinction between 
"traditional" MRAs, which focus on the mutual recognition of conformity assessment 
certifications without aligning relevant standards and "enhanced" agreements, which are based 
on standards deemed to be equivalent to each other or, even better, on common standards. The 
Commission concluded that the "traditional" form of MRA has proven unattainable”, in K. 
NICOLAIDIS, G. SHAFFER, Transnational Mutual Recognition Regimes: Governance without 
Global Government, 2005, at  
http://www.law.duke.edu/journals/lcp/articles/lcp68dsummerautumn2005p263.htm.. 
130 See L. TORCHIA, Il governo delle differenze, cit., p.111. 
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 The agreement concluded in February 2000 between the governments of 
Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania can be an example. This fits within the wider 
framework of the 1997 Lisbon Convention on the recognition of higher 
education qualifications. Its purpose is to «strengthen the Baltic common 
educational space and to stimulate the academic recognition as well as the 
mobility of students and teaching staff» between the party States.131 Each State 
agrees that: «a higher education qualification or a qualification providing access 
to higher education shall give its holder the same rights in the other Parties as it 
gives in the State in which it has been awarded.» In contrast to the more 
traditional agreements, there is no further procedure for the ascertainment or 
certification of professional skills. Still, this holds «unless there is evidence of 
substantial differences.» 
The traditional procedure is thus stood on its head: there is no presumption 
of non-conformity implied by equivalence checks, but rather a presumption of 
equivalence with a possible check of non-conformity, which can be invoked 
only on the basis of evidence of substantial differences.   Each State recognises 
the validity of the educational systems of the other party States tout court, as 
well as indirectly recognising the norms regulating the procedures for earning 
such titles.  
Moreover, even these more penetrating agreements, zones of state 
sovereignty remain. Where a first-level university degree is obtained after a 
three-year program of study in which a thesis is not required, the university of 
the host State can require the fulfilment of other conditions before  admitting 
the student to the next level of education. 
 
3.7. The role of national administrations in the agreements 
 
In the context of the duties that each State must fulfil in the negotiation and 
management of recognition, we need to distinguish between the general duties 
imposed by the GATS and those deriving from the individual mutual 
recognition agreements.  
As we have seen, Article VII of the GATS requires national administrations 
to guarantee transparency and publicity of the negotiation procedures. The 
States must notify the agreements, making the relevant documents available to 
other national delegations.  This is supposed to limit the derogation from the 
most favoured nation principle and create the possibility for new accessions.  
Moreover, there is a duty of non-discrimination upon the States in their 
negotiations: the agreements must remain “open” to all States that consider 
themselves interested in the recognition.  
                                                 
131 For an analysis of the conditions in which the agreement has been shaped see WORKING 
GROUP OF THE NORDIC ADVISORY COMMITTE ON HIGHER EDUCATION, Report on the Potential 
for Creating a Nordic-Baltic Space for Higher Education and Training, 1999, at 
http://www.aic.lv/rp/eng/norbarep.doc.  
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 The GATS provides a minimal legal framework, while leaving the 
substantive details and future obligations to individual agreements. A 
systematic and comparative analysis of the agreements enables us to determine 
the limits upon the exercise of administrative activity by national authorities.  
The first limit is implied by the very essence of recognition. For example, if 
diplomas, certificates and attestations conferred by a foreign administration are 
recognised, then the agreements contain an implicit prohibition on duplicating 
these administrative acts in the host State.  A similar duty can be derived from 
the content of almost all of the agreements examined and is much more evident 
in the agreements providing for an automatic or semi-automatic recognition. 
The agreements also imply an important development in the tools of 
cooperation and a multiplication of the forums in which this cooperation might 
take place.  This creates duties of cooperation with other national 
administrations, which are served by duties to provide information, between 
these different national organisations and in relation to the service providers.  
For instance, the above-mentioned agreement between Estonia, Latvia and 
Lithuania established a National Academic Recognition Information Center, as 
part of a wider network of ENIC/NARIC national information centres created 
by the Lisbon Convention. Each centre has the duty of information in relation 
to its own institutions and citizens as well as in relation to the centres of other 
party States to the agreement. It must provide the institutes of higher education 
and universities present on its own territory with all of the relevant information 
about the educational and qualifications systems of the other States, while it 
shall send all of the information about its own system to the centres of the other 
countries.  
But the function of the centres goes beyond the purely informative. On the 
basis of the data gathered, they are also charged with evaluating the 
qualifications conferred in the other countries.  In the cases in which the private 
organisations implement the agreement, the same duties fall upon them.  In the 
agreement between Australia and Japan on engineers, the activity of 
informational exchange is carried out between the organisations. Changes in the 
criteria, procedures and programmes must be notified, and every year a list of 
all the applicants requesting registration in the host country must be prepared. 
The consultation and constant cooperation between the associations is supposed 
to be, moreover, the essential tool for ensuring a unitary application and 
interpretation of the recognition measures. 
Finally, national administrations bear obligations relating to the 
implementation of the agreements: duties to check and, where necessary, duties 
and powers to discipline. The powers of control still generally attach to the 
administration of the destination State, while disciplinary powers are attributed 
to the State of origin as well as the State in which the service is provided. The 
agreement between Lithuania, Estonia and Latvia establishes a Baltic Higher 
Education Co-ordination Committee charged with oversight.  This body is 
currently composed of five members for each country, representing the 
ENIC/NARIC centres and the national conferences of rectors. It oversees and 
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 coordinates the centres’ activities, and implements the decisions and 
recommendations of the intergovernmental commission established by the 
Lisbon Convention. An example of the exercise of disciplinary powers is 
instead seen in the Australia-Japan agreement. Each country may exercise 
disciplinary powers where the recognised engineer violates the standards of the 
host country which are also the standards of the country of origin: «[e]ach 
country will take appropriate disciplinary action if an engineer violates the 
standards of that country.»132 The sanctions must be communicated to all of the 
APEC party States in which the engineer is registered. Each country must then 
take the most opportune measures in relation to the disciplinary action 
communicated to it. 
Also with respect to the administrative activity explicated, it is possible to 
trace a path of evolution between the old and the new agreements. In particular, 
there are at least two differences between them. First, in the new agreements, 
the administrative activity is performed by ad hoc bodies which have tight, 
mutual relations or are composed in a mixed way. By contrast, in the traditional 
agreements, even if cooperation were necessary, it would almost never find a 
permanent forum in which to take place. Secondly, the new forms of agreement 
have done away with the case-by-case verification and certification that 
consumed much of the resources of the national administrations and that shifted 
the costs of the administrative activity to the host State. 
 
4. Standards in mutual recognition agreements 
 
The GATS goal of eliminating trade barriers is pursued by means of two 
instruments: general WTO rules and individual mutual recognition agreements 
between States.  Reference to standards is made in both of these cases, as set 
forth in Articles VI and VII, respectively. 
We have see how the debate within the various bodies of the WTO has been 
addressed above all to the first case and how it has been generally inconclusive, 
so that we do not have an effective and efficient reference after all.  
The reference to standards in the mutual recognition agreements, by contrast, 
though having received little attention within the WTO, can be seen in several 
of the agreements notified on the basis of Article VII. 
There are specific mutual recognition agreements concluded in the context 
of global or regional alliances (ASEAN, APEC, EMFA), notified to the GATS 
as well, and which are addressed to the equivalence of professional practices.133 
                                                 
132 Mext (Japan), Ipej (Japan), Engineers Australia, National Engineering Registration 
Board (Australia), A Bilateral Framework to Facilitate Mobility for Mutual Recognition of 
Registered/Licensed Engineers, October 2003, art.8.5, at 
http://www.mext.go.jp/b_menu/houdou///15/10/03100103/001.pdf
133 See, for instance, the six international mutual recognition agreements for engineering. 
Three of these regard the recognition of qualifications: the Washington Accord (1989), the 
Sidney  Accord (2001) and the Dublin Accord (2002). These agreements recognize the 
substantial equivalence of the accreditation systems for professional qualifications. Differently, 
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 The basic concept underlying these agreements is that a professional, who is 
regarded as having attained a certain international standard of competence in 
the country of origin, can be registered without further verifications and thus 
exercise her professional activity in a host country which is party to the 
agreement. The APEC Engineering Agreement (1999), the Engineers Mobility 
Forum Agreement (2001) and the Engineering Technologist Mobility Forum 
Agreement (2003) are agreements of this type.  
 The mechanism for recognition functions on two levels: the global/regional 
level and the state one. The global or regional organisation defines the 
standards. Thus, individual member States of the organisation conclude mutual 
recognition agreements with each other, or with a non-member State which has 
accepted and applied the same standards. 
An analysis of the APEC Engineering Agreement procedures enables us to 
better understand the functioning of the references to standards. The Asian-
Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC) was born in 1989, in Canberra, 
Australia. Originally made up of twelve countries,134 this organisation has a 
regional character and seeks to promote the creation of a free trade area 
between its members.  It has three objectives: “trade and investment 
liberalisation,” “business facilitation” and “economic and technical 
cooperation”.  
 In order to guarantee the free movement of engineers, an APEC Engineer 
Coordinating Committee was established to define and update the standards 
upon which one could be considered an engineer.135 According to the 
Committee, professional engineers are those who have “completed an 
accredited or recognised engineering program; 136 been assessed within their 
own economy as eligible for independent practice; gained a minimum of seven 
years practical experience since graduation; spent at least two years in 
responsible charge of significant engineering work; and maintained their 
continuing professional development at a satisfactory level.”  Individuals 
meeting these criteria can be registered by APEC as recognised engineers. 
The APEC Human Resources Development Working Group Steering 
Committee has actually created an APEC Engineer Register in order to 
“recognise the equivalencies in the qualifications and experience of practising 
professional engineers in the participating economies and to facilitate trade in 
engineering services between those participating economies”.137  
In each member country, a public or private body designated by the APEC 
manages the national section of the register and, on the basis of regional criteria 
and standards, registers individuals. The registration in one of the national 
                                                                                                                                                    
the other agreements regard the recognition of equivalence of the professional practice.  As 
pointed out by the APEC, in these latter cases: “it is individual people, not qualifications that 
are seen to meet benchmark standards”. 
134 Among these: United States, China, Australia, Japan, Russia. 
135 WTO, CTS, Communication from Australia, cit., p. 4. 
136 It is the Apec who has the duty to list the “accredited and recognized programs”. 
137 Ibid., p.3. 
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 sections of the general APEC register is supposed to enable an engineer to 
exercise his professional activity in any other country of the Asian-Pacific area. 
Thanks to the common standards, this leads to a presumption of equivalence, 
tending to ensure the mutual exemption from any further verification of the 
prerequisites for exercising the profession of engineer in all of the APEC 
countries: «[e]ach side shares the recognition that all requirements for 
registration/licensing as a professional engineer in its country are met by 
engineers whose names appear on the APEC Engineers Register of the other 
country».138 Each State «has a high level confidence in the assessment 
procedures followed by the other in the registering of individuals». 
The APEC Engineers Agreement fixes guidelines for the equivalence 
mechanism. The specific mutual recognition agreements between APEC 
member States can be located within this framework.  These concretely specify 
the national bodies that manage the registers, the mechanisms defined by APEC 
itself, and further procedures, when held to be opportune. For example, a 
bilateral agreement between Australia and Japan was concluded in 2003, and 
notified in the sense of GATS Article VII.  The signatories of the agreement 
were three bodies private professional organisations of engineers (Engineers 
Australia (EA), the National Engineering Registration Board Australia (NERB), 
the Institution of Professional Engineers Japan (IPEJ) and the Japanese ministry 
of science and technology (MEXT). In Australia, the EA, a private organisation 
established in 1919 actually manages the National Professional Engineers 
Register (NPER), but most importantly for our study, manages the Australian 
section of the APEC register. In Japan, the MEXT administers the registration 
of engineers on the basis of national law (the Professional Engineer Law).  This 
designates the IPEJ to administer the habilitation exams for engineering and the 
registration in the national APEC register for engineers. The agreement 
provides for a «bilateral framework to facilitate mobility for mutual recognition 
of registered/licensed engineers,» concretely implementing the mechanisms 
provided in the context of APEC: registration in the national section of the 
APEC registry following a verification of the prerequisites defined at the 
supranational level. The following figure clarifies the functioning of the 
agreement. Figure 2.  
                                                 
138 A Bilateral Framework to Facilitate Mobility for Mutual Recognition of 
Registered/Licensed Engineers, cit., art. 3.2. 
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Figure 2:  Standards and mutual recognition agreements in APEC
    Apec Engineering Coordination Commitee 
  Standards 
  Apec Register 
   State A 
 (Apec member) 
   State B 
  (Apec member)    Mutual     recognition 
         Apec 
Other agreements follow a similar logic. In these types of agreements, the 
vertical dimension joins with the horizontal one, and the first is essential to the 
second. The State, lets a standard, that it has contributed in part to create, into 
its own legal system. Then, by virtue of another party State’s adherence to the 
same standard, recognition happens.  
In the case of reference to standards within mutual recognition agreements, 
different questions arise compared to the debate surrounding the other type of 
reference, discussed in the first part of this paper. The need for the standards 
setter to have a universal character is overcome both in principle, in so far as 
the agreement is by its very nature limited to the parties that conclude it, and in 
fact, since some agreements have a very wide regional or even a global 
membership. 
 
5. Summing up  
 
 The WTO agreement for trade in services seems to draw on the principle of 
harmonisation less than the TBT and SPS agreements. As we have seen, the 
TBT and the SPS require the Member States to use the standards as a basis for 
national measures, they presume the conformity with WTO obligations of 
domestic regulations in accordance with such standards, and they foster the 
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 participation of States in the standard setting activity of the international 
organisations. In the GATS, by contrast, there are only two provisions 
concerning international standards: Article VI, paragraph 5(a), provides that, in 
evaluating whether domestic measures may constitute an unnecessary barrier to 
trade, the States’ use of international standards shall be taken into 
consideration, while Article VII, paragraph 5 promotes the cooperation with the 
international standard setting organisations.  
 The debate within various subsidiary organs of the WTO has been focused on 
the possibility of widening the scope of these rules in various ways.  In 
particular, it has been proposed to specify more precisely the characteristics that 
the standards setters ought to have to be recognised by the GATS agreement; to 
introduce different modes of cooperation with the international standard setting 
organisations; to require the States to use standards as a basis of domestic 
regulations, and to require that national measures in accordance to standards be 
presumed not to constitute an unnecessary obstacle to trade. 
The difficulty of reaching an agreement to amend and strengthen the 
principle of harmonisation reflects the States’ fear of seeing their right to 
regulate replaced by rules made by others. Still, some mechanisms could be 
introduced which would guarantee an effective participation of the States in the 
standard setting activity carried out at the global level. This is the thrust of 
some proposals that an international organisation be recognised in the sense of 
the GATS agreement only if it internally respects a one-country one-vote rule, 
as well as offers assistance and training programmes to less developed states, to 
give them the expertise necessary to an effective participation in the 
organisation’s activity. It has moreover been suggested that the Principles for 
the Development of International Standards, Guides and Recommendations, 
formulated to dictate the rules for the standard setting process carried out within 
the organisations recognised by the TBT, be adapted for the services sector in 
order to guarantee respect for the principle of participation. 
By introducing these requirements, the WTO could become a tool for 
changing the structure and functioning of global standard setters who, in order 
to take advantage of WTO recognition according to the mechanism of 
borrowing regimes, would be induced to adapt their procedures for the 
elaboration of the standards, favouring an effective extension of the 
participation of their member States. 
Regarding the principle of equivalence, the analysis of the GATS norms and 
the general recognition of the notified agreements have provided the normative 
and empirical data for evaluating the extent of the limitations upon state 
normative and administrative  power deriving from the WTO system. The 
transfer of the right to regulate was analysed from two perspectives, the 
relevant actors and function.  With respect to the first, we have distinguished 
between traditional agreements, in which there is a State-to-State transfer of 
regulatory power, and the new generation agreements, in which the transfer of 
power is made by States to private actors. Professional organisations, acting 
with or without delegated authority, determine the norms that regulate 
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 individual professions – standards, codes of conduct, recognition prerequisites – 
in addition to materially concluding the agreements. From the functional 
perspective, a greater or lesser limitation of sovereignty corresponds to different 
modalities through which recognition operates. In the case of automatic 
recognition, the cessation of sovereignty is integral, while recognition with 
scrutiny preserves a space for state intervention. The tendency of more recent 
agreements is in the first direction and yet, quantitatively, they are still a 
minority. 
The type of recognition also influences the limitations on the national 
administrations. Integral recognition imposes less costs upon national 
administrations than other types of recognition. In general, these costs are 
realised in respecting specific duties and prohibitions. Most salient are the 
duties deriving from GATS norms, concerning the transparency of the 
negotiations.  These duties are thus implicit in the very nature of recognition: 
the prohibition on the duplication of the acts, documents and decisions 
(certificates, diplomas, etc.) whose recognition is sought. There are also duties 
arising out of individual agreements: cooperation with other administrations, 
mutual information, control and oversight of implementation, exercise of 
disciplinary powers. 
But what is the relationship between the principles of harmonisation and 
recognition within GATS? Do they mutually reinforce each other, or are they in 
competition? 
The text of the agreement suggests a interrelation between these two 
principles. We have mentioned that the removal of barriers to trade in services 
is guaranteed by the GATS both through common rules adopted by WTO 
organs (Article VI), as well as by encouraging mutual recognition agreements 
between member States (Article VII). In both of these cases, there is a reference 
to standards.  
Still, in the first case, the analysis of negotiations carried out in the WPDR 
demonstrates interpretative uncertainties and the ineffectiveness of the rules. 
The empirical analysis of the agreements notified within GATS in the sense of 
Article VII sheds light on the possibility that harmonisation and mutual 
recognition are closely related. In this case, the agreements are recent ones, 
concluded in the context of regional or global understandings. Here, a body 
within the regional or global organisation fixes the unitary standards, which are 
then the basis of any future recognition. The member States of the organisation 
conclude agreements by referring to a common, harmonised platform. 
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The law contained in the “Services Directive”. 3. Harmonisation. 3.2. Equivalence. 4. The relationship 
between the two principles and administrative cooperation. 5. Limits to the Member States’ right to 
regulate. 6. Towards a convergence of national laws? 
 
1. Introduction 
 
In recent decades, we have seen the institution of many supranational bodies 
(of a regional or global character), whose activity, aimed at integrating national 
economies and markets1 produces strong interdependencies between legal 
systems existing at different levels of government and ends up tangibly 
affecting individual Member States’ right to regulate2. 
The European Union represents the most important and mature expression of 
this phenomenon. The EC Treaty, in pursuing the single market (which to this 
day is a pilar of the Union),3 expressly posits as one of the objectives of 
Community action “the approximation of the laws of the Member States”4.  
5The approximation of the laws is realised by means of two principles:  
harmonisation,6 which implies the definition of common norms, standards and 
                                                 
1 For a summary of the main international economic organisations, see M.P. CHITI, Diritto 
amministrativo europeo, ed. II, Milan, 2004, p. 12 et. seq. 
2 In a global prospective, S. CASSESE, Gamberetti, tartarughe e procedure. Standards 
globali per i diritti amministrativi nazionali, in Riv. trim. dir. pubbl., 2004, p. 657 et. seq. 
(Shrimps, Turtles and Procedure: Global Standards for National Administrations, available at 
http://ssrn.com/abstract=692761); S. BATTINI, La globalizzazione del diritto pubblico, in Riv. 
trim. dir. pubbl.,  2006, p. 325 et. seq.; M. DE BELLIS and E. MORLINO, Armonizzazione e mutuo 
riconoscimento nel General Agreement of  Trade in Services, in this volume.  
3 In these terms, S. CASSESE, La nuova costituzione economica, in Riv. dir. pubbl. comunit., 
2001, p. 905. 
4 Article 3, paragraph 1, letter h). The relationship between the single market and European 
regulation is highlighted by G. DELLA CANANEA, L’amministrazione europea, in Trattato di 
diritto amministrativo. Diritto amministrativo generale, S. Cassese (ed.), Milan, 2003,  p. 1823 
et. seq. 
5 In this regard, see S. CASSESE, La nuova costituzione economica, cit., p. 907 et. seq. The 
author illuminates two instrumental relationships. The first is the relationship between the 
harmonisation of national legislation and the four freedoms of movement. The second is the 
relationship between these freedoms and the unity of the market. Cassese views mutual 
recognition as another factor in the development of the European economic constitution (pp. 
913,  920). 
6 For further analysis, see F. CARUSO, Unificazione del diritto, diritto uniforme e 
ravvicinamento delle legislazioni nella Cee, in N.ss. D.I., app. vol. VII, Turin, 1987, p. 972 et. 
seq.; M. DOUGAN, Minimal harmonisation and the internal market, in Common Market Law 
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 administrative practices and equivalence (especially in the forms of mutual 
recognition and control of the country of origin)7, which allows goods and 
services legitimate in one Member State to circulate freely (though not 
necessarily unconditionally) in the markets of every other Member State. These 
principles thus affect domestic regulation in different ways: harmonisation 
replaces (or reduces) domestic regulation, in as much as it tends to homogenise 
national legal systems; equivalence, by contrast, preserves the differences 
between national laws, but restricts in some measure their scope of application. 
In the course of the integration process, these two principles have been used 
in different ways. At times, radical solutions have been privileged only to be 
later revealed as inadequate to govern a reality as complex as the European one. 
In the first phase of constructing the common market, total harmonisation was 
the path of choice, but this was soon abandoned for a variety of reasons (for 
example, the complexity of decision-making procedures and the breadth of 
areas to regulate).8 Recently, however, the Commission has tried to pursue the 
opposite solution, proposing the rule of the exclusive control of the country of 
origin in the area of services.9  The legislator, however, in order to avoid social 
                                                                                                                                                    
Review, 2000, p. 853 et. seq.; M. GNES, Ravvicinamento delle legislazioni (diritto comunitario), 
ad vocem, in S. Cassese (ed.), Dizionario di diritto pubblico, Milan, 2006; M.R. SAULLE, 
Ravvicinamento delle legislazioni (diritto comunitario), in Enc. dir., agg. IV, Milan, 1998, p. 
899 et. seq.; P.J. SLOT, Harmonisation, in European Law Review, 1996, p. 378 et. seq.  For a 
global perspective, see J. WEINER, Globalization and the harmonization of law, London-New 
York, Pinter, 1999. 
7 There is a vast literature on this subject. Some noteworthy recent works are L. TORCHIA, Il 
governo delle differenze. Il principio di equivalenza nell’ordinamento europeo, Bologna, 2006 
(according to the author, mutual recognition does not exhaust the principle of equivalence, but 
does however represent its main operative instrument (p. 68, note 31, and p. 91-92)); M. GNES, 
Mutuo riconoscimento (diritto comunitario), ad vocem, in Dizionario diritto pubblico, cit.; S. 
NICOLIN, Il mutuo riconoscimento tra mercato interno e sussidiarietà, Padova, 2005; G. 
ROSSOLILLO, Mutuo riconoscimento e tecniche conflittuali, Padua, Cedam, 2002; J.H.H. 
WEILER, La costituzione del mercato comune, in J.H.H. WEILER, La Costituzione dell’Europa, 
Bologna, 2003, p. 307 et. seq.; V. HATZOPOULOS, Le principe communautaire d’équivalence et 
de reconnaissance mutuelle dans la libre prestation de services, Athens – Brussels, 1999 ; A. 
BERNEL, Le principe d’équivalence ou de “reconnaissance mutuelle” en droit communautaire, 
Zurich, 1995. 
8 Since the mid-1970’s, the Court of Justice has made a fundamental contribution in this 
direction by introducing the technique of mutual recognition into Community law. The key 
decisions in this area are the well-known judgments in Dassonville (11 July 1974, Case C-8/74) 
and Cassis de Dijon (20 February 1979, Case C-120/78), both in the area of goods. Less well-
known, but equally relevant, if for no other reason than that it precedes the more famous Cassis 
de Dijon, is the judgment in Van Wesemael (18 January 1979, Case C-110/78), in the area of 
services. In this judgment, the Court affirmed for the first time the principle that a service 
provided on the basis of an authorisation granted in one Member State enjoys the freedom of 
movement, if meeting similar conditions as those required in the destination State  and that 
possible restrictive measures ought therefore to be considered incompatible with Community 
law. 
9 EUROPEAN COMMISSION, Proposal for a Directive of the European Parliament and of the 
Council on services in the internal market, 25 February 2004, COM(2004) 2 definitive/2, in 
particular Article 16, concerning the country of origin principle, establishes that “Member 
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 dumping, preferred the more attenuated solution offered by the principle of 
equivalence, preserving the host State’s power to impose national law norms, 
under certain conditions.10
The abandonment of the more radical solutions, however, shed light on one 
of the main problems facing the European Union (like any other supranational 
organisation with similar ends): the difficulty of balancing between the need to 
recognise national authorities’ right to regulate autonomously throughout their 
national territory, on the one hand, and the need to limit their power of 
economic regulation, in order to enable the common market to function on the 
other. This motivated the search for a way to strike a balance between 
uniformity and differentiation, or in other words, between harmonisation and 
equivalence. 
In truth, the White Paper from the Commission to the European Council of 
198511 provided a new approach for the regulation of the market, based on a 
combination of different instruments and techniques, including minimal 
harmonisation and mutual recognition. The results were not altogether 
satisfactory, especially in the most important sector of the European economy – 
the service sector12 – which is not free from important legal and administrative 
barriers.  
For this reason, the Commission recently set out a new strategy for the 
market for services,13 which refined the application and composition of the two 
                                                                                                                                                    
States shall ensure that providers are subject only to the national provisions of their Member 
State of origin which fall within the coordinated field.”   
10 The Commission’s original proposal had in fact fed the fear that, in an ever wider (and 
thus more heterogenous) context, this would create an extraordinary competitive advantage for 
the States with lower standards of protection, thus forcing the more advanced States to renounce 
their higher levels of protection. In these regard, see M. PALLINI, Liberalizzazione dei servizi e 
rischi (veri e presunti) di dumping sociale nell’Unione europea, in Dir. pubbl. comp. eur, 2007, 
p. 379 et. seq.; R. CAFARI PANICO, La liberalizzazione dei servizi tra regime vigente e la 
direttiva Bolkestein, ivi, 2006, p. 1880 et. seq.; M. PEDRAZZI, Potrà l’applicazione della 
“direttiva Bolkestein” ledere i diritti fondamentali?, ivi, 2006, p. 1894 et. seq.    
11 EUROPEAN COMMISSION, Completing the Internal Market: White Paper from the 
Commission to the European Council, Milan, 28-29 June 1985, doc. COM (85) 310.  
12 EUROPEAN COMMISSION, Report from the Commission to the Council and the European 
Parliament on the state of the internal market for services presented under the first stage of the 
Internal Market Strategy for Services, p. 11, asserts that, in the modern economy, services 
account for 70% of GDP and employment. See also A. VANNINI, La disciplina europea, in 
AA.VV., Professioni e concorrenza, Rome, 2005, p. 19, which cites Eurostat data that only in 
fourteen Member States do the professional services rendered to businesses produce 8% of the 
income. 
13 EUROPEAN COMMISSION, An Internal Market Strategy, which was followed by the Report 
from the Commission to the Council and the European Parliament on the state of the internal 
market for services presented under the first stage of the Internal Market Strategy for Services, 
30 July 2002, COM(2002) 441 def., which shed light on the main problems facing the sector. In 
particular, it demonstrated that ten years after what was supposed to have been the completion 
of the common market, there were still important “‘legal barriers’ arising from national, 
regional and local regulation the behavious or administrations” and “the unsatisfactory 
application of certain EU instruments” (pp. 6, 9).   
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 principles.  This approach found its initial concrete application in two important 
measures: Directive 2005/36/EC of 7 September 2005, in the area of 
professions, and Directive 2006/123/EC of 12 December 2006, with a broader 
scope, extending to the internal market for services in general. 
This study, proceeding precisely from an analysis of these two Directives, 
seeks to identify the (new) balance that has been struck between harmonisation 
and equivalence on the services sector14, and its impact on national regulations 
and administrations. The questions posed by this analysis are the following. 
What concrete forms do these two principles take in the European legal system? 
What limits do they impose upon domestic regulations and administrations? 
What are their effects on the system as a whole? More specifically, is there a 
convergence of national laws? If so, what kind of convergence and with what 
outcomes? The analysis will therefore focus on the services sector, as it is not 
only the most important economically, it is also the most interesting legally.  
I will first examine the principles of harmonisation and equivalence in 
relation to the two areas mentioned above; then, on the basis of this analysis, I 
will look at the effects of these principles on national laws and administrations; 
finally, I will try to make sense of the results – real and potential – of the 
convergence of the laws of the Member States.  
I will argue that, in the context of the new services strategy, the balance 
between the two principles of harmonisation and equivalence is struck now 
more than ever by the application of administrative law doctrines and 
techniques. Not only do they enable national systems to coexist and converge 
towards more evolved models, they can be extended and generalised, becoming 
the basis of a normative body aimed at limiting States in order to serve the 
proper functioning of the market. 
 
2. The law governing professions 
 
Many professional activities in the Member States are governed by 
regulations which require the possession of specific qualifications in order to 
practice them.15 These particular legal schemes are aimed at ensuring the 
quality of the services provided on the national territory; these schemes 
however must not place legal obstacles in the way of the free movement of 
services. Thus, in order to facilitate the access to professional activities and 
their exercise within the Community, the Community legislator has acted on 
                                                 
14 Obviously, the questions at the heart of this examination will be addressed with specific 
reference to the two Directives. While they do not exhaust the provisions of European law in 
the area of services, they do however represent a relevant (given also the consistency of the 
sectors considered) and significant part of the new approach. The considerations that follow are 
thus drawn not from Community law as a whole, but from the new strategy for services. 
15 For a general framework, see G. DELLA CANANEA, L’ordinamento delle professioni, in 
Trattato di diritto amministrativo. Diritto amministrativo speciale, S. CASSESE (ed.), Milan, 
2003, p. 1139 et. seq. and C. MORVIDUCCI, Professioni, in Trattato di diritto amministrativo 
europeo. Parte speciale, II, M.P. CHITI and G. GRECO (eds.), Milan, 1997, p. 1001 et. seq. 
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 numerous occasions to fix common rules for the recognition of professional 
qualifications acquired in a different Member State.  
In the beginning, it enacted sectoral directives. These directives were 
addressed to individual professions, and subjected the recognition of diplomas 
and professional qualifications to a prior harmonisation of the national laws 
governing professional education and training. But then, given the extreme 
difficulty of guaranteeing a similar legal mechanism for regulating a decisively 
more complex and articulated reality, a second phase was launched in which 
directives were instead focused on general systems for the recognition of 
diplomas and qualifications.16
Most recently, this area has been addressed by Directive 2005/36/EC 
(hereafter, Professions Directive),17 which consolidates, updates and simplifies 
as many as fifteen directives adopted between 1977-1999, in order to make the 
legal regime more uniform, transparent and flexible. The Professions Directive 
also introduces some important innovations. I will briefly illustrate its contents, 
beginning with harmonisation measures, which may either be: a) substantive, 
that is addressed to the content of the laws; b) procedural, meaning concerned 
with the relationship between the service provider and the administration; c) 
organisational, more strictly connected with the conformity of the 
administrative structures.  This distinction – as I will argue in what follows – is 
useful insofar as it allows us to understand the current propensity of 
Community legislation to pursue procedural and organisational rather than 
substantive harmonisation in order to facilitate the functioning of the market.  
 
2.1.  Harmonisation 
 
Looking more closely at the Professions Directive, the substantive 
harmonisation measures address only a few professions: doctors of medicine, 
nurses, dentists, veterinarians, midwives, pharmacists and architects. These 
professions were already addressed by specific directives, and the Professions 
Directive basically brings them all together in a single instrument.  
For each of these professions, the directive sets forth “minimum training 
conditions,” which have to do with the basic education necessary to access 
university training, the length of the course of study or the number of hours of 
theoretical and practical instruction, the basic knowledge and skills to be 
                                                 
16 For a deeper analysis, see C. MORVIDUCCI, Professioni, cit., p. 1013 et. seq. and H. 
SCHNEIDER, The Recognition of Diplomas in the European Community, University of 
Maastricht, available at http://www.fdewb.unimaas.nl/eurecom/PDF/Paperschneider.PDF. For 
a European and global perspective, see K. NICOLAIDIS, Managed Mutual Recognition: The New 
Approach to the Liberalization of Professional Services, Harvard University, 1997, available at  
http://users.ox.ac.uk/%7Essfc0041/managemr.htm. 
17 For early commentary, see A. MARI, La nuova direttiva sul riconoscimento delle 
qualifiche professionali, in Giorn. dir. amm., 2006, p. 398 et. seq. and R. ROTIGLIANO, Primo 
commento alla recente direttiva 2005/36/CE sul riconoscimento delle qualifiche professionali, 
in Serv. pubbl. app., 2005, p. 901 et. seq.   
 187
 acquired, as well as the basic curriculum (except for doctors and architects).  
The minimum conditions fixed at the European level do not create homogenous 
solutions at the national level because the Member States can dictate additional 
and more severe conditions, as well as modulate the indications contained in the 
Directive in different ways. 
Much more consistent and, in certain aspects, more innovative, are the 
procedural and organisational harmonisation measures (to be understood in the 
sense indicated above), which address the entire sphere of application of the 
Directive. On the procedural level, already in the preamble we read that “to 
ensure the effectiveness of the system for the recognition of professional 
qualifications, uniform formalities and rules of procedure should be defined for 
its implementation...”18 Thus, in case of the right of establishment, the 
Directive fixes the time limits of the procedure: the competent authority of the 
host Member State has one month to acknowledge receipt of the application 
and inform the applicant of any missing documentation and must make a final 
decision as soon as possible, in any case within three months after the date on 
which the applicant’s complete file was submitted.19 The documentation 
process is also regulated: the competent authority of the Member State can 
request specific documents and certificates from the applicant or the 
administration of the Member State of origin, which are required to produce 
them within two months; in the event of justified doubts, the host Member State 
may require from the competent authorities of a Member State confirmation of 
the authenticity of the attestations and evidence of formal qualifications, and in 
some cases shall be entitled to proceed to direct verification.20 The Directive 
likewise makes indications for the final decision concluding the procedure: the 
procedure for examining an application must lead to a duly substantiated 
decision by the competent authority of the Member State, thus with an express 
and motivated decision. The Directive also guarantees judicial review: the 
decision, or failure to reach a decision within the deadline, shall be subject to 
appeal under national law.21 Somewhat similar requirements are made for the 
provision of services, whenever a prior check of the professional qualifications 
is necessary: in this case, the procedural time limits are shorter, the documents 
that can be requested are fewer and once the final deadline passes, an 
administration that has not yet made a decision is bound nevertheless by tacit 
consent.22 In substance, the procedure for the examination of the application to 
exercise a regulated profession has to respect definite time limits, has to follow 
predetermined criteria, conclude with an express and motivated decision 
                                                 
18 Whereas 30 and Articles 50 et. seq. 
19 Article 51, paragraphs 1 and 2. 
20 Article 50 
21 Article 51, paragraphs 2 and 3.  
22 Article 7, paragraphs 2 and 4.  
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 (except in the case of tacit consent), and be open to judicial challenge in all of 
the Member States23. 
No less important are the measures for organisational harmonisation, 
instrumental to the collaboration between different Member States, and 
between them and the Commission, in order to facilitate the implementation of 
the Directive and compliance with the obligations arising from it.24 The 
Directive thus imposes three obligations upon the Member States. The first is to 
designate the authorities and bodies competent to award or receive evidence of 
formal qualifications and other documents or information, and those competent 
to receive applications and take the relevant decisions. The second obligation is 
to designate a national coordinator for the above-mentioned authorities with the 
job of promoting the uniform application of the Directive and collecting all of 
the information useful for its application, such as on the conditions for access to 
regulated professions in the Member States. The third obligation is to designate 
a contact point, responsible for providing the citizens and contact points of the 
other Member States with such information as is necessary concerning the 
recognition of professional qualifications, such as information on the national 
legislation governing the professions and to assist citizens in realising the rights 
conferred on them by the Directive, in cooperation, where appropriate, with the 
other contact points and the competent authorities in the host Member State. 
Under all three of these obligations, the Member States must immediately 
inform the other Member States and the Commission of the measures taken in 
their fulfilment25 and the competent authorities are obliged to work in close 
collaboration and shall provide mutual assistance in order to facilitate 
application of the Directive.26 In this way, a common and transparent 
organisational structure must take root in each Member State, which is then 
horizontally linked to the similar structures in other Member States, and 
vertically connected to the Commission, thus enabling institutions and 
individuals to easily identify the responsible administration and access the 
information necessary for pursuing the recognition of professional 
qualifications.  
Considering therefore that, in the face of some 800 professions regulated in 
the Member States, only ten are addressed by substantive, minimal 
harmonisation norms and that even in this area margins of discretion are left to 
the States, it cannot be said that, in the professions sector, legal convergence is 
realised through this technique of substantive harmonisation. Of much wider 
scope are the results obtained by procedural and organisational harmonisation 
measures which, importing doctrines of administrative law, can be applied 
transversally to all of the professions addressed by the Professions Directive. 
                                                 
23 See G. FONDERICO, I principi comunitari di buona amministrazione dei servizi nazionali, 
in this volume. 
24 Whereas 31. 
25 Articles 56, paragraphs 3-4, and 57. 
26 Articles 8, 56, paragraph 1. 
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2.2. Equivalence  
 
Regarding equivalence, Directive 2005/36/EC, after establishing that the 
recognition of professional qualifications allows the beneficiary from one 
Member State to gain access to the same profession and to pursue it in the host 
Member State under the same conditions as its nationals,27 goes on to address 
operative procedures, which differ according to whether the free provision of 
services or the right of establishment is at issue.28  
In the case of the free provision of services, mutual recognition is supposed, 
in principle, to be automatic, and in exceptional cases conditional upon prior 
verification. Regarding the automatic procedure, the Directive establishes that 
the Member States cannot restrict, for any reason relating to professional 
qualifications, the free provision of services in another Member State if the 
service provider is legally established in a Member State for the purpose of 
pursuing the same profession there.29 In that case, the host Member State shall 
exempt service providers established in another Member State from the 
requirements which it places on professionals established in its territory relating 
to authorisation, registration or membership in a professional organisation.30 
Member States may however require an advance declaration from a service 
provider who first moves from one Member State to another and the annual 
renewal of such declaration, potentially accompanied by a certain number of 
documents.31 Once these requirements have been met, the professional is free 
to provide his service. The procedure for prior check of the provider’s 
professional qualifications, by contrast, can be used only for those regulated 
professions having repercussions on public security or public health.32 
Whenever the verification reveals a substantial difference between the 
professional qualifications of the service provider and the training required in 
the host Member State, to the extent that that difference is such as to be harmful 
                                                 
27 Article 4. 
28 D. FISICHELLA, Il principio di mutuo riconoscimento e la libera circolazione delle 
professioni, in Dir. UE, 1999, p. 51 et. seq; L. LEZZI, Principio di equivalenza, mutuo 
riconoscimento e libertà di circolazione delle professioni nell’Unione Europea, in Dir. comuni.  
scambi  intern., 2003, p. 383 et. seq. 
29 Article 5. 
30 To facilitate the application of the disciplinary code in force in the host State, the 
automatic temporary registration with the relevant professional organisations may be required. 
31 Article 7, paragraphs 1 and 2. The service shall be provided under the professional title of 
the Member State of establishment or, in the case of an unregulated profession, under the 
provider’s academic title. (art. 7, co. 3). The formal weight of the title thus becomes the visible 
measure of the provider’s different origins, in order to protect the service recipient. In cases 
where the qualifications have been verified, the service shall be provided under the same 
professional title as in the host Member State (Article 7, paragraph 4). 
32 Article 7, paragraph 4. Such a prior check  - the Directive specifies - shall be possible 
only where the purpose of the check is to avoid serious damage to the health or safety of the 
service recipient and where this does not go beyond what is necessary for that purpose. 
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 to public health or safety, the host Member State shall give the service provider 
the opportunity to demonstrate his qualifications, in particular by means of an 
aptitude test. The host State thus has the duty to evaluate the equivalence of the 
provider’s training with that required domestically and, when there are 
substantial differences, to offer the possibility of overcoming them following 
procedures defined by Community law.33
The law relating to the right of establishment is more complex. In this case, 
in contrast to the free provision of services, recognition in principle requires a 
prior check, while the automatic mechanism applies only in limited cases34.  
Therefore, the general regime is based on the principle of mutual recognition, 
without prejudice to the application of compensation measures, in case of 
substantial differences between the training acquired by the provider in the 
Member State of origin and that required by the host Member State. These 
compensation measures can consist in an adaptation period or an aptitude test. 
The choice generally falls to the service provider. There can be derogations 
from this right to choose, but they may not be freely introduced. The host State 
must give prior notice to the Commission, which has three months to ask the 
State not to adopt them because they would be inappropriate or inconsistent 
with Community law.  In any case, the possibility of providing for 
compensation measures is subjected to the principle of proportionality, for 
which the host State, whenever it intends to require an adaptation period or an 
aptitude test, must always conduct a prior check on whether the knowledge 
acquired by the applicant in the course of his professional experience can make 
up for the substantial difference with respect to the training required to practice 
on its territory.35  
                                                 
33 Article 7, paragraph 4. 
34 More particularly, the Directive sets forth three mechanisms for recognition: a) 
recognition on the basis of the coordination of the minimum training conditions; b) recognition 
of professional experience; c) the general regime for the recognition of educational titles 
(hereafter, “general regime”). The first functions automatically and applies only to the 
professions for which “minimum training conditions” have been fixed (Article 21 et. seq.). The 
second, which also follows automatic procedures, regards a number of professions which have 
to do with industrial, commercial and artisan activities and is based on the experience obtained 
in the country of origin (Article 16 et. seq.) The third, finally, requires the completions of a 
prior check and functions as a default, in the sense that it applies to all the professions not 
covered by the other two mechanisms or applies to the covered professions when the applicant, 
for a specific and exceptional reason, does not satisfy the conditions provided for them. In any 
event, an individual application for recognition must be presented to the competent authority of 
the host Member State. Thus, even in the first two cases, there will be a procedure that is 
defined as automatic, for the simple reason that it implies an activity of mere recognition of the 
conditions fixed in the Directive rather than a genuine evaluation as is required by the general 
regime, where the conditions are not predefined.  
35 Article 14. This solution is in line with the principles affirmed in the case-law. In the 
abovementioned Vlassopoulou judgment (ECJ, Case C-340/89, cit.) regarding the legal 
profession, the Court held that “a Member State which receives a request to admit a person to a 
profession to which access, under national law, depends upon the possession of a diploma or a 
professional qualification must take into consideration the diplomas, certificates and other 
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 The system for the recognition of professional qualifications thus involves 
national administrations, and particularly those of the host State, in the 
observance of a number of obligations which correspond to just as many rights 
in the possession of the applicant. First of all, the administration of the host 
Member State is obliged to evaluate the correspondence of the applicant’s 
actual professional qualifications with those required by national or Community 
law. Secondly, where there is an incomplete equivalence between the 
prerequisites actually fulfilled and those required, the administration cannot 
simply deny recognition, but must enable the applicant to overcome the gaps by 
means of one of the two indicated measures, the adaptation period or the 
aptitude test. Thirdly, the administration’s ability to evaluate is limited and 
oriented by the secondary legislation: thus, for example, some derogation 
decisions can be assumed only with the Commission’s authorisation. In 
substance, the conditions for exercising the right are checked by the 
administration in the destination country, but according to rules of European 
law aimed at preserving as much as possible the effects of country of origin’s 
law. 
 
3. The law contained in the “Services Directive” 
 
The Services Directive represents the second, and most important, normative 
instrument created by Community law to realise the new strategy for the 
internal market for services. The legislative process was marked by heated 
political and social debate, which tangibly affected its outcome.36  
However altered with respect to the original proposal, Directive 
2006/123/EC (hereafter, “Services Directive”) did not lose its relevance.  It was 
born from the need to overcome the many legal obstacles to the effective 
exercise of the free movement of services, which the Commission found to lie 
especially in excessively burdensome administrative procedures, the legal 
uncertainty of administrative norms and practices and in the lack of mutual trust 
                                                                                                                                                    
evidence of qualifications which the person concerned has acquired in order to exercise the 
same profession in another Member State by making a comparison between the specialized 
knowledge and abilities certified by those diplomas and the knowledge and qualifications 
required by the national rules” (p. 16).  
36 The Commission’s initial proposal for the free provision of services established the 
principle of country of origin, which subjected service providers exclusively to the national 
rules of their Member State of origin.  The debate that followed was fed by the fear that the 
widespread adoption of the proposal’s country of origin principle would have favoured service 
providers from Member States with lower levels of social protection, and lead providers from 
other Member States to establish themselves there in order to enjoy greater competitiveness, 
creating a general lowering of standards of protection. The initial proposal was ultimately 
amended to enable the Member States to enforce their national laws, subject to certain 
conditions. This is described by A. HEIMLER, La direttiva Bolkestein, in MCR, 2006, p. 95 et. 
seq. and A. La Spina, Competizione e conflitto tra norme nella prospettiva sociologo-giurista, 
in A. Plaia (ed.), La competizione tra ordinamenti giuridici. Mutuo riconoscimento e scelta 
della norma più favorevole nello spazio giuridico europeo, Milan, 2007, p. 157 et. seq.   
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 37between the Member States.  For this reason, the Services Directive 
establishes a general legal framework applicable to all services,38 with the 
exception of those expressly excluded39 and leaves room for the specific 
measures contained in other Community instruments.40 Notwithstanding these 
limitations, the Directive has a wide scope and presents many interesting 
features regarding the principles of harmonisation and equivalence, which have 
a strong impact on the administrations of the Member States. 
 
3.1. Harmonisation 
 
While the substantive harmonisation measures are minimal in the 
Professions Directive, merely confirming the provisions already made in prior 
directives with respect to specific professions, such measures are even more 
modest in the Services Directive.  What measures there are basically have the 
scope of guaranteeing an equivalent protection of the general interest on 
essential issues, like consumer protection, particularly in regard to the 
provider’s duties to furnish information,41 42 professional liability insurance,  
multidisciplinary activities,43 the exchange of information on the quality of the 
services44 45 and the settlement of disputes.  In truth, the Directive foreshadows 
later harmonisation initiatives by the Commission,46 probably for the purpose 
of limiting them to what is strictly necessary for the functioning of the market, 
and a vast programme for the convergence of national laws, to be realised 
mainly through a mutual evaluation system involving both Member States and 
the Commission, which has a function of initiative and orientation.47  It remains 
                                                 
37 Services Directive, whereas 3. 
38 Article 1. 
39 Articles 2 and 17. 
40 Article 3. Including Directive 2005/36/EC. 
41 Article 22. 
42 Article 23. 
43 Article 25. 
44 Article 26. 
45 Article 27. 
46 Article 16, paragraph 4. 
47 The whole Chapter VII of the Directive is dedicated to the convergence programme, 
which sets forth three instruments: codes of conduct at the Community level, additional 
harmonisation in specific areas and mutual evaluation. Mutual evaluation is to be achieved in 
the following way: each Member State shall present a detailed report to the Commission on the 
requirements restricting access to or exercise of service provision, justifying their conformity 
with Community law; then the Commission transmits the reports to all of the Member States 
and consults the interested parties; then the Member States, within six months of receiving these 
reports present their observations on each report and the Commission transmits the reports and 
relative observations to the appropriate comitology committee, which can in turn make its own 
observations; finally, the Commission presents a summary report to the European Parliament 
and to the Council, accompanied where appropriate by proposals for additional initiatives. The 
Commission must moreover provide on an annual basis analyses and observations on the 
application of national provisions restricting access to or exercise of the provision of services.  
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 the case however that effective implementation is remanded to future (possible) 
proposals by the Commission, and that the measures of substantial 
harmonisation are wholly marginal in the short term.48
The limited scope of the substantive harmonisation measures stands in stark 
contrast – even more so than in the Professions Directive – to the wide scope of 
the procedural and organisational harmonisation measures. With respect to 
procedural harmonisation, the Directive first of all dictates general norms for 
administrative simplification: the Member States are obliged to simplify 
procedures, to adopt the forms harmonised by the Commission, to accept the 
documents issued by another Member State,49 as well as to enable all of the 
formalities to be completed at a single contact point,50 also by electronic means, 
according to the rules for implementation set forth by the Commission.51 With 
reference to the exercise of freedom of establishment, the Directive sets forth 
principles and procedures for authorisation: the procedures and formalities must 
be clear and made public in advance; applications must be treated in an 
objective and impartial manner, according to predetermined criteria and, in the 
case of numerical quotas, through a process of selection; the time limit for a 
response must be reasonable, pre-established and made public; failing a 
response within the time period set, authorisation shall be deemed to have been 
granted, unless a different regime is justified by overriding reasons relating to 
the public interest; decisions to deny authorisation must be duly motivated;52 
finally, all applications for authorisation shall be acknowledged (a kind of 
recognition that the proceeding has been initiated), with a communication 
indicating the time period, means of redress and, where applicable, a statement 
that in the absence of a response within the period specified, the authorisation 
shall be deemed to have been granted.53  Compared to the Professions 
Directive, the Services Directive does not contain detailed provisions, like the 
time limit for the end of the procedure, which it leaves instead to the 
determination of the Member States.  It is however certainly more complete, 
and it is not difficult to compare its contents to the most evolved national laws 
governing administrative procedures.54  
                                                 
48 This aspect is criticised by G. AMATO, L’errore Bolkestein. Armonizzare stanca, in Il 
Sole24ore, 19 February 2006, p. 1.   
49 Article 5. 
50 Article 6. 
51 Article 8. 
52 In truth, the Directive does not expressly provide for this duty to motivate, which can 
however be implied by the duty to motivate the decision to extend the time period for the 
conclusion of the procedure: if the ratio is to protect the citizen in the face of a prejudicial 
decision in the course of the proceeding, it is all the more important to motivate the final 
decision to refuse authorisation as well. 
53 Article 13. 
54 See A. SANDULLI, Il procedimento amministrativo, in S. CASSESE (ed.), Trattato di diritto 
amministrativo. Diritto amministrativo generale, Milan, 2003, p. 1048 et. seq. With reference 
to European law, see S. CASSESE and F. BIGNAMI (eds.), Il procedimento amministrativo nel 
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 The measures for organisational harmonisation are quite incisive as well. 
The Directive requires the Member States to set up points of single contact to 
which service providers can turn to obtain all of the information needed for 
navigating the system of the host Member State and completing the procedures 
and formalities useful for accessing and exercising their activities.55 These 
points of single contact are destined to play an important role in assisting 
service providers, functioning as both an authority directly competent to issue 
the documents necessary for accessing a service activity, and as an intermediary 
between the service provider and the directly competent authorities. The points 
of single contact thus represent a form of organisational simplification: while 
they do not affect the separation of functions and competences between 
authorities within national systems, they are extremely useful in ensuring 
services providers with a single office to which they may turn. Moreover, every 
Member State is obliged to designate liaison points which, cooperating with 
analogous bodies in other Member States, guarantee administrative assistance, 
especially in carrying out checks.56 Member States shall communicate the 
contact details of the liaison points to the other Member States and the 
Commission, which shall publish and regularly update the list of them. This 
establishes a functionally connected network of national administrative 
authorities, which work to ensure the correct application of Community law. 
The characteristics highlighted with reference to the Professions Directive 
are thus even more accentuated in the Services Directive. The substantive 
harmonisation measures are barely relevant, while measures for procedural and 
organisational harmonisation assume an important dimension, revealing a clear 
propensity to utilize doctrines and techniques drawn from administrative law. 
 
3.2. Equivalence 
 
The final version of the Services Directive does away with the country of 
origin principle found in the original proposal, which would have implied the 
service provider’s subjection only to the laws of the Member State of origin. 
The final Directive, by contrast, establishes a number of principles and rules for 
national authorisation schemes, based on mutual recognition, and including 
some stringent limits upon the States.  
With reference to the freedom to provide services, the Directive first 
establishes that the Member States shall not condition access to a service 
activity or its free exercise upon requirements which do not respect the 
principles of non-discrimination, proportionality and necessity, or do not pass 
the so-called test of proportionality.57 The Directive moreover specifies that the 
                                                                                                                                                    
diritto europeo, Milan, 2004, in particular, the contribution of C. FRANCHINI, I principi 
applicabili ai procedimenti amministrativi europei, p. 281 et. seq.  
55 Articles 6 and 7.  
56 Article 28. 
57 On this, see S. MORETTINI, Community principles affecting the exercise of discretionary 
power by national authorities in the service sector, in this volume. 
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 necessity of national requirements cannot be justified by just any imperative 
need of a general interest, but only by particular reasons of public policy, public 
security, public health or protection of the environment.58 This system can be 
derogated from only under exceptional circumstances and on a case-by-case 
basis, in order to ensure the safety of the services.59 In this case however, the 
State must follow a particular procedure, called mutual assistance, which 
requires the Member State to verify the readiness of the Member State of 
establishment to adopt an analogous measure and eventually submit the 
question to the Commission.60 In substance, the national authority’s decision is 
subjected to a procedure that involves another Member State on the one hand, 
and is subjected to second-degree check by the Commission on the other, in 
order to prevent and eventually punish abuse of the interested Member State. 
Relating to the right of establishment, the Directive provides that the 
Member States may condition access to a service and its exercise upon an 
authorisation scheme only of it passes the test of proportionality.61 It then 
provides a series of precise dispositions that limit the exercise of administrative 
power in the face of such authorisation schemes. Thus, national administrations 
are required to predetermine the conditions for granting authorisation, ensuring 
that they do not duplicate requirements and controls which are equivalent or 
essentially comparable as regards their purpose to those which the provider is 
already subject to in another Member State.62  
The Services Directive, moreover, in order to guarantee a high level of 
mutual trust between Member States (which Community law regards as 
indispensable for the realisation of the free movement of services), strengthens 
the administrative cooperation between national authorities, especially in the 
area of checks. First of all, it obliges Member States to give mutual assistance 
and to establish forms of efficient cooperation in order to ensure control over 
the providers and the services offered: to this end, national administrations must 
furnish information and carry out checks, inspections and investigations upon 
the request of the host Member State, as well as designate one or more liaison 
points for handling such requests.63 Secondly, the Directive sets out a clear 
subdivision of oversight responsibilities: the Member State of establishment is 
responsible for checking a provider established on its territory and, upon the 
                                                 
58 Article 16.  
59 Article 18. 
60 Article 35. Specifically, the interested Member State must ask the State of establishment 
to take measures appropriate to ensure a particular level of protection; thus, the State of 
establishment must act to communicate to the requesting State the measures taken or foreseen 
or the reasons why it has not taken any measures; then, after the interested State has notified the 
Commission and the Member State of establishment and the time limit of fifteen days has 
expired, it may adopt measures of its own, duly stating its reasons; finally, the Commission 
shall examine the compatibility of the measures taken with Community law and if necessary, 
ask the Member State to refrain from taking the proposed measures. 
61 Article 9. 
62 Article 10, paragraph 3 
63 Article 28. 
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 request of the host State, must furnish information, carry out checks and adopt 
measures necessary in relation to the provider;64 the host Member State is 
instead responsible for supervising the observance of the specific measures in 
force on its territory and, on request of the Member State of establishment or, in 
exceptional circumstances, on its own initiative, supply information, carry out 
checks and eventually adopt appropriate measures.65 In this way, each Member 
State must guarantee the conformity of its own rules and give assistance to the 
other so that it may effectively exercise its own supervision, without useless 
duplications66.  
To conclude, the Services Directive does not exclude, but rather 
presupposes, that there are different legal regimes in the European legal order 
and that the free movement of services, and the right of establishment even 
more so, are thus subjected to administrative procedures aimed at ascertaining 
the equivalence between national legal requirements. It requires however that 
the initial checks and later controls not be duplicates of what the service 
provider is already subjected to in the State of establishment. This affects the 
division of competences between the Member States and the development of 
intense forms of administrative collaboration. 
 
4. The relationship between the two principles and administrative 
cooperation  
 
The examination of the two specific Directives in terms harmonisation and 
equivalence sheds light on the particular form that these two principles tend to 
assume in the new strategy for the internal market for services.  
The first consideration that can be drawn from this is that the two principles 
operate in tandem, combining themselves in a relationship in which 
harmonisation operates in function of equivalence. The principle of equivalence 
is immanent in Community law. Based in Articles 43 and 49 of the EC Treaty, 
which prohibit state restrictions on citizens of other Member States exercising 
their rights of free establishment and the free provision of services. Community 
jurisprudence has long recognised their direct effect while extending their 
scope, so much so that the principle is now consolidated according to which the 
two freedoms imply “not only the elimination of all discrimination against a 
person providing services on the ground of his nationality but also the abolition 
of any restriction […] when it is liable to prohibit or otherwise impede the 
                                                 
64 Article 29. 
65 Article 31. 
66 This is clearly a very different solution from the one initially proposed by the 
Commission: the proposal assigned all responsibility to the State of establishment; the 
Directive, by contrast, establishes a more complex mechanism which creates a relationship 
between the interested administrations, which carry out each others’ functions in an integrated 
way. 
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 activities of a provider of services established in another Member State where 
he lawfully provides similar services.”67  
Despite this, experience has shown that the elimination of numerous legal 
obstacles, necessary to the effective exercise of the above-mentioned freedoms, 
requires a “prior coordination of national legal schemes, including the setting 
up of administrative cooperation.”68 Thus, the two Directives embody the 
principle of equivalence, bringing together and organising rules already 
emerging in other Community legislation and case-law and pursuing the 
principle of harmonisation through specific measures and the announcement of 
others that will follow according to an approach that is both dynamic and 
limited to what is strictly necessary. This demonstrates the secondary 
relationship that connects harmonisation to equivalence: the first operates 
within the limits in which it is necessary to enable the second to function better. 
The second observation deriving from this analysis of the secondary 
legislation is that the combination between the two principles takes place 
mainly at the administrative level, according to doctrines and techniques drawn 
originally from administrative law. In the Directives under examination, the 
equivalence that is established between the norms of the Member State of 
origin and the host Member State is always presumed:69 The host Member State 
must take account of the titles, authorisations and checks to which the provider 
is subject in the Member State of origin, and is eventually responsible for 
demonstrating that there are substantial differences such as to justify further 
measures. The principle of equivalence thus establishes a relationship between 
the provider, who has the right to certain protections under European law, and 
the administration, which must respect the conditions imposed by both national 
and European law.  
Because equivalence implies an “administrative-like” action, and because 
harmonisation serves the function of equivalence, harmonisation measures are 
essentially procedural and organisational, rather than substantive in nature.70 
Procedural harmonisation measures (sometimes detailed, as in the case of the 
Professions Directive, and sometimes less comprehensive, as in the case of the 
Services Directive) govern precisely the relationship between the provider and 
the administration of the host Member State and, eventually, between this 
administration and the administration of the State of origin. These measures 
thus recall important administrative law doctrines of protection, like the prior 
definition of procedural time limits, the pre-determination of evaluation criteria, 
                                                 
67 ECJ, 25 July 1991, Case C-76/90, Sager, paragraph 12, for the provision of services, and 
ECJ, 7 May 1991, Cause C-340/89, Vlassopoulou, for the right of establishment. See also ECJ, 
18 January 1979, Case C-110/78, which manifests one of the first extensive interpretations of 
the EC Treaty dispositions. 
68 In this sense, whereas 6 of the Services Directive. 
69 According to the analysis of L. TORCHIA, Il governo delle differenze, cit., p. 21 et. seq, 
which distinguishes three types of equivalence: predetermined, presumed and prefigured.   
70 In this regard, see G. DELLA CANANEA, L’Unione europea. Un ordinamento composito, 
Bari, 2003, passim. 
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 communication of receipt of the application, motivation of unfavourable final 
and intermediate decisions and the judicial review of the administrative 
decisions. They include simplification doctrines, like implied consent, applied 
in a general way in the case of the freedom to provide services.  
The organisational harmonisation measures are also aimed at facilitating the 
exercise of free movement by regulating the relationship between the provider 
and the administration. Thus the law requires that the competent administration 
be determined. From the supranational perspective, this recalls the doctrine of 
the unity of the organisation responsible for the proceeding. It makes use of the 
points of single contact (where interested parties may go to acquire information 
and complete the necessary formalities), which is one of the most important 
institutions of organisational simplification; it calls for the creation of a network 
to connect national administrations with each other, in order to facilitate the 
circulation of information and the carrying out of checks.71  
This last point sheds light on another interesting perspective, which is that of 
administrative cooperation.  The check of national conditions and the judgment 
of equivalence between the laws of one or more Member States is strongly 
conditioned upon the mutual trust of the national administrations, and thus upon 
their ability to effectively perform the checking functions assigned to them. For 
this reason, these laws establish ever more intense forms of cooperation, which 
require the national administrations to work together, in order not to duplicate 
their respective activities72. It is in the application phase that most of the 
contacts between the different administrations are established. These practices 
generate a great flow of information, favouring the circulation of models and 
(thanks mainly to the role of the Commission in collecting all of this 
information) and the adoption of common ones.  
In conclusion, in the context of the new strategy for the internal market for 
services, the principles of harmonisation and equivalence work together, by 
means of doctrines and institutions drawn from administrative law.  The 
principle of harmonisation however operates in an instrumental way with 
respect to the principle of equivalence: thus it focuses on procedural and 
organisational elements, enabling the principle of equivalency to have greater 
effect.  
 
                                                 
71 As S. CASSESE points out in L’influenza del diritto amministrativo comunitario sui diritti 
amministrativi nazionali, in Riv. it. dir. pubbl. comunit., 1993, p. 330, “European administrative 
law, however indifferent in principle to States’ internal organisation, conditions it all the same. 
It produces in some cases a singular effect: some national administrative bodies, though 
established by national laws, are relevant from the point of view of Community law because it 
actually requires their institution or regulates their structure or conditions their existence or 
organisation in some other way”; by the same author, see also La signoria comunitaria sul 
diritto amministrativo, in Riv. trim. dir. pubbl. comunit., 2002, p. 291 et seq. More specifically 
on the organisational perspective, see C. FRANCHINI, Il diritto amministrativo italiano e 
l’influenza comunitaria: l’organizzazione, in Riv.it. dir. pubbl. comunit., 2004, p. 1179. 
72 In this regard, see E. CHITI and C. FRANCHINI, L’integrazione amministrativa europea, 
Bologna, 2003, passim. 
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 5.  Limits to the Member States’ right to regulate  
 
The principles of harmonisation and equivalence, as embodied in the new 
strategy for services, place stringent limits on the Member States’ right to 
regulate. To illustrate the scope of these limits, I will separately examine the 
limits place upon the legislative power and the limits upon the administrative 
power, which can be further broken down into external and internal limits, 
according to whether they affect the scope of the power or the modalities of its 
exercise.73
Harmonisation functions as an external limit to the scope of national 
legislative power, in the sense that it pre-empts or reduces the field of domestic 
regulation: pre-emption is seen when the Community norm is sufficiently 
precise and directly applicable; reduction (which is much more frequent) is seen 
when the Community norm leaves some margin of discretion to the national 
legislator in implementing Community law. In both cases, the Member State – 
due to the well-known principles of supremacy and direct effect – is obliged to 
conform to the harmonisation norms in all of their aspects, substantive, 
procedural and organisational. Equivalence, in its part, functions as an external 
limit, in the sense that it redefines the scope of application of the national 
norms: mutual recognition and the control of the country of origin prohibit the 
host State from applying national rules to providers operating in a regime of 
free provision of services or the right of establishment,74 and require them to 
consider the distinction between free provision of services and right of 
establishment, providing different and certainly less onerous conditions for the 
first case, which would not be possible in the second.75 The Member States 
preserve the ability to introduce specific and even potentially derogatory norms, 
but their legitimacy depends on the existence of imperative needs of a general 
interest (which are often pre-determined by the harmonisation norms 
themselves), and their passing the proportionality test. The effect of external 
limits on the scope of the national legislative power is thus evident: in some 
cases its exercise is pre-empted or reduced; in others, its content is conditioned 
by a series of prohibitions and obligations, most important of which are the 
prohibition of discriminatory or restrictive measures and the duty to conform to 
Community prescriptions.  
                                                 
73 According to the analytical scheme followed by L. TORCHIA, Il governo delle differenze, 
p. 96 et. seq. and p. 123 et. seq. As the author argues, the distinction “does not have a general 
formal value in the European legal system, which uses a system of sources only partially 
hierarchised and a very reduced administrative system, but it is relevant for national legal 
systems, and the Italian one in particular, where the power to make the rules and the power to 
implement them are strongly differentiated” (p. 93). 
74 ECJ, 8 June 2000, Commission v. Italy, Case C-264/99, paragraphs 12-13; 10 July 1991, 
Commission v. France, Case C-249/89, paragraph 26; 17 December 1981, Webb, Case 279/80, 
paragraph 16.  
75 ECJ, 15 March 2001, Mazzoleni, C-165/98, paragraph 23. 
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 Turning now to internal limits, the national legislative power is subjected to 
a series of conditions aimed at ensuring its compatibility with Community law. 
This is seen where the legislative power is exercised to further imperative needs 
of a general interest. At the least, the principle of equivalence imposes a burden 
of proof upon the Member States, requiring it to demonstrate the necessity and 
proportionality of the law.  Harmonisation thus enriches the contents of national 
laws while proceduralising their forms; generally, the Member State is obliged 
to state the reasons for its legislation, to give notice to the Commission and, 
possibly, to the other Member States as well, to take their observations into 
consideration and to respect the final decision of the Community body.76 
Moreover, we may observe that the Community secondary legislation obliges 
Member States to share information about their respective national laws and 
entrusts the Commission with a general power of policy orientation, which the 
States must then take into account. In this case, the norm aims not only to 
ensure the consistency of national law with Community law, but also to 
promote their coordination. The exercise of the national legislative power is 
thus conditioned upon many internal limitations, which can be reduced to three 
basic types: the burdens of proving necessity and proportionality, the duty to 
give notice and the duty to share information relative to national measures 
potentially creating barriers to the freedom of movement. 
The limits upon domestic regulation are even more incisive at the strictly 
administrative level. Looking at external limits, the principle of equivalence 
prohibits first of all the duplication of procedures already required in the 
Member State of origin. Mutual recognition and the control on the country of 
origin require the administration of the host Member State to not repeat 
procedures that can be substantively (though certainly not formally, given that 
the national laws can be different) assimilated to those carried out by the 
administration of the Member State of origin. With the mechanism of the 
control of the country of origin, it is not only the normative measure that 
penetrates into the destination Member State, but also the administrative 
activity of the State from which the service provider comes, since the former 
cannot duplicate the work of the latter.  This leads to the second external limit 
(implicit in equivalence, but developed and reinforced by harmonisation 
                                                 
76 The Member States’ choices are in any case subject to review by the Community court. 
The court, in fact, has affirmed its own competence in setting the points of reference and 
interpreting derogations. This means that the derogations established by national laws and 
customs must conform to the parameters set by Community law or judicial interpretation and, 
above all, by the European Commission. Thus, by effect of the principle of supremacy, the 
domestic conception of imperative reasons of a general interest must give way to the 
Community conception, which is determined by the Community bodies on the basis of the 
Community interest, discrimination, proportionality and necessity. The Member States and their 
administrations must, therefore, respect the orientations set forth at the Community level, even 
where they enjoy a greater room to manoeuvre. In this regard, see S. Nicolin, Il mutuo 
riconoscimento, cit., p. 152 et. seq. 
 201
 77measures), which is the duty of administrative cooperation.  The 
administrations, in addition to having to take the decisions and activities of 
other Member States’ administrations into account, must also exchange 
information useful to fulfilling their respective responsibilities.  In dealing with 
duly motivated requests, they are obliged to carry out checks, inspections and 
investigations and, in case of difficulty, to notify the requesting administration 
in order to find a shared solution. There are therefore basically two external 
limits upon administrations: the prohibition of duplication and the duty of 
administrative cooperation, which requires different national administrations to 
help each other in an integrated way. 
Looking at internal limits we see the following substantive fact: 
administrations have the duty to provide equal treatment, which thus subjects 
every decision to the principles of proportionality and transparency. Even in 
this case, national measures potentially restrictive of the freedom of movement 
are subjected to a review procedure, which is carried out by notice to the 
Commission or by means of a more complex system which requires the 
national administration to enter into dialogue with the administration of the 
Member State of origin in search of the best solution or, in case of 
disagreement, to satisfy the scrutiny of Commission. Even more important is 
this procedural fact: administrations’ conduct is coordinated by harmonisation 
norms either in the sense of enabling the automatic exercise of the service (as is 
supposed to happen for the free provision of services) or in the sense of 
following specific procedural requirements. Thus the administration is obliged 
to define its evaluation criteria in advance, consider the steps already taken by 
the applicant, respond within certain time periods, state reasons for its decisions 
(in order to enable judicial review). The organisational dimension is also 
relevant: European law – as we have seen – requires administrative conformity, 
setting forth structures and relations with other offices, in order to facilitate 
administrative cooperation. The functioning of the system is moreover the focus 
of an intense monitoring activity: the Member States are obliged to send the 
Commission periodic reports of their implementation measures;78 the 
Commission may, in turn, at any moment ask the national points of single 
contact for reports on the outcomes in assisting citizens and must prepare a 
general report on the state of implementation of the Community law within a 
certain deadline. These provisions are of no small account because they 
represent one of the most advanced forms of administrative control, which is 
                                                 
77 On this subject, see S. CASSESE, Gli Stati nella rete internazionale dei poteri pubblici, in 
Riv. trim. dir. pubbl., 1999, p. 321 et. seq., now also in Id., La crisi dello Stato, cit. p. 54 et. seq. 
and S. CASSESE, International Organizations and National Administrations, Kluwer Law and 
Taxation Publishers, International Institute of Administrative Sciences, 1983, p. 163 et. seq. 
78 The report, beyond general comments, includes statistics on the decisions taken and a 
description of the main problems arising from the implementation of the Directive.  
 202
 79based on gathering, elaborating and circulating information,  making it 
possible to raise and overcome possible criticism and, in the final analysis, 
enabling the uniform application of the Community law.  
In substance, harmonisation and equivalence place stringent limits on the 
Member States’ right to regulate, both at the substantive rule-making level as 
well as at the strictly administrative (procedural, organisational) level. These 
limits obviously function in different ways, but there is a fact that seems 
common to all of them: the use of traditional administrative law doctrines and 
institutions. The limit requires national administrations and legislatures – in 
their relationship with citizens and the administrations of other Member States 
– to give an account for their action, motivating their decisions and submitting 
them to the judgment of an external body (mainly the Commission), which 
provides vigilant oversight and initiative for the correct functioning of the 
market. 
 
6. Towards a convergence of national laws? 
 
If the Community principles of harmonisation and equivalence (as defined 
and realised in the two Directives under examination) have such a strong 
impact on the Member States (and in particular on their administrations), it is 
clear that their functioning cannot help but create some homogenisation of 
national laws.80 This phenomenon is in fact the result of the connections that 
the two principles forge between different national legal systems: 
harmonisation opens up national systems vertically, establishing relationships 
between bodies operating at different levels of government in drafting and 
implementing the norms; equivalence opens up national systems horizontally, 
establishing multilateral relationships between the norms and administrations of 
different Member States.81 Thus the real problem is not so much to ascertain 
whether there is some form of convergence, as to identify what kind it is, and 
what its consequences are.82
                                                 
79 G. D’AURIA, I controlli, in Trattato di diritto amministrativo. Diritto amministrativo 
generale, cit., p.  1393, which specifically discusses control through awareness and control 
through information. 
80 See G. FALCON (ed.), Il diritto amministrativo dei paesi europei tra omogeneità e 
diversità culturali, Cedam, 2005, in particular the contributions by J.-B. AUBY, I diritti 
amministrativi dell’Europa: un convergenza verso principi comuni?, p. 363 et. seq.; M.P. 
CHITI, Il diritto amministrativo dell’integrazione, p. 375 et. seq.; E. FERRARI, Per 
l’armonizzazione dei diritti amministrativi europei, p. 383 et. seq. See also G. DELLA CANANEA, 
I fattori sovranazionali e internazionali di convergenza e di integrazione, in G. NAPOLITANO 
(ed.), Diritto amministrativo comparato, Milan, 2007, p. 325 et. seq.  
81 S. CASSESE, Le basi costituzionali, in Trattato di diritto amministrativo. Diritto 
amministrativo generale, cit., p. 183 et. seq; Id., Diritto amministrativo comunitario e diritti 
amministrativi nazionali, in Trattato di diritto amministrativo europeo, cit., p. 9 et. seq.; Id., 
L’influenza del diritto amministrativo comunitario, cit., p. 329 et. seq. 
82 As L. TORCHIA argues in Il governo delle differenze, cit., p. 129, “the principle of 
equivalence functions as a tool of integration, but not of homogenisation and it has a strong 
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 From this perspective, a first form of convergence is that directly “imposed” 
by harmonisation measures, whose effect is to pre-empt or reduce the scope of 
domestic regulation in favour of Community regulation. These measures – as 
we have seen – are focused on the procedural and organisational aspects of 
national regulation, above all on these aspects in relation to the administrative 
sphere, in order to facilitate the functioning of equivalence; these measures 
addressed the substantive aspects of regulation only marginally, mainly 
repeating and capturing general principles, such as the fundamental principles 
of non-discrimination and restrictive measures. 
A second form of convergence is “induced” by the principle of equivalence, 
which preserves the differences between national regulations, but conditions the 
scope of their application, enabling the law and administration of one Member 
State to penetrate the territory of another Member State.  Also in this case, the 
convergence is basically realised at the level of procedure and organisation: 
equivalence in fact requires all administrations to evaluate the correspondence 
of national regulations, to respond to the applications of interested actors and 
cooperate with the administrations of other Member States, while, by definition, 
it does not affect the substantive law. 
The combined force of the two principles, as embodied in the new strategy 
for services, thus creates a strong regulatory and administrative integration,83 
which facilitates the exercise of the free movement of services. Substantive 
regulation, by contrast, still remains very distant given that neither 
harmonisation nor equivalence affects Member States’ legal regimes. 
The preservation of strong differences at the substantive level – especially in 
a Community system that by now includes as many as twenty-seven national 
legal systems – together with the functioning of the principle of equivalence, 
which – as we have seen – is immanent in the European legal system, highlights 
one of the most interesting and at the same time most problematic current 
issues: the competition between legal systems.84 As Mr. Cassese has recently 
                                                                                                                                                    
influence on both national administrations and producers, creating convergence.  The discussion 
naturally remains open as to the degree and quality of this convergence, it being clear that a 
legal regime based on the presumption of equivalence can present margins of uncertainty as to 
the rule effectively applicable in the concrete case”. In more general terms, see S. CASSESE, Il 
problema della convergenza dei diritti amministrativi: verso un modello amministrativo 
europeo?, in Riv. trim. dir. e proc. civ., 1992, p. 472 et. seq. 
83 In this view, compare the different arguments put forward by L. TORCHIA, Il governo 
delle differenze, cit., p.171 et. seq., discussing “integration”, S. CASSESE, La signoria 
comunitaria sul diritto amministrativo, cit., 295 et. seq., which, while referring to integration 
introduces the idea of “signoria” (majesty), J. SCHWARZE, The convergence of the 
administrative laws of the EU member states, European Public Law, 1998, p. 191 et. seq., 
which employs the very concept of “convergence,” R. CARANTA, La “comunitarizzazione” del 
diritto amministrativo: il caso della tutela dell’affidamento, in  Riv. it. dir. pubbl. comunit., 
1996, p. 439 et. seq., which uses the idea of  “Communitisation.” 
84 On this feature, see S. CASSESE, L’arena pubblica. Nuovi paradigmi per lo Stato, in Riv. 
trim. dir. pubbl., 2001, p. 601 et. seq., now also in S. CASSESE, La crisi dello Stato, cit. p. 74 et. 
seq.; M. GNES, La scelta del diritto. Concorrenza tra ordinamenti, arbitraggi, diritto comune 
europeo, Milan, 2004, passim  and for a synthesis by the same author, Scelta del diritto 
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 argued, “the absence of harmonisation measures, together with the disparity 
between national laws and the protection of the right of establishment, 
ultimately creates the phenomenon of the choice of the most convenient law by 
subject to whom the law applies,”85 the law that is “less severe,” in the 
terminology of the Court of Justice.86  
The American scholars who first examined this phenomenon, in reference to 
the Delaware case, highlighted the possible effects to which this can lead.87 
Even if their conclusions are not unambiguous, many expressed the concern 
that the possibility of choosing the less severe law can provoke a generalised 
race to the bottom, and thus argued in favour of regulation at the federal level. 
This interpretation has been taken up in Europe since the European 
Commission’s presentation of the first proposal for the Services Directive 
which – as we have seen – was based on the principle of the exclusive control 
of the country of origin, provoking a lively debate which led the Commission to 
rewrite the Directive’s text.  
The solution put forward in the Services Directive, like that in the 
Professions Directive, is very different from that emerging out of the American 
legal commentary.  The point of the regulation is not substantive harmonisation 
(an ever more difficult operation given the complexity of the European 
composite legal system) but rather procedural and organisational 
harmonisation, which facilitates the functioning of equivalence (which, in so far 
as it is assumed, is based on the relationship between operators and national 
administrations). The European solution substantially rests upon regulatory and 
administrative integration, through the use of administrative law doctrines and 
institutions (the duty to evaluate equivalence, to state reasons, and ensure the 
judicial review of decisions, no matter whether the applicant is a private actor 
or the administration of another Member State), rather than a generalised push 
towards (clearly impossible) uniformity.  
This form of integration is important for at least three reasons. First, because 
it facilitates the coexistence of different legal regimes. The clear and stable 
definition of tools to further equivalence provides much support in constructing 
a “legal regime in which the differences between national systems are not 
homogenised or cancelled, but governed by an order that determines their 
relevance and reciprocal relationships.”88   
This form of integration is also important for the second reason that it 
constitutes an effective protection against the danger of national regulations’ 
race to the bottom, while protecting the rights of service providers. The right of 
                                                                                                                                                    
(nell’ordinamento europeo), ad vocem, in Dizionario di diritto pubblico, cit.; also A. ZOPPINI 
(ed.), La concorrenza tra ordinamenti giuridici, Bari, 2004. With special reference to financial 
services, see G. HERTIG, Regulatory competition for EU financial services, in Journal of 
international economic law, 2000, p. 349 et. seq. 
85 S. CASSESE, L’arena pubblica, cit., p. 116. 
86 This refers to the famous Centros judgment, ECJ, 9 March 1999, Case C-212/97. 
87 Described in M. GNES, La scelta del diritto, cit., p.  33 et. seq. 
88 L. TORCHIA, Il governo delle differenze, cit., p. 128. 
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 establishment and the free provision of services are not in fact unconditional, 
but rather are subjected to a judgment of equivalence, which implies an 
evaluation of the correspondence of national rules and the possibility of 
asserting the domestic rule where substantive deformities are registered. Even 
the domestic regulation is subjected to precise limits and forms of monitoring 
and control, which ensure its compatibility with European law.  Thus, just as 
the State has the power to impose national regulation (and to preserve, thereby, 
its established levels of protection), service providers (but also the 
administrations) may assert their freedom of movement and ask for the 
withdrawal of decisions or norms which unjustifiably impede its full exercise. 
The third reason for which this form of integration is so important is that it 
furthers normative convergence at the substantive level as well. Equivalence in 
fact implies operating costs inversely proportional to the degree of 
harmonisation: the less convergence of national legal regimes, the more intense 
will be the activity carried out by the administration of the host Member State 
and the probability that the service provider will be rejected or subjected to 
difficult and burdensome compensation measures.  The national laws, in the 
absence of adequate harmonisation measures, present elements of diversity 
which require national administrations to conduct detailed checks of 
compatibility, motivate their decisions, communicate them and so on. In this 
framework, it is clear that the Member State that applies a more rigorous 
standard gains a competitive advantage over Member States with lower 
standards: service providers for the former State can fulfil the requirements of 
the host Member State with greater ease; conversely, service providers resident 
in States with lower standards will have greater difficulty in extending their 
activity beyond the national boundaries. The integration that is realised by 
means of administrative law doctrines and institutions thus creates the 
conditions so that, in the medium to long term, a gradual race to the top in 
terms of the substantive law may take place.89
Moreover, the Community legislator has recognised that the functioning of 
the market requires a convergence of substantive law.90 In particular, the 
Services Directive – as we have seen – expressly provides for a wide 
convergence programme, based not so much on harmonisation measures than 
on a system of mutual evaluation of national regulations91.  In this way, the 
approach to regulation is more procedural, in so far as harmonisation is not 
                                                 
89 S. BATTINI describes this phenomenon at the global level in La globalizzazione del diritto 
pubblico, cit, p. 345 et. seq. It thus seems all the more plausible that it might manifest itself at 
the European level, where the legal systems are integrated by much more penetrating legal 
obligations. The process, however, is not at all automatic, as is pointed out by S. CASSESE, 
Mercatizzazione dello Stato o arena pubblica?, in A. ZOPPINI (ed.), La concorrenza tra 
ordinamenti, cit., p. 220 et. seq. 
90 See V. HATZOPOULOS, Le principe communautaire d’équivalence et de reconnaissance 
mutuelle, cit., 225 et. seq., which argues that for the functioning of the very principle of 
equivalence it is necessary to provide for measures of minimal harmonisation. 
91 See note 46. 
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 pursued by means of a norm, but rather through the search for different types of 
regulatory processes to be shared between different decision-making bodies92  
In conclusion, with the new strategy for services, the European legal system 
is experiencing a convergence, in part imposed by harmonisation and in part 
induced by equivalence, both of which have a common denominator: the use of 
administrative law doctrines and institutions. The convergence certainly regards 
procedural and organisational features, but this creates the conditions for which 
there may also be important consequences at the level of substantive regulation 
as well.  This strategy is original and effective, and could also be extended into 
supranational contexts even wider than the European one,93 because it operates 
as an instrument of integration rather than homogenisation, and acts as a 
protection against regulatory races to the bottom and as force towards an 
improvement of levels of protection, by recognising the free movement of 
services and thus ensuring the functioning of the market. 
                                                 
92 C. BARNARD, The substantive law of the EU. The four freedoms, Oxford, 2004, p. 525 et. 
seq., which speaks of reflexive harmonisation. This system is extremely interesting for at least 
two reasons. The first and most obvious is that, in this way, national administrations are 
required to account for their choices and demonstrate their compatibility with Community law; 
this enables the Commission to have a complete overview of national laws, to focus on existing 
problems and act conscientiously to remove barriers to the free movement of services. The 
second reason – less obvious, but not less important – is that the circulation of information, the 
possibility of preparing and receiving observations, the availability of a synthetic framework are 
all useful conditions favouring an effective process of national laws’ convergence. 
93 In this perspective, see K. NICOLAIDIS and G. SHAFFER, Transnational mutual recognition 
regimes: governance without global government, 68 Law and Contemporary Problems (2005), 
263 et. seq. (also available on the internet at http://law.durke.edu/jounals/Icp), according to 
which “enlargement has expanded the coverage of U.E. “regional administrative law” and made 
it a better laboratory than ever as to what may eventually happen in the realm of global 
administrative law” (p. 265). 
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